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IT  was  with  the help of  my brother  that this work  on the 
history  of  Mediaeval  Political  Theory  was  begun  in  1892 ; 
indeed  his  article on "  The  Political  Theory  of  St Thomas 
Aquinas "  in the '  Scottish Review,' 1896,  was its first published 
form.  He was one of  the pupils of  Arnold Toynbee at Balliol, 
and  though what he learned from him was mainly in Economics, 
it was from him, I think, that he learned not only the signifi- 
cance of  Economic History and Theory, but also the importance 
of  the history  of  Political  Thought.  During the many years 
of  his long service in the Government of  India, 1880 to 1916, 
and in spite of  the pressure of  his public work, he contributed 
by  his  continual  sympathy  and his  careful  judgment  and 
criticism to help and correct this work ; and happily, in the 
years after his retirement in 1916 he was able to write a large 
part of  Volume  V.  I had hoped  to finish,  as I had begun, 
with his help, but t,his was not to be, for he died in 1934, and 
I can  only  express something  of  what  he  was  and did  by 
dedicating  this  volume  to his  memory-the  memory  of  an 
honourable, just, and kindly man, and an indefatigable scholar. 
Till the last year of  his life he was occupied with the materials 
for thiu volume, and happily something of  his work I have been 
able to include in it, but only a little of  that which  he was 
preparing.  This has unavoidably  compelled the omission  of 
one very important subject which we  had hoped to treat in 
this volume,  as in former ones-that  is,  the relations of  the 
Temporal  and Spiritual  Powers-and  I fear  that it is  too X  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  xi 
late to hope to be  able to deal with  this.  I greatly regret 
this, but at the same time I feel that in the fourteenth century, 
and still more in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these 
relations  must  be  studied under  terms  in  many  ways  very 
different from  those  under  which  we  have  dealt with  them 
in these volumes. 
With  the  downfall  of  Boniface  VIII.  the  long  conflict 
between the Papacy and the Empire had, as it seems to me, 
really  come  to an end.  No  doubt  it  was  renewed  in  the 
struggle  between  the Popes  and  Henry  VII.  and  Louis  of 
Bavaria, and it may oven be said that this ended in the success 
of  the Popes ; but the Declaration of  the Electors at Rhense 
in 1338 seems to indicate that there was little real significance 
in this. 
Again, while there were in the fourteenth century several 
treatises like those  of  Augustinus Triumphus which asserted 
the theory  of  the temporal supremacy  of  the Popes  in  the 
strongest terms, these do not seem to add anything of  import- 
ance  to  the  contentions  of  Innocent  IV.,  or  Hostienis,  or 
Egidius Romanus, or James of  Viterbo. 
The truth is, as it seems to me, that from the fourteenth cen- 
tury the history of  the relations of  the Temporal and Spiritual 
authorities,  while  wo  must  not  overlook  the great  import- 
ance of  Papal authority, must be studied primarily under the 
terms of the relations of  Church a,nd State within the separate 
nations.  This is true of  the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
and even  more  of  the sixteenth, and that not  only  in  the 
Reformed but also in the Catholic countries.  These questions 
are so  important  that their proper  treatment  would  require 
a detailed examination of  the circumstances and the literature 
of  the subject in each of  the more important Western countries, 
and t,his is a task of  a formidable complexity and magnitude. 
At,  almost the same time as our last volume appeared, there 
was published the most important and valuable work of  Pro- 
fessor J. W.  Allen, '  A History  of  Political  Thought  in  the 
Sixteenth Century,' and I would express both my high admira- 
tion  for this  admirable  and illuminating work  and also  my 
obligation to it for much information.  I trust that our readers 
will  recognise that what  we  have attempted in  this  volume 
on  the sixteenth  century is not like Professor Allen's  work, 
a  detailed  study of  every important  aspect  of  the rich  and 
varied '' Political Thought  '7  of  that century, but a treatment 
of  it, primarily, in its relation to that of  the Middle Ages. 
Among other important works recently published, I should 
wish to draw the attention of  historical students to the very 
valuable work of  Professor Ercole  of  Palermo,  'Da  Bartolo 
all'  Althusio,'  and  to  the  excellent  work  on  the  Political 
Theory of  Hooker  by Professor A.  P.  d1Entr8ves of  Pavia. 
I must also express my great obligation to the late Professor 
G.  Fournisr of  Paris in directing my attention to the sources 
of  information  on the French  Civilians of  the sixteenth cen- 
tury, and I should wish  to express something of  the regret 
that every sorious student of  medizval civilisation must feel 
at the Ioss which we  have suffered in the death of  so great, 
so learned, so judicial a student of Canon Law.  We are indeed 
glad that he was able to complete his work on the Collections 
of  Canon Law from Pseudo Isidore to Gratian ; and we  look 
forward to the forthcoming treatment  of  Gratian himself  by 
Fournier's  learned successor in Paris, Professor Le Bras. 
By the kindness of  Professor Giorgio del Vecchio of  Rome, 
one chapter of  this work  (Chap. 11.  Part 11.)  was  translated 
into  Italian  and  published  in  the '  Rivista  Internationale 
di filosofia del diritto.' 
I cannot end  without once again  expressing my profound 
indebtedness to Dr R. Lane Poole, the most learned of  English 
mediaeval scholars.  Looking back after fifty years I remember 
not only his continual kindness to an immature student, but 
also that it was from his '  Illustrations of  Mediaval Thought ' 
that I first  learned  something  of  the real  character  of  the 
poIitica1 principles of  the Middle Ages. 
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FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
WE have Eieen  in earlier volunles that the political principles 
of  the  &fiddle Ages  were  clear  and  intelligible,  and  that, 
though the forms of  the organisations in which they expressed 
themselves were in many respects different from those of  the 
present day, the principles themselves were really not very far 
removed from our own.  The confusion about this which is still 
to be found in the minds of  some peoplc is simply a confused 
ignorance.  The medieval world was a rational world ; indeed, 
as has sometimes been  suggested, its defect was  that it was 
somewhat  too  rational.  The  great  schoolmen,  especially, 
appear to us sometimes to have too great a confidence in the 
power  of  the humall  reason  to analyse  the  complexity  of 
human life.  However  this may be, the political thinkers of 
thcl twelfth and thirteenth centuries are to us intelligible and 
rational. 
It  is very different when we come to some of  tho political 
idea&  of  the seventeenth century ; it is dificult to say which 
seams  to  us  most  irrational :  the absurdity  of  the theory 
of  the  divine  right  of  the  monarch,  or  the absurdity  of 
the  theory  of  the  absolute  s~vereignty  of  the  State  as 
rcDrescnted  by  Hobbes.  It  is  no doubt true that we  can 
recognise behind both these absurdities some historical  con- 
ditions which serve to explain their appearance, but they do 
VOL.  VI.  A not justify  them.  To us these conceptions seem, 'snd indeed 
they we, irrational and mischievous.  The conception of  the 
divine right of  the monarch has happily, oven if  only in our 
days, disappeared, and the thcoly of the absolute ~0vereignt~ 
of  the State only  lingers  on  among  politically  uneducated  -  - 
people or societies. 
Our task, then, in thiu volume, is clear ; we have to con- 
sider,  first,  the  continuity  of  political  civilisation,  and, 
secondly,  the conditions  or  circumstances under  which  this 
continuity was  in part interrupted by the rea13pearance  of 
that confused orientalism of  Gregory the Great, the theory of 
the divine right  of  the monarch,  and by the appearance  of 
the conception  of  t.hc absolute powa of  the prince, in the 
State. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE  SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF LAW:  CONSTITLT- 
TIONAL  PRACTICE  AND  GENERAL  THEORY. 
WE have seen  that the most important political conception 
of  the &fiddle Ages  was the conception  of  the supremacy of 
law, the law which was the expression, not merely of  the will 
of  the ruler, but of  the life of the community ; and this life, 
which expressed itself  in the customs, and therefore the law 
of  the community, was  conceived of  as itself  the expression 
of  moral principles.  The law was supreme, because it was the 
expression  of  justice ;  the unjust  law  was  not law  at all. 
This  conception  can,  as we  have  shown,  be traced through 
all mediaevalliterature from  the  ninth century to  the  thirteenth. 
It  is sometimes expressed in the technical terms of  the deriva- 
tion of  JUS  from Justitia, or of the subordination of  all positive 
law to the natural law, sometimes in the more popular terms 
of the distinction between the king and the tyrant. 
It is then these profound conceptions of the real nature of 
political  authority which  the Middlc  Ages  handed  down  to 
the modern world, and our first task is to consider how far 
these conceptions may have been modificd in the period with 
which  we  are now  dealing.  We begin,  therefore,  with the 
consideration  of  the concephion of  the immediate  source  of 
the authority of  the positive law of  a political community. 
As we have, in former volumes, endcavourcd to show, thcre 
Was  from the twelfth century at least a divergence  between 
what we have called the normal conceptions and practice of 
m('diaeval  society,  end the theory  of  some  at least  of  the 
8tndent~  and teachers of  the Roman law, and we  shall have POURTEENTH  CENTm.  [PART  I. 
to consider this divergence carefully in the period with which 
we are now dealing, and shall have to ask how far the absolutist 
theory of  some of  the great civilians may have modified the 
traditional political principles of  medizeval society. 
We begin with some observations on the actual methods of 
legislation in the fourteenth century. 
There is  a  noteworthy  phrase  in  the coronation  oath  of 
Edward 11. and ldward 111.  of  England, which will serve to 
express the constitutional procedure and theory of  the time. 
They swear to hold and maintain, not only the laws and cur- 
toms granted by former kings, but also the laws and lawful 
customs which the community shall have ch0sen.l  The words 
express both the place of  custom in the system of  mediseval 
law, and also the recognition of  the principle that laws derive 
their authority, not only from the consent  of  the king but 
from  the determination  of  the community.  The words  in 
which  the ordinances  of  1310 were  annulled  in  1322  only 
add to this the statement of  the method in which the drter- 
mination of  the king, tho barons, and the whole community 
was to be expressed-aU  those matters which are to be estab- 
lished for the kingdom and people are to be discussed, agreed 
upon,  and established  in Parliament  by  the king, with  the 
assent  of  the prelates,  counts,  barons,  and the community 
of  the kingdom, as had heretofore been the custom? 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  parallel  between  these 
conceptions and those of  the Cortes of  Castile at  Burgos in 1379, 
and at Bribiesca in 1387.  At Burgos the Cortes complained 
that  certain  persons  produced  " Cartas " (bricls) annulling 
ordinances made  by the king  in the Cortes, and petitioned 
1 Rymer, '  Fcedera,'  vol.  iii.  p.  63 : 
"Sire,  yraunte vou4 a tonir  et gardor 
les  ~oys  et  les  custumes  droitureleti, 
les  quiels  la  Communaute  de  votre 
Roia~ln~o  aura odeu,  ot 10s  dofcndrez 
et  afforterez,  a1  honur  de  Dieu,  a 
vostre  poer.  Jeo  les  graunte et pro. 
molto."  Cf. Id. id., vol. iv. p  244. 
2  The Statutes of  the Realm,'  vol. i. 
p.  189 : "  Mes les choses q.  s'rount a 
ostablir  . . . pour  lestat  du  roialmc 
et du peuple, soient tretes, accordees, 
establiea.  on  parlementz,  par  notro 
Seigneur  le  Itoi,  et  par  l'assont  des 
Prolatr,,  Countes  ot  Barouns,  et  la 
communalte  du roialme ; auvint come 
ad este accustu~ne  cea enarere." 
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the  killg that not'hing done in the Cortes should be undone 
excel't;  by the Cortes.  The king, Juan I.,  seems in his reply to 
a little evasive and to reserve to himself sorne freedom of 
1 (of suspending or dispensing). 
~t  ~ribiesca,  however,  Juan  I. laid  down  in  the  most 
terms that royal briefs (Cartas),  which were contrary to 
custoln or law, were not to be re,garded, that the royal officials 
were not to seal any briefs which contained "  non obstante " 
clauses, and that laws, customs and ordinances were not to be 
annulled except by ordinances made in the Cortes.2 
These are statements of  Constit~tional  practice,  and when 
we  consider the actual methods or forms of  legislation we find 
that there was no other method of legislation in Castile than 
that of the king acting with the advice, in earlier times, of his 
prelates,  nobles  and  magnates,  and  as  the  representative 
system developed, of the prelates, nobles and delegates of  the 
1 '  Cortes of  Castile,'  vol.  ii.  22,  37 
(1379) :  "  Otrosy  nos  pedioron  por 
merced  quo  por  algunos  omos  do 
nuestros  sennorios  ganan  cartas  para 
desittar  10s  ordinamientos  que  nos 
fezimos enlas Cortes e  ayuntamiontos 
por servicio de Dios st nueetro : e que 
mandnsemos,  quelm  tales  cartas  que 
sean obdedecidns e non cunplydas, e lo 
quo es fecho por  CorLes o por ayunta- 
micntos  quo  non  se  puede  dos  fazor 
por 10s tales cartas, saluo por Cortes. 
A csto respondemos que nos auemos 
ordonado  quolas  cartas  que  fueren 
galladas  contra  drrecho  quo  sean 
0bedo;idas  e  non cunplydas fasta qua 
"0s  searnos rrcquerido  dello ; pero en 
"azon  do desatar 10s ordenamientos o 
ddos dexar en su cstado nos faromos 
On  ello  10  quo  ontandieremos  que 
cunple  a  nupitro servicio." 
2  6  Cortss  of  Castile,'  ii.  28,  Tercero 
Tractado,  9  (1387):  "Et por  que 
nUestra  voluntad  es  quela  juaticia 
florozca~  0  las  cosas  quo  contra  olla 
podies~en  vonir  non  ayan  poder  dola 
cO1ltrariar, Cstablescemo~ que  si  en 
nueatras  cartas  mandarernos  alguna 
caufia que sea contraley  fuero o derocho. 
qupla  tal carta  ssea  obedescida  e  non 
conplida,  non  enbargarlle  que  onla 
dicha  carta  faga  menqion  espoyial  o 
general  dela ley fuero o ordenamiento 
contra  quien  se de ;  nin  embargante 
otrosy que faga menpion espepial cloatn 
ley nuestra nin delas clausulas derrcga. 
torias  enella  contenidas ;  ca  nuestra 
voluntad  es  quelas  tdes cartas  non 
aysn efecto. 
Et  otrossy que les fueros ualedores e 
leyes  e  ordinamientos  que non  fueron 
rrevocatoa  por  otras,  non  sean  periu. 
dicados synon por ordinamiontos fochos 
en  Cortes,  maguer  quo  enlas  cartas 
ouiese  las  majoros  firmezas  quo pudi. 
esen ser puestas. 
E  todo  lo  que  en  contrario  desta 
ley se feziaso, nos lo damos por ninguno, 
at mandamos alos de nuestro consoio o 
alos nuestros oydores  e  otros oficialrv 
quales  quier,  so pena  de  perdor  10s 
oficioe,  qne non firmen carta alguna o 
dcuala enque be  contonga, '  non embar- 
gante loy o derecho o ordonamiento.' 
E esna mesma pena aya el esrrlvano 
quela tal carta o aluala firmare." 6  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY. 
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oities.  There is really no trace of  any other system in Castile 
or  England, and it is a curious misconception which has led 
some serious historical writers to speak as though the legis- 
lative authority in Castile belonged to the king alone.  This 
has arisen partly from a hasty interpretation of  the phrases 
which describe the law as the king's law, and such phrases 
as those used by Alfonso XI. of Castile in issuing a new law- 
book at the Cortes of  Alcala  do  Henares in 1348 : "  Et por 
que a1 Rey pertenesce el poder de fazer fueros e leyes e delas 
entrepretar e declarar  e emendar." l  We  have  pointed  out 
in the last volume that the similar phrase used by Alfonso X. 
in the '  Especulo '  cannot be taken to mean that he claimed an 
absolute or sole right to make or unmake law, but only that 
no law could be made without him, and that it was his part to 
promulgate or declare the law.z  And it must be observed that 
in issuing the new law book at Alcala, Alfonso XI. was acting 
with the counsel of  the prelates and nobles and the good men 
of  the citie~,~  and that it  was  in this same Cortes that the 
great law book of  Alfonso X., the '  Siete Partidas,' was first 
formally recognised as having legal authority, for it had not 
hitherto been promulgated by the king or received as law.4 
With regard to France it is more difficult to speak precisely ; 
while, as we shall see in a later chapter, there is frequent men- 
tion of  the States general, and of  the Provincial Estates, the 
former at least  did not  meet  so regularly as Parliament  in 
England, or  the Cortes in Castile,  and it is  more  difficult, 
1 '  Cortes of  Castile,' i.  52, 64.  Siete Partidas quo el Rey Don Alfonso 
Cf. vol. v. pp. 56-58.  nuestro vlsauelb mando ordenar, commo 
8  '  Cortes  of  Castile,'  i.  52 : "  Por  quier que fa~ta  aqui non so  fabla que 
ende nos Don Alfonso . . . con conseio  fuesen  publicadar  por  mandado  do1 
delos  perlados  e  rricos  e  caualleros,  e  Roy, nin fuoron  auidas, nin  respibidas 
ommos  buenos  quo  son  connusco en  por  loyes;  pero  nos  mandamos  las 
estas  Cortes  quo  mundarnos  fazor  en  rrequerlr  e  concentnr  e  emendar  en 
Alcala  do  Henaros  . . . fazemos  e  Jgunas  cosas  que  cunplia.  Et  asy 
cstablescemos  estas  leyes  quo  so  concertadas o emendadas porque fueron 
signon."  sacadas  e  tomadas  delos  dichos 
Id. id.,  52.  64 : "  E  10s pleitos  e  sanctos Padres o dolos derochos e dichos 
contiendas quo so  non  podieren librar  clo muchos sabioa antiques, o do fucros 
por las loyes deste libro e por 10s dicho!!  e  de costumbres  antigos,  do  Espanno, 
fuoros, mandamos que se libren per Ins  damos la9 por neustraa loyes." 
loyes  contenidas  enlos  l~bros dolas 
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therefore, to make precise statements about the methods  of 
legislatIion  ; but it seems, from examining the collection of 
Xoyal Ordinances, that, so far as these can be  described as 
having the nature of law, they were promulgated  under  the 
same terms as those of  the thirteenth century, by the great 
sometimes with reference to the barons  and others, 
sometimes with the advice of  the estates.1 
The formulas of legislation in the Empire me more ex~licit. 
L  -7  and seem to imply ~.~ormally  the presence  of  the  members 
of the Diet.2 
We  can now turn to the general theory  of  the legislative 
authority  in  the  fourteenth  century.  It  seems  hardly 
nocearsary to cite the opinions of the English writers, for it is 
obvious  that they  adhere  to, and indeed frequently simply 
repeat, the opinions of Bracton. 
Brit!.on  represents the king as issuing a law book, and as 
colnmanding that it was to be obeyed in England and Ireland, 
but reserves the right to repeal or annul these laws with the 
consent  of  the barons and counts and the other members of 
his  PIeta restates almost literally the judgments of 
Bracton.  The king has indeed no equal, but it  is the law which 
has made him king, and it is therefore right that he should 
recognise the authority of  the law.4  The king can do nothing 
except that which he can do lawfully, and the saying that the 
prince's  pleasure  has the force  of  law  must  be  understood 
under the terms of  the statement that it was from the "  lex 
regis"  that he derived his authority, and that, therefore, it 
is to be understood that that only is law which has been made 
after due deliberation by the advice of  the "  magnates " and 
1'  Recueil des anciennos Lois  Fran. 
caises '-e.g.,  vol.  iii.  p.  315 . vol.  v. 
PI'  5, 156. 
'  Cf.  Introduction  to  the  Golden 
Bull  of  1356.  Sonokenburg  and 
Scllmaus, '  Neuo Sammlung der Reich- 
abschiede,' vol. i. p. 46. 
Britton,  i.  Prologue : "  Edouurd 
par  la pracei  Deu  Roi  de Engletorre. 
. . .  Et  volums et commund~~ms  qe par 
tut Engletorre et  tut Hyrelaunde solent 
issi usez et  tonus en tous poynta, sauve 
a  nous  do  rcpder  10s  et  do  engter 
et de amenusor  et de amender  a totes 
10s foiz, qn  nous vcrums  qe bon serra, 
par  lo  assent  de  nos  Countes  ot 
Bnrouns et sutrcs do  nostor  conseyl." 
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the  authority  of  the  king.  The  king  must  restrain  his 
mthority by the law whicl~  is the bridle of  power, and must 
live according to law, for  it  is  the principle  of  human law 
that laws bind the legi~lator.~  This was evidently the normal 
,  opinion of  English  lawyers,  and there is  therefore  nothing 
surprising  in  the  terms  used  by  that  curious  work,  the 
' Mirror  of  Justices.'  The worst  of  all  abuses  is  that the 
king  should be against the law, for he ought  to be subject 
to it, as is  expressed  in  his  coronation oath.  It is a grme 
abuse  that  ordinances  should  be  made  by  the  king  and 
his  clerks and others who  would not venture to oppose the 
king, while laws ought to be made by tho common consent of 
the king and his  count^.^ 
It is, then, from this standpoint that we  can understand 
the real significance of  the treatment of  the source of  authority 
of  law by BIarsilius of  Padua in  the ' Defensor Pa~is.~  I-Ie 
Flrta, I.  17, 7 : "  Nec obstat, quod 
dlc~tur, quod  prlnclpl  placot  legls 
habet potostatem,  qula sequitur,  cum 
lege regla quae do elus Impeno lata est, 
quod  est,  non  qulcquld  do  voluntate 
leg~s, tantopere  praesumptum  est, 
sed  quod  magnaturn  suorum cons1110. 
Rep  auctorltatem  p~aestaute, et 
hablta ~uper  hoc deliberatlone ct trac- 
tatu, recte  fucnt  dofinltum  . . . 11 
Temperent lg~tul  reges potentlam suam 
pel legom quae fraenum ost  potentme, 
quod secundum legeb  vlvant ,  qu18 hoc 
sanx~t  lox  humana,  quod leges  auam 
hgent  latorem,  et  ahb~,  dlgna  vox 
malestate  rognantls  est,  leg~bus  a111 
gatum se princlpem profiterl " 
2  '  Mlrror  of  Justices,'  V  1. : "  La 
prembre e la sovera~n  abuslon est qe 11 
ROI  est  eontre la 101,  car 11  dolst &stre 
subje~t,  slcom est contonu en sou seie 
ment, 2.  Abuslon  est  qe ou les parlc 
mentz so dmssent tere sur les saux nclons 
des  almes  des  trespassoeuls  e  ceo  LL 
Londros e as deux fols per an, la ne so 
font  11  o~o  fo~que  rarement  e  Q la 
volontle  Is  101 sur  e~des  e  ~uetlleLtes 
do  trosor  Et ou  10s  ordonaunces  se 
dmssent  fore de comun  asscnt do1 rol 
e de ses countee, la ce funt ore  par lo 
rol  e ses clers e par allens e autres q~ 
nosent contrerlner 10  ROI,  clnz de>lrent 
do1 plere e de 11 conselllor as son profit, 
tut no so~t  mle lur cons011 covensblo a1 
comun  do1  people,  sanz  appeler  10s 
countes  e  saun~  smro  10s  rlules  do 
drolt, e  donc plusours ordenaunres se 
fondant  ore  plus  SUI  la  volunile  qe 
sur drolt." 
For a crlt~cal  discuas'on  of  the date 
and authorshlp  of  th~s  work,  cf.  the 
cdltlon  of  Whltaker  and  Maltland, 
published  by  tlie  bolden  Soclety  :n 
1895 
8  We deslre to  express the grat~tude, 
whlch  all students of  Medlzval Lltora- 
Lure  must fecl, to Mr  Prev1t6-Orton of 
St John's  College,  Cambndgo,  and to 
Professor R.  Scholz of  EIalle,  thot we 
have now In thelr edltlons of  1928 and 
1932 a  masterly crlticlsm  of  the text 
of  tho  work  of  Marsllms.  We  have 
wed them thro11,ohout In  our c~tat~ons, 
~ndlcatlng any  d~fferences d  they 
is not, as appears to be thought by some miters who are not 
very well acquainted with mediaval political literature, setting 
out some new and revolutionary  democratic  doctrine, but is 
rather expressing,  even  if in  rather drastic  and unqualified 
terms, the normal judgment and practice of the Middle Age,s : 
he represents not the beginning of  some modern and revolu- 
tionary  doctrine, but tho assertion of  traditional principles. 
It is,  however,  true and not  unimportant  that  the author 
derives his  doctrines from various sources, that he combines 
the principles of  the actual practice of  the Middle Ages with 
conceptions  derived,  on  the  one  side,  from  Aristotle,  and 
on the other, to some extent from the Civilians. 
He lays down, for instance, the principle that there is no 
"  politia " when the law is not supreme, and he cites in sup- 
port  of  this  some  words  of  Aristotle l ;  but  this  doctrine 
had been implied in the Assizes of Jerusalem, and asserted by 
Bract~n.~  Again, he sets out with great emphasis the principle 
that  the source of  law  is  the "  populus " or  "  universitas 
civium "  or its "  valencior pars,"  and not either one rnan or  a, 
few men, for either the one or the few might make bad laws 
directed to their own  advantage rather than to the common 
good3  Marsilius refers to Aristotle as having laid down this 
occur  We  must  refer  tho  reader  to 
the  admirable  ~nlroductlorls  to theso 
edlt~ons  for a full chstusslon of  tllo most 
~nterebtmg  textual  quest~ons,  as  well 
as for thoso relatlng to the authorshlp 
of thls work. 
Mars llus,  'Dcfensor  Pacls,'  i.  11 
(4) 
' Assizes  of  Jerusalem,'  Asslses 
do la Cour dcs Bou~geois,  26. Bracton, 
'Do  Leglbus,'  I.  8,  5.  Ct.  vol.  In. 
pp  32, 07. 
Marsll~us of  Padua,  ' Defencor 
Pac~s,'  I  13, 3 .  "Nos autem dlcamuq 
secundum  verltatom  atque  conslliurn 
Ar~stotells 3'  Poht~co  Cap  Go, leg18 
latorem  seu  causam  lepls  eHect~vam 
Prlmam  ot  proprlam  esse  populuvl 
Beu  clvlum  un~versltntrm,  aut  elus 
valen~lorern  paltern,  per  suam  elec- 
clonem  seu  voluntatem  In  genera11 
sIvlam  congregaclolle  per  scrmonom 
expressam,  proclplontom  seu  deter- 
mlnantom allquld fier~  vel om~ttl  c~rra 
c~vilos  actus humanos,  sub poenn  vol 
suppl~clo  temporal: .  valenc~orem In. 
quam  partem,  constderota  quantitate 
personarum  et  quahtato  In  com- 
munitate  111% super  quam  lox  fertnr ; 
slve  ~d  fecer~t umversltas  predlcta 
c~vlum  aut o~us  pars valerlclor  per se 
lpsrtm  immediate,  slve  ~d  allcul  vel 
al~qu~bus  comrnlsor~t fec~e~ldum,  qu~ 
leg~ulator slmpllc~ter non  sunt,  nec 
esqe  possunt, sed solum ad allquld  et 
quandoquo  ac,  socundum  prlml  leg~r. 
latoris  auctorltatem."  Id,  I.  12,  8. 
"  Aut  legum  lac~onls auctor~tas  a~1 
bolam  ~lvluin  un~vers~tatem  pertlnet, 
ut d~xlmus,  vel  ad hom~nem  unlcum 10  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
doctrine  that the universitas  is the source of  law,  but the 
, 
principle had been suggested by some of  the earliest Civilians. 
We have drawn attention in the second volume to the words 
of  works  attributed to Lrnerius and Bulgarus, that it is the 
"  populus " or  "  universitas " which is  the ultimate  source 
of  law:  and it is evident that they had learned this from the 
Roman law books.  It seems reasonable to say that Marsilius 
is restating the doctrine of the ancient Roman law and of the 
medircvd Civilians. 
But further, as we  have seen, there is scarcely any trace 
whatever,  either  in  the  constitutional  systems  or  in  the 
writers on  political  theory of  the Middle Ages, except in the 
medimval Civilians, of  the conception that law could be made 
by any one person, even by the prince, except with the advice 
and consent of  the community as a whole, or those who stood 
for it,  whether they were the great and wise men, or the elected 
representatives  of  the community.  Egidius  Oolonna  stands 
practically  alone  in  suggesting  that  the  king  should  rule 
according to his own will and the laws which he had made, 
and not according to the laws which the citizens had made.a 
So far, then, Marsilius was simply expressing in clear terms 
the normal conception of  the Middle Ages, but there are some 
aspects of  his  statement which  deserve further notice,  and 
especially  the  emphatic  phrase  which  he  uses  about  the 
aut pauciores.  Non  ad solum unum, 
propterea quae dicta eunt in 11" hujus 
et in  prima  demonstracione  quam  in 
boo  adduximus ; posset  enim  propter 
ignoranciam  vel  malitiam, aut utrum- 
que  logem  pravam  ferre,  inspiciendo 
scilicet magie proprium conferone quam 
commune,  unde  tyrampnlca  foret. 
Propter  candem  vero  camam  non 
pertimet  hoc  ad  pauciores ;  possent 
enim  peccare  in  ferendo  legem,  ut 
prius,  ad  quorundam,  scilicet  pau- 
corum,  ct  non  commune  conferens, 
quaemadmodum  videre  est  in  olig- 
archiis.  Pertinet hoc igitur ad civium 
universitatem  aut ejus  partem  valen- 
ciorem,  de  quibu9  est  alters  et 
opposita ratio." 
1 Imerius, '  De Aquitate,'  2 : "  Uni- 
versitas  id  est  populus,  hoo  habet 
oficium  singulis  scilicet  hominibas 
quasi  membris  providere.  Huic  de- 
scendit hoc ut legem condat." 
Bulgarus,  '  Comm.  on  Digest,'  60, 
17, 176 : "  Vigor judiciariu~  ideo est in 
modio  constitutus no  singuli  jus  sibi 
&ant.  Non  enim  cornpetit  singulis 
quod  permissum  est  tantum  univer- 
sitati, vel ei qui obtinet vicem universi- 
tatia, id est  populi,  qualis  est  magis- 
tratus." 
Cf. vol. ii. p. 57. 
2  Cf. vol. v. p.  7 1. 
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"  valencior pars " of  the populus.  It will  be  observed that 
he explains these words when he adds, "  Valenciorem inquam 
partern,  considerata  quantitate personarum  et  qualitate  in 
communitate illa super quam lcx fertur," for there seems to be 
no doubt that this is the correct reading.  It seems clear that 
he does not mean simply the greater number.  The history, 
however,  of  the developnlent of  the theory  of  the majority 
in the political and ecclesiastical organisations of  the Middle 
Ages  is one of  great complexity, and we  do not feel that we 
are competent to discuss this subject.l 
It should also be observed that Marsilius sets out  a very 
important  defence of  the authority of  the whole  people  in 
making law.  Men, he says, are more ready to maintain a law 
which they have imposed upon themselves, and it is therefore 
well  that whatever  may  concern the  common  convenience 
should be known and  heard  by all  ; and, while  he admits 
that the legislative power  should not be entrusted to a base 
and  incompetent  authority,  he  meets  the  contention  that 
the "  universitas civium " is a body of  this kind with a flat 
denial.  For, he declares, the great mass of the citizens (civium 
pluralitas) are not normally or generally base or incompetent, 
rather they are all, or for the most part, of  sound mind and 
reason,  and  have  a  right  intention  towards  the Common- 
1 We desire to draw the attention of 
those  who  wish  to study this subject 
to  the  very  caroful  and  interesting 
mocographs  written  by  Dr E.  Ruffini 
Avondo :  "  I1  principio  Maggiori- 
tario nelle elezioni  dei  re e imperntori 
Romano-Germanici "  in  '  Atti  della 
reale Academia delle Scienze di Torinu,' 
VOI. 60 (1924.26).  "  Il principio  mag- 
~ioritario nella  storia  del  Diritto 
Canonico "  in  '  Archivio  Giuridico,' 
V01.  93,  fasc. I. (Quarta Serie,  vol.  ix. 
faso.  1:.  "I systemi  di  doliberatione 
collettiva  nel  Meclioevo  Italiano " in 
'  Nuova  Colleziono  di  Opere  Giuri- 
diche,'  n.  243.  Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 
1927.  "  I1  Defensor  Pacis  di Marsilio 
di  Padova,"  in  Rivista  Storicn Itnli- 
am,'  fasc. II.,  1924.  "  I1  l'rinoipio 
Maggioritario,"  '  Profilo  Gtorico,' 
Torino,  Fratelli  Bocca,  1927  (an ex- 
cellent summary). 
Marsilius, '  Dofensor Pacis,' i. 12, 6: 
"  Secundam  propositionem  probo : 
quoniarn lox  illa  melius  obsorvrttur  a 
quocunque  civium,  quam sibi  quilibet 
imposuisse  vidatur ; talis est lex  lata 
ex  auditu  et  precapto  universe  mul- 
tudinis  civium . . .  (i,  12.  7).  Con- 
venerunt cnim homines ad civilem com. 
municationem  proptcr  commodum  et 
vite  suffioienciam  consequendam,  et 
opposita  declinandum.  Que  igitur 
omnium  possunt  tangere  commodum 
et  incommodum,  ab  omnibus  sciri 
debent et  audiri, ut commodum assequi 
ot  oppositum repollere pussint." FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
wealth  and whet  is  necessary  for  its  maintenance.  And, 
therefore, although every individual, or the greater multitude, 
is not capable of  devising new laws, yet everyone can judge 
and determine as to that which is devised and proposed to him 
hv otl.iers.1  -.,  ---- 
I  It seems to us, then, to be clear that the constitutional pro- 
/  cedure  and  the general  political  theory  of  the  fourteenth 
century  represent  the same principles  as to the source and 
supremacy  of  the law  which,  as  we  have  seen  in  forn~cr 
volumes, were characteristic of  tho Middle Ages.  The law of 
the State is the expression of  the custom and will of  the -whole 
community, and it is supreme over all members of  the com- 
munity, even over the king and prince. We shall, however, have 
more to say about this in later chapters, when we deal directly 
wibh  the  conception  of  the  nature  and  limitation  of  the 
authvrity of  the prince in the fourteenth century. 
1 Id.  id.,  i.  13,  3 :  "  Cum  ergo  policiam  et  quo  necessaria  sunt 
primum  dicebatur,  'ad pravum  et in  propter  eius  pormanencinm,  quemad- 
pluribus  iqdiscretum,  non  pertinet  n~oclum  loges et alia  statuta vol  eon. 
legumlacionis  auetoritas,'  conceditur,  suetudines,  sicut  prius  ostensum  est. 
Et cum additu~,  universitatem civium  Quamvls  onim  non  qtul~bot  nut 
esee hujua rnodi,  negandum  est.  Nnm  mnior  multitude  civium  sit legum in- 
oivium  pluralitas  neque  prava  neque  ventor,  potest  tamen  quilibot  de in. 
indiscreta est quantum ad pluralitatem  ventis ct ab alio sibi propositis indicare, 
suppositorurn,  et  in  p111ri  tompore ;  addendum vel  mlnnc~ldum  nut  mutan 
omnes  enirn, aut plurimh sane mrntis  clum  dirceruere." 
et rac~onis  sunt et recti appetitus  ad 
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IT  remains, then, to consider tho treatment of  this subject by 
the Civilians and Canonists, for here if  anywhere we may find 
some development of another kind.  We have pointed out in 
earlier volumes that in the twelfth  and thirteenth  centuries 
there  are clear  traces  of  two  and divergent  movements  of 
opinion:  that some of the Civilians seem to think that the 
Roman  people  had  so  completely  transferred  their  original 
legislative  authority  to  the  emperor  that  they  no  longer 
possessed it at all, while others thought that though they had 
given the emperor this authority it still, also, remained with 
them, and could still be reclaimed and exercised.l  We have 
now  to consider how  far the Civilians and Canonists of  the 
fourteenth century can be said to adhere to the one or the 
other of  these opinions. 
It  is well to observe at the outset that there is no question 
in the minds of  these Civilians that it was the people from whom 
the prince derived his authority.  This is very clearly set out 
in a passage in the ' Commentary  on the Digest ' by Cynus. 
(Gin0 of  Pistoia ; one of  the most important of the Civilians 
of  the  early  fourteenth  century.)  Cynus  maintains  very 
dogmatically that the "  imperium " is from God, but he holds 
that this is not inconsistent with the principle that the prince 
was created by the lex regia, the emperor derives his authority 
from the people, the "  imperium "  is fro111 God." 
Having made ourselves clear on this point we  can consider 
Cf. vol.  ii.  pert i. chap. 7 :  vol  v.  iv.  Fol.  v~ii.  R. :  "Not.  Ex loge  lsta 
part i. chap. ti.  quod lura reputant imperalorem Deum, 
Qnu8,  '  Comm.  on Digest,'  Rub.  seu personam divinam, et hoc merito ; FOURTEENTH CENTURY.  [PART I. 
an important discussion of  the whole question of  the legislative 
authority of  the people, by Cynus in his ' Commentary on the 
Code,'  which indicates very  clearly  that he was  well  aware 
of  the  contention  between  the  older  Civilians  about  this 
quesiion.  He cites the opinion of  "  Joannes " and of  " HOS- 
tieusis," that tho lioman people could not now make alaw, but 
dso the judgment  of  Hugolinus to the contrary,  and says 
that some of  the "  moderni " (his contemporaries) held with 
Hugolinus.  Cynus himself  seems to be indifferent as to the 
question, but the reason he gives seems to imply that he is 
thinking  not  of  the general  authority  of  t@ people of  the 
Roman empire, but of  the authority of  tbe'people  of  the city 
of  Rome, which would have no reality,6utside  of  the city.' 
We  must,  however,  observe  also  the  opinion  of  Cynus 
quia imperium est a Deo, ut in authen. 
quomodo oportet cpi : in princip : Do 
Fide  instrum:  5  1,  et ab  ips0  Deo 
immediate  processit,  unde  inter  Im- 
peratorcm  et  Deum  non  est  ponere 
medium, ut in authent.  constit, quae 
de dignilate § : illud.  Nec  obstat quod 
dioit,ur  supra  1.  i.  quod  lege  regia  , 
dicitur Princeps creatus : quia hoc  eat 
permissione Divine ;  sicut diximus, non 
.st  malum in civitate quod non Fecerit 
Dominus ; ncc cst absurdurn, quod bic 
a  populo  ost  a  Deo,  tamquam  ab I 
\ 
sgente  utriversdi, sicut  d~ter  dicitur, 
homo hon~inem  gonerat ; et solu.  Vel 
molius  dico, quod imperator  a  populo 
est,  sed  imperium  cuj11s  praesidatur 
imperator  dicitur divinum,  a Deo." 
1 Cynus:  Comm.  on  the  Code, 
Rub.  14,  Fol.  29  R.  (Cod.  I.  14. 
12).  "  Si  imperialis . . . Item  nota 
quod soli principi licet  condore legem 
. .  . Secundo opp. quod solus princeps 
non  potest  facere logem, imo  populus 
. . . item senatus  . . . item praefectus 
. . . Respondotur secundum quosdam. 
Primo ad 1.  normam.  Quin  prefectus 
facit  de  auctoritate  principi~. Undo 
ipse facere videtur ; et idem in populo, 
et  sic  auctoritas  pendet  a  principe, 
quod non  est verum.  Quid ergo dice- 
mu9 ?  De  hoc  fuerunt  dissensiones 
apud  nostros  antiques  patres,  qune 
etinm et hodis vigent  apud modernos. 
Dixit  Joannes.  quod non  potest  hodie 
populus Romanus facere legem, et hoc 
tenet  Hostiensin, extra  de  constit.  C. 
fin,  in  summa  sua.  Hugolinus  dixit 
contrarium,  Glossa  approbat  opinion- 
enem Joa.nnis in d.c. ambigitur (Dig. I. 
3,  9).  Quidam  moderni  tenent  cum 
Hug. et probant inter alia argumcnta 
Nam certum  est  quod  Ulpianus  fuit 
tempore  quo  erat  concessa  Impera- 
toribus  potestes  condendi  leges ;  ut 
men  Ulpianun  dicit,  Senatum  posse 
loqtatur  in  senatu,  qui  erat  numero 
centym,  quia  jus  totum  remanet  in 
uno .  .  unde populus et Senatus qui 
regit  populum  potest  legem  facere. 
Et quae$nm suo jure fa-it populus, et 
Senatus p'opuli  auctoritate,  non  Prin- 
cipis, quia krincipis auctoritas pendet a 
populo, non',econtra,  ut dixi  supra in 
L.  1.  ~uinibo  dicunt  quidam  quod 
populus  possbt  hod~e  deponere  prin- 
cipem,  causal subsistente,  ut  ff.  de 
execut.  tut.  1.  sed  et  rcprobari,  in 
princip.  Secqndum ergo istos expone. 
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on  two  different but related  questions.  He discusses  with  .. 
some  care the meaning  of  the fanlou,s passage in the Code, 
"~igna  vox  maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum  se confi- 
teri " (Code I. 14, 41,  and maintains that, while the emperor 
is not  bound  to observe tho law "  de necessitate,"  he feels 
himself  bound "  de honestate."  And  he goes on  to dism~ss  -  . .  - -- - -  a  question  whose  importance  we  shall  have  to consider in 
relation  to other writers, and even with regard to Bohn in 
the sixteenth century.  The question is, whether the emperor 
mus hic literam 'soli ' (Cod. I. 14, 12) 
uno  modo,  prout  dixit  Glos.  Vel 
secundum Pctrurn diccndum est, quod 
litera '  soli ' exponatur sic, quod nullus 
Jius existens solus potest facere legem, 
nisi Imperator.  Hoc non  placet mihi, 
quia licet populus  sunt plures,  tamen 
pro uno reputatur.  Praeterea Senatus 
potest esse in uno, ut supra dixi.  Item 
praefectus  unus  est.  Expone  ergo, 
quod  litera  'soli '  excludat  solum 
alios inferioros.  Non  antem illos, qui 
possunt  legem  facere,  sicut  sunt  pre- 
dicti ut oxposucrunt Jacobus et etiam 
Petrus supra  00.  I.,  I. ; et haec  vern 
secundum  opinionem  illam,  quae  se 
habet  ut populus  hodie  possit  facere 
legem.  Sod secundum Joannem popu- 
lus  hodie  non  potest  legem  facere, 
quod  et quidam alii  doctores moderni 
tenent,  ut  populus  non  possit  legem 
facere sino principe,  et tunc  ponitur, 
quod  nullus  existens  solus  potest 
facere legem nisi Princeps ; unde solus 
princcps, id est, solus existens princeps 
potest facero legem, sed solus populus 
"on:  quia  cum  imperator  eat  caput 
impcrii . . .  populus quantum ad regi- 
men imperii nihil sine eo facere potest,, 
quia  universit,as sine  capite suo nihil 
agit. . . .  Ipse  nutsem, solus  potest 
facere, ut hjc, et cum populo, et cum 
senatu, et cum concilio procerum . . . 
quad  probat  illa  littera  humanum  ut 
ibi dixi (i.e., his obscrvations on Code I. 
14,  8,  in  this  work.  Fol.  28,  v.). 
Quid ergo  dicomus.  Ad  I.  '  non  am- 
bigitur ' (Dig. I. 3,  Q),  dicendum quod 
hodie  est immutata  per  legem  istam, 
hoc  non  est  verum,  ut  patet  infra 
Tit : 11.  (Dig. I. 2) ; vel dicendum est 
quod  Senatus potest facere legem, non 
tamen contrarium legi  principis, sicut 
et  prefectus  ut  1.  normam.  Contre 
istam opinionem est manifest0 lex '  de 
quibus '  (Dig. I.  3,  32),  ubi  dicitur, 
quod  populus  potest  facere consuetu- 
dinem,  quae  legem  tollit  generaliter, 
ergo  et  legern,  quia  nihil  refcrt,  an 
verbis an factis, ut ibi.  Nisi dices quod 
hodie sit restricts potestas populi per 
hanc legem. 
De  his  opinionibus tene quae magis 
tibi placet quia ego non curo.  Nam si 
populus  Romanus  faceret  legem  vel 
consuetudinem, de facto scio quod non 
servaretur  extra  urbem."  (Confer 
Cynus,  Comm.  011  Cod.  8,  Rub.  63. 
Fol. 520.) 
'Id.  id.,  Rub.  14,  Bol.  25,  v. 
(Code  I.  14,  4) :  "  Digna  vox . . . 
dico ergo, quod  imperator  est solutus 
legibus,  de  necessitate :  tamen  de 
honestate ipso vult ligari legibus, quia 
honor  reputatur  vinculum sacri juris, 
ot utilitas ipsius . . .  contra hoc posses 
opponere quod ipse non  bene facit hoc 
volendo ;  quia  quilibet  suam  debet 
auctoritatem  augere. . . .  Ad  hoc 
respondet  ipsemet  imperator  in  hac 
lege, quia dignitatem suam ob hoc  non 
minuit,  immo  auget,  quia  '  re  Vera ' 
etc.,  unde honor est in tali ligamine." FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
and his  successors  are bound  to observe  an agreement  (or 
contrmt, pactuni)  which  he  has  niade  with  any "  civitas," 
or baron.  The question, as he says, had been propounded by 
Guido do Suza, and it is not quite clear whether the discussion 
of  the question is that of  Gynus, or whether he is stating it in 
the ternis  of  Guido, but the co~clusion,  at least  of  Guido, 
seems  clearly  to be that the emperor  is  bound  by  such  a 
"  ~ractum,"  and that the subjects may be  entitled to resist  I 
any unjust and manifest violence? 
It is also important to observe that Cynus is clear that the 
authority  of  the prince  does not  include the right  to take 
away  a  man's  property  without  adequate cause.  He can 
indeed qake it "  de facto," and his action must be assumed to 
be fouijded  upon  some just  reason, but he  cannot  do  this 
"  de judo " without reason : the laws give him no such powcr, 
\  and if  he does it, he commits a sin.2 
We  have  given thcse  somewhat  detailed  quotations from 
Cynus, because it  appears to us that his position represents 
1  Id. id.,  Rub.  14 (Cod. I.  14,  21). 
Fol.  26 R. : "  Ultimo sciondum quod 
Guido de Suza formavit hie quostio~lcm  ; 
utrum  si  imperator ineat aliqua pacta 
cum aliqua civitate vel barone, teueatur 
ea  observaro,  tam  ipse  quam  ejus 
successor 'I  Videtur  quod  non,  ut  1. 
princeps  ff. eo (Dig. I. 3,  31) st ff.  de 
Leg.  3,  1.  si  quis  in  prin.,  st 
quia par in parem non habet imperium  . . . Ecoutra videtur  quod sic ; nam 
grave ost fiden~  fallcre . . . et naturalin 
jura  suadont  pacLa  servari,  et  fides 
etiam  hostibus  est  servanda  . . . 
I'raeterea, ad hoc facit haec lex : quia 
honestas  ligat  etiam  principem ;  ut 
hic  patet  per  ea  quae  supra  dixi,  et 
nihil magis debetur homini quam pacta 
servare. . . .  Praetmea  conLractus 
principis cst lox.  Ergo otc, ot hanc 1. 
et  hanc  partem tenet  ipse  Guido  ad 
quod  facit  cxtra  de  probationibus. 
c.  I.  Alii  distinguunt :  an  erit  ibi 
justitia  altera  parte,  an erat  ibi  in- 
justitia  st dolus, ut primo casu valeat 
paetum  et  oom~ositio,  secunclo  non 
. . . et potest essc ex pai'te  subrlitorum 
justitia  resistendo,  si  ex  parCedomini 
sit  injusta  et  notoria  violent&,  ut 
inira de jure  fisc. 1.  prohibiturn,  l? 
(Cod. X. 1, 5, lo)." 
Fol.  36,  v. : "  Secundo casu, scilicet, \ 
quando vult mihi tollere dominium roi 
meae,  sine  aliqua  causa  de  mundo;  I 
si queratur  utrurn possit de facto, non  ~ 
est dubium.  Scd utrum possit de jure  1 
et de potcstate  sibi per  jura  conccssa, 
in  veritate  non  potest. . . .  Sed 
tamon  quantum  ad  observantiam,  1 
qualitorcunque  scribat  debet  servari.  ( 
Nam  semper  rcscriptum  suum  sup- 
ponimus  ex justa  causa  interpositum. 
EL  tnlis  presumptio  est  violenta  in 
persona  principis ; ut  sup :  dixi  in 
proxima questione.  Ncgari tamen non 
potest  quod si mihi rem meam auferat 
sino causa, quod ips0 peccat." 
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very  fairly  that  of  the  fourteenth-century  Civilians  in 
general ; they were, like Cynus, aware of  the divergent judg- 
ments  of  the  older  Civilians.  I..  one  important  passage 
~artolus  Conlment~  on  the well-known  words  of  the Code 
VIII. (52,2)  in which Constantine said that while the authority 
of  custom  is not  insignificant  (vilis) it could  not  override 
reason  or law, and he points  out that Azo, John Bassianus, 
and  the  Gloss  (i.e., the "  Glossa  Ordinaria"  of  Accursius) 
maintained  that  a  local  custom  overrides  the  "lex  com- 
munis " in  that  place,  and  a  general  custom  overrides  it 
everywhere, while Placentinus  had contended  that this  had 
been  true in  ancient  (pre-Imperial) times, but  not in later. 
He also cites one of  the earlier fourteenth-century Civilians, 
William  of  Cuneo,  as maintaining  that  the custom  of  the 
Roman  people  retained  its  legislative  authoritv,  for  %his 
",  had  never  been  transferred  to the prince;  and  a  jurist  of 
the  thirteenth  century,  Martin  Silimani,  as  maintaining 
that  tho Iioman  people  still retained the power  of  making 
a general and written law (lex).l 
Bartolus :  Comm.  on  Code  VIII. 
62 (53)  (p. 806), It. : "  TerLio ~IC  sumnla 
secundum  Azo. ; Jo.;  et  GI. : Con- 
suetudo  specialis certi loci  in  eo loco 
vincit  legcm  communem, et generolia 
generaliter, non autem  specialis goner. 
alitor in quolibet loco. .  .  (p. 807). Sol. : 
multis modis.  Primo secundum  Plac. 
q. d.  1.  do  quibus, loquitur secundum 
tempora  antiqua,  secundum  quae 
populus Romanus poterat facere legcm 
genoralem, ergo consuetudi~lem  gcner- 
alom  contrariam  logi,  et  illam  con- 
trariam  logem  tollentem ;  haec  lox 
loquitur  secunclum tempora  moderna, 
secundum quae populus Romanus non 
Potest  legem  generalem  facere,  ergo 
DOC  consuetudinem  co~ltrariam,  illan] 
vincentem. . . .  Quod  non  videtur 
bene  dictum quia  secundum  hoc  d. 1. 
de quibus (D. I. 3, 32) esset derogatum 
~brogatum  per  1.  seq.,  quod  in 
CaSU  dubii  dicere  non  debemus. . . . 
Praetorca Gul. de Cuneo d. 1. de quibus 
VOL.  VI. 
(D. I. 3,  32)  illud  impugnat, et aliter 
fatetnr quod in principeln translata est 
potestas condendi legem expressam et 
scriptam, non autem consuotudinariam, 
quae  in  eum  non  potuit  transferri, 
quum procedat ex tacito consensu . . . 
et sic  dicit hodie populum  Romanum 
posse facere consuetudinem genoralem, 
quum  potestas  ipsius  legis  consue- 
tuclinariao  inducendae  non  sit  trans- 
lata in  principem.  Et secundum  hoc 
d. 1.  de  quibus  (Dig. I. 3,  32) hodie 
remanet  in  suo  statu ;  quod  placet 
Mar. Silimani, ubi dicit hodie populum 
Romanum  posse  facero  gencralem, 
soriptam  et  expressam ; do  quo  hic 
non insisto quia plene est tractaturn in 
1.  fi.  s.  de Leg.  (i.e., his  Commentary 
on  Code  I.  14,  12).  Sed contra  pre- 
dicta instatur, nam non debemus sequi 
quod  populus  Romanus  fccit,  s. 
utendo . . . moribus contra legvm, sed 
quod  facere  debeat  s.  utendo  lege 
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When we compare these passages with others in his writings 
we  mav incline  to the judgment  that he accepts  the  .  dis-  - 
tinction  of  William  of  Cuneo  between  the continuing legal 
authority of  the custom of  the people, and their  power  to 
make law (lex) in the more  strictly technical  sense.  In  one 
place,  indeed,  he states clearly  and dogmatically that  the 
Roman  people have not the power of  making law (lex) ; the 
reason he gives for this is, however, rather curious.  So long, 
he saya, as the Roman  people retained the right  of  electing 
and deposing the emperor, they kept the power of  legislatioil, 
but this right had now passed to the princes of  Germany, and 
the right of  deposition had passed to the P0pe.l 
On the other hand, at  the end of  his discussion of  the  rescript 
of  Do?stantine  on  custom, he saya, dogmatically and in his 
that,  if  custom is contrary to law, and the law is 
to the custom, the law annuls it ; if, on the other 
is "  praeter legem,"  it is superior to  the  law. 
A  general  custom  is  supcrior  to law  everywhere,  and  a 
local  custom,  to law locally;  and it  is perhaps  worthy  of 
note  that  here  Bartolus  refers  to the  highly  important 
statement of  Gregory IX. in the Decretal~.~  , 
spondit  et  bono,  videlicet  quod  non  abdicata  ab eis.  Jus enim  eligondi 
dobom~~s  soqui quod populus Romanus  liabent principes do Alomannia, et jus 
facit, perperam et erroneam. . . .  Sed  privandi habet solus Papa, ut extra do 
hene sequi debemus illud quod populus  re  judicata  c.  Ad  Apostolicae ; Cum 
Romanus ex certa  scientia fooit con-  onim  nihil  sit  quod  de  imperio  re- 
snetudinem inducendo.  d. 1.  do  quibus  mansisset eis non video quomodo possiut  -. 
(Dig. I. 3,  32).  Quia ltoma est com- 
munis pat,ria . . . et est caput mundi, 
sic  nliao  civitates  debont  sequi  ipsius 
consuotudines, non autem ipsa aliaruln 
civitatum." 
Bartolus:  Comm.  on  Code I. 14, 
12 (p. 81) : " Ego crcdo quod populus 
Romanus  at  senatns  non  possunt 
facero  logem,  ratio  est,  postqnam 
populus Romanus transtulit potestatcm 
in principom, adhuc apud COB remansit 
potestas oligendi et privancli ut 1.  2,  $ 
exactis, de origine juris (Dig. I. 2, 2, 16) 
et  illo  temporo  potorat  populus  Ro- 
manus rondrre lcgem, ot otiam senatus, 
sed  hodie  omnis  potestas  imperii,  est 
legem oondere." 
Id., Comm. on Code VIII. 82 (3)  2 
(p. 814): "  Ego  autom  sic  dico  ut s. 
dixi,  in  opp.  2  quod  aut  dicta  con- 
suetudo ost contra logem, et  lox soq1ieIls 
contraria  illi  consurtuclini tollit  earn. 
. . . Aut  praetor legem,  et tun0  non, 
sed lex succumbit illi. . . . 
Aut  ronsuetudo  est  generalis,  ot 
vincit legem generaliter d. 1. de quibus 
(D. 1, 3,  32) aut est specialis et localis 
et vincit eam spocialitor in eo loco." 
Cf. Decretals, I. 4, 11 : "  Licet etiam 
longaevae  consuetndinis  non  sit  vilis 
auctoritas, non tamen est  usclue ad00 
valitura,  ut  vel  iuri  positivo  debeat 
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1f we  turn to his great contemporary Baldus, we find that 
his  is much  the same  as that of  Bartolus  on  this 
question.  In commenting  on  the  Code (I. 14, 12) he says 
dogmatically that the Roman people cannot make law (lex), 
for its general  authority has been transferred to the prince ; 
on  the  other  hand,  commenting  on  Dig. I. 3,  32,  he  also 
seems  to  repudiate  the  contention  of  Placentinus,  that 
custom does not now override the written law, and that, there- 
fore, no custom has authority unless it has been formed with 
the knowledge of  the prince ; this, he says, is not required, 
st  least with regard to  local customs, and he refers to  a Decretal 
of  Boniface VIIT., and also to Gratian's  well-known  doctrine 
that laws are abrogated by custoin.1 
Bartolus  and Bsldus  again  agree  with  Cynus  about  the 
binding nature of contracts or agreements between the prince 
and the people. 
Bartolus  maintains  that  while  the  prince  is  "legibus 
solutus,"  it is  "  equum  et  dignun? " that  he  should  live 
according to law, though he does this of  his free will. not of 
,  --  necessity;  but if he has made a "  pactum " with  any city, 
he is bound  to keep this,  for "  pacta"  belong  to the "  ius 
gentium."  a 
praejudicium generare, nisi fuerit ration. 
alibis et  legitime sit praescripta." 
Cf. vol. ii. p. 158. 
'  Baldus : Comm. on Code I. 14, 12 
(fol.  60) :  "  Queritur  utrum  hodie 
Populus Romanus possit legem farere, 
dicendnm  est  quod  non ; quia  de~lu- 
datus ost  generali  potostate,  cum illa 
translata fuerit in principem." 
Id.,  Comm.  on  Digest  I.  3,  32,  6 
(fol.  20) :  " Seoundo  opponitur  et 
videtur  quod  consuetudo  non  possit 
derogari logi  scriptae. . . . Sol.  dicit 
Plwontinus  quod  illa  corrigit  istam, 
quia  hodie  solus  princops  facit legem, 
et  idea  hodie  nulla  consuetudo  valot 
nisi  sit  inducta  conscientis  principis. 
Gecundum  Plao :  et  hoo  tangit  glo. 
viii.  Dist : c.  frustra (i.e.,  Gloss r  Ord : 
on  Gratian  Decretum  D.  8,  8).  Sod 
illn opinio est false, nam tompore llujus 
legis  ita erat  Imporator  sicut  hodio ; 
undo in sua poteatate nihil ost additum 
vel  detractum. . . .  Et idoo  non ro- 
quiritur  scientia  principie  in  consue- 
tudine sinqularium locorum ; casus at 
in c.  1.  De constit li. 6 (Sext. I. 2,  I), 
ubi  dicit  eonsuetudinem  esse validam 
et tamen principem  noscire, ut nota  4 
distin:  c.  leges  (Gratian  Decretum 
D. iv. 3.  Gratian's observations at  Lhe 
end)." 
But  cf.  Baldus'  Commentary  on 
Code VIII. 52 (fol. 172.) 
Bartolus : Comm. on Code I. 14, 4 : 
"  Sol.  fateor  quod  ipso  (princeps) ost 
legibus  solutus,  tamen  acquum  et 
dignum  est  quod  legibus  vivat ;  ita FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
Baldus,  commenting  on  the  same  passage  of  the  Code, 
sets  out the same  opinion, that the prince  should  obey the 
law, though he is not bound to do so "  ex necessitate " ; and 
he adds a  judgment  of  considerable significance, that there 
is a suprenle authority in the prince,  as well as an ordinary 
authority, and that this supreme authority is not under the 
law.  He also, however, like Bartolus, quotes Cpus as main- 
taining that a pactum, made by the prince with his subjects, 
if  it has natural justice and equity, and is made for the public 
good, is binding, not only on the prince but on his successors, 
and in  his  oomment  on '  Digest ' I.  3,  3  (Princeps legibus 
solutus), he sets out the principle  again and seema to accept 
it for himself.] 
loquitur  hic : unde  ipse  submittit fie 
legibus  de  voluntate,  non  de necessi- 
tate.  Ita debes intelligero hanc legem. 
Quaero, quid si imperator faoit pactum 
cum  aliqua  civitate,  utrum  teneatur 
illud  pactum  servare.  Videtur  quod 
non  quia  est  solutus  a  legibus. . . . 
Contrarium  est  veritas.  Nam  paota 
aunt de jure  gentium  1.  ex hoc  ff.  de 
just : et jure (Dig. I. 1, 5).  Jura gen- 
tium  sunt  immutabilia  ut Instit,  de 
jure nat, § sed naturdia (Inst. I. 2, 11). 
Ita  tenent ibi Doc. ut Cynus hic rcfert." 
1 Baldus:  Comm.  on Code  I. 14, 4 
(fol.  55) :  "  Princeps  dcbet  vivere 
secundum legos ; quia ox lege ejusdem 
pendet  autoritas.  Intellige quod istud 
verbum debet intelligi do debito hones- 
tatis, quae summa debet esse in prin- 
cipe, sod  non intelligitur  precise,  quio 
suprcma et obsoluta potestas principis 
nou est sub lege ; unde lox ista habet 
respectum  ad potestalem  ordinariam, 
non  ad  potestatem  absolutam.  . . . 
Nota  quod  imperator  dicit  so  esse 
alligatum,  ot  hoc  ex benignitate  non 
ex  necessitate.  Secundo  nota  quod 
auctoritas  imperatoris pendet  ex  lege 
regia, quae fuit nutu divino promulgata, 
et icleo imperium dicitur esse immediate 
a  Deo. . . .  Quarto  nota  quod  ille 
bene  priilcipatur  qui  vult  principari 
Deum et leges, undo dicit imperator 80 
submitterc principatum  suum legibus. 
Ultimo  nota quod  nemo  pokest  im- 
ponere legem successori  dignitatis vel 
officii vel  imperii. . . .  Mod0  ~UX~S 
hoc  doctores  quaerunt  de  una,  q. lex 
principis non ligat successorem ; quid 
in  contractu. . . .  Dominus  Cynus 
dicit quod (si)  istud pactum habet in se 
justitiam naturalem et equitatem, quod 
istud pwtum est servandum ; si  im- 
perator facit pacem vel capitulum cum 
subjectis propter  generale et publioum 
bonum,  quad ista non  debent infringi 
par  successorem,  nisi  ex  parte  sub- 
ditorum intervenisset  dolus vel fraus." 
Id., Comm on  Digest I. 3, 31 (fol. 
20) :  "  Princeps  non  ost  sub  leg0 
fori, est tamen sub lege poli, nature ot 
rationis,  actus  autem  sui  sunt,  leg: 
do re iu. pastoralis, in cle. (Clementines, 
11.  11, 2) et dic.  ut  no.  c.  eo.  digna 
vox  (Code I. xiv.  4) : Cyn. ot hi  no. 
Cyn.  quod princeps  potest  cphtrahere 
cum  suis  fidelibus,  et  tenetur  ei  do 
jure  gentium  et  civili,  quia  civili 
rationi natura  i, naturalis  ratio com- 
paratur. . . .  Nam  si  princeps  non 
obligaretur alii, certe nec alius obligare- 
tur ei, ex rsgula con-reletivorum ;  et sio 
esset interdictum commercium, et esset 
tamquam exul qui omnium praesul." 
Here we  have  come  upon  an important  point  of  oontact 
between  the Civilians and the system  of  Feudal law.  We 
have, happily, an important work of Baldus upon the Feudal 
law, and when we  turn to this we  shall be led to think that 
the  conception  of  the contract  which  is  binding  upon  the 
is related to Feudal conceptions, and that this affect8 
also the conception of customarv law. 
The emperor,  Baldus  aays,  has,  no  doubt, the fulness  of 
power  (plenitudo potestatis),  for  God  subjected  the  (leges) 
laws  to him,  but  God  has not subjected to him  the agree- 
ments (contracts) by which he is bound, and he gives as an 
example  of  his  meaning  the  grant  by  Frederick I.  of  the 
countship and other territories to the community of Pavia on 
their taking the oath of  fidelity to him : this grant neither 
Frederick nor his successors could revoke, except on tho ground 
of  some guilty action of  Pavia.l 
Good  and natural consuetudines,  Baldus aays in the same 
work, bind the prince, for the "  jus naturale "  is stronger than 
the  "principatus " :  the prince  is  bound  to  maintain  his 
"  consuetudines," for  customary law (jus consuetudinarium) 
has  authority  over  the prince  (concludit prin~ipi).~  In his 
commentary on the Peace of  Constance he sets out the same 
principle:  if  the prince had granted to any city the right to 
make any statutes for itself, he could not revoke the grant.3 
'  Bddus : Super  Feudis  (f 01.  19) : 
"  (De Natura feudi).  Pone quod Imper- 
ator vel Rex Francorum creat diqucm 
ducem et investitur eum de ducatu, vel 
marchionem . , . vel  comitem . . .  vel 
baronem  . . . numquid  potest  pro 
libito  divestire  enm.  Respondetur 
quad  non,  sed  demum  propter  con- 
victam  culpam  vel  feloniam. . . . 
Net  obstat  quod  imperator  habeat 
~lenitudinem potestatis,  quia  verum 
est  quad  Deus  subjecit  ei  leges,  sed 
"0"  ~ubjecit  ei  contractus  ex  quibus 
Obligatus est, ut nota in 1.  digna  vox 
(Cod. I. 14, 4). . . .  Et per hoc  dice- 
barn quad imperator Fredericus Prjmus 
pui  fecerat commune Papiae  Comitem 
lncertis  castris et terris, ei ea conferendo 
sub  juramento  fidelitatis,  quod  nec 
ipse concessor nec eius successor poterat 
revocare sine culpa communis Papiae:' 
Id.  id.  (fol.  9) :  'I (Notandun 
est  autem) . . . quaero  nunquid  im- 
perator  possit  disvestire  vassalum 
sine convicta culpa 7  Respondet glossa 
quod  non  est  ratio:  quia  bonae  et 
naturales  consuetudines  ligant  princi. 
pem,  quia  potentius  est  jus  naturale 
quam principatus." 
Id. id.  (fol.  19) :  "  Et  nota  hlc 
quod  princeps  tenetur  servare  suas 
consuetudines,  et sic jus  consuetudin- 
arium concludit principi." 
a  Id. id. : '  Commentarium ejusdem 
Baldi  super  Pace  Constantiae.'  (Fol. 
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llnd in another plme Bddus sets out as a general principle 
that custom is a tacit agreement of  the citizens.l 
We  have dealt with the position  of  Cynus, Bartolus, and 
Bddus at  length, for we think that they are in these matters 
representative  of  the  Civilians  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
but we may notice a few points in others. 
Joannes  Faber,  one  of  an  important  group  of  French 
Civilians of  tho early fourteenth century,  asserts very  dog- 
matically, not only that the prince derives his authority from 
God, but through the people, but also that the people  can 
tor proper causes depose him.2  He holds that the people can 
no longer make a, general law (lex),  for it has transferred the 
power to the prince, but it can, under proper conditions, make 
a municipal law.3  Custom, however, he seems clearly to mean, 
still makes and unmakes law.4 
oeps  concessit civitat~  facere statuta,  constat  hoc  factum  fuisse  antiquis 
v~rtute  cmus concesslonls  clvltas  fcclt  temponbus  . . .  Sed contra (vanous 
statuta sua.  Quaero, numqu~d  potest  arguments  stated) . , .  Sed  tamen 
revocare , et vldetur quod non."  sat16 posset dlcl quod populus ex causa 
1  Id ,  Super  Feudis  (fol.  31) :  posset eum destruere. . . . Hoc tamen 
"  Illud  non  om~tto  quod  consuetudo  attentare perlodosum est." 
d~cltur  clvlum tac~ta  conventlo."  Cf.  Id. : '  Brev~ar~um  ~n Codlcem,' 
Joannos  Faber  '  Super  Inst~tu-  I. 1 (p. 1) : "  Populus  enlm  ad  quem 
tion~bus,'  1,  2  (fol.  8)  "Populus  de  lure  communl  spectat  electlo 
el  et in  eum.  Et SIC  vldetur  quod  et  oreatlo  prlnclpls,  potest  dare  ]us 
prlnceps habet junsdlct~onem  a populo  reglbua  quos  creav~t.  .  .  Unde 
. . .  sed contra, lmo  a Deo . . .  Glo  quamvls  ~mperlum  fmt a Deo lnst~tu- 
ib~  dlc~t  quod  ~mperlum  process~t a  tum  permlsslve,  populus  tamen  fult 
Deo  dlspos~tlve,  qua elus d~spos~tlone author et dlsposltor " 
factum  est  Mel~us d~ceret  Glo.  61  9  Id.,  ' Super  Inst~tut~on~bus,'  1.  2 
d~ceret  quod  processit  a  Deo  permls-  (fol.  0) :  "  Sed  an  populus  potest 
slve sed a populo dlsposlt~ve,  qma lta  hod~e  legem  facere.  Glo :  dlc~t  quod 
dlsposmt  et volmt  ex quadam  neces-  non,  cum  totem  potestatem  trans- 
s~tate. . .  SI  enim  esset  Del  dls-  tuler~t,  quod est verum, generalem, sed 
posltlone  non  fulssent  prelat~ multl  mumc~palem  SIC  . . .  dum  tamen  ha- 
turpes,  luxonos~  et  fatu~  . . .  Sed  beant  collegium  approbatum:  ahas 
an  populus  potest  Imperatorem  de-  non." 
ponere.  Vldetur  quod  SIC, qula  cum  '  Id ~d ,  1,  2 (fol. 7) : "  Clrca sextum, 
ad populum  pertlnet  ejus  creat~o.  ut  quae  sunt ejus  (Z e.,  Custom) vlrtutes 
h~c  . . . et  deposlt~o . . .  Praeterea  seu vlres, dlcendum quod multae, nam 
cum  mandatum  jur~sdlctlorus s~t  re-  per  eam  quandoque  ]us  constltultur, 
vocab~le de  su~  natura . . . et  lm.  quandoque  acqulntur, ut satis d~x~  IU 
perator  jur~sdlct~onem  et  potestatem  precedentlbus  Item  per  eam  dero- 
habeat  a  populo  . . .  V~detur  quod  gatur jurl  scrlpto, super quo dlc quod 
populus  revocare  posslt  Praeterea  aut  consuetudo  precedlt,  et  ]us  sub. 
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He also raises the question whether the prince was bound 
to consult the "  Proceres " when making a law, as laid down 
in Cod. I. 14, 8 : he seems to think n0t.l 
Jacobus  Butrigarius,  an  important  Bologna  Jurist  under 
whom Bartolus studied12  in an interesting passage discusses the 
question of  the authority of  custom, and suggests that both 
those who upheld the view that custom still makes and un- 
makes law, and Placentinus who denied this, were light, for 
the Roman people had transferred their authority to the pnnce 
and could not, therefore, make  general laws, but they could 
revoke this grant to the prince and could then make any law.3 
We  shall have to return to this passage in the later chapters, 
when we  discuss the theory of the prince or ruler, but in the 
ineantimeit is worthnoticing for  Butrigarius does not stand alone 
in the suggestion.  It is suggested by Vacariu~,~  and by AZO.~ 
The Canonists of the time do not, as far as we  have been 
able to see,  deal  with  these  questions to any great extent, 
sequ~t,  et  tunc  SI  condens  ]us  eam  v~detur  quod  oonsuetudo  non  tollat 
non  ~gnorat,  qula  forte  generahs,  veI  legem,  ut C.  eod.  1  3. ln  fin.  Plac. 
ahas  constat  earn  non  Ignorare,  con-  entlnus  solvit  uno  modo, et glo  a110 
suetudo  tolhtur . . .  ubl  autem  ]us  mod0 (Accurslus . Gloss on Code VIII. 
precedlt, consuetudo  subsequens tolht  62  (3) '  aut  legem ' , and  Gloss  on 
Ipsum, durn tamen s~t  rat~onabll~s  . . .  Dlgest I. 3,  32 '  abrogentur '),  et tmen 
non  tamen omnlno , sed part~cular~tcr uterque bene dlc~t  . . . Ad proposltum, 
In  loco In  quo servatur. . . .  Sed an  ergo quum simplic~ter  dlsponat aliquld 
1lgat  fiscum  vel  dommum  terrae  In  respublioa Romanorum, videtur pot~us 
qua  consuetudo  obt~net,  non  v~detur,  81b1 speclallter, cum  non poss~t  gener- 
quum lex  inferlorlv non  hget superlo-  ahter, nlsl revocate. ~urlsdict~one  trans- 
rem, ut dm,  § sed quod prmcipl.  Do  lata In  prlnclpem : et ~deo  ejua  con- 
ho~  fu~t  ques~tum In  facto  ducatus  suetudo  legem  generalem tollere  non 
Brltannlae  Tamen  potest  dl01  quod  posset ;  et 61  SIC  lntellevzt Placentinus, 
8% non enlm Inferlor hgat, sed ]us ex  bene  d~x~t,  sed  81  populus  Romanus 
cons~~etud~ne  emanat."  revocaret  jur~sdlct~onem  translatam 
Cf. Id :  ' Brevlarlum  In  Codmem,'  In  prmclpem ,  quod  posset,  ut  ~IXI 
VIII. 62 (p 222).  supra. 1  9. '  non amb~gltur  (z.e ,  Comm.  '  Id., 'Super Instltutlombus,'  1  2  on  DI~  I.  3.  9), tum  posset  legem 
(fol. 6).  Id. ' Brevlarum In Cod~oem,'  condere gene~alem,  et per  consequens 
1. 14  8 (p. 19).  consuetudlnem  generalem  ~nducere  , 
Cf  Woolf . '  Bartolus,'  p  2.  et slc legem generalem, speclalem non ' " 
a  Jacobus  Butrlgar1~8, '  Thesaurus  Cf.  Vacar~us, '  Liber  Pauperurn ' 
Legum  . . In Pr~mam  et Secundam  (ad. Zulueta), p. 15. 
?tom  Vetens  Dlgest~,' I.  3,  32  6  Cf.  vol  11.  p.  64. 
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but  it is  worth  while  to notice  that  the  great  Canonist, 
who is generally known  as the "  Archdeacon," in  his Com- 
mentary on  Gratian's  Decretum,  while he  does not  express 
his owd judgment,  mentions that some said that the people 
could not now make a law ; but others maintained that they 
could take  away from the emperor the authority they had 
given  him,  and he  contrasts  this with  the position  of  the 
P0pe.l  The Archdeacon also reasserts the principle of  Gratian, 
that all laws required to be approved and confirmed  by the 
custom of  those concerned, but he adds that if  the subjects 
refuse to accept a reasonable constitution, the legislator can 
compel them to do thisS2 
Again,  William  Durandus  the younger,  in  his  important 
work on the mode of  holding a general Council, written in the 
first decade, probably, of the fourteenth century, makes some 
important  observations  on  the obligation of  both  Temporal 
and Spiritual rulers to obey the law,3  and also maintains that 
the Pope should not  make laws without the consent  of  the 
1  Guglielmus  Bailso  (The  Arch- 
deacon) : '  Apparatus  ad  Decretum,' 
D.  2  (fol.  6) :  "  Dicunt  qmdam 
quod  hodie  populus non  potest  legem 
condere  . . . a111  . . . dlcunt contra, 
qu~  dixit  quod populus potest  auferre 
auctorltatem  imperatori.  Sed  omnes 
eccle~iae non  possunt  Papae,  qula 
non habet eb eis, sed ipsae ab eo  . . . 
Et dlcunt  ]psi  quod  populus  potest 
revocare  lllam  potestatem  cum  vult, 
sicut  judex  qui  delegat,  qula  pro- 
prletas apud eum remansit " 
2  Id. ld ,  D  4 (follo ti,  v.) : "  Leges 
promulgantur,  Id. est de  novo crean- 
tur, 'approbantur'  ~d,  In judicio  popull 
reclpiuntur,  ff  de  legibus,  de  quibus 
inveterata  (Dlg  I.  3,  32).  Ipsae 
confirmantur.  Unde SI constitutio non 
est  morlbus  utentlwn  approbata  illi 
qul  el  non  observant  non  dicuntur 
transgressores. . . .  Nam  ad  hoc  ut 
const~tutio  suum  habeat  effectum  et 
confirmatlonem  requintur,  quod  sit 
moribus utentlum approbata  . . . Sed 
81 subdlti nollent acceptare ratlonabllem 
constltutlonem,  constituens  eos  ad 
hoc  compellere potest,  et  sit  factum 
fmt 23,  q,  5  De  Llgurlbus (Gratian 
Deoretum, C.  23, 6, 43) ut I~I  patet in 
casu,  cum  alias  elus  potestas  esset 
delusoria, . . ." 
Wllham  Durandus,  'De  mod0 
generalis Concilii tenendi,' I  3 . "  Quod 
predlctus  modus  correctionls  et  re- 
formationls  eccleslae et Chrlstiamtatis 
sit convemens ration] et ]un, maxime 
quantum  ad  presldentes  sp~r~tuall  et 
temporall  potestatl,  et  quod  non 
debeant transgredi jura,  sed se regere 
et  llmitare  secundum  ea  . . .  De 
pnnclp~bus  autem  secularlbus  nequa- 
quam  dubium  est,  quin 1ps1 se  velle 
fateantur vivere socundum leges eorum 
(Cod.  1. 14, 4) . . . Isldoius insuper 
soriblt  in  3  LI  '  De  summo  bono,' 
c.  62.  (Isldore of  Seville  Sententlae, 
3,  61) et ponltur  pro palea in Decretls 
9. dl (Gratian Decretum. D  9).  Quod 
justum  est  principem  legibus  obtem- 
perare ems." 
oardinals, nor kings and princes without the consent of  the 
"  Probi,"  for that which concerns all should be approved by 
all.  l 
Joannes Andreae, another important Canonist of  the first 
half  of  the fourteenth  century,  discusses  the  authority  of 
custom, and denies that it can change the "  lex communis," 
canonical or civil, but admits that it may "  derogate "  from it 
in some particular province or place, and create a "  munioipal " 
law, if  this is permitted by the Pope or the prince.2 
It will be, we think, evident that the Civilians and Canonists 
can hardly be said to express any very clear judgments upon 
the general question  of  legislative  power.  They are, in the 
main,  rather  endeavouring  to  expound  the  tenets  of  the 
Civil Law than stating the actual and working principles  of 
the political society of  the time.  At times at least they are 
even thinking rather of  the powers of  the actual citizens of 
the city of  Rome than  of  the people  of  the empire.  This 
Id. ~d.,  I. 4:  "Verum  cum scriba- 
tur Proverb 11, quodib~  salus ubx multa 
conailla,  et  Innocens  Papa  bcrlbit 
quod  facillus  invenltur  lllud,  quod  a 
pluribus  semonbus  quaeritur ; 20  dl. 
de  quibus  (Gratian  Dec. : D.  20,  3) 
. . . et exemplum  habemus  in vetere 
testamento de Moyse, qul ad consllium 
Jethro cognati  sul,  72  Seniores secum 
assumpsit  . . . Videretur esse salubre 
pro  republlca  et pro  dictis  adminis- 
tratorlbus  relpublicae,  quod  SIC  sub 
ratione,  ut  premissum  est in rubrlcis 
proximis,  hmitaretur  potestas  eorun- 
dem, quod absque certo consilio domm- 
orum  cardinalium,  dominus  papa,  et 
reges  ao  principes  absque  aliorum 
proborum  consilio,  sicut  hactenus  in 
republ~ca servabatur,  non  uterentur 
praerogativa hujusmod~  potostat~s,  po- 
t~ssime aliqud  concedendo  contra 
concllia et contra jura  approbata com- 
mumtcr.  Et  quod  contra  .  .  . 
conc~ha  et lure mhll possunt  de novo 
statuere,  vel  concedere,  msi  gonorall 
conclllo convocata ; quum  illud  quod 
omnes langit, secundum juris utriusque 
regulam  ab  omnlbus  debeat  com- 
muniter approbari." 
Joannes Andreae, '  Commentary on 
the  Decretals,'  I.  4,  11  (fol.  61): 
"  Quarto sic opporutur, ~llius  est tollere 
legem positivam, cujus est Inducere, vel 
sui  malorls,  minoris  non. . . .  Sed 
lox  communis,  canonica  vel  civlhe, 
inducitur a Papa vel a Prlncipe : con- 
auetudo insurgit ex ast~bus  privatorum, 
qui aunt minores , ergo ipsorum actua 
legem  etiam  poeltivam  tollere  non 
possunt  Sol.  Fateor  quod  usus  vel 
actus prlvatorum unius regni, vel pro- 
vinciae,  vel  loci,  legem  communem 
abrogare, I. ub~que  tollere, non possunt , 
sed  derogare  possunt  in  eo  regno, 
provincla,  vel  loco,  ut slcut 1b1 legem 
munlcipalem  facere,  possunt,  sic  et 
consuetud~nem Inducer-  et  tamen 
ad objectlorus solutionem fateri oportet, 
quod nec  in loco id possent, msi  quia 
Papa  vel  Prlnceps  id  expresae  per- 
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is in  strong contrast w~th  their judgments  when  they turn 
from the general principles  of  constitutional law to the eon- 
ception of  the municipal laws of  the Italian c~ties. We have 
already, but only incidentally, observed some of  the references 
to these : we must now very briefly consider them. 
We may begin by observing a general statement of  Bartolus 
in his Comment on  Gaius' famous phrase, as cited in Dig. I. 
1, 9 : " Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim 
suo proprio, partem communi omnium hominum iure utuntur." 
Some argue that only the emperor could make law, but this 
is an error:  any people can  make its own law, "  jus  civile 
proprium,"  while  only  the  prince  can  make  "  jus  civile 
commune."  l 
This, however, raises the question, what is the relation  of 
these municipal laws or  statutes to the general law.  There  - 
is an important statement on this by Bartolus, in an opinion 
(consilium) which he gave on the question of  the validity  of 
a will by which a certain citizen of  Arezzo had left his property 
to his illegitimate son, born of  a concubine, while his wife was 
alive.  we are not concerned  with the merits  of  the case, 
but with the reason why Bartolus advised that the will was 
void.  He cites, and seems to agree with, the opinion that only 
the prince could legitimatise, and that the "  jus  commune " 
prohibited the legitimisation of  Lb spurii," in this case the child 
was born in adultery, and concludes with the judgment that 
the people only made laws by the permission of  the prince, and 
cannot therefore make them contrary to his prohibitioa2 
1 Bartolus, Comm.  on  D~gest  I. 1, 9 
(p.  16)  "  Secundo  opp  et  v~detur 
quod solus prlnceps poss~t  facere legem  . . .  HIC autem  dlcitur, omnes popull 
qui  leglbus,  etc ,  ergo  male,  cum 
lnnuat quemllbet populum posse legem 
condere.  . .  Item jus clvile proprlum 
potest  constitu~  a  populo, ut hie,  sed 
]US c~v~le  commune  constltuit  solus 
princeps "  Cf.  Jo  Faber,  Comm  on 
Inst, I.  2  (fol  G),  and  Albericus  a 
Rosate, '  Comment de Statutls,' I. 9, 3. 
2  Bartolus,  '  Consihorum,'  Lib.  I1 , 
'  Conslhum ' 105 . "  Civ~taa  non potest 
statutum condere super eo quod Impera- 
tor  proh~bet  etiam  sib1 1ps1 . . . ergo 
d~ctum  statutum non valet." 
Consilium ' 106 . "  Quia sol1 prlncipl 
competit  restltuere  natalibus,  non 
autem  ordln~  civ~tatum . . .  Idem 
consuluit  Do Cynus  . . ergo  vult 
quod  per  elv~tatem  non  posset legltl- 
marl " 
Bartolus also cites  Jo. Butrigarms. 
"  qu~  consulmt  super  lsto  puncto  per 
rat~onem,  qua  in casu a lure communi 
proh~bito statutum  non  valet  . . . 
Sed  leg~t~mare  spurlum  est  prohlbl 
Albericus of  Rosate discusses the question in general terms 
and asks whether,  if  the statute of  the Civitas contradicted 
the "  jus commune," it is valid ; he points out that there was 
much difference of  opinion about the question, but he concludes 
that the general  opinion was  that the statute was valid for 
those  who  made it (inter statuentes)  as long as it was  not 
"  specialiter  derogatoria  de  statuto."  He  adds,  however, 
that a city could not make a statute to the prejudice of  the 
empire, or of those who were not subject to it.l 
It is important, also, to consider the form under which the 
Civitates made their statutes.  Bartolus discusses the question 
in the later part of the passage of  which we have before cited 
the first words.  Jf,  he says,  the statutes are made by the 
"  judices  maiores " or the lords of  the cities, it is well that 
this should be done wth  the consent of  the wise men ; they 
can, however,  do  it "  proprio  motu."  If  the statutes  are 
made by the people, this should be done by an assembly of 
the whole  people,  or  of  those  who form the council  of  the 
people,  and represent it, and the assembly should be called 
together  by the Podesth, or some other magistrate.  Another 
method is that some definite proposal should be put before the 
people, and the decision  of  the majority should become law.2 
tum.  . . .  Praeterea  populus  non 
cond~t  legem  nisl  autorltate prlnclpls, 
ergo  uon  cond~t  in  casu  prohlbito  a 
prlnclpe " 
Alberlcus  a  Rosate,  '  Comm.  de 
Statutla,' I. 7, 1 : "  Sed quld SI statutum 
clvltatls contradlcat juri  communi, an 
valeat.  Commun~s  opln~o  est quod SIC, 
per  praeallegatam,  1.  omnes populi, ff. 
De  jure  et justlcla  (Dig  I. 1, 9). . . . 
Quid  In  tanta  varletate  tenebimus ? 
. . . Communls opimo quam  sequitur 
totus  munrlus,  ut predixi,  hcet  forte 
pred~cta  de  str~cto  lure  s~t  Vera,  est, 
quod statutum Inter statuentes valeat, 
etlam contra ]us  communo, dummodo 
lex  non  s~t  spetiahter  derogatoria  de 
statute, ut predixi.  Non tamen potest 
Clvltas  vel  populus  statuere  In  pre- 
ludlcium  Impern, vel  non  s~bl  subdl 
torum  Unde  SI  clvltas  statuer~t, 
quod non teneretur ad tr~buta  vel  aha 
jura Imper~aha,  vel quod al~ter  esset in 
prejud~cium  non  sib1 subdltorum, non 
valeret,  et  ita  possent  lntelligi  jura 
superlus  ad  hoo  deducta." 
Bartolus, Comm. on  Dlgest I  1, 9 
(p. 18)  "  Quaero secundo prlnclpaliter, 
quallter  statuta fiant  Et  SI  qu~dem 
jud~ces  majores vel domlm hoc faciant, 
humanum  est  quod  faciant  conslllo 
saplenturn  . . .  Sed  sl  volunt,  pos- 
sunt hoc  facere  proprlo  motu.  et hoo 
subdit~s  dlvulgare.  . . .  SI vero  sta- 
tuta fiunt a populo, tahs est ordo, quod 
convocetur totus populus, seu homlnos 
qm sunt de cons1110 popull, qui repre- 
seutant  populum  . . .  Et haec  con- 
vocat~o  fiet auctor~tate  Potestatls, vel 
alterlus  maglstratus,  solemmter,  hoc 
eat  sono  tubae, vel  pulsata campana, 
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Albericus a  Rosate  also  states three  methods  of  making 
statutes.  The first is by the authority of  the whole people 
or "  universitas " in a public "  parliamenturn,"  to whom the 
"  Rector " or magistrate is to put the question whether they 
desire to make statutes, and what statutes, and by whom they 
are to be made ; and these questions are to be decided by the 
voice of  the majority.  This method, Albericus says, was now 
rarely  used.  The  second  method  was  that they  should be 
made by  the "  decuriones,"  whose  place  was  now  taken by 
the Councillors of  the city.  The third method was that the 
universitas,"  the  LL decuriones,"  or  Councillors of  the city 
should elect certain expert persons  and give them power to 
make statutes, and these should be valid, as though they had 
been made by the "  universitas."  This method also, Albericus 
says, was now not much in use, and he seems thus to mean 
that normally  in  his  time  the statutes were  made  by  the 
Council of  the city.l 
We regret that we  cannot in this work discuss the constitu- 
tional forms developed in the Italian cities and their relations 
to the empire, nor  the municipal  constitutions of  Northern 
Europe.  The subject is of  too great importance and complexity 
to be treated summarily, and it has a very large modern as 
well as medizeval literat~re.~ 
est, quod fiat proposltio certa et hmi- 
tata, an placeat  populo quod s~t  talis 
lex  vel  statutum  . . . tune  quod 
placuer~t  major1   part^,  illud  ent 
firmum " 
1 Albericus a Rosate, '  Comment. de 
Statutls,' I. 4 : "  Item, quaero quallter 
clvitas  facit  statuta 7  Dic,  quod 
tnbus modis  pnmo, oongregato populo 
seu  universitate  clvitatls  In  publlco 
parhamento  secundum  mwem  ~IVI 
tatis,  et  1b1  facta  propositlone  per 
rectorem  seu  mag~stratum civitatls, 
an vel~nt  statuta facere, et qualia,  et 
per  quos, et quod obtlnebltur per mal- 
crem  par~em,  valebit. . . .  Et iste 
modus  raro servatur.  .  Secundus 
modus  est  quod  decur~ones civitatls 
qu~  habent admlmstratlonem  civitatls, 
quorum  loco  hodle  successerunt  con- 
ci11ar11 . . . simu more solito convo- 
centur,  et  Inter  eos  fiat  propos~tlo, 
consultat~o  et  reformatlo  de  statutls 
fiendls  . . . . et  iste  modus  mag16 
servatur , et talis propositlo fien debet 
cum authontate vel  presentia  rectorls 
civ~tatis vel  universitat~s. . . .  6 
Tertms  modus  est  quod  univers~tas, 
decuriones seu concll~arn  ellgant aliquos 
peritos, quibus dent potestatem statuta 
condend~, et  quod  statuta  per  eos 
valeant, ac  si  statuta forent  per  unl- 
versitatem  . .  Sed neque lste modus 
eat magis In usu " 
2  It wrll  be  ev~dent  that  we  have 
made no  attempt In  this work to deal 
w~th  the great  and Important  history 
of  the development of  the pol~tical  inde- 
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We  have given what may seem to some of  our readers  a 
disproportionate space in  this chapter  to the political ideas 
expressed or implicit in the work of  the Civilians and Canonists 
of  the fourteenth century, for, as will now be apparent, we  do 
not think that those writers added much to the conceptions of 
the Civilians of  the twelfth  and thirteenth centuries.  It is 
necessary, however, to consider to what extent and in what 
way the revived study of the Roman Law may have ultimately 
contributed to the development  of  the monarchical  as con- 
trasted with the constitutional conceptions of  Western Europe, 
and we  shall  deal further with  this when  we  come  to the 
fifteenth  and sixteenth  centuries.  We  have  therefore been 
compelled to examine the nature of  the development  of  the 
~olitical  conception of  the Civilians, even  when  they  have 
little immediate relation to the actual conditions of  Europe 
outside of  Italy. 
As  far as the fourteenth century is concerned, we  do not 
think that there is any reason to say that they exercised any 
appreciable influence upon the political theory of  the rest of 
Europe, except so far  as it may be thought that they confirmed 
the judgment  that all authority in the State was ultimately 
derived from the community. 
pendonce of  the Itallan c~tles. Thls 1s 
not because wc  think  that this was  of 
httle  ~mportance,  on  the  contrary,  as 
we  ttnnlc it represents one of  the most 
Important developments of  the humon 
splr~t. We  have  not  attempted  to 
deal  wlth  ~t  for  two reasons  In  the 
first place,  because ~t 18 far too  large 
and  complex  a  subject  to  be  dealt 
Wlth,  ex~epL  in detall  and  at length ; 
and in the socond place, because it has 
been  treated  w~tli  great  learning  and 
caro In a number of  historical and legal 
worlrs.  Among  the  most  important 
of  these  In  recent  years  have  been 
C.  N.  Woolf's  '  Bartoluq  of  Sasso- 
ferato '  and  Profes.;or  Ercole's  '  Da 
Bartolo  all'  Altbowo '  We  deslre  to 
express  our  great  obhgat~on  to  both 
these  admirable  u o~ks. CHAP 111.1  THE AUTHORITY  OF  THE  RULER.  31 
CHAPTER  111, 
THE  SOURCE  AND  NATURE  OF THE  AUTHORITY 
OF TIIE  RULER. 
WE have in  the last  chapters  discussed the theories of  the 
source and authority of  the law of  the State.  It is with these 
in our minds that we can now turn to the conceptions of the 
political theorists  of  this time with regard to the prince  or 
ruler. 
We  turn first  to a  group  of  English  works  of  the later 
thirteenth and carly fourteenth centuries-that  is, to Fleta, 
Britton,  the  ' Mirror  of  Justice,'  and the  ' Modus  tenendi 
Parliamentum.' 
The work  of  Fleta would be of  the very first importance, 
if  it were not that in most essentials it does little more than 
re-state the principles of  Bracton, with which we  have dealt 
in a previous volunie,l but even so, it is important to observe 
that these  principles were  understood  and reasserted ;  and 
there are a few points in which Pleta goes beyond the genuine 
text of  Bracton.  It is only necessary in these circumstances 
to summarisc very briefly his statements.  The king has no 
equal or superior in tho kingdom, except  God and the law ; 
but it is tho law which has made him king, and he should 
therefore recognise the "  dominiurn and potestas 7' of  the law, 
and his rule is evil when it represents a will different from that 
of the law.2  The king has in his hand all jurisdiction, but he 
is the Vicar of  God and must give to every man what is his ; 
1 Cf.  vol.  iii.  part  i.  chaps.  2,  2 Fleta,  i.  6, 4  (cf.  Bracton,  'De 
3, 4.  Legibus,'  i.  8, 6). 
he cannot do anything but that which he can do by 1aw.l  It is 
said that what is the prince's  pleasure has the authority of 
law, but this does not mean that everything which the king 
wills has the force of law, but only that which has been laid 
down by the king's authority with the counsel of  the magnates, 
and after due deliberati~n.~  So far Fleta is only re-stating 
Bracton's  position,  of  which the essence is that the law is 
not the arbitrary creation of  the king, and that it is supreme 
over him.  But now we come to an iniportant deviation from 
the original text of  Bracton.  Fleta says that no one is to 
presume to dispute about the action of  the king, and to go 
against it ; but he adds that the king has  two superiors in 
ruling his people : the law, by which he has been made king, 
and his Curia-that  is, his counts and barons.  The counts 
are so-called "  a comitiva,"  and if they see that the king is 
without a bridle, they are bound to impose a bridle on him. 
And, he adds, kings should moderate their power by the law, 
which is the bridle of  power ; they should live  according to 
law, for the human law declares that laws bind the legislator ; 
and elsewhere it is said  (i.e.,  Cod. I. 14, 4) that it becomes 
the majesty of the ruler that the prince should profess that he 
is bound by the law.3 
As  wc  have pointed out in dealing with Bracton, it seems 
most  probable  that  this  passage  was  not  in  tho  original 
text  of  Bracton,  but was  interpolated by  a later hand.  It 
does  not  seem  very  probable  that it has  also  been  inter- 
polated in Fleta, though it must be observed that the text of 
Flcta has not been revised by  any very modern editor.  If, 
then, we  assume  that this  passage  docs not  belong to the 
original text of Bracton, it is very important to observe that 
Id.,  i.  17,  3  and  7  (cf.  Bracton, 
iii. 9,  3). 
Id., i.  17, 7 (cf. Bracton, iii. 9, 3). 
a  Fleta,  i.  17,  9 : "  Nemo  ellim  de 
fact0  regis  presumat  dlsputare,  noc 
contra  factum  suum  venire.  Verurn 
tamon  in  populo  regendo  suporiores 
hahot,  ut legom,  per  qunm  factus est 
et curiam suam, videlicet comites 
c%  baro~les  ; comites enim a  comitiva 
diountur,  qui  cum  viderint  Regem 
sine  freono,  fraenum  sibi  apponere 
tenentur.  . . .  11.  Temperent  igitur 
reges potontiam suam per legem, quod 
fraenum cst potentiae, quod s~cundnm 
loges  vivant,  quia  hoc  sonxit  lex 
I~umana, quod  loges  suum  ligent 
lntorem, ot  a'ihi,  digna  vox  majcstate 
regnantis  est,  logibus  alligatum  se 
principom  profiteri." 32  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART I. 
whether Fleta found it in his text of  Bracton, or it was  his 
own  doctrine,  it  is obviously  a  principle  of  high  import- 
ance, for it means that not only was the prince bound by the 
law, but that there was a legal process by which this could be 
enforced. 
The stateme,nt of  the principle is sharp and clear,  but it 
must not be considered as anolnalous or  eccentric.  For, as 
we  have pointed out, it was  the judgment  of  all feudal law 
that a lord could not be judge in a question between himself 
and his vassal, and Bracton, in another passage whose genuine 
ness has not so far been  contested, says that some at least 
maintained that in the last resort, if the king refused to do 
justice,  this  should  be  done  by  the "  universitas  regni  et 
baronagium suum in curia." 
There is another passage in Flet,a which, as far as we  have 
seen, does not correspond precisely with anything in Bracton, 
and which is important.  It is a passage in which he repeats 
Bracton's  legal doctrine, that there is no remedy against the 
king by way of  the Assize (of Novel Disseisin), but he goes on 
to sag that the aggrieved person may have recourse to one 
of  two remedies : he may proceed by way of  a supplication 
addressed to the king, as Bracton had said, but he may also 
proceed directly against the "  spoliator," but without bringing 
in the king's name.  If the "  spoliator " says that he cannot 
reply without the Icing, in whose name he acted, the process 
under the Assize is not to be postponed.  If  the ('  spoliator " 
has manifest grounds for his action, judgment  is to be post- 
poned  till the king  has been  consulted ; if not, the plaintiff 
is  to  receive  seizin with  double  damages, both  against  the 
escheator, the sheriff, and the other royal officers, as well as 
against any private persons.2 
1 Cf.  vol. iii. p.  73. 
Id., iv.  2,  20 : " Contra dominum 
vero Regem non habetur romedium per 
Asaisam, quamvis  in electione spoliati 
sit, vel provider0 sibi per supplicationem 
versus ipsum Regem, ve;  quad omnino 
proredat Assisa versus spoliatorem, hoc 
excepto, quod  1p60 Rex in Assisa  non 
comprehendatur.  Et si spoliator dixit 
quocl sine Rege respondere non poterit, 
cujus nomine fecit  id  quod fecit,  non 
propter  hoc  differatur  Assiza,  sed 
capiatur.  Et si  spoliator  ovidentem 
rationem  et  manifciitam  habeat,,  dif- 
feratur in juclicium  donoc  cum  Rege 
fuerit in& tractaturn; sin autem, seis- 
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The work  of  Britton  contains  some important statemcuts 
011  the nature  and  source  of  law, which we  have  already 
mentioned, and on the nature of  the royal  authority.  The 
introductory  statement  which  is  put  into  the  niouth  of 
~ing  Edward  declares in  the first place  that there  can  be 
no peace among his people without law, and he has therefore 
caused the laws which have been in use in the kingdom to 
be written down.  In the second place, he declares that the 
king  has  power  to repeal  or  to annul  these  laws when  he 
thinks  this  to be  desirable,  but  only  with  the  consent  of 
his  counts  and  barons  and  the  other  members  of  his 
council. 
In another passage Britton sets out the principle that the 
royal jurisdiction  is over all other jurisdictions,  but later he 
adds  a very important  passage, in  which  Edward is repre- 
sented as laying down the general doctrine that no man can 
be  judge  in  his  own  cause, and adds  that in  cases  where 
he (the king) is a party-that  is in cases concerning felony or 
treason against the king-the  court is to be the judge, and not 
the king.2 
The curious tract called the 'Mirror of  Justices ' has been 
carefully edited and criticised by Mr  Westlake and Professor 
Maitland, and the circumstances of  its origin discussed.  The 
inam recuperet cum dampnis duplicatis 
versus  tam  Escaetorem,  Vicecomitem 
et alios ministros  Rogis, quam  versus 
quascunque privatas personas." 
Britton, i., Introduction :  L'  Eduard 
Par  In  graco  Dou,  roi  de  Engleterm, 
. . . Desirauntz pes entre le poeple  qe 
est en nosl~re  proteccioun, par la suf- 
fraunce do  Deu, la  quolo pes ne  poet 
mie  hen estre sauntz leys, si avoms les 
leys, qe horn  ad u.6,  en noster reaume 
avant  ces  hores, fet mettre  cn  escrit 
Solurn  ceo qe cy est ordeyn6.  Etvolums 
Commandums qe par tut Engleterre 
et  tut Hyrelaunde  soint  issi  usez  et 
tenus en touz poyntz, sauve B nous de 
rePeler les et de enoyter et de amenuser 
de amender B totes les foiz qe nous 
VOL.  VI. 
verums  qe  bon  serra, par le assent de 
nos  countes  st barouns  et  autres  de 
noster conseyl, seuve les usages B ceux 
qe par prescripcioun de tens ont autre- 
mcnt  us6  en taunt  qe  lour  usagos  ne 
soynt mio descordauntz A dreiture." 
Id., i. 23, 8: "Et quant B la juris- 
diccioun  put-il  dire,  qe  il  n'est  mie 
tenu a respoundre en place  ou le juge 
est partio,  disium nu1  jugornent  ne  se 
put fere de meym qo  de 111.  porsones, 
ceo  est  a  saver  de  un  juge,  de  un 
pleyntif, et de un  defendaunts ; et en 
cas ou  nous sums partie, voloms nous 
qe notre court soit juge, sicum countes 
et barouns en tens de Parlement."  Cf. 
vol. iii. pert i. chap. 4. 34  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
work undoubtedly represents a very individual and eccentric 
point  of  view.  But it is  not without value, when  it agrees 
with other  judgment,^ of  the time, even though it may express 
these in sharper terms than more careful writers would have 
done. 
In  one  Book  the author  discusses  a  series  of  what  he 
calls "  Abusioi~s,"  and thc first and chief  of  these is, as we 
have seen, that the lung should be ovcr the law, for he ought 
to be under it, in accordance with his  0ath.l  The king, he 
says in another place, has to swear at  his coronation that he 
will maintain the Christian Faith and that lie will guide his 
people according to law,  without regard  of  persons,  and be 
liable  to judgment  in  law,  like  any  of  his  people.2  And 
again, the king's  court is open to all suitors against the king 
or the queen, as much as against other persons,  except with 
regard  to "  vengeance',  of  life  or limb.'  In the Book  on 
the  a  Abusions,"  he  says  that it is an "  abusion " that  a 
man  should not have remedy  for a  wrong inflicted  by  the  -- 
king or queen, except by the will of  the king.4 
In another place,  again, he asserts that, while  the king 
should have no equal in his land, neither  tho king nor the 
king's  coinmissioners  can  be judges  in the case  of  a  wrong 
(tort)  done by the king to one of  his subjects, and  it  is therefore 
law that the king should have companions who  should hear 
and determine in the Parliament the complaints about such 
injuries  done  by  the  king  or  queen  or  their  children,  or 
"  leur  especiaus " ; these  companions  are,  he says,  called 
1 '  Mirror of  Justices,'  s. v.  1 : "Abu-  Seint  Eglise,  e  justisiable  a  sdfrir 
sion est desus ou mesus do dreits usages,  droit corn autre de son poeple." 
tournant  en abusions.  . .  .  .  .  .  3  Id.,  i.  3: "  Ordene  fu qe la curt 
1.  La prem'ure et la  soverein  abusion  le  Rei  fust overte  B  touz  pleintifs, 
est  qe  li  Roi  est  outre la  lei  ou  il  par  quei  il  usent  sans  delai  brefs 
dois  estre  subject,  sicom est  contenu  remedials  aussi  sur  le  liei  ou  sur  la 
en son serement."  Reine comme sur autre del poeple, de 
Cf. p.  8, and Bracton, '  De Legibus,'  ohescun injurie,  forpris  en vengeance 
iii. 9,  2.  de vie ou  de membre,  ou  pleint tient 
Id., i. 2: "A1 corounement le firent  leu sans bref." 
jurer  q'll  meintendreit  la  sainte  foi  4  Id., v.  1.  153:  "Abusion  est  que 
cristiene  a tut son poer, e  son poeple  nu1  ne  ad  recoverer  del  tort  le  Rei 
guieroit  par  droit,  sauna  regard  A  ou  de  la Rcine  si  non  a la  voluntie 
nule  persone,  e  serreit  oheissant  a  le Rei." 
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coullts, from the Latin word "  cornites."  This is the general 
I;"inciple,  and it is therefore of  less significance that he asserts 
it also with regard to the relation of the king to his imme~ate 
the tenants-in-chiefa2 
He also denounces as an "  abusion "  the notion that "  Parle- 
mentz " are only  to be  held  rarely  and at the king7s will, 
~hile  they ought to be held twice in the year.  And -rvhen they 
meet, their function is not merely to provide aids for the king, 
but to make ordinances by the common  consent of  the king 
and the counts.  These ought not to be made, as was being 
done, without summoning the counts, and without considera- 
tion  of  the rules of  law, by the king and his "  clerks " and 
others who would not dare to go against the king, but only 
desire  to please  him.  Such counsel was  not directed  to the 
wellbeing of  the community of  the people,  and some of  the 
ordinances which  were being made were  founded  rather  on 
will (volontie) than uDon law.' 
A 
The  principles  of  the  writer  are asserted  very  definitely 
and even contentiously, but that docs not mean that they are 
abnormal or inconsistent with the general conceptions of  the 
time.  The principle, that the king is under the law, is, as we 
have so frequently said, the normal political principle of  the 
Middle  Ages,  and no one  had  expressed  it more  definitely 
or emphatically than Bracton.  The principle that the king, 
Id., i.  2 : "  Et tut seit,  qe  li  Roi 
ne  deut aver nu1 pier en sa terre, pur 
ceo  neqedent  quo  le  Rei de  son tort, 
s'il  peeche  vers  ascun  de  son  poeple, 
"0  nu1  de  ces  commissaires, ne  poet 
eatre juge e partie, convenist par dreit 
quo li Roi ust compaignouns pur oir et 
terminor  as  Parlementz  trostuz  les 
brefs  10s  plointes de torz  le  Roi,  tie 
la Reyne, e de  leur onfanz, ot do leur 
es~eciaus,  de  qi torz  len no  poet aver 
&utrement comun  dreit.  Ceus  com- 
paignons sunt ore appellez oontes apres 
le Latin de comites." 
'  Id., iv. 11. 
Id., v.  1, 2 : "  Abusion  est qe ou 
les  Parlementz se duissont £ere sur les 
sauvacions les almes des trespassours, 
et ceo it  Londres e as deux fois par an, 
la ne  se funt il ore forque rerement  e 
a la volontie le Roi sur eides o cueil- 
letles do tresor.  E ou les ordonnsnres 
be  duisent fore de comun assent del ltoi 
et de ses countes, 1s ce funt ore par le 
Roi e oes clercs e par aliens et autres qi 
n'osent contreriner le Roi, einz dbsirent 
del  plere  et  de  li  con~eillcr  as  son 
proffit,  tut  ne  soit  mie  lur  consoil 
covenable  a1  comun  del  poeple,  sanz 
appeler 10s countes  e saunz  suivre les 
riules de droit ; e done plusours orden- 
aunces  se  fondent  ore  plus  sur  Is 
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in cases between himself  and his subject, was  "justiciable " 
-that  is, that he was under the jurisdiction  of  a court, was 
clearly a matter of  some conlplexity ; but it must be remem- 
bered  that  it  was  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  general 
principles  of  feudal law,  and  probably,  even,  as  has  been 
recently  urged  by  M.  Ganshof,  of  pre-feudal  1aw.l  The 
'  Mirror of  Justices ' is  only  expressing the  same  judgment 
as the interpolator of  Bracton, as Fleta, and as Britton.  The 
principle that laws were to be made, not by the king alone, 
but with the advice and consent of  his great council, corre- 
sponds with the constitutional usage of  the Middle Ages.  The 
principle  that  Parliaments  should  be  held  frequently  and 
regularly  belongs  to  the  question  of  constitutional  usage, 
wliilc the assertion that when  they mot  they were  not con- 
cerned solely with granting "  aids,"  clearly corresponds with 
the facts. 
There  is  yet  another  English  treatise  of  this  time,  the 
'Modus  Tenendi  Parliamenturn,'  which  has  considerable 
importance as representing  opinions upon  the nature of  the 
constitution of  the time, which must not be taken as univer- 
sally accepted, but are not therefore unimp~rtant.~ 
In the first place, it is laid  down  in emphatic terms that 
when  the king requires "  aids," he must ask for these in full 
Parliament,  they  cannot  be  imposed  without  the  consent 
of  Parliamer~t.~ 
What  is  perhaps  more  significant  in  the  treatise  is  the 
assumption  that  all  difficult  and  serious  questions  in  the 
1  Cf. Ganshof's  Essay in  'M6langes 
d'histoiro  offerts a Henri Pirenne.'  Cf. 
vol. v., pago  11  1 of  this work. 
2  For a  discuhsion  of  the dato  end 
character of  this work, we would rofer 
the  reader  to the  edition  by  Sir  T. 
Duffus  Hardy,  1846.  He  dat,es  tho 
work  as  probably  written  between 
1294 and  1327.  Professor  Pollard,  in 
his '  Nvolution of  Parliament,' expresses 
the opinion that it belongs to  the early 
years of  Eclwnrcl 111. 
"  Modus  tenondi  Parljamentnm,' 
page  41 :  "  Rex  non  solobet  petere 
auxllium do regno suo nisi  pro guerra 
instante, vel filios suos milites faciendo, 
vel  filias  sues  maritendo,  et  tunc 
debont hujusmodi auxilia peti in pleno 
Parliamento,  et  in  scriptis  cuilibet 
gradui  Parliamenti  liberari  et  in 
scriptis  respondon ;  et sciondum  est 
quod  si huiusmodi  auxilia  concedenda 
oportet, quod omnes pares parliamenti 
consentiant." 
government of  the country should be brought  before Parlia- 
nlent,l  and  a  description  of  what  the writer  conceived  to 
be the proper order of business in Parliament.  He puts first, 
of  war and the affairs of the king and his family ; 
second, the common  affairs of  the kingdom, the amendment 
of laws, &c. ; and  third, the affairs of  private  persons  and 
Another passage of  some importance is that in which the 
author  declares that Parliament  must not  disperse until all 
petitions have been considered, and that if  the king permits 
this, he is perj~red.~ 
We  may put beside these English works a treatise written 
evidently in Prance jn  the latter part of  the fourteenth cen- 
tury, for it  is addressed to Charles V., the '  Somnium Viridarii.' 
In Book I.,  Chapter 134, the discussion turns upon the nature 
of the tyrant, but this part of  the work corresponds so closely 
with Bartolus' tract, '  De Tyranno,' with which we  deal in a 
later chapter, that it is unnecessary to consider it hem5 
In Chapter 140, however, the discussion takes a new direc- 
tion, and raises important questions about the nature of the 
royal  power  and the rights  of  the commuliity in  regard  to 
thls.  "  Clericus " asks  by  what  right  thc  King  of  France 
imposes upon  his subjects the "  Gabella " and other intoler- 
able burdens.  Is not  this  tyranny ?  "  Miles " replies  that 
the  King  of  France has  certainly the right  to impose such 
taxation, but he is guilty of  sin if  he does this without cause. 
He can do it for the defence of  the Commonwealth against the 
enemy, but if  he uses the money thus raised for other purposes, 
the blood and sweat of  his subjects will bc demanded of him 
at the Day  of  Judgment.  This leads him  to the important 
distinction bctween the ordinary revenues of  the crown  and 
the extraordinary ; the prince should not normally demand of 
his  subjects  more  than  the former.  Even  with  regard  to 
Id.,  pago  17 :  I'  Do  Casibus  et  4  '  Somnium Viridarii,'  ed.  Golclast ; 
judiciis  difficilibus."  '  Monarchia,'  1611, vol. i. p. 58. 
Id., page  23.  CE. p. 80. 
a  Id., page  45. 38  FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
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these, however, it must be assumed that they were originally 
granted for such great purposes as the defence of  the country 
and the administration  of  justice,  and they  must  be  used 
for the purposes for which they were granted ; if  they were 
diverted to other purposes, they may justly  be refused,  the 
prince  may  justly  be  deposed,  and the  people  may  elect 
another prince.' 
Ee repeats  that the prince  may impose  talliages  for the 
defence of  the country, but  he may not spend  the money 
on his personal pleasures  and vices ;  if  he does so, he must 
repay it.  Except for public purposes, no king or prince may 
impose such taxcs ; and if  he does so, the subjects are not 
bound to obey, for  he is exceeding the limits of  his power.2 
It  is clear that the author  has definite and dogmatic  views 
about the limitations of  the authority of  the king in matters 
of  taxation. 
The principle of  the right of  the subjects to resist and even 
'  Sommum  Vlridanl,'  I.  141 
"  Miles :  Credendnm  enlm  est,  quod 
fusta de causa lst~  (ordlnarl~)  redd~tus 
fuerunt prlnclpi  concessl, sclllcet, pro 
defens~one  patr~ae,  pro  lustltla  Inter 
populum  exercenda,  et  s~m~llbus  de 
causls  ~ta  tamen  quod  domlnus 
compleat  ~llud,  propter  quod  dlch 
redditus fuerunt lnstltutl 
SI  enlm  princeps  justlt~am dene 
garet subdltls, utpote  appellantes non 
rec~peret,  vel  patr~am  non  defenderet, 
tales  reddltus  ordlnan~,  gebellae, lm- 
positlonos, foagla, et s~mllla,  si sint ln- 
duct1 tales redd~tus  oxtraord~narl~  justa 
do causa, scll~cet  pro defenslone  patrlae, 
nec oo mod0 defendatur quo posslt et de- 
bet, nec redd~tus  ad lllum usum, sed In 
allum convertantur, tunc tales redclltus 
ordlnan~  juste possent donegar1,lmo  lure 
scr~pto,  super dictamlne roctae rat~onls 
fundato,  mer~to  a  reglmlne tamquam 
~nd~gnus  foret  doponendus.  Et 81  In 
reglmlne  tot~us  regnl,  SIC  negllgeret, 
omruno deponendus : st bceret populo 
6l1um 9111 prlnclpem el~gere  81 In parte 
regnl  soluun  hoe  negl~geret, llceret 
populo 1111~s  locl  allurn slb~  prlnclpem 
el~gere, maxlme  quando  talls  esset 
princeps  qul  superiorem  non  recog- 
nosceret In teri~s." 
4  Id  ld.  ~d : "  Si  autem  dominus 
vellt ad aleas ludere, vel ultra vlres In 
voluptatlbus, vest~bus,  hosp~t~bus,  cas- 
tris  non  necessarlls  ad  tult~onem 
reipubllcae aed~ficand~s  expendere, non 
dcbet  propterea  a  subd~tls allquld 
extorquere, quods~  fece~lt,  ad rest~tu- 
tlonem  tenetur. . . .  SI  slt  rex, 
potest  auctorltate  sua  proprla  pro 
ul~htate  bon~  cornmunls de novo tdllas 
imponere,  compensata  suhd~torum 
facultate. . .  Quod  debet  ~ntell~g~, 
nlsl facultates sufficlant reg1 vel prln 
clpi  pro  defens~one reipubllcae.  Si 
autem ~llae  talkae nu110  mod0 slnt ad 
ut~lltatem  bolu  communln,  nec  rex, 
nec  princeps  po(cst  eas  Imponere. 
Quod,  SI  ~mposuer~t,  subd~t~  non 
tenentur obedlro, qula  potestatls suae 
I~m~tes  ex~t.  Undo  ergo,  In  tall 
causa,  si  ad  hoc  reg1  non  sufficlunt 
facultates, potest  a  subdltls aux~llum 
moderaturn ~mplorare." 
to depose  the  king  who  neglects  his  duty,  or  abuses  his 
autllor~ty,  1s  stated  again  very  dogn~atieally in  a  later 
chapter,  and is there brought into relation  to the principle 
that it was from the people that the king had received  his 
authority.  If the emperor or king be guilty  of  destruction 
of  the kingdom,  or  of  damnable  negligence,  or  of  tyranny, 
or any other crime for which he deserves to be deposed, the 
people,  from  whom  he  received  his  authority,  tacitly  or 
expressly, are to depose him, and not the Pope, unless those 
who are responsible will not or cannot do this.  He brushes 
aside the tradition  that it was  Pope Zacharias who  had de- 
posed  Chilperic ;  the  French  at that  time  consulted  him 
because,  perhaps,  they were  not sure of  their power, for at 
that time there was not yet the University of  Paris, and there 
was not then in France the multitude of wise men that there 
is n0w.l 
The  gleater  part  of  the work  is  occupied  with  the dis- 
cussion of the relations of  the temporal and spiritual powers, 
and with this we are not here concerned. 
We turn to a treatise written by Lupold of Babenburg about 
the year  1338.  Every people,  he says, who  are without  a 
king can by the "  jus  gentium " elect a king for themselves ; 
and ~t is thus that the electors of  the empire elect a king or 
emperor, as being the representatives of the princes and people 
of  Germany, of Italy, and the other provinces of the kingdom 
and empire.  They do this "  vice omnium " ; they are acting, 
not as individuals, but as a "  collegium,"  and as representing 
th~  "universitas " of the princes  and people of  the empire.2 
Id,  1.  163 : "  Ed ldeo  SI  lmpera 
tor vcl rex comm~ttlt  crlmen d~lap~da- 
t101116  vel  destruct~on~s  lmperl~ vel 
106111,  aut  damnabllls  ncgllgenilae 
ImPer11 vol  regnl,  vel  tyrannldlr,  sou 
'luodcunque  aliud  propter  quod  non 
"nmerlto  depon~  meruent,  Papa  non 
rlcheret cum  deponcre, sod  populus, n 
buam  lecep~t  potestatem,  tac~to 
"'I  eXpre960,  nlsl  1111, ad  qllos spectat, 
"'"'tnt,  aut 11011 pos~ent  facere lust~t~ae 
complemcntum  Non  obstat  c  Allus 
15, q.  3  qua Galllci dub11 forsltan  de 
proprla  potestate  Papam  tanyuam 
saplentem duaerunt consulendum  Non- 
dum, tunc  temporls,  v~gebat  studlum 
Par~slus,  nec  Erancla  tot prudcnt~bus, 
prout nunc est adhuc, erat replcta " 
Lupold  of  Bebenburg,  'Do  Jure 
Regn~  et Impern Romam,' v  (p 179). 
"  Qulllbet  PO~II~US  carens rege, potest 
61b1 Ieyem ohy~le  do  jlue  gent~um,  ex 40  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
Again, he says that some maintained that the translation  of 
the empire receivcd its authority, not from the Roman Church, 
but from the Roman people.  Again, in another place, he cites 
the opinion of  sollie great Jurists, who held that the Ron~ail 
people could still make laws, especially during a vacancy  of 
the empire, for the people was greater than the prince, and 
coiild, for just reason, depose the emperor.  He is careful to 
explain that he means by the Roman people the whole people 
of  the empire, and that this people inchided the whole com- 
munity, the princes and nobles as well as the others.] 
We  can now consider the exact nature and importance of 
the contribution to this subject, made by Marsilius of  Padua, 
in his treatise, '  Defensor Pacis.' 
Mars~lius  is anxious to show that his treatment of  political 
quo jure regna cond~ta  sunt  . . . Et 
princlpes  olectorea  ratlone  jam  d~ctae 
~nst~tut~onls,  habent  ehgere  regem 
seu  ~mperatorem, reprosentantes  In 
hoe  omnos  pnnclpes et populum  Ger- 
man~ae,  Itallao, et  al~alumprovlnclarum 
et terrarum, regnl et Impern, quasl vlce 
omniurn  eligendo  . . .  v~  (p  181) . 
Hostlensls  notat  ext.  de  electlone  c. 
Venerabllem,  In  Glossa,  haec  alter- 
natlo . quod  elect10  pertmot  ad pnn- 
c~pes  electores, non tamen ad  colleglum, 
sed tamquam  ad slngulares  pelsonas. 
Sed ego salva reverentla tant~  vln, non 
credo  hoc  vorum.  Credo  onlm  quod 
ad eos  pertmet tall8 electlo,  tanquam 
ad colleglum  seu  ad un~vers~tatem: 
cujus ratlo est, SI  lnstltutlo prinupum 
electorum non essot facta, omues prln- 
apes  et  a111  representantes  populum 
sublectum  Romano  regno  ct  lmperlo 
haberent cllgere regem et  ~mpcratorem. 
Sedlps~  censentur el~gerev~ceet  auctoll- 
tate umverbitat~s  pnnclpum, et pop1111 
praedlctorum " 
Id ld ,  XII.  (p 105) : Some  mum- 
tam  "quod prcdlcta  tranlatlo non ab 
ecrlrsla Romana,  sod pot~us  a  populo 
Rolllano robur habult et vlgorem." 
Id ~d ,  XVII  (p 200)  "  Ullca opposl- 
tlones ~stas  earumque solul~ones,  sclen. 
dum est quod quaedam solennls opimo 
magnorun? leglstorum, quae habet, quod 
populus  Ronianl  lmporll  posbet  hodle 
legem condor0 In absentla prmclpls, vel 
vacante  impello :  dlcenhum  quod 
populus est major ~mperstore,  ~ta  quod 
ex  causa  jnuta  poss~t  ~mperthtorem 
deponere  . . . Et respondunt  ad  1. 
fin. c. de leg~bus  (Cod. I.  14, 12) ln qua 
legc  dlcltur  so11  lmpeiatorl concessum 
esse leges conderr, quod id quod dlcltur 
ib~,  soh, dlcatur ad evcluslonem Infer]- 
orum, non  ad exclus~onem  popul~,  qu~ 
major est pllnclpe secundum eos  Et  slo 
~ntrll~go  populum Roman1 lmperli, con- 
numeratis  pr~nc~p~bus  dector~bus  ac 
et~am  ahls  prln~lp~bus,  comlt~bus  et 
baronlbus regnl et lmperll Romanorurn. 
Nam  appoll,ztlone  popul~  contlnontur 
etlam patrltn et senatores " 
Cf.  Engolbert of  Adrnont . '  De Ortu 
et Fine Roman1 Impcrn.'  (Ed  Offen- 
bach, 1610). xi  (p 31)  "  Quod patet 
ex  eo  quad  qualnvls  aliquls  juste 
adeptus s~t  regnum, 61  non bcne  regit, 
aut intolerat~lls  est In regonclo, mallt~a 
1ps1113 just8  dedlcltur,  et  do  Iegno 
depomtur." 
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theory is related to the Aristotelian "  Politics."  He therefore 
begins with a discussion of  the origin of  civil society, which is 
taken  directly froill  histotle,l and  he  states  the  purpose 
and end of  this dso in the terms of Aristotle ; the end of  the 
state is the good life.2 
Be cites  from  Aristotle  the  description  of  the  various 
forms of  government : the good forms, monarchy, aristocracy 
and the  Commonwealth;  and  the  corrupt  forms.3  It is, 
however, when he comes to the discussion of  the place of  law 
in the State, and its source, that his discussion begins to have 
a substantial importance ; we have already, however, discussed 
this  part  of  his work in the first  chapter,  and we  are here 
concerned with  his  very  important  statements with regard 
to  the ruler  or  "Principans."  (If  we  may  conjecture,  we 
should  say  that he  generally  uses  the term "  Principans " 
instead of  the more usual term "  Princeps,"  because he doe8 
not conceive of  the ruler  as being necessarily one man, and 
this may possibly be due to the circumstance that he is think- 
ing  of  an  Italian  city,  at least  as  much  as  of  a  northern 
monarchy.) 
Marsilius sets out very emphatically the principle that the 
"Principans"  derives  his  authority,  not  at  all  from  his 
personal  qualities,  but solely from the election of  the legis- 
lator-that  is, the "  civium universitas,"  and that the correc- 
tion and, if  necessary, the deposition of  the ruler belongs to 
the same a~thority.~  Marsilius  appeals to Aristotle as con- 
'  Marslllus  of  Padua,  '  Defensor 
Pac~s,'  I.  3. 
=  Id,  I.  1, 4. 
Id,l. 8 
Id.  ld ,  I.  15,  1 : "  Consequenter 
autem  dlctls  restat  ostendere  prlncl- 
Panlls  factlvam  causam,  per  quam 
vldellcet  allcu~ vel  ahqu~bus  datur 
auctorllas  prlnc~patus,  qu~  per  olec- 
Clonem statultur.  Hac enlm auctorltate 
ht prlnceps  secundum actum, non per 
legurn  8clcnrlam,  prudenclam,  aut 
moralem vlrtutem, llcet slnt ha0 quah- 
prlnclpanti~  perfect]  Cont~ng~t 
has  multov  habere,  qm  tarnen 
auctorltate  carentes,  non  sunt  prln- 
clpes nlsl forte proplnqua potenola. 
2.  Ad  quaesltum  ergo  redeuntes, 
dlcamus  secundum  verltatem  et sen- 
tenclam  Anstotehs  3'  Pol~tlce Cap. 
6'  potestatem  factlvam  ~nstituclonls 
prlnc~patus sou  eleccion~s ~ps~us  ad 
leglslatorem seu clvlum un~vers~tatem, 
quemadrnodum  ad  eandem  legumla- 
clonom  dlx~mus  pcrtlnere,  12'  hu~us, 
prlnc~patus  quoque  correpclonem 
quamhbet, eelam  depos~t~onem.  SI  ex- 
pechens  fuer~t  propter  commune  con- 
ferens, eldem simlllter convemre." 
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The position  of  Marsilius is plaln and dogmatic, but again 
we  must not makc the mistake of thinking that it was ncw 
and revolutionary.  We cannot recapitulate our treatment of 
these questions in earlier volumes, where we have, as we think, 
made it sufficiently clear that the normal mediaval tradition 
was,  not only that the prince  was  bound by the law,  and 
that he could not take any action against either the persons 
or  the property  of  the subjects,  except  by process  of  law, 
but that in the last resort the community was entitled to take 
legal action against him and, if  necessary, depose him.  This 
was not the judgment  only of  writers like Manegold or John 
of  Salisbury, who may be thought to  represent an extreme or 
merely theoretical position, but also of  so careful and  measured 
a political thinker as St Thonlas Aquinas.l 
We turn to the political theory of  William of  Oooam.  He 
conceived  of  the authority of  the emperor as being derived 
from God, but  through men  (per homine~).~  What does  he 
then  consider  to be the nature of  this  authority 4  In one 
important passage he draws out the same distinction, which 
we have already seen in some writers of  the  thirteenth century ; 
the 'distinction that is between  the king who rules according 
to  his own will and  not according to the  laws of  the community, 
and the king  who  rules  according to the law.3/ Like these 
writers,  Occam  draws  a  very sharp contrast between  these. 
vel per ahquem aut al~quos  leg~slator~s 
auctor~tate  statutos ad hoc, ut demon 
stratum ast 12'  et 15O  hulus  Convenlt 
eclam  pro  tempore  allquo,  corr~gendl 
prlnc~pantls officlum  suspendere  ad 
~llum  maxlme  aut ~llos,  qu~  de lpslus 
transgresslone  debuermt  jud~care, ne 
proptel  tune  plural~tatem  p~lnc~patu? 
contlngcrot  In  commumtato  sch~sma, 
conrltat~o  at pugna, et quonlsm  rlon 
corrlgltur  In  quantum prlnclpans  sod 
tanquan~  subd~tus  transgressor logls. 
Secundum  haec  ltaque  lngxod~entes 
ad ques~tas  dub~tac~ones  d~camus,  quod 
excessus prlnc~pant~s  vel gravls cst aut 
mod~cus,  adhuc vel est de poss~b~l~bus 
evenire  frequenter, aut  raro  tantum- 
modo.  Ampllus vel est de lege deter- 
mirlatls aut non . . . . . . .  . . . . 
SI  qu~de~n  lege  determlnatus,  se- 
cundum  legem  corrlgendus,  SI  vero 
non, secundum leg~slator~s  sententlam ; 
et  leg0  debet  determlnarl,  quanturn 
poss~b~le  fuerit,  ut  ostensum  est  a 
rlobls  11'  liu~us." 
1 Cf. vol. m  part I, chap. 4, part li. 
chap.  5 and 6, vol  v. pa16  I  cllaps. 
7 and 8 
2  Occam,  '  D~alogus,' Pars  Tertla, 
Tractatus Secundus, I.  26 (p 899). 
3  Cf.  vol. v. part I  chap  6. 
The  first  governs  according  to  his  own  will,  and  is  not 
bound  by  human law or  custom,  but  only by natural law. 
such a king does not swear to keep the human laws and cus- 
tonls : he need only swear to observe the natural law and to 
pursue the common good.  The second is bound to obey the 
laws and customs made by men, and must swear that he will 
do this.  It is not very clear from this passage whether Occam 
intends to give a preference to the one form of  kingship or the 
other ;  but it  is important to  observe that he doubts whether in 
his time there was any monarchy of  the first kind.l 
Occam 1s here discussing the nature of  monarchy in general. 
Another  part  of  the '  Dialogus ' is  entitled  "  De  Iuribus 
Romani Imperii " : he is here discussing the question  of  the 
political  authority  of  the  emperor,  and  the  treatment  is 
somewhat  complex.  Tho emperor, he says, and every king 
in  his  kingdom,  is "  solutus legibus,"  and is not bound  to 
judge according to the law.  The emperor is above all positive 
law, but not above "natural equity."  So far, Occam might 
Occam,  'Dlalogus,'  Pars  Tertla,  tales  leges  et  consuetudlnes  servare 
Prlmus Tractatus, 2, 6 (p.794)  "  Ille  tenetur, tanto magls  reced~t  a  momo- 
dlcltur prlncxpare st regnare secundum  rato prlnclpatu  regall ; et ldeo  forte 
voluntatem  suam,  et  non  secundum  h~s  diebus non est In un~vereo  orbe talls 
legem,  qul  regnat  propter  commune  prlnclpatus sc111cet prlmus regalls  . . . 
bonum  omnlum  at nullls  leg~bus  hu-  Ex  predlctls coll~g~  potest, quod prlncl- 
manls pure posltlvls, vel consuetud~m-  patux regah, praesertlm potlsslmo,  non 
bus alllgatur, sed est supra hujusmod~  solum tyranms propne dlcta, sed etlam 
leges, llcet  leg~bus  natural~bus  astnn-  princ~patus despotlcus  ahquo  modo 
gatur  Et ~deo  tall8  rex  non  habet  oppon~tur,  vel  est prlnc~patus  ~ta  dls- 
lurare  et  promlttere  se  ~orvaturum  paratus  ut  nullus  unus  prln~lpatus 
quaspunquo  legcs  vel  consuctud~nos  posslt esse regalls et despot~~us  respoctu 
humanas  ~ntroductas,  llcet  expediens  eorundem  quod tamen allquls doml- 
816  lpsum lurare quod leges naturales  netur regahter, ot allqms despot~ce,  in- 
Pro utllllate communl sorvablt, et quod  convenlons  non  v~detur  " 
omnibus  quao  spsctant  ad  prlncl-  Id  ~d ,  Pars  Tortla,  Tractatus 
Patum  assumptum,  commune  bonum  Secundus,  I.  15 (p 884)  "  Qua enlm 
Intendat, non prlvatum. .  Et talls  Imperator  in  lmperlo  mundl,  et rex 
Prlnclpatus  regalls  dlntur  aocundum  In  regno  sno, solutus  est leg~bus,  11oc 
legem,  qua,  hcet  unus  pnnclpetur,  tenetur  de necess~tate  jud~care  secun 
mode  tamen  pnnclpatur  socundunl  dum  leges,  quemadmodum  lud~ces 
vO1untatem, sed  quibusdam  leglhui  infer~ores  secundum  leges  de  neceyil 
et  consuotuchmbus,  humarntus  lntro  tate judlcare tenentur. . . . 16 (p 886) 
ductls astrlngltur, quas tenetur servare,  Ita Imperator  qula est supra posltlva  ''  lPSas be  servaturum lurare vel pro  jura  non  est super aequltatem naturs. 
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seem to mean that the emperor is one of  those who  govern 
according to his own will,  and not according to the laws  or 
customs of  the community.  We must, however, observe that 
this does not give us a complete account of  Occam's conception 
of  the power of  the emperor.  A little further on, the question 
is raised  whether men  must  obey the emperor in all lawful 
things (in omnibus licitis).  The "  Discipulus " asks whether 
men must obey the emperor in everything ; the "  Magister " 
replies  that wc  must  not  obey  him  in unlawful  or  unjust 
things,  and that men  are only  bound  to obey  the emperor 
in  matters  which  belong  to  the  temporal  rule.  The  dis- 
ciple  asks  whether  this  means  that a  man  must  obey  the 
emperor  rather  than  his  immediate  lord,  and  the  master 
answers  that he  must  do  so,  for the emperor is the immc- 
diate lord of  all men in temporal things.  The disciple urges 
that  this  would  have  "  duo  inconvenientes "  ;  first,  that 
if  all men are bound to obedience, they would  all be slaves ; 
and, secondly, that those who follow thcir immediate lord in 
war against the emperor would be guilty of  "laesae majestatis." 
The answer to both points is very  significant.  It  does not 
follow, the "  Magister " in the first place answers, from what 
has been said, that the subjects are bound to obey the emperor 
in all things, but only in those things which belong to the rule 
of  the people ; and, therefore, ~f the emperor should command 
anything which is contrary to the utility  of  the people, they 
are not bound  to obey.  Subjects  are not under  the same 
obligation as slaves : slaves would have to surrender all their 
goods at the command of  the lord, but freemen are not under 
that obligation ; the emperor  cannot command this, except 
for  the coiilmon  utility  or  good,  and this  utility  must  be 
necessary and manifest.  In the second place,  he says, it is 
true that the man  who  follows  his lord in  an  unjust  war 
against the emperor is guilty of  "  laesa majestas." 
1 Id.  ~d , Pars  Tertla,  Tractatus  ~must~s  nullus  debet  s1b1  obedlre. 
Secundub, n  20 (p 017) : "  DISCI~II~UR  DISCI~U~US  :  Numqu~d in  omn~bus 
Queilvlmus,  . . .  utrum  slb~  omnev  11~1tls  omnes  81b1  debent  obedlre,  ~ta 
teneantur ln ommbus obedlre.  Magls-  ut  peccent  ~UI  s1b1  recusavermt  In 
tar.  Respondetur  quod  ln ilhc~tls  et  llc~to  quocunque  obed~re.  Maglslor. 
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~h~ treatment of  these questions by Occam is as interesting 
as it is complex ; the necessity of  obedience is at  first stated 
very sharply, but it appears that Occam leaves a large amount 
of discretion to the subject to  judge of  what the emperor may 
legitimately  require,  and especially  this  passage  suggests  a 
reference to the questions of  property and taxation, and to 
the very complex conditions of  the Feudal Law with regard to 
the relations of vassal and  lord. 
 he question of  the relation  to private property is further 
developed in a survey of  different opinions.  There are some, 
Occam says, who maintain that the emperor is not "  donlinus 
olnlliuin rerum  temporaliuni,"  others that he is ; but there 
is also a third opinion  that he is not lord of  all property in 
such a sense that he can do what he likes with it, but he is 
lord in a certain sense, for he may use it for the public utility 
when he sees that this is to be preferred to the private.  Hc 
may not do this arbitrarily, but only on account of  the guilt 
of  the owner, or for some common purpose, and he has, there- 
fore, no absolute rights over property in genera1.l 
In h~s  quae spectant ad reglmen popull  quibua non tenentur hberi,  nam  servl 
temporalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ad solurn  praeceptum lmperator~s  om. 
Dlsclpulus:  Numqu~d  In  hu~usmodl  ma  bona  quae  tenent,  tenentur  blb~ 
qu~llbet  tenetur mags obedlre Impera-  dlmlttere  alsque  hoc  quod  utlhtatem 
tor],  quam  cull~bet  alter],  puts  reg]  communem  praetendant,  sed  ad  hoc 
sue, aut duc~,  ant marcluoni, aut alten  Ilberl  non  tenentur,  nec  Imperator 
dommo suo lmmed~ato  . . . . . . . .  potest  els  hoc  praec~pere  absquc 
Maglster :  Respondetur  quod . . .  utlhtate  bonl  communls,  lmo,  etlam 
Imperator est domlnub in temporahbus  neque  sbsque  man~festa utllltnte  et 
Omnmm ~mmediatus,  ita ut In h~s  quaa  necessitate. . . . Ad seeundum dleltur, 
sPect+3nt  ad regnum  mortahum, magls  quod qulcunque comt cum quocunque 
slt obedlendum  lmporatorl quam cul-  doml~~o  suo ad bellum lnlustum contra 
OUnque  domino ~nfer~o~i.  . . . . . . .  Imperatorem  lnmdit  in erimen  laesm 
Maglster :  Ad prlmum dtcltur : quod  majestatls." 
nOn sequitur  ex procl~ct~s,  qula, slcut  Id. ~d.  ~d.,  11.  23 (p. 920) : "  Est 
dictum  est  pnus,  snbdlt~  ~mperatons  una  oplnlo,  quod  Imperator  non  ost 
"On  In omnibus tenentur s~bl  obedlre :  dominus  omnlum  rorum  temporal~um, 
his  tantum  quae spectant  sd  quae etism mlnlme spectant ad eccle- 
"glmen  popuh ; hoc  cut, In  h~s  quae  blam,  ut ad llb~tum  suum  llceat  81b1 
ne~e~saria  ad regendurn juste  et  vel valeat, de omrl~bus  hu~usmodl  rebus 
utlllter populum s1b1 subd~tum,  et ldeo  quod  voluerlt  ordlnare ;  est  tamen 
Praeclperet  ahqud, quocl est contra  dominus  quodammodo  omnlum  pro 
utllltatem  popul~  slbl  subjocto,  non  eo,  quod  omn~bus  hujua   mod^  rebus, 
tenerentur  slbl  obed~re.  . . .  sed  In  quocunque  contradlcente,  potost  ut~ 
mu't1s  tenentur  slbi  obedlre  servi,  In  et  eaa  appllcare  ad  utll~tatem  com- FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
This  section  of  the '  Dialogus ' ends  with  the  question 
whether the emperor has "  plenitudo potestatis " in temporal 
things.  He gives reasons for the view that he has, but other 
reasons against it.  The emperor can only make law for the 
public good, not for his private convenience, for the Imperial 
Power is only established for the public good, and does not 
extend to things that do not concern this.  The emperor is 
not  bound  by  his  own  laws,  but he is bound  by  the "  jus 
gentium." l 
We must, however, turn to another work of  Occam before 
we endeavour to sum up his position : this is the work entitled 
'  Octo Questiones super potestate et dignitate Papali.'  It is 
chiefly concerned with the position and authority of  the Pope, 
but frequently refers  to that  of  the emperor,  and in  some 
important passages it seems to be  dealing rather with  the 
general principles of  royal authority than with the empire in 
particular. 
We  begin  by  observing an important  general  statement. 
The king is superior in the kingdom, but in some cases ("in 
casu ")  he is inferior in the kingdom, for in cases of  necessity he 
may be deposed and held prisoner, and this by "  jus naturale," 
for by this law  violence may be resisted  by  violence.  The 
words are strong, but they receive an additional significance 
when we observe that Occam goes on to say that if  the emperor 
commits  some  great  crime,  such  as  the destruction  of  the 
empire, or is guilty  of  extreme negligence,  the Romans,  or 
those to whom the Romans have entrusted their power, ought 
to dopose him.2 
munem,  quandocunque  viderit  com- 
munem  utilitatem  esse  praeferendam 
utilitati  privatae.  . . .  Rerum etiam 
spectantium ad alios habet  domiuium 
ex  causa  et  pro  communi  utilltato 
populi,  et propter  delictum  possiden- 
tium  potest  ab  eis  auferre,  et  sibi 
appropriare,  vel  aliis  donare.  Quia 
tamen hoc non potest pro suo arbitrio 
volunlat,is,  sed  pro  culpa  possiden- 
tium, vel ex cause, scilicet, pro utilitate 
communi ;  ideo  non  habet  in  eis 
dominium  ita  pingue  sicut  in  rebus 
primis,  quas  potuit,  sicut  placuerit, 
sibi alienare ad libitum." 
1 Id. id. id., ii. 26-28. 
2  Id. :  '  Octo  Questiones,'  ii.  7 
(p.  340) :  "  Rex  enim  superior  e,t 
toto regno;  et tamen  in  casu  est in 
ferior regno : quia in casu necmsitatis 
potest  regem  deponere  et  in  castro 
retinore,  hoc  enim  habetur  ax  jure 
naturali, sicut ex jure  naturali habetur 
quod vim vi repellcre licet." 
11.  8 : "  Et ideo  si  Imperator  com- 
mittat  crimen  dilapidationis  vel  des- 
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In another "  Question " he  deals  with the nature  of  the 
authority of  the ruler in more general terms ; terms the more 
significant because Occam  begins  by setting out his opinion 
that  the best  form  of  government  is  the monarchy.  This 
does not mean that this authority should be absolute.  The 
"  principans " should not have that "  plenitudo  potestatis " 
which  in  an earlier  "  question " he had  discussed-that  is, 
that he could take from his subjects what he might will, for 
this would mean that his subjects were his slaves.1 
In another "  Question " he returns to the subject  of  the 
origin and nature of the power of  the emperor, and discusses 
the question of the transference of the empire from the Greeks 
to Charlemagne.  He argucs that this was not done by  thc 
Pope, but by the Roman people:  it was to them that from 
the beginning the "  Imperium " belonged, and it was  from 
then? that the emperor received it, for they transferred their 
authority to him  for the common  good ; but  they  did not 
give him authority to rule despotically, nor did they abdicate 
their power of disposing of the empire in certain  cases  (casu- 
aliter).  Had they done this, they would have ceased to be free, 
and  would  have  made  themselves  slaves,  and the emperor 
would have possessed a despotic and not a royal a~thority.~ 
tructionis imperii aut damnabilis negli- 
gentiae  in  pericnlum  imperii  tyran- 
nidis, vel  quodcunque  alhd deponore 
dignissimum,  Romani  vel  illi  in  quos 
Buam  potestatem  Romani  dederunt, 
debent ipsum deponere." 
Id.  id.,  iii.  5  (p. 350) :  Secundo 
ad optimum principatum tam generalem 
respectu  cunctorum mortalium,  quam 
specialem respectu  quorundam,  seoun. 
durn  opinionem prescriptam  rcquiritur 
quad princcps  sit una persona . . .  qua 
Propter  secundum  philosopl~os  princi- 
Patus regalis, quo una persona refulgot, 
tam principatum aristocraticum, quam 
Politicurn,  quorum  utrique  proesident 
plures,  suporat  et praecxcellit.  . . . 
Ex isto  secundum  opinionem  prae- 
fatam videtur  principatui  optimo  re- 
pugnare, quod principans  illam habeat 
VOL.  VI. 
plenitudinem potestatis, quae descripta 
Ost supra q. i. cap. 6. ut scilicet do jure, 
si  voluerit,  omnia  possit  percipere  st 
imponere  subditis,  quae  nec  juri 
naturali indispensabili  nec juri  divino. 
ad  quod  omnes  catholici  obligantur, 
obviant  vel  repugnat ;  nam  omnes 
nubditi,  habeuti  hujusmodi  plenitudi- 
nem  potestatis  super  eos,  sunt servi 
ipsius,  secundum  strictissimam  signi. 
ficotionem  vocabuli  servi.  Nam  hac 
potestate nullus dominus super servos 
potest  habcre  majorem  de  jure,  ergo 
optimo  principatui  repugnat,  quod 
omnes  subiecti  sint  servi,  ergo  etiam 
ropugnat,  quod  habeat  hujusmodi 
plenitudinem  potestatis." 
Id. id., iv.  8  (p. 367) : "  Hic (the 
contention  that  the Pope  transferred 
the Empire from the Greeks to Charle- FOURTEENTH  CENT-. 
It  is interesting to compare the position of  Occm with that 
of  Marsilius, for there are obvious differences between them. 
Marsilius sets out in broad terms, which are related both to 
the gcnerd theory and to Lhe  constitutiond  practice  of  the 
Middle Ages, that the community itself is the ultimate source 
of  all law and all authority, and remains the legislator, and 
that the ruler  (principans) as he receives his authority from 
the community, so  also remains subject to its authority and 
judgment. 
Occan~  appears  to us to represent  something more  of  the 
tradition  of  the Civilians.  hike them, he recognises frankly 
that it is the community from which all authority ultimately 
comes, but hc conceives of  the community as having trans- 
ferred  its  authority  to the ruler,  including  the legislative 
power,  and he does not  seem to think that the community 
had retained  the power  of  legislation.  On  the other hand, 
he does  dogmatically assert  that the power  of  tho ruler is 
not unlimited or absolute ; he can only exercise his authority 
for the public good, and the subject is not bound to obey when 
the ruler transgresses against this ; and he is very emphatic 
in his assertion that tho people may in the last resort depose 
the ruler.  Tho Roman people had always retained the right 
"  disponendi  de  imperio."  We  seem  here  to find  again  a 
parallel to that rather curious position of  Yacarius  that the 
Roman  people  cannot legislate  unless they first  depose the 
emperor,  and thus resume  tho right  of  making laws.  The 
formal  terms  of  the conception  of  the naturo  of  political 
authority in Marsilius and in Occam seem, at first sight, far 
apart, but the final results are not very different.  The aulho- 
rity of  the ruler is a limited authority, not an absolute one ; 
magne) diversinlode respondetur.  Uno 
mode,  quad illa  translatio  non fuit  a 
Papa, sad a Romanis, quorum ab initio 
fuit imperium, ot  a quibus  Imperater 
primo  accepit imperium ; qui omnem 
suam  potestatcm  regendi,  propter 
bonum commune transtulcrunt  in Im- 
peratorem ;  non  tamen  in  ipsum 
notestatem  dominandi  seu  regendi  r  - 
despotice,  nec  a  se  abdieaverunt 
omnem  potcstatem  casualitor  cllspon- 
ondi de imperio.  Si enim l~oc  fecissent, 
servos se fccisscnt Imperatoris strictifi- 
sime  accipiendo  vocabulum  servi,  et 
revera  nullatenus  liberi  remallsissent : 
et  per  consequens  Imporator  non 
habuisset  principatum  rcgalem,  aed 
pure  despoticum." 
1 Cf. p. 23. 
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the  community is  the source  of  authority  and retains  the 
power of  restraining it. 
There  is  another  writer  of  the fourteenth  century  whose 
political theory we  must examine-that  is Wycliffe.  We are  not here concerned with his theological opinions or influence, 
but  only  with  such  political  theories  as  are set out in  the 
treatises '  De Civili Dorninio,' '  De Dominio Divine,' and ' De 
'officio  Regis.'  We have endeavoured to put these together, 
but it must be remembered that Wycliffeis one of  the most com- 
plice,ted of  thinkers and writers, and it  is difficult to feel entire 
confidence that we  have done full justice to his conceptions. 
For the sake of simplicity we begin, not, as he does himself, 
with the analysis and discussion of  the nature of  "  Dominiurn," 
but with the discussion of  the origin and purpose of  govern- 
ment.  We begin with a phrase, incidental indeed, but signifi- 
cant.  "Civile  dominium"  (by which  Wycliffe here  means 
civil  government)  was  created  by  the  "Ritus  Gentim," 
and coercive authority was accepted by the custom and con- 
sent of  the people as being approved by reason, for, as St 
Paul  says in Romans  xiii.  4,  the ruler bears  the sword not 
without  a  cause.'  And  again,  civil law was  introduced  by 
men  on account of sin, with respect to the goods of the body 
and of  f~rtune.~  These  are, of  course, traditional  mediteval 
conceptions, and lest  we  should  misunderstand  thern,  it is 
well  to observe that Wycliffe also  says in the next  chapter 
that we  must not think that because the civil law was insti- 
tuted by men on account of sin, it does not derive its authority 
from God." 
We  wish to  express our great obligs- 
tiom to the editions  of  the 'De Civili 
Dominie ' and  '  Ds  Dorninio Divino ' 
by Dr  R.  Lane  Poole, and we  would 
to his Preface to the '  De Dominio 
pivino ' for the discussion of  the sub- 
lects and dates of  both works. 
w~cliffe,  '  DO  Civili Dorninio,' i. 11 
(P '5)  :  "  Ecce  primo,  quod  civile 
clomini~  .st  ritu gencium  introduc- 
et  potostas  coactive  ex  consue- 
tudine  et  consensu  rscceptnta  est  a 
populo racionablliter commondata, quia 
Romans  xiii.  4  quod  non  sino  causa 
portat  gladium." 
Id.  id.,  i.  18  (p.  125):  "  Jlls 
autem  civlle cst jus  occssione  peccati 
humanitus  adinventum  ad  justifican- 
dam rempublicarn coactive quoad bona 
corporis ot fortune." 
'  Id.  id.,  i.  19  (p.  1331 :  "Nee 
crodat aliquis quod lex  civilis, que oc- 52  FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
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Having thus recognised  that Wycliffe  repeats  the normal 
patristic and nledieval conceptions about the origin of  govern- 
ment as being a Divine remedy for sin, we can inquire what were 
Wycliffe's views  about the best form of  government and its 
conditions.  He deds with this subject at length in the '  De 
Civili Dominio. ' 
He first raises  the  question  whether  it is  better  to  be 
governed according to the law of God by judges, or according 
to a civil law by kings.  The first he calls an aristocracy, the 
second is monarchical or royal ; his conclusion is that it is 
probably better, in view of  man's sinful nature, to be governed 
by kings.l  In the next chapter he asks whether the Christian 
man should obey the tyrant, and seems to say that the Christian 
man should do so ; and he cites the example of  Christ as having 
obeyed Herod and Pilate and the chief   priest^.^ 
He then discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of  hereditary  and elective  governments,  but  arrives  at no 
certain  ~onclusion.~  The  only  observation  Wycliffe  makes, 
which might be thought to have some importance, is that the 
continuity  of  the  hereditary  succession  might  encourage 
tyranny,  while  the possibility  of  deposition  would  act  as  a 
check upon tyranny.$  Those words, lf pressed, might seem to 
moan that Wycliffe  recognised the possibility of  the deposition 
of  an elective, but not of  an hereditary ruler.  In the thirtieth 
chapter,  Wycliffe  raises  a  difficulty  which  applies  both  to 
hereditary  and elective kingship, and that is that there can 
caslone peccatl est humanitus lnst~tuta, 
non  slt  a  Deo  pr~ncipaliter ordinata, 
qula allter  non  poterit esse ]usta nlsl 
civll~ter ord~nnntos et  adlnvementes 
legem  hujusmod~  forent  organa  Del 
prlncipal~ter  ordlnantls." 
Cf.  Wycliffe,  'De 0IXr1o Regls,'  XI. 
1 Id, 'De  Clv111  Domlnlo,'  I.  26, 
p  185 
a  Id. ~d ,  I.  28 (p. 199). "  Sed iermo 
lalcus  dub~tatur,  SI  Chnst~anus  debcl 
potentat~bus  tyrann~zant~bus  obedlre, 
et  vldotur  quad  SIC, nam  Salvator 
obedlvit  quoad bona corpons,  Herorli, 
Pllato, et pr~nc~p~bus  saoerdotum, cum 
tamen  facilhme  potulsset  restltlsse , 
sed  omms  Chrlsti accio est nostra in- 
strucclo,  ergo  nos  debemus  eciam 
tyrann~zantibus  quoad  bona  fortune 
mlnus valenc~a  obedlre  Et  lnnc dic~tur 
1 Peter  11  18.  ' Serv~  subditi estote 
in omnl t~more  domlnis , non tantum 
boms et modehtls, sed eclam dlscohs.' " 
Cf  I.  37, p.  271. 
8  Icl  ld ,  1.  29. 
4  Id  ld , I.  29  (p.  208)  'I Item 
certitude  reg14  regiland~ pro  se  et 
suis hered~bus  est ut plur~mum  occas~o 
tyrann~zand~  ubl  frenum  foret  regls 
deposlcio post  dellctum." 
(XIAP.  111.1  THE AUTHORITY  OF TRE RULER.  53 
be  no true "  dominium " without "  caritas " ; and he argues 
that this is illustrated by the fact that the Christian  Church 
would not suffer any unbaptised person to rule in the church, 
for he is in mortal sin.'  We  shall come back to this question 
presently. 
We have so far been  dealing with the political concel~tions 
of  Wycliffe as expressed in the treatise '  De Civili Don~inio,' 
but we  must also take account of  these as they appear in his 
work, '  De Officio Regis.'  In this work  he says clearly that 
~olitical  authority was  made necessary by sin, and that, in 
his  opinion, monarchy  was  the  best  form  of  government.8 
He also sets out in clear terms that the authority of  the ruler 
is  founded on the election of  the community, and that this 
was the case both in England and in other kingd~rns.~ 
1 Id. id, i.  30 (p. 212) : "  Et patet 
ex  sentencla  Al~stololls,  tercio  Pohtl- 
corum,  Cap~tulo 28  rec~tata, quod 
vlrtus super excellens In  rege  est pre- 
c~pua  cause  regnand1  clvlllter.  Ipsa 
enlm  per  se  suffic~t ad  regnandum 
ewangelice, et est  suffic~ens  cum  ap- 
probacione popul~  ad regnandum  clvl- 
liter  unde  slcut  tltulus  acqulrend~ 
non  per  se  sficit (ex  21  Capltulo), 
sed  oportet  praeclpue  superaddore 
tltulum  cantatis,  SIC  indub~e  nee suc- 
aessio heredltana, nec popdaz~s  elecclo 
per se sufficit. 
De  success~one hereditaria  sic  pro- 
batur .  non  est  poss~bile creaturam 
dlquam  dominarl  slne  titdo car~tatls 
(ex 22  Cap~tulo)  ,  nullus post lapsum 
succedit ex traduce sine mterrupcione 
earltatis (ut patet, de original1 peccato 
lnccmposs~bll~  cant at^), ergo nemo post 
lapsum  SIC  procedit  contlnuando  do- 
mlnlum :  oportet  ergo  lnmtl  alter] 
tltulo  pro  habendo  domlnlo  Con- 
firmatur :  Slt  Petrus  prlmogen~tus 
regls, culus ambo parentes sint mortu~, 
"Ondurn  baptlsatus, qm ex lege humana 
ex Chrlst~amsmo  debet lure hereditar~o 
~uccedere parentibus  In  regno ;  et 
patet, cum Petrus slt lnfidel~s  In mortal1 
Peccato,  caret  vero  domin~o, eclam 
juxta  jura  clvllla  non  corrects,  et 
lial-reb~t  post bapt~slnum  ,  elgo acqulret 
verum  titulum , et cum  nullus  quem 
non habet sufficlat, nullus est s~gnandus 
nlsi  tltulus  partis gracie  bapt~smatis  , 
ergo  ~stum  oportet  addore  ad llneam 
natural18 propagacionls,  manontls con- 
tmue cum mortal].  Cum erqo e~cles~a 
Chrlst~ana  non  sineret  de  lege  civ111 
talem  regnare  lntra  ec~lesiam,  patet 
quod  omne peccatum  mortale  a~iuale 
exclud~t  dominium : peccatum quldem 
or~gmale est  mln~mum mortallum, 
m~tles~me  punlendurn " 
Wychffe,  ' De  Oficlo  Reg~s,'  XI. 
(pp. 246 248) 
a  Id. id, xi.  (p  249) .  "Scd  ter- 
clo .  . .  concedltur quod cont~nue  In hu- 
mano genere vlante est unum caput vel 
rapltaneus per quom oportet residuum 
legulari,  qu~  est totum genus capitan- 
corum, qu~bus  deus ad hoe excellenter 
dona sua dlstrlbu~t  Sod  non  oportet 
continue  esse  unam  personam  simph- 
cem  ante eleccionem vel  auctontatem 
humanam, ad hoe a domlno ordlnatam. 
In c~vllltate  autem  auctorisat ad hoa 
humana  eleccio  sed  non  In  pnore 
reglmlne  euangehco  vel  d~vlno.  . . . 
Sed llmitate loquendo de communltste 
polltlca  v~detur  mlh quod ratio d~ctat 54  FOUILTEERTTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
So far the position of  Wycliffe is normal, but it is different 
with his conception of  the extent of  the royal authority and 
the relation  of  the subjects to this.  In one set of  passages 
he  asserts  the  necessity  of  obedience  to  the  king,  as  the 
Vicar  of  God, whether he  is just  or  unjust.  He begins the 
treatise  by  citing  the First  Epistle  of  Peter  (ii.  13-17) as 
requiring  obedience  to  kings  for  the  Lord's  sake,  and  St 
Paul's  words,  "Let  every  soul  be  subject  to  the  higher 
powers, for there is no power  but of  God " (Rom., xiii. 1). 
For the king is the Vicar of  God.  And he even applies to the 
relation  of  subjects and kings, St Peter's words : "  Servants, 
be in subjection to your masters  with all fear, not only to the 
good and gentle but also to the froward "  (1  Peter, ii. 18). 
He  draws  out his conclusion in very precise terms.  The 
authority,  even  of  perverso rulers,  is from  God.  We  must 
indeed distinguish between the case where the injury which is 
inflicted affects  us only personally, and that where the ruler's 
action is against God.  In the first place, we  must patiently 
submit, in the second we  must resist  even to death, but in 
patience  and submission.  The  man  who  goes  beyond  this 
and resists by force or fraud, is guilty of  a great sin.2 
He admits, indeed, that it might be argued that such evil 
rulers  are not really  kings, for they have not "  domiaium " 
(we shall discuss the meaning which Wycliffe attaches to this 
ut ipsi faciant sibi caput, nedum unum 
genus  in  religione  politica,  sed  quod 
quilibet  populus  appropriat  sibi  sim- 
plex  caput,  ut  nos  Anglice  habemus 
unum regem benedictum, cui secundum 
doctrinam  evangelii  dctectam  xxxiii. 
c. debemus impendere obsequium secu- 
lare.  Et  ita est de regnis aliis, mnjor- 
ibus et minoribus, usque ad imperium." 
Id. id., i. pp. 1-6. 
Id. id., i. (p. 8) : "Undo  quod per- 
versorum  potestas  non  sit rusi  a  Deo 
patet Job. ii. . . . Sed quia contingit 
prepositum  abuti  sua  potestate  ideo 
sccuuclum glossam  est taliter distingu- 
enclum.  Vel  illata  est  injuria  quo 
ad causam  propriam,  vel  pure  quoad 
causam  Dei.  In primo casu  post  ex- 
hortationem evangelicam pacientia est 
optima  medicina.  Si  pure  in  causa 
Dei,  Christianus  debet,  post  correp- 
oionem  evangelicam, preposito suo us- 
que ad mortem, si oportet, confidenter 
et obedienter resistere.  Et  sic utrobique 
innitendurn  est  pacienciae,  commit- 
tendo humiliter Deo judioium injuriam 
vindioandi.  Et  qui  excedit  hano 
regulam  resistit  dampnabiliter  potes- 
tati et Dei  ordinationi, ut faciunt  hii 
qui rebellant  precipue, id est affecione 
commodi  temporalis  personalis. . . . 
(p.  9) :  Ex  quibus  colligitur  quod 
peccat  graviter  qui  resistit  regslie 
principum vi vel dolo." 
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word presently), but he brushes this argument aside and says 
that we  must honour even perverse kings, for their power has 
been given them by G0d.l  He even extends this to tyrants ; 
they are indeed kings only in name, but they have a "  potestas 
informis "  to  rule,  although  their  "potestas " is  not 
" dominiurn." 
It is true that in one place he approaches the conception 
of  the nature  of  the royal authority in a  different manner. 
 hat is, when he discusses the functions or duty of  the king. 
Wycliffe's words are indeed very general, but he says that the 
first duty of  the king is to provide just laws for the kingdom, 
for Aristotle had said that law was more necessary for a com- 
munity than a king  ; and he maintains that the king trans- 
gresses against God and his people if  he violates the law ; he 
has indeed the right to dispense with it in some cases, but only 
when this is reasonably required.  Aristotle had said that wise 
philosophers maintained  that the king should obey the law.$ 
1  Id.  id.,  i.  (p.  16) :  "Et  iterum 
videtur  quod  non  remanet  in  eis 
status diguatatis  vcl  potestas  regalia, 
quia non remanet eis dominium et per 
consequens non remanet, eis quod sint 
reges  . . . (p.  17) :  Et  patet  quod 
reges  disooli  sunt  racione  honorandi 
. . . secundo  quia  habent  potestatern 
eis  collatam  a  Deo  ad  proficiendum 
suae ecclesiae,  et  sic  ad  adiuvandum 
Deum  potestative, licet  potestate  sua 
dampnabiliter abntautur." 
Id.  id.,  i.  (p.  17) : "  Sed  ulterius 
patet ex saepe dictis quod tales non re- 
manerent  reges  nisi  equivoce,  licet 
habent potestatem regalem abusivam, 
sic  realitor  habent  potestatem  et 
dignitatem  consequontem  secundurn 
quam  regunt,  licet  demeritorie.  Et 
sic  tyranni,  eciam  presciti  qui  solum 
nominetenus  sunt  reges  vel  domini, 
habont potestatem informem ad regen- 
durn 0t dominandum, sed illa potestas 
"On  est dominium." 
a  Id. id., iii.  (p. 55) : "  Stat  autem 
"gimen  regni in paucarum et justarum 
legum  institutione,  in  illarum  sagaci 
et acuta  execucione, et generaliter  in 
status  ac  juris  cujuscunque  legis  sui 
defensione.  Oportet enim regnum cum 
vivit civiliter  non solum reg0 sed lege 
taliter regulari,  in tantum quod Aris- 
totelis  videtur  dicere  quod  lex  est 
necessarior communitati quam rex." 
Id. id. id. (p. 67) : "  Rex igitur qui 
dobet scire legem suarn et ejus execu- 
tionem  esse  juslnm  et  racionabilem, 
impediendo  ipsam  facit  contra  Deum 
et  populum  proprium  qui  exinde 
haberet  justiciae  complementum. 
Quamvis autem rex  dispensare  potest 
in casu cum execucione legis tamquam 
superior lege sua, tamen nunquam nisi 
quando  dispensebilitatis  ratio  hoc 
requirit.  . . .  Ideo dicit  Aristoteles 
ul~i  supra quod sapientes pilosophi et 
divinitus loqucntes  dixerunt  quod  in- 
primis decet regiam majestatem obtem. 
pernre legalibuv institutis, non in ficta 
apparencia  sed  in  facti  evidenoiu,  ut 
cognoscant omnes ipsum timere Doum 
excelsum  et  esse  subjectum  Divinae 
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In a later chapter, however, Wycliffe contrasts the concep- 
tion that the king is subject to his own law, with that which 
he attributes to Aristotle, that the king as the maker of  law 
is above Iaw.  Subjection to law may  be understood in two 
ways : as due to the authority of  law itself, or as due to a 
higher  law.  The  first  is  called  compulsory  subjection,  the 
second a voluntary.  The king is subject to his law, in virtue 
of  the author it,^ of  the Divine law, but not in virtue of  the 
authority of  his  own  law.  The  king,  therefore,  as head  of 
the kingdom, serves his own law voluntarily, while the sub- 
jects must be compelled to obey it.l 
It would seem, then, that there is no contradiction between 
Wycliffe's  judgment  about the relation  of  the king  to the 
law,  and his  judgment  that the king  is  the Vicar  of  God, 
and that his subjects must submit to him whether his actions 
are just  or  unjust.  The  king  should indeed  govern justly 
and according to law, but Wycliffe  does  not  allow any legal 
right in the community as against the king. 
We must now, however, examine the meaning of  the term 
"  dominiurn " in  these treatises.  As  we  have  seen,  in  the 
'De Civili  T)ominio,'  i.  30,  Wycliffe  says  that  if  a  man 
lacks  "  caritas,"  and  is  in  mortal  sin,  he  cannot  have 
"  dominium ', : aud in the '  De Officio Regis,' i., that wicked 
1 Id. id.,  v.  (p.  93) : "  Sed secundo 
dicitur per hoc qllod videtur regem esse 
subjectum  legi  proprie,  cum  sit  pre- 
cipua  pars  regni et inferior  sacerdoti, 
regulatus per legem propriam, quo est 
rege  prestancior.  Oppositum  tamen 
videtur ex hoe quod nemo rationabiliter 
statueret  legem  ad  tollendam  ejus 
libertatem.  Oportet  ergo  quod  legis 
conditor sit suprs, legem, ut dicit Aris- 
toteles de Rege,  3'  Politicorum.  Hic 
oportet  notare  quomodo  lex  cum sit 
racio vel veritas supra hominum ~otes- 
tatem, obligat, omnem hominem, eciam 
Christum  humanitus,  licet  secundum 
div~nitatem  sit  supra  omnem  lcgem, 
quae  non  est  Deus,  ut ahas  exposui. 
Sed lex contracta per  civilitatem con- 
notat  supra  talom  veritatem  ordina- 
clonem  et promulgacionem  humanam 
ad civile dominium regulandum, et sic 
est rex principalis  condltor legis  suae. 
Oportet secundo notare quomodo dupli- 
citer  potest  intelligi  lcgi  subieccio, 
sc~licet  debita ex pura  ligacione  ejus- 
dem  legis,  vel  debita  ex  obligaclone 
legis superioris.  Prima subjecc~o  dicitur 
coaeta, et secunda voluutaria.  Primo 
mod0  omnis  Chrlstianus subicitur legi 
Christi  et secundo  mod0 ipse Christus 
humanltus subicitur suae legi.  Ex  istis 
patet  tercio  quod  rex  subicitur  legi 
proprie, imperio legia divinae, sed non 
impcrio legis proprie." 
men  are  not really  kings,  for  they have  not "  dominiurn." 
What  does Wycliffe mean by "  dominium "  ?  It must first 
be  observed  that  he  sometimes  uses  it with  reference  to 
political authority, sometim~s  to property. 
Wycliffe begins the '  De Civili Dominio ' by laying down the 
general principles that all human "  ius " presupposes as its 
cause (presupponit causaliter) the divine "ius,"  and, therefore, 
d  '' dominium " which is "  justum ad honlines "  presupposes 
a " dominium " which is "  justum  quoad deum " ; but the 
man who is in  mortal sin: has  not a "  dominium " which is 
"  justum  quoad deum,"  and therefore "  simpliciter " he has 
not "  justum  dominium."  He confirms this by an appeal to 
the words  of  St Augustine : "  Fideli  homini totus  mundus 
divitiarum  est, infideli  autem nec  obolus."  And  he  amms 
again, in the next chapter, that God does not grant his gifts 
to anyone who is in mortal sin.1 
This sounds as if it were a drastic criticism of  property as it 
exists in  the world,  but we  must  observe that Wycliffe is 
careful  to  distinguish  various  senses  of  the  corlception  of 
property.  It is necessary, he says, to make some distinctions 
about "  habicio "  (property) and "  justicia."  There are three 
senses in which the word "  habicio "  may be used : "  natural," 
"civil,"  and  "evangelical."  In the first  sense sinners may 
possess  natural goods,  although  they  do  this  unjustly ;  in 
the  second  sense, "  habent potentatus seculi bona fortunae, 
aut  fortuita";  but in  the  third  and  most  exalted  sense, 
'  Id., 'De Civili Dominio,' i. 1 (p. 2) : 
"Omne  jus  humanum  presupponlt 
oausaliter  jus  divinum.  . . . Ergo 
Omne  dominium  justum  ad hominem 
presupponit  justum  dominium  quoad 
Deum.  Sed quilibet existens in peccato 
mortal1  caret,  ut  sic,  justo  dominio 
quoad  Deum ;  ergo  ct  simpliciter, 
just0  dominio  . . . (p. 6).  Quod si 
¶uaeris  sanctorum  testimonium,  ecce 
magni  Augustini  sentencia,  Epist.  37. 
Ad  Macedonlum  de  tyrannis,  plane 
docet istam sentenciam : '  Ideo, inquit,' 
8i Prudenter intueamur quod scripturn 
eats Fideli  homini  totus mundus divi- 
tiarum est, infideli  autem nec obolus; 
nonne omnes qui slbi viclentur  gaudere 
licite  conquesitis,  elsque  uti  nesciunt, 
aliene possidere convincimus ? " 
Id., i.  2  (p. 8) : " Non  est  possibile 
hominem  juste  simpliciter  habore 
aliquod bonum  sibi adiacens, niai Deus 
donando id sibi  praestlterit  (ut patet 
tractatu  tercio  de  Dominio  Divino) ; 
sed Deus non praestat  alicui,  dum est 
in  mortali  peccato,  al~quod  donurn 
suum : ergo nullus existens in mortali 
peccato habet protunc juste simpliciter 
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only  those  who  are  in  "charity"  or  "grace"  possess 
anything.l 
Wycliffe develops these distinctions and their consequences 
at length, and especially brings out clearly the principle that 
the unjust (or unrighteolls) man  cannot properly be said to 
possess anything, for he abuses, he does not use, what he has, 
and he cites with approval some words of  St Jerome, that the 
avaicious man  does  not  really  possess that which  he  has, 
any more than that which he has not;  and  again, that, as 
"grace"  is  lacking  to  the  unrighteous  man,  he  has  not 
"  dominiurn " ; and again, "  grace " is needed for the true 
uso  of  things,  and,  therefore,  it  is  required  for  all  true 
"  dominium."  His  whole  conclusion  is  expressed  in  the 
last  words  of  a  later  chapter.  The  unrighteous  man  has 
not  "  dominium,"  although  he  has  "  bona  nsturalia  mod0 
irnproprio."  a 
The meaning of  Wycliffe's conception of  "  dominium " is 
further  elucidated  when  he  goes  on  to maintain  that the 
righteous man is lord of  the whole "  sensible "  world, and that  u 
he should not be disturbed because he has not civil "  domi- 
nium "  in these things, for this might rather injure than benefit 
1 Id. id., i.  3 (p. 17) : "  Hic  oportet  tola  ad  Paulinum) : '  Avaro,'  inquit, 
distinguere de habicione atque justicia.  '  deest tam quod habet quam quod non 
Quamvis  enim  secundum  Aristotelem  habet.'  Et patet  in  principali  argu- 
et auctorem '  Sex principiorum ' multi-  mento quod non sequitur quod injustus 
plices sunt modi, trcs tamen sufficiunt  sit  univoce  dominus  cum  iusto,  licet 
pro presenti : scilicet, habicio naturalis,  univoce  habeat  bona  naturalia  cum 
civilis, ac evangelica. . . . Primo mod0  ill0 :  set  dominium  dicit  distinct0 
habendi, habent peccatores bona natur-  ~erfeccionem secundam  fundatam  in 
alia, et tamen non juste simpliciter (ut  gracia,  quae  cum  deest  injusto,  et 
patet  superius) sed  injuste:  secundo  verum dominium sibi deest  . . . p. 25. 
mod0  habendi,  secundum  utrumque  Sic inquam gracia requiritur ad usum, 
membrum  equivocum,  habent  poten-  et  per  conscquens  ad  omne  verum 
tatus seculi bona fortunae aut fortuita.  dominium." 
Sed tercio  mod0  habendi,  eccellentis-  Id. id., i. 6 (p. 46) : "  Sed loquendo 
simo  possibili,  quoad  genus,  habent  de habitudine quo foret dominium, quia 
solum existentos in caritate vel gracia  non  existit  (licet  deceptis  appareat 
quidquid habent."  ipsum esse),  concedendum est  simpli- 
2  Id. id., i.  3  (P. 20) : "  Sic  injusto  citer  quod  injustus  non  habet  domi- 
deest quidquid habuit, durn  non  tunc  nium,  licet  habeat  bona  naturalia, 
utitur  sed  abutitur  quodcunque  quis  mod0  irnproprio,  ut  eat  dictum:  et 
occupat:  hinc  vere  et  philosophice  patet  conclusio  de  carencia  dominii 
dicit Ieronimus (Capitulo ultimo, Epis-  peccatoris." 
hirn.1  His meaning is perhaps best illustrated by his comment 
the saying of Christ : Thele is no man that has left house 
or  brothers, &c., for my sake and for the gospel's sake, but 
he shall receive a thousandfold now in this time,  &c.  This,  - 
Wycliffe says, must be interpreted spiritually.2 
It  is from this standpoint that we must understand Wycliffe's 
treatment of  the community of  goods.  His meaning is only 
understood  when we  observe his mode of  stating it.  Every 
nlan, he says, ought to be in grace, and if  he is in grace, he 
is lord of  the world and all that it contains ; therefore every 
man  ought to be lord  of  all (universitatis) ; but this would 
be impossible with a multitude of  men, unless they had all in 
common, therefore all things  ought to be c~mmon.~  Christ, 
in  confirmation  of  this,  rejected  (individual)  property, 
and  had  all  temporal  things  in  common with  his disciples ; 
and  after  his  ascension,  all  things  were  common  to  his 
disciples. 
That he  does  not  mean  by  this that individual  property 
was to be rejected in the world as it actually is, is evident from 
his  account in  another  chapter  of  the origin of  '  Dominium 
Civile.'  In his judgment  ' Dominium Civile ' was  instituted 
1 Id.  id.,  i.  7  (p.  47)  :  "  Conse- 
quenter ad dicta restat ostendere quod 
quilibet  justus  dominatur  toti  mundi 
sensibili . . . nec turbetur justus quod 
non habet civile dominium in hiis bonis, 
quia revero non proficeret sed noceret." 
Id. id., i.  7 (p. GI) : "  Nec  dubium 
quin ista  sit conclusio veritatis, quod 
omnis  relinquens  universitatem  tem- 
poralium,  propter  Christum  in  affec- 
cione debita debite preponcndum, habet 
ex  adinccione  consequenti  omnia  illn 
melius quam esset possibile habere ill8 
Woye prepostero ; unde  Marc,  x.  29, 
30  sic  testatur :  '  Amen  dico  vobis, 
nemo  est  qui  dimisit  domum  aut 
fratres, etc.  . . .  qui  non  accipiet 
cencies tantum  nunc  in tempore  hoc 
domos, etc. . . . (p. 52).  Unde quod 
Bpiritualiter debet textus Marci intelligi, 
Patet ex hoc quod nemo ambigit  quin 
non  consequatur  virum  evangelicum 
ex tali oommutacione, sequendo Chris- 
turn cenclos tanlum de fratibus, etc." 
Id. id., i.  14 (p. 96) : "  Pro cuius 
intellectu  sunt  tria  dicenda  per  ordi- 
nem:  primo  quod  omnia  bona  Dei 
debent esse communia.  Probatur sic : 
omnis homo debet esse in gracia, et si 
est in gracia est dominus  mundi cum 
suis contentis, ergo omnis homo debet 
esse dominus universitatis :  quod non 
staret cum  multitudinc hominum,  nisi 
omnes  illi  deberent  habere  omnia  in 
communi ;  ergo  omnia  debent  esse 
communia."  " 
Id. id.,  i.  14 (p.  96) :  "In cujus 
confirmacionem Veritas  cum  suis dis- 
cipulis aufugit proprietatem sod habuit 
tcmporalia  in commuui (ut patet  pos. 
terius), et post ejus ascensionem erant 
eius  discipulis  omnia  communia, '  di- 
videbatur  enim  singulis  pro  ut  cui- 
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by man on account of  sin 1; and a little later he says that, 
assuming  the fall  of  the  human  race,  it was  necessary  to 
establish human laws and ordinances, lest a man should take 
of  the goods of  fortune whatever he might wish.2 
It is therefore, we  think, clear that when  Wycliffe says of 
the man who is in mortal sin, or is not in "  grace "  or "  charity," 
that he has not "  dorninium," he means hhat he has neither 
political authority nor property in the full and proper spiritual 
sense, but he does not mean that he cannot have these in the 
ordinary or legal sense.  Political authority and private pro- 
perty  are  institutions  which  men  have  been  compelled  to 
create by the fall, by the corruption and vice of  human nature, 
as it actually  is.  They are therefore  to be regarded as con- 
ditions of  man's sinfulness. 
' 
It is  interesting to observe that  at first  sight  Wycliffe's 
doctrine of "  dorninium," as belonging only to rllen in a state 
of  grace, seems closely parallel to the principles set out early 
in the fourteenth century by two extreme papalists, Egidius 
Colonna and James of  Viterbo.  Egidius maintained  that no 
one could hold political authority, or private property,  who 
was  an infidel or outside  of  the communion of  the Church. 
James of  Viterbo  mitigated  Egidius'  political  doctrine,  but 
held that no one could hold private property, "  secundum ius 
divinum,"  who  was  not  subject  to  the  Spiritual  P~wer.~ 
The contention  of  Egidius was  extreme and revolutionary in 
character;  it was  intended  to  support  the  most  extreme 
doctrine of the supremacy of  the Spiritual over the Temporal 
Power,  even  in  Temporal  things;  while  the  doctrine  of 
Wycliffe had no such revolutionary character. 
It is  evident  that  Wycliffe's  treatment  of  " dominium " 
is in principle closely related to that of  Richard Fitz Raiph, 
the  Archbishop  of  Armagh,  in  his  treatise  '  De  Pauperie 
1 Id. id., i.  18 (p. 127) : "  Ideo satis  precipue  innitendi,  necesse  fuit  legea 
signanter dicitur quod dominium civile  vel  ordinaciones  humanas  statuere, 
occasione  peccati  humanitus  institu-  ne  quilibet  lapsus  de  bonis  fortunae 
tum."  caperet  quantumcunque  voluntos  in. 
Id. id.,  i.  18  (p.  128) : '' Unde,  debite inclinaret." 
eupposito  lapsu  humoni  generis  et  Cf. vol. v. pp. 402-417. 
cecitate  proclivi  bonis  sensibilibus 
salvatoris.'  This  treatise  was  probably  written  between 
1350 and 1356, and arose out  of  tho wolk  of  a commission 
appointed by Pope Clement VI. to inquire into the disputes 
as to the nature of the poverty of OU~  L0rd.l  The Archbishop, 
finding the disoussion  protracted  and inconclusive, prepared 
a  treatise  on  the whole  subject,  which  includes  a  detailed 
discussion of  the meaning of  "  don~inium.~~  He lays down the 
general principle  that no  one  can  be  said  to have  "istud 
dominiurn " unless  he is purged  from  sin  and has  received 
grace  ; but this does not mean that the sinner has lost his 
natural LL titulus j7 to the use of  things  ; and in later passages 
Richard says that the right to the use of  things needed to be 
safeguarded by "  positive " law, and defines the "  dominium 
positivum "  as the right of a man to possess and to  use rationally 
those things which are subjected to him by LLp~sitivev  law.4 
This seems to be substantially the same position as that of 
Wycliffe.  It appears to us that their conceptions of  "  domi- 
nium " added  little  or  nothing  to the  medimval  theory  of 
political authority and of private property, that is that neither 
of these belonged to the state of  innocence, but that they were 
the results of  the fall, and remedies for it. 
1 Cf.  Wycliffc :  ' De  Dominio 
Divino.'  Ed. R. L. Poole.  Preface, p. 
xxxv. 
a  Richard  of  Armagh :  ' Do  Pau- 
perie  Salvatoris,'  ii.  8  (p. 348).  (Ed. 
R. L.  Poole, as above.)  'L Unde nullus 
de stirpe ipsius prirni parentis seminalis 
filius,  donec  a  peccato  mundotur  et 
gratiam  gratilicantem  reciporet,  istud 
dominium potest rrciporo sen habere." 
Id.  id., ii. 21 (p. 363) : "  Verum est 
tamen  quod,  perdito  isto  originali 
dominio  per  poccatum.  . . . Nihilo- 
minus tamen  materialis causa  dominii 
ipsius  romanet  in poccanto,  quoniam 
quantumcunque homo delinqunt sempor 
in ymagine  pcrtransit  (intelligo, rroa- 
toris) :  ymago  vero  cum  indigoncia 
corporali  (ut superius  est  expressurn) 
est causa  quasi materialis istius origi- 
"&]is  dominii:  et  ob  hoc  quidam 
titulus naturalis licet drform~s  ad uzum 
rerum  rcmanet  in  poccante,  quamvis 
dominiurn per emissionem sui formalls 
principii amittatur." 
Id.  id.,  ii.  25  (p.  369) : ''  Unde 
primogenitus  Adam,  Cayn  ex  hac 
cupidit,ate invidia  st,imnlatus  justum 
Abel  fratrem  suum  occidit:  propter 
quem ot alios similes  tunc futuros lex 
positiva necessaria cxtitit. . . . Ut  alii 
viam vite scquentes bonis  propter eos 
crestis liberius  uti possent."  Id. id., 
iv. 3 (p. 440) : "  Jollannos : Jam pcto 
ut illa  michi  dominia positiva  que  in 
primi libri principio nominesti in genere 
michi  describas.  Ricardus : Omnium 
dominorum  advonticiorum  gnncralis 
dcscripcio patot esse rationalis croature 
mortalis  jus  sive  radicalis  auctoritas 
acquisita civilitor possidendi res illi loge 
possitiva  subjcctas et eis plene ulondi, 
conformiter racioni." 62  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
We  have felt  ourselves  compelled  to give  a  considerable 
space  to the  discussion  of  Wycliffe's  political  conceptions, 
because  there  has  been  much  controversy  about  his  real 
meaning. 
As we have just said, it seems to us that his conception of 
"  dominium " had little real significance, at least in political 
theory, and there is nothing new in his conception of  the source 
of  political  authority.  He evidently  accepted  the norinal 
principle  of  the  Middle  Ages,  that  political  authority  was 
derived  ultimately  from  God,  but  immediately  froin  the 
community.  When, however, we turn to his conception of  the 
nature of  this authority we find that Wycliffe reasserted that 
conception  of  the duty of  absolute obedience to the prince, 
and of  the wickedness  of  ~esistance,  which, as we have often 
pointed  out, was  dogmatically stated by  Gregory the Great, 
but  had practically  disappeared  in  the Middle  Ages,  bcing 
asserted only by a few writers like Gregory of  Catino in the 
eleventh century.=  Wycliffe in the  De Officio Regis ' states 
this  dogmatically  and without  qualification.2  He held,  no 
doubt, that the prince ought to obey the law, but, like many 
of the Civilians, when they interpreted the "  Digna Vox " of 
Cod.' i.  14, 4, he thought that the obedience of  the prince 
should be voluntary and was not compulsory. 
We shall have much to say in later chapters of  this volume 
about  the  development  of  the  conception  of  the "  Divine 
Right " ;  in the meantime it  is obviously important to observe it 
in Wycliffe. 
It is evident that the writers with whom we have dealt in 
this  chapter  approach  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the 
authority of  the ruler or prince from different points of view, 
and that they differ to a considerable extent in their judgment 
upon  particular  questions.  If,  however,  we  omit  Wycliffc, 
whose work indeed cannot well be brought into line with that 
of the others, they seem clearly to agree with each other, and 
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the normal character of  medizval political thought, in 
holding that the authority of  the prince was derlved from the 
community, that it was lini~ted  by the law, and that, in the last 
resort,  the community  could resume the authority  11 hich  it 
had given, and depose the prince who was incompetent or who 
and persistently disregarded the law. 
l Cf. vol. 1.  9. 192, vol.  111.  part  1.  Cf. pp. 63.66. 
chap. 4. of 1351 the Cartes demanded that no  man should  be killed 
or taken prisoner withoul an inquiry, according to "fuero " 
and law ; and the king, Pedro I.,  assented and prolnised to 
instruct his officers that they were not to kill or injure anyone 
without "  razon " and 1aw.l  This prolnise was emphatic,ally 
renewed by Henry 11.  at the Cortes  of  Toro in 1371.  The 
"n~erynos  majores " and others  are not to kill  or  imprison 
except  by the judgment  of  the alcaldes, as was  ordered by 
King Alfonso in the Cortes of  Maladnd,l and in another clause 
a similar provision was demanded by the Cortes and granted 
by the king,  with regard to a  man's  property.'  A  similar 
condition was imposed by the Cortes of  Madrid in 1391 upon 
the Regency appointed for the minority of Henry IIL4 
It  is hardly necessary to argue that the same principle was 
continually maintained in England.  Bishop Stubbs has dealt 
with  the matter  carefully in his  Constitutional  History  .  -  of 
England, and we only cite one or two of  the passages ln the 
Rolls of  Parliament to which he refers, in order to illustrate 
the mode in which the subject was treated.b 
tal carta  o  por  taJ  alualn,  que  non 
ssean  muertos  nin  lisiardos  nin 
despechados,  nin  tomado  ninguna 
cosa  del  suyo,  fasta  quo  scan  ant0 
oydos  e  librados  por  ffuoro  o  por 
dorecho." 
1 Id.,  ii.  1,  21 :  "  Nin  maten,  nin 
mnndon  prendor 10s omes non aviendo 
y posquissa quo sea ffecha con fuoro e 
con  derecho  contra  ellos,  o  quorella, 
o accusapion  giorta por  que deuan ser 
presos."  (Tho king replies) : "  Tongo 
por bion o mando nlos xnis adolantndos 
e  morynos,  e  alcnllos  o  a108  otros 
officialos quo non  prcndon  nin  lisicn, 
nin  tormenten, nin  maten  a  ninguno 
asin razon e ssin dorecho." 
8 Id.,  ii. 13, 19 : "  Otrosi quelos mery- 
nos  mayoros  et 10s morynos  que  por 
si povioron en el caso dicho es de ssuso 
quo  non  maton,  nin  ssuelton,  nin 
prendan  10s omos nin 10s cohochen nil1 
10s  mnnden  prondar  nin  tomar  nin 
rollerchan,  sinon  por  juizio  do108 
dcalles, sbegunt  dictlo  que  todo esto 
esta ordonado por el Roy Don Alfonso 
nuestro  Padre, en las  Cortes  que fizo 
en Madrit." 
3  Id., ii.  14, 26 : "  Alo que nos ped- 
ioron por morced que non mandassemos 
prondor  nin matar nin  lisiar  nin  doe- 
pechar  nin tomar  a  ninguno, uinguna 
cosa  dolo suyo, sin ser  anto llamados 
e  oydos  e  vencidos  por  fuero  0  por 
dorocho, por quorolla nin por quorollas 
que nos fuosson dadas sogunt quo osto 
ostauo, ordonado por ol ro Doll Alfonso 
nuostro  Padro,  quo  Dios  pordona,  on 
las cortos quo fizo en  Valladolid dnspues 
quo fuo do hodat." 
A  osto  respondomos  quo  0s  gr:bntle 
nuestro sorvioio et que nos plazo. 
'Id., ii.  39, 9 : "  Otrossy non daran 
cartav  para  matar  nin  l~siar  nin  des- 
terrar  a  ningund  ome,  mas  quo  see 
judgado  por sus alcallos." 
6  '  Rolls  of  Parliament,'  ii.  228, 
239,270,280 ; Statutes, i. 382.  Stubbs, 
'  Constitutional  History  of  England,' 
ed.  1877. vol. ii. p. 607. 
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Tile truth is that there was nothing new in this.  We have 
out in previous volullles  that the principle  that the 
authority of the king was limited by the law with respect to 
the ~roperty  and person of his subjects was part of  the normal 
conception of  the Middle Ages,l and the constitutional  prac- 
tice of  the fourteenth century  corresponds  with this.  That 
does not, of  course, mean that the legal principles were not 
frequently violated  by  the rulers ; on the contrary, it was 
often their violation  or  neglect  which  was  the occasion  of 
their  affirmation. 
The question of the limitation of  the royal authority with 
regard to private property leads us to anothcr and equally 
important aspect of  the constitutional practice  of  the four- 
teenth century, and that is to the question of taxation.  This 
subject is, however,  so closely related to the development of 
representative institutions that we have thought it better to 
postpone  our discussion of it to a later chapter (VI.), where 
we  deal with it in detail.  Here we  need  only say that it 
ceems to us clear that the limitation of  the authority of  the 
Icing  with  regard  to taxation was  an essential  part  of  the 
constitutional tradition  and practice  both  of  France  and of 
Castile in the fourteenth centurv. 
We  find some  examples  of  the  continuance  of  what  we 
have  called  the  contractual  conception  of  the  relation 
of  the  ruler  and  his  subjects  in  the  fourteenth  century. 
We  have  dealt  will1  this  in  earlier  volumes,  and  have 
poinled  out that this was really iiziplied in the whole feudal 
structure  of  society.Vho first  of  these  is  to  be  found 
in the detailed  statement of  the conditions under which the 
inhabitants  of  Dauphin6 were to accept the Dauphin on his 
accession.  Charles  V.  of  France  in 1367 issued  a  charter 
confirming  the  privileges  and  liberties  of  the  people  of 
Dauphine,  in  terms  wlvllich  are  significant  and  important. 
when  the new  Dauphin  or  his  successor  comes  to assume 
the rule of  Dauphine, before he can cornpcl any individual or 
'  ".  especially  vol  iii.  part  i.  Cf.  "01.  iii. put  i. chaps. 2 and 4 ; 
4; vol.  v. part i. chap.  7.  part ii. chap. 6. FOURTEENTH  OENTURT. 
" comlnunita,~  "  to do hiin homage or "  recognition " he rll~~t 
swear  that  he  will  iuaintain  inviolably  all  the  fr%nchises, 
liberties,  and privileges  which  are  mentioned  in  this  docu- 
ment.  The barons, nobles, and " con~inu~lit~ates  "  of DaluphinA 
a,re not  bound  to  obey  either  him  or  any  of  his  officials  --  -  ~ 
until he has taken the oath in a public  forrn  and  manner.' 
As  though this were not sufficiently drastic, the next clause 
adds  that all  the "  baillis,"  the judges, the procurators  and 
"  castellani " of  Dauphin6  must  in like  ll~aiiner  swear that 
they will  maintain  and observe  all  these liberties, &c., and 
if  any  of  them refuse to do  this no  man  need  obey them. 
If any of  them should violate these oaths, he is to be punisl~ed 
a,s a perjurer, and in addition must repay any expenses which 
the   noble.^, or commuiiities, or individual persons have incurred 
in the measures they have taken against him.2 
Recueil,  vol.  v.,  No.  411,  62  cessit,  decrevit,  et  declaravit  supra 
(p. 291) : "  Quandocunque . . .  no\ us  dictus dominus Delpllinus, quod omnes 
Dolphinus  vel  successor  ejus,  veniet  et singuli ballivi, judices, procuratorcs 
ad successionem  vcl  regimen Dolphin-  et  castellani  Dolpl~inatus  . . . tene- 
atus,  antequam  ad  homagia  sou  re-  antur  et  dobeant,  ac  efficaciter  sin6 
cognitiones  feudorum  recipionda  seu  wstricti jurare ad sancta dei Ev~ngelia, 
rccipiendas  quovismodo  procedat,  et  praomissas libertates, franchesias, im- 
antequam aliter  compellere  possit  ali-  munitates  et  declarationes  omncs  et 
quem  singularem  personam  vel  Uni.  singulas . . . tenncitcr  custodire  et 
versitatem  ad praostandum  et facien-  inviolabiter  observare:  et  si,  mod0 
durn  sibi  homagia,  fidelitates  seu  re.  debito requisiti, quilibet eorum dictum 
cognitiones,  jurare  dcbet  primitus.  sacramenturn facere et praestare  pub. 
. . . Servars,  custodire,  et  attendere  lice recusarent,  impune  non  paroatur 
inviolabiliter  praemissas  omnes  et  cuilibet  recusanti:  st si,  quod  nhsit, 
singullas  declarationes,  franchesias,  aliquis  ex  dictis  officialibus predictis, 
libertates,  ac  gratias  st  privilegia  libertates  privilegia,  concessiones vel 
supra  scripta,  in  omnibus  at singulis  doclarationos  in  toto  vel  in  parte 
clausulis st capitalis  eorundem :  et si  quomodolibet  violaret  aut  infringeret 
itn esset,  quod in principio regiminis,  quoquomodo, ubi convictus erit dictus 
ut  predicitur  . . . prnedictum  sacra-  oificlalis de violatione predicts, toneatur 
ment,um  facere  recusaret,  eo  casu,  et debeat expeusas factas pcr  barones, 
barones,  nobiles  et universitates  qui-  hanneretes,  vavassores,  nobiles,  uni- 
cunque  Dolphinatus  et rujufilibet ejus  versitates,  seu  singulerea  personas, 
partis,  et  aliarum  terrarum  suarum,  porsequentes  dictum  ofticialem  de 
eidom  novo  Domino  succossori  vel  d~rtn  violationc  resarcire  et  solvere; 
officialibus  suis,  obedire  mlnimo  et  ad  l~oc, per  suum  superiorem 
teneantur,  impune,  donec  predicturn  viriiitcr  compellatur ;  et nil~ilominus, 
sacramenturn  praestiterit  st  Eecer~t  ~dem  of'firialis  violator dictarunl li ber ta- 
publice et per publicuminstrumentum."  Lum, do periurio pnniatur." 
a  Id.  id.  ld.,  53  (p.  291) : "  Con- 
aInlost  precisely  siillilar  conception  of  the  mutual 
obli@%i,ion~  of  ruler and subject is to be found in t,he Charter 
in  Charles TI. in 1351 confirmed the privileges which 
ha,d been granted to the people of  Brianqon by the Dauphin 
~~mberf  II., and among other things it is provided that the 
~auphin  on his first visit to Briangon after his succession was 
to swear to observe all these privileges, and that the  men 
of  the "  communities " were not under*  any obligation to do 
homage  to him  until he had done this.  The officials of the 
~auphin  were  to take the same oath, and  until  they  had 
done this the people were not bound to obey then1.1 
The terms  of  these  documents illustrate  very  clearly  the 
contractual  conception  of  the relations  of  prince  and  sub- 
jects, and it should be observed that this applies not merely 
to the relations between the prince and his nobles,  but also 
to those between him and the communities or "  Universitates." 
We  iind a similar principle expressed in the proceedings of 
the  CastiLia'n Cortes,  not indeed  with  reference  to thc king 
himself, but with regard to the  regent,^  or council of  regency 
who  were  appointed to administer  the kingdom  during  tllo 
minority of  the king.  At the Cortes of  Burgos in 1315 tho 
"  Tutores " (guardians or regents) confirm the "  fueros " and 
liberties granted  by fornier  kings,  and  declare that if  they 
violate these they will cease to be "  Tutores " and will forfeit 
all claim to obedience, and that the Cortes may appoint otllc:r 
"  Tutores."  At  the  Cortes  of  Valladolid in 1322 we  find 
' Ordonnances,'  vol.  viii.  p.  719, 
16 : "  Et quod nor1 turlealltur llornir~cs 
ipsarum  universitatwn  ipsis  nobis 
dominis  futuris  homagia  praestare, 
donee  ipsi  domini  quilibet,  videlicet, 
'n  adventu suo, haec omnia juraverint 
et  ra~ificaverint observanciam  prae 
dictorum." 
2  ' Cortes,'  vol.  i.,  39,  55 : "  Otrossi 
"0s  otorgamos todos  vuestros  ffuoros 
O  ffranquczas e  libertades  e  buenos 
US05 e costumbres e ~rivilleios  e cartns 
We  avedes del  imp&ador  e  del  buen 
"Y  Don A~~~oI~so  . . . 
Et  ssi todos tres (the three guardinno 
of  the king) non uos lo guardasscmos 
como dicho es, que iamos non sseamos 
tutores  del ro,  nin  nos  coiados or1  Ins 
villas,  nin  nos  rrecudados  con  Ins 
rrentas  del  re,  nin  nos  obedezcados 
como a tutores, et qne podades tomar 
otro tutor qual quisieredes, que onten- 
dicrodes  que  conplira  mas  para  este 
ifecho, et quo seados quitos del pleito e 
de  la  postura  e  del  omenaie et  dela 
jura  que  nos  ffiziestes, ssalvo ssi  nos 
10s tutores o qual quier de nos a quien 
estas  cossas  ffueren  affrontadas  o 
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the guardian of  that time declaling  that if  any Alcalde or 
Alcaldes "  que  andodieren en  la casa  del  Iley o en la rnia 
casa " (that is, presunlably,  of  the lio~rsehold  of  the king or 
the guardian) should incur  any  penalty, they were  not  to 
escape, even though they pleaded that they had acted under 
the orders  of  the guardian, and even  though  the guardian 
hiniself confirmed this.l  He also adds a clause similar to that 
of  the Cortes of  Rnrgos, that he confirms a11  their liberties, 
kc., that a11  "  Cartas " contrary to these are to be neglecteil, 
and that if  he does not carry out this ~lroinise  they are not to 
obey hiill and can elect another g~ardian.~ 
These exaniples of  a contractual conception of  the nature 
.  of  political  authority  are in themselves  no  doubt  of  small 
importance,  but  when  we  put  them  alongside of  the more 
general principle of  the liniitation of  the authority of  the ruler, 
they are not wholly insignificant. 
We  must, however, now  go  on to observe a more drastic 
conception still with regard to the lii~litation  of  royal authority 
as represented in the theory and actual practice of  the four- 
teenth century, and that is the conception that as the authority 
of  the king was  derived from the community, so  also in the 
last resort the community could deprive hini of  that authority 
and depose him. 
In  Volume V. of  this work we have pointed out that mediroval 
society not  only assumed the limitation of  the rights of  the 
king, but also developed various inethods  of  enforcing Lhcse 
limitations.  The right to resist illegal action on his part, the 
determination of  questions between lbe vassal and the king 
as feudal lord by the Court of  the Vassals, the right to with- 
draw allegiance from a king who refuses to accept the judg- 
ment of  the court,  such were some of  the practical forms which 
were  recognised  in the 1Middle  Ages  for  this  purpose.  But 
remus  escusa  derecha  porque  non  en Casa del Roy,  o en la mia, que non 
pu~iicmos  ffaecr  daquellos  que  el  ssean  escusados  della  pena,  SI  onclla 
dererho pone,  que el  que la mostrare  cayeren,  maguor  d~ga  quo  gclo  yo 
por ssl quo1 vala."  mand6, et maguer yo digo que yo gelo 
1 ' Cortes,'  vol.  i.,  43,  12 :  "  Et  mand6." 
quel alcalle 010s alcalles que sndodieren  '  Cortes,'  vol.  I.,  43,  104. 
the resources of  the medimval Colnmunity were not conceived 
as limited to these nlethocls ; even such careful and moderate 
political thinkers as S.  Thoinas Aquinas were  clear that in 
the last resort the ruler who  persisted in unjust  and illegal 
actions coiild rightfully be deposed, and the principle found 
a  practical  illustration  in the last  years  of  the thirteenth 
century in the deposition of the Emperor Adolf-a  deposition 
which, as it was  contended, was effected by  due process of 
1aw.l 
It is, then, with the recollection both of  the theory and the 
historical circumstances of  the thi~teeiith  century, and of  the 
principles represented in the political  and legal literature of 
the  fourteenth  century,  that  we  must  approach  the  con- 
sideration of  the cleposition  of  Richard 11.  of  England.  It 
is no doubt true that his deposition was the work in the main 
of  a  baronial faction, and that their  motives  had  probably 
little, if  anything, to do with the merits of  the constitutional 
principles alleged.  But this does not destroy the importance 
of  the terms and forms of  his deposition as expressing what 
was  alleged to be the constitutional tradition of  the English 
community as represented in Parliament. 
It  was represented to Parliament that Richard had resigned 
the Crown,  and  the first  proceeding of  Parliament  wai  t'o 
accept the resignation ;  but  not  satisfied with  this, if  was 
agreed  that  a  stateixent  of  the  principal  charges  against 
Richard  should be read  to the people.  This begins with  a 
statement of  the terins of  the oalb which, as they said, Richard 
had taken at his coronation.  By this he promised to main- 
tain justice amd the ju8t  laws and customs which the " viilgus " 
should have ~hosen.~  (The word "  viilgus " should be  com- 
Cf. vol. v. part i. chap?. 7,  8. 
'  Rolls  of  Parliament,'  vol.  iii. 
(p  417),  13, 14.  Cf.  for an oxcellent 
crltlcism  of  the circumstances  of  the 
alleged reslgnst~on  ' Tho Deposition of 
Rlcharrl II.,' by MISS  M. V. Clarlre  of 
Somcrv~lle  Colloge, and V. II. Galbraith 
of  Ball101 Collogr,  Oxford,  reprinted 
from  'The  Rullet~n  of  the  Iiylands 
Library,' vol.  14, No.  1, Jan. 1930. 
'  Rolls  of  Parliament,'  vol.  iii. 
(p. 417), 17 : "  Facies fieri in omnibus 
judl~lls  tuis equam et rectam justic~am 
ot  d~scretioncm in  misericord~a et 
ve~itnte, secundum  vires  tuas . .  . 
concedis justas  leges  et consuetudines 
esso  tenendas ot  promittis  por  te eas 
esse  p~oicgontlas,  ot  ad  honorrm  Dei 
corroborandas  quas  vulgus  eligerot, 
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pared  with the terms of  the coronation  oath of  Edward 11. 
and III.,  which we  have already cited, "les leys et les cus- 
tulnes droituriers lesquels la communaute  de votre Reiaume 
aura esleu "). 
We need not enumerate all the charges ; it is, for our pur- 
pose, specially important to notice some of  them, and these 
may be divided into two groups.  The first group is concerned 
with the relation of  the king to the law, and the administration 
of  justice.  It  was  alleged  that  the king,  desiring  not  to 
maintain the just  laws and customs of  the kingdom, but to 
act according to his own  will, frequently, when  the laws  of 
the kingdom had been set forth and declared to him by the 
Justices and others of  his Council, said in express terms, and 
with a severe countenance, that the laws were in his mouth 
and in  his heart, and that he  could, by himself  and alone, 
alter  and  make  the laws  of  his  kingdom.  It  was  further 
allegcd that the king, led astray by this opinion, had refused 
to allow justice  to be done to many of  his  subjects, and by 
threats  and terror  had forced them  to withdraw  from  the 
pursuit  of  justice.l 
He was  charged  with  having frequently declared, in the 
presence of  various lords and others, that the  life and property 
of  his subjects were his and  at his  disposal "absque  aliqua 
forisfactura " ; this was wholly contrary to the laws and cus- 
toms of  the kingd~m.~  It was  alleged that, in spite of  the 
1 Id. id. (p. 419), 33:  "Item, idem 
rex nolens justas lepes et cons~~etudines 
regni  sui  servare  seu  protegere,  sed 
secundum  sue  arbitrium  voluntatis 
facore  quicquid  desideriis  ejus  occur- 
rerit, quandoqne et frequentius, quando 
sibi oxpositar et  declarntae fuerant leges 
regni  sui  per  justiciarios  et alios  do 
concilio  suo,  ut  secundnm  leges  illas 
petentibus justiciam  exhiberot.  Dixit 
exprosse,  vultu  austoro  et  protervo, 
quod  leges  sue  erant  in  ore  suo,  et 
aliquotiens  in  pectore  suo;  et quod 
ipse  solus  posset  mutare  et condere 
loges regni sui.  Et  opinione illa seduc- 
tus, quam pluribus  dc ligois suis justi- 
ciam  fieri  non  permisit ;  sed  per 
minas et terrores  quam plures  a  pro- 
secutione  communis  jnsticiae  cessare 
coegit." 
2  Id. id.  (p. 420),  43 : "Item  licet 
terrae  et tenementa,  bona  et oatalla 
ct~juscunque  liberi  liominis,  per  leges 
regni ab omnibus retroactis temporibus 
usitatas,  capi non deboant  nisi fuoriut 
forisfacta :  nihilominus  dictus  rox 
proponens  et  satagens  lcges  hujus 
modi  enervare,  in  praeseutia  quam 
plurium  dominorum  et  diornm  de 
communitate  regni,  frequenter  dixit 
et affirmavit, '  quod vita cujl~sc~~nque 
ligei  sui, ac ipsins  torrae,  tenomenla, 
of  Magna Carta, 39, which declared that the king 
could not seize or iinprison any free man except "per legale 
iudicium parium suorum vel per legeln terrae," many men ha,d 
beon  seized and brought before the nlarshal  or  constable in 
a military court, on the ground that they had said something 
ad vituperiun scandalum seu dedecus " of  the king's person ; 
and that they could only defend themselves by trial of  batt1e.l 
~t was alleged that he caused a number of  the judges to come 
to him  at Shrewsbury, and had compelled them  by various 
threats to answer certain questions concerning the law of  the 
country  against  their  will,  and  otherwise thau  they  would 
have done if they had been free and unco~rced.~ 
The second group of charges was concerned with the Parlia- 
ment and the king's relations to it.  The first of  these was the 
allegation  that  at the last  Parliament  the  king,  with  the 
intention  of  oppressing  his  people,  had  by  subtle  means 
procured  an arrangement  that, with the consent  of  estates, 
the power  of  Parliament should be given to certain persons 
to deal with some petitions  which had not been dealt with ; 
and that, under colour of this, these persons had, by the will 
of the king, dealt with other general matters concerning that 
Parliament.  This was, it was  alleged, a  grave prejudice to 
the position of Parliament and the good of the kingdom, and 
a dangerous precedent.  The king had also, in order to give 
colour and authority to these doings, caused various changes 
bona  et catalla  sunt  sua  ad  volun- 
tatem  sum, absque  aliqua  forisfac- 
turn.  Quod est omnino contra loges et 
consuetudines regni sui snpradicti.' " 
'  Id.  id.  id.,  44:  "  Item  quum 
8tatutum  fuerit  et  ordinatnm,  ac 
etiam  confirmatum,  ' Quod  nullus 
libor  homo  capiatur  etc.,  nec  quod 
alicluo mod0 deqtruatur, nec  quod rex 
etun ibit, nec  supor eum mittet, 
ni8i  per  legale  judicium  parium 
suor~m  vel  per legem terrae ' ; tamen 
voluntate, mandato, et ordination0 
dicti regis, quamplures ligium suorum 
' '  fucrant capti  ot  imprisonati,  et 
ducti  coram  Constabulario  et Mares- 
caleo in Curia militari." 
Id. id. (p.  418),  19 : "Item,  idem 
rex  nupor  apud  Salopiam  coram  se 
et  aliis  sibi  faventibus  venire  fecit 
quamplures et majorem  partem justi- 
ciarorum  cameraliter, et BOS  pcr minas 
et terrores  vurias  ac etiam  metus qui 
possent  cudore in constantoa, induxit, 
focit  et compulit,  singillatim  ad ros- 
pondendum  certis  questionibus  pro 
parte ipsius rogis factis ibidem, tangen- 
tibus leges regni sui, praeter  et contra 
voluntatem  eorum,  et  aliter  quam 
respondissent  si  fuissent  in  libortate 
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and omissions to be made in the  Rolls  of  Par1iament.l  It 
was  also alleged that while  certain  statutes had  been  made 
in Parliament  which were binding unless they were revoked 
by  the  authority  of  another  Parliament,  the  liiilg  had 
procured  the  pre~entat~ion  and acceptance  of  a  petition  to 
Parliament from the " Communitates Regni,"  that the king 
sl-lould be  as  free  as  any  of  his   ancestor^.^  Finally,  it 
was  alleged  that  kings  had  interfered  with  the  freedom 
of  electlion and  had  directed  the  sheriffs  to  secure  tllc? 
return  of  persons  nominated  by  him~elf.~  It was  on  tho 
ground  of  these  and other  charges  against  Richard,  which 
were  accepted  by  Parliament  as  notoriously  true  and  as 
being sufficient to justify his deposition, that they decided to 
proceed to this, an(!  appointed a Commission to carry it oh4 
1 Id.  id.  (p.  414),  25:  "Item  in 
Parliamento  ultimo  celebrato  apud 
Salopiam,  idem  rex  proponens  oppri- 
mere  popiilum  suum, procuravit  sub- 
tilitcr  ot  fccit  concedi,  quocl  potestas 
parliamenti  do  oonsonsu  omnium 
Statuum  regni  sui  remaneret  apud 
quasdam  ccrtas personas,  ad tcrmin- 
andum, diqsoluto  p~rliamento,  certas 
petitioncs  in eodem  parliamento  por- 
rectas,  protunc  minimc  expeditas. 
Cujus conccssionis  colore  personae  sic 
deputatae prccesserint ad alia gcneral- 
iter  parliamontun~ illud  tangontia ; 
et hoc  do voluntate regis ;  in deroga- 
tionom  status  parliamenti,  et  in 
magnum  incommodunl  totius  regni, 
et  perniciosum  exemplum.  Et  ut 
supor factis eorum hujuclmodi aliquem 
colorem  et  auctoritatem  viderentrir 
habere,  rex fecit  Rotulos  Parliamenti 
pro  voto suo mutari ct delcri,  contra 
effectum concessionis predicte." 
Id. id. (p. 410),  34 : "  Item, quod 
postquam  in  parliamento  suo  certa 
statuta  erant  edita,  quae  semper 
ligareut  donec  auctoritate  alicujus 
alterius parliamenti  fuerint  specialiter 
revocata,  idem  Rex  proruravit  sub- 
tiliter talem petitionem in parliamento 
suo pro parto communitatis regrii  sui 
porrigi,  et  sibi  concedi  in  genere, 
quod posset esso adeoliber sicut aliquis 
progenitorum  euorum  extitit  ante 
eum." 
3  Id.  id. (p. 420), 36 : "Item licet de 
statuto et consuetudinibus regni sui in 
convocatione  cujuslibet  Parliamenti, 
populus  suus  in  singulis  comitatibus 
regni  deberet  osse libor  ad eligeu~lnm 
et deputnndum  milites  pro hujusmodi 
comitatibus  ad interesscndum  Parlia- 
mento ct ad  cxponcnclum eorum grava- 
mina et ad  prosequenclum pro remcdiis 
superinde prout eis videbitur expedira ; 
tamen  pracfatus  Rox, . . . direxit 
mandata  sua  frequentius  Vicecorni- 
tibus  suis,  ut  certns  personas  per 
ipmum  Regem  nominatas  ut  Militev 
comitatum  venire  faciont  ad  Parlia- 
nionta sun." 
4  Id. id. (p. 422). 51 : "Et quoniam 
videbatur omnibus Statibiis illis fluper- 
inde singillalim  ac etiam communiter 
interrogalis qiiod illae cause criminum 
et  defectuum  crant  satis  sufficientes 
et  notoriac  ad  deponondum  eundem 
regem,  attenta etiam  sua  confessione 
miper  ipsius  insuff~cientia  et aliis  in 
dicta renuntiatione et ccssionc contentis 
patenter  emissa,  omnes  Status  pro- 
dicti  unanimiter  concesserunt  ut  ex 
The  Commission,  sitting  as  a  Tribunal,  after reciting  his 
and his recognition of  his incompetence for the rule 
and government of  the kingdom, formally deposed him.l 
~t c ill,  we  hope,  be  clearly understood  that we  are  not 
here discussing the truth of these chargcs : we  are here only 
concerned with the constitutional conceptions and the prin- 
ciples of  political authority which are implied in these, and in 
the formal act of deposition.  When we  consider them from 
this  standpoint, it is  obvious that they have  a  very  great 
significance.  In the first place, the charges against  Richard 
bring out very clearly the repudiation of  the conception that 
the king was, by himself, the source of  the law, and that he 
was  above it.  The law is conceived of  clearly as something 
which draws its authority from the community, and not from 
the king alone ; he is not above it, but under it.  The rights 
of  his  subjects  are protected by the law, and the king could 
not be permitted to violate them.  In the second place, they 
illustrate  very  clearly  the  development  in  England  of  the 
importance of  the organised representation of  the country in 
Parliament and of  the relation of  this to the royal a~l~hority. 
The  circumstances  of  the  deposition  of  Richaril  11.  are 
indeed for us important, primarily as ill~st~rating  in a highly 
dramatic  fashion the principle of  the fourtecllth century, as 
well  as  of  the Middle Ages, that the authority  of  the ruler 
was  a limited and conditional  authority, limited by the law, 
and conditional upon conformity to the la,w. 
habundanti  ad  dopositionem  domini 
regls  procederetur,  pro majore securi- 
tate et tranquillitate  populi  ac  regni 
commodo faciendam." 
Id.  id., 52 : "  Nos Joannes Episco- 
PUS Assavensis .  .  .  pro pares et  proceres 
regni Anngliae spirituales et temporales, 
et ejusdcm rcgni cornn~unit.~tes,  omnes 
etntus  cjusdem  rcgni  representnntes, 
Commissarii ad infra scripts specialiter 
dcputati,  pro  tribunali  sedentes. . . . 
ipsum  Ricardum . . .  mcrito  doponon. 
dum  pronunciamu,s,  decernimus  et 
declaramus  et  ipsum  simili  cautela 
deponimus  per  nostram  difflinitivnm 
sententiam  in  hiis  scriptis  omnibus 
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CHAPTER  V. 
THE  THEORY  OF THE  CIVILIANS  WITH  REGARD  TO 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  AUTHORITY  OF THE  RULER. 
WE have, in a  previous  chapter,  considered the opinion of 
the civilians on the subject of  the source of  law, how far they 
conceived  of  the legislative  authority as having been trans- 
ferred  to the prince  in  such  a  sense that the people  now 
possessed no legislative authority, how far they conceived of 
this as still belonging at least to their custom.  As  we  have 
said, they seem to us a little uncertain about the whole matter, 
but  this uncertainty  seems to us  to  be  intelligible  enough 
when  we  remember  that they  were  endeavouring to apply 
the text of  tho EonIan law itself  to the very different  coa- 
ditions  of  the fourteenth century.  If  they have  doubts as 
to the legislative  authority of  the people of  the empire they 
have no  doubts as to the legislative  authority of  the com- 
munity in the cities of  Italy, and with respect to constitutional 
conditions they are much more concerned with those of  the 
Italian city than with those of  the empire or  the Northern 
National  States.  We  must  now  consider their  theory of  the 
nature  of  the  authority  of  the ruler  or  prince  as  distinct 
from the question of  his legislative power. 
We may conveniently begin by observing some aspects of 
the theory of  government in the treatise of  Bartolus entitled 
'  De  Regilnine  Civitatis.'  He  begins  by  enumerating  the 
various forms of  good and bad government as given by &is- 
totle, and then asks which is the best of  the good governments. 
This, he says, had been treated by Aristotle, but more clearly 
by Egidius Romanus in his treatise '  De Regirlline Principum,' 
and he gives  his opinion that the best  form of  government 
was  the  monarchy-that  is, the government  by  one  man. 
ae  Iloints out, however, the distinction between the king who 
governs according to the laws and the king who inakes the 
law as he will ; the first does not hold the "regalia"  which 
belong to the State which he rules, or to some superior ; the 
"  regis " is properly that of the second, to whom  all 
things belong.' 
Hc: asks, then, whether it is goocl to be governed by a king, 
and cites, first, the description by Sarnuel (1  Sam. viii) of  the 
oppressive nature  of  the king's  government,  and  next, the 
difl'erent terms in which it is described in Deuteronomy, and 
contends  that  Samuel  described,  not  what  the  monarchy 
ought to be,  but what might  happen if  the king  became  a 
tyrant.  The proper character of the kingship is that which is 
described in Deuteronomy xvi., in which the subjects are not 
the  slaves but the brothers  of  the king.2  It would appear, 
however, that Bartolus felt that this did not give a sufficiently 
clear notion of  what was the extent of  the king's rights, and 
he  therefore adds a brief  but significant- sentence.  The king 
has  the right to demand whatever is necessary for the royal 
expenses, "  omnia tribute, vectigalia et census publicos."  He 
can for sufficient reason impose "  collectas," for  kings have 
all power.3 
'  Bartolus, '  De Regimine Civitatis ' : 
" Praemitto quod  non  omnu  regimen 
ipsius  unius  dicitur  regimen  regis. 
Nam, quandoque est unus qui regit, et 
tanturn  ost  judex,  ut  praesides  pro- 
vinciarum  et  proconsules.  . . .  Isti 
enim  habent  judicare  secundum  leges 
tenent staturn  regium, 8.  competen- 
tern  ministris : nec  ad eos cornpetunt 
regalia,  sod  ad  civitates  quas rogunt, 
vel ad slium superiorem vcl fiscum. . . . 
&uandoque unus  rcgit  civitatem  vel 
Provinciam, qui fscit leges prout vult ; 
Omnia all oum pertinent et  istud dicitur 
rOgirne11 regis." 
Id. id.,  11 : " Apparet  ergo quod 
aubditi  non  sunt  servi  regis,  sed 
fratres,  et  sic  quod  in  precedente 
auctoritate  (i.e.,  Samuel  viii.)  dictum 
est,  n5n  de  vero  rcge  socl  tyranno 
intellexit. . . .  Debet ergo bonus  rox 
esse  fidelis,  Christianns,  justus,  non 
pornposus,  nec  subditorurn  gravator, 
non  luxuriosus,  non  avarus,  nec 
suporbus." 
a  Id. id., 12 : "  Sed licet ibi ponatur 
quod  rex  facere  deboat,  et qualis  in 
se  debeat esse, non  tnmen ibi ponitur 
quid a subditis posset exigere. 
Resp :  Quod  expensas  majestatis 
regiae  congruentes  facere  debeat,  s. 
hoc  habumus  expressurn  10 col.  quae 
sunt regalia, c.  I., ubi clicitur quod  ad 
regem  pe~tinent  omnia  tributa,  vectl- 
galia et census publici, cjuae ibi special- 
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110 returns then to the question  whether it is good  for  a 
"  civitas " or  "people"  to be  governed by  a king,  and, as 
we  understand  him, he thinks that this is the best forin of 
government, and he also thinks that this was the opinion of 
Aristotle as well as of  Egidins Romanus.  He observes, how- 
ever, that we must  considcr not  only what is good, but also 
what is likely to happen, for the king or his descendants may 
becoine t,yrants.  l 
This leads him to a discussion of  the best form of  govern- 
ment in relation to the different magnitude of  different States. 
The small State or city is, hc thinks, best  governed by tlie 
multitude  or  whole  people.  The  second  grade  of  State in 
magnitude-and  he  gives  as examples  Florence  and Venice  - 
-is  best  governed by a  small number  of  men,  that is, by 
the  wealthy  and  honourable  men.  The  third  or  great 
State  should  be  governed  by  a  king,  and  he  cites,  as 
illustrating  his  view,  the  statement  of  Pomponius  in  the 
'Digest'  (i.  2,  2),  that  when  the  Roman  Einpire  grew  - 
and conquered many provinces, the government was put into 
the hands  of  one ruler.  He  adds, however, that in such  a 
grcst multitude there will  be many  good  men, and the ruler 
should  take  couilsel with  them.2  This  monarchy,  Bartolus 
etiam  portinct  ex  causa  necessaria 
ponere  collcctas,  ut  ibi  dicitur,  st 
etiam  jure  Digestorum probatur,  quia 
reges  habeant  omnem  polestatem  ut 
ff. de  origino  jur.  1.  2.  $  in initio. 
(' Dig.,'i.  2, 2)." 
1  Id. id.,  13 :  "  Viso  ergo  quid  sit 
jus  regls,  rodearnus ad questionem, arl 
exped~at  civitati  vel  populo  regi  per 
regcm, prout  bonus ebb  habens  dictas 
conditiones,  optimurn  regimen  est 
rognurn regis per rationes s. lactas.  Et 
ita intrlligo dictum Arisl. et Egidii.  Si 
vero  consideramus  illud  quod evonire 
potest,  quia  rox  quandoque  veriitur 
in  tyrannum,  ipse  vel  descendentcs 
ab  eo,  tunc  dico  quod  considc~n~c 
dobemus  quid evenire potest,  quando 
illud do  quo agitur ad lloc naturaliter 
et uiliversaliter tendit." 
3 Id.  ld.,  16: "HOC  preemisso,  facio 
triplicem  divisionem  civitatum  seu 
populornm,  nam aliqua cst civitas sou 
gens  magna  in  p~ilno  grado  magni- 
tudinis.  Quaedam est civitas sou gens 
major, et sic in socundo gradu magni- 
tudinis.  Quaedam  est  civitas,  seu 
gens  maxima,  et sic  in  tertio  gradu 
magnitudinis. 
16.  Si  loqunmur  de  gente  seu 
populo in primo gradu, tunc dico quod 
non  cxpedit  illi  regi  prr  regem  . . . 
nec  expedit  tali  populo  regi  per 
paucos . . . expedit autenl huic populo 
. . . regi  per  rnultitudinem,  quod 
vocatur regimen ad populum.  . . . 
19.  Quod  autem  dico,  per  multi- 
tudcm, intelligo, exceptis vilissimis. . . 
item ab isto rogimi~ie  possunt excludi 
aliqui magnates, qui sunt ita poteutes 
quod alios opprimerent. . . . 
20.  Secundo eat vidcndum  de gente 
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says, may  be either hereditary  or elective,  but the elective 
lllethod  is alone proper for the universal monarchy-that  is, 
the  It is  interesting  to  notice  that  while  he 
has  a great  reverence for the empire, he  admits  that  since 
it ceased to be held by Italians it had fallen in their esteem.2 
~artolus  is clear that monarchy is not adapted to the small 
or  even to the moderately large State.  He evidently thinks 
that it is  not  suited to Italy ; the question  of  the relation 
of  the city State to the Empire does not here seem to be in 
his mind. 
IVe  must,  however,  be  careful  to  observe  that,  like 
Egidi~s,~  he very sharply distinguishes the true king from the 
tyrant.  The monarchy which he thinks to be good is absolute, 
but it is directed to the common good of  the community, while 
the tyrant pursues his own advantage.  And here we  can see 
that his  judgment  is  quickened by his sense  of  the Italian 
conditions. 
For  to  Bartolus  tyranny  is  not  only  a  corrupt  forrn  of 
government, but it is the worst  of  all corrupt governmoats. 
The  government  of  a  few, or  of  the multitude,  is  corrupt 
when  they pursue their  own advantage, but it is not  so far 
removed from a government for the common good as that of 
seu populo majori et in secundo gradu 
mngnitudinis,  tunc istos  non  expedit 
reg1 per unum regem . . . nec expedit 
regi  per  multitudinrm,  esset  enim 
valde  diacile et poriculosum  tantam 
multitudinem  congrogari.  Sod  istis 
expodit  regi  pcr  paucos,  hoc  ost,  por 
dlv~les  et bonos hominos ilkus rivitatis. 
. . . Sic enim rogitur  civitas Venetia- 
llll11, sic civitas Florentiao.  . . . 
,,  lerlio videndum  est  do  genie  vcl 
Populo maximo, qui est in tertio gradu 
"agnitudinis.  IIoc  autcm fieri possot 
Coutingcrc,  in  civitate  una  per  so, 
Bed  si  esset  civitas  quao  nlultis  aliis 
civitatibus  et provinciis  dominarclur, 
bulc   ent ti  bonum  est  regi  per  uno. 
lloc'  r~robatur  ff.  Do  Orig.  Jur. 1. 111. 
Novi6sime  (' Dig.,'  i.  2,  2),  ubi, 
auoto  rnullur~l imperio  Romano  ot 
captis multis provinciis, deventum fuit. 
ad unum s. ad principem.  Hoc cl~nm 
probant  ornnos  rationes,  fnctae  por 
dictum  fratrum  Egidium,  hic  cessant 
I ationos in oppositum.  In tanta onirn 
mullitudino,  do  necessitate  enim sunt 
multi boni, por quos oportebit se regem 
cons~ilero  at in justitiao  ria se ponclc ; 
et sic  de  facto  comrnunitor  vidrmus 
quod  tanto  molius  gm;  vel  populna 
regetur,  quanto  sub  majore  rege 
rogitur." 
Id. id., 23. 
Id. id.,  25:  "Et ideo  imporium 
Romanorurn postquam  fuit ab Italicis 
separatum, semper  decrevit  in  oculis 
nostris,  lloc tamon ahsqi~e  Dei judicio 
occulto factum non est." 
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the one man.l  We may put it iu concrete terms, the Italian 
oligarchy or democracy was not so really corrupt and evil a 
thing as the Italian tyranny.  Bartolus adds that the corrupt 
oligarchy  or  denlocracy tends to develop into a tyranny, as 
they had seen in their own day, for "  Italy is full of  tyrants." 
This treatment  of  tyranny  by  Bartolus is  of  importance, 
and  we  must  consider  it  not  only  in the  'De  Eegiinine 
Ci~itat~is,'  but also in another treatise, entit,led '  De Tyranno.' 
We  have  just  seen  that  Bartolus  derives  from  Egidius 
Colonna  and  Aristotle  the conception of  the tyrant  as  one 
.who governs for his  own profit  and not for the good  of  the 
community.  In the treatise,  '  De  Tyranno.' he derives from 
S. Isidore, directly or indirectly, the description of  the tyrant 
as that wicked king who exercises a cruel rule over his sub- 
jects ;  from  8. Gregory the Great he  takes  his  description 
of  the tyrant  as  one  who  governs  the  coinmonwcalth but 
not lawfully (non jure),4 and he applies this to the case of  the 
King or Emperor of  the Romans ; if  any man seeks to obtain 
that place unjustly he is properly called a tyrante5 
1 Id. id., 27 : "  Quaoro enim de malis 
modis regendi, quisqu~s  sit dotorior : in 
hoc  omnes philosophi dicunt, quod ty- 
ralinus est  pessimus principatus, tenet 
enim ultimum  gradum malitiae.  Item 
predictus Egidius  in  dicto libro,  dicit 
enim  ut  dictum  est,  regimen  icloo 
dicitur bonum,  quia  per  illud maximo 
tenditur  ad  bonum  commune.  Sod 
per  tyrannum  maxime  ab intentione 
communis boni roceditur,  unde t~yran- 
nus  pessimus  principatus;  undo  si 
dominentur  plures,  quia  divitos  vel 
boni  crcduntur,  vel  si  dominetur 
mullitudo,  quamquam  illi  regentes 
tenclant  ad proprim,  et  non  a  Deo 
est, et sic  est  regimen  malorum  vel 
populi  perversi;  tamen  non  tantum 
receditur  ab  intentione  communis 
boni, quio ex eo quod pluros bunt, ali- 
quid  sapit  de  natura  communis  boni. 
Scd  si unus est tyrannus etiam recedit 
a  communi  bono.  Praoterea,  sicut 
virtus  unita in  bonum  est  melior, ita 
unita in deterius est deterior.  Tyran- 
nus  autem  est  pessimus,  hoc  autem 
est  ita  manifesturn  quod  demonstra- 
tionem non eget." 
2  Id. id.,  29 :  'L Item  advertendum 
est  quod  regimen  plnrium  mdorum, 
vel  regnum  populi  perversi  non  diu 
durat,  sod  do  facili  in  tyrannidem 
unius  deducitur,  hoc  enim  de  facto 
saepius vidimus.  Hoc etiam pormissio 
divina  est,  quum  script-  sit,  ' Qui 
regnare  facit hypocritom  propter  pec- 
cata, populi ' ; et quia hodie Italia cst 
plena tyrannis." 
"artolus,  '  De Tyranno,'  1. 
4  Id.  id.,  2: " Proprie  tyranl~us  is 
dicitur  qui  communi  reipublicae  non 
jure  principatur." 
5  Id. id.,  3 : "  Sicut  enim  rex,  sou 
imperator  Romanorum  est  justus  ~t 
verus et universalis : ita si quis illm 
locum vult injuste obtinere, appcllatur 
proprie tyrannus." 
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In another place Bartolus says : "  The tyrant may be either 
lnanife~t  ' or '  veiled,' " but,  what  is  inore important, he 
may be a tyrant, "  ex defectu tituli " or "  ex partc exereitus." 
The distinction is important, though it was not new ;  Aquinas 
had  pointed it out in his commentary on the "  Sentences." l 
When he comes to the question of  tyranny "ex parte exer- 
citus,"  he first  says in general terms  that the tyrant is he 
who  does  tyrannical things-that  is, things  directed  to his 
own  advantage  and not  that of  the community,Z and then 
cites  from  a  work,  which  he  attributes  to  Plutarch,  'De 
Begillline Principum,'  an enumeration of  such actions.3 
What is the remedy against the tyrant.  If  he has a superior, 
it is for the superior to depose him ; but Bartolus interpolates 
the observation that there may be occasions when the emperor 
or  Pope  may  maintain  such  tyrants  in  their  position  for 
some gave  and sufficient reasoa4  In another work he seems 
clearly to indicate that the tyrant may rightfully be deposed, 
and he cites a passage from Aquinas, to which we have often 
referred, that it is not sedition to resist the tyrant.6 
It is not easy from all this  to form any very  clear  view 
as  to the judgment  of  Bartolus with regard  to the nature 
of  the  authority  of  the ruler.  He is  clear that monarchy 
'  Id.  id.,  12:  "  Nam  quidam  est 
tyrannus  manifestus,  quidam  quan- 
doque  velatus  et  tacitus.  Ilem  esse 
quem  tyrannum  manifeste  contingit, 
quandoque  ex  parte  oxercitus,  quan- 
doquo  ex  defectu tituli."  Cf.  vol.  v., 
P.  91  (S.  Thomas  Aquinas,  'Com-  - 
mentary  on  the "  Sentences," ' II., D. 
44,  2, 2). 
Id. id.,  27 : "  Octavo  quaero  do 
tyranno ox  parte exercitii licot habeat 
jusLum  titulum, minus proprio dlcatur 
tayrannus. . . .  Dico  quod iste tyran- 
"US  ex parte ejus qui opera tyrannica 
facit, hic  ex  opere  ejus non  cedit  ad 
bcnum  commune,  sed  ad  proprium 
ip~ius  tyrani." 
Id. id., 28, 29. 
Id. id., 34. 
'  Id., ' De Guelfis et Gebellinis,'  9 : 
VOL.  VI. 
"  Ad  utilitatem  publicam  licitum  est 
(i.e.,  tyrannum  deponere), et si  pcr- 
veniret ad actum ita quod rumor  ve1 
tumultus  irrepserit  in  civitate,  non 
incidit  in legem  C.  de  seditione, quia 
licet  faciat,  ut  dictum  cut;  pro  1100 
induco Thomas de  Aquino  in  2,  2,  Q. 
42,  ad  2  in  fi : (' Summa Thoologica,' 
2, 2, 8. 42,  2), ubi sic  ait.  ' Regnum 
tyrannicurn  non est justum,  quia  non 
ordinatur  ad bonum commune, sod ad 
bonurn  privatum  rogentis,  et  iclco 
perturbatio  hujus  regni  non  11abet 
rationem  seditionis,  l~i~i  forte, quando 
sic  inordinate  perturbaretur  tyromni 
regnum,  quod  multitudo  subjecta 
majus damnum paterciur ex pertarba- 
tioue  sequente,  quam  ex  tyranni 
rogimine.'  Cf. vol. v.  " p. 9.2. 
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is not proper to the Italian city, but he seems to incline to 
the view, which 110  iliay have derived from Egidius Rorllanus, 
that it is suited to the great monarchies, that is to Northern 
and  Western  Europe ; his  hatred  of  the  tyrant  may  be 
interpreted as related to these as well as to Italy. 
We turn from Bartolus to his great contemporary Baldus. 
He says in one  place, but merely incidentally, that a  good 
king  is  better  than  a  good  1aw.l  In another  place  he 
says  that the emperor  is  called  a  king  because  he  rules 
others, and is ruled  by no  one, though he rules himself  by 
the advice of  the wise men.  All  kings have  supreme juris- 
diction in thcir kingdom, and there is no appeal from their 
judgment,  for  their  judgments  are  accepted  as law;  their 
"  bene placituln " is subject to no law.= 
We  may  compare  a  passage  in his  Commentary  on  the 
Code in which he discusses the question whether the prince 
is  bound  by  the  law.  Baldus  says  that  the  passage  in 
the Code on  which he is commenting means that he should 
live according to tho law  "de debito honestatis,"  but this 
must not be taken too precisely.  The supreme and absolute 
power  of  the  prince  is  not  under  the law;  the words  of 
the  Code  must  therefore  be  taken  as  referring  to  the 
ordinary  power  of  the  prince,  not  to his  absolute  power. 
While  the  emperor's  authority  is  derived  from  the  "lex 
regia,"  it must be borne in mind that this "  lex regia " was 
promulgated by the divine will  (nutu divino), and therefore 
the empire is said to be immediately from God.  It should be 
1  Baldus,  '  Commontary  on Digest ' 
(fol.  10, v.) : "  Et molius  est  bonus 
rox quam bona lox." 
2 Id. id. : '  Proomium ' (fol.  2,  v.) : 
"  Item  nota  quod  imperator  Caesar 
dicitur  Rex . . . et n  nemine  regitur 
. . .  Consilio  tamen  prudentum  se 
rogit  ot  gubarnat.  . . .  Item  nota 
quod  hoe  est  commune  jus  omnium 
regum quod a regia maiestatis sententia 
non  appellatur ;  nimirum  quia  ojus 
definitivn  sententia  in  regno  suo  pro 
lego  habotur,  et sic  nomo  possct  in 
melius commutare.  Item in reguo suo 
habat  supromam  jurisdictionem  . . . 
cum manu omnia gubernet . . . bone- 
placitum  nulli  legi  subiaceat  . .  . 
Etiam si unus rex  teneat  in feudum 
regnum suum alio rogo.  Nam oo ipso 
quod intitulatur rox, habet supremarn 
potevtatem  in  subditos,  nec  enim 
minor  est  rex  praefecto  praetorio.  a 
cujus sententia non appellatur." 
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observed, however, that after all this Baldus adds that he is 
good ruler who dosires that God  and the laws should rule, 
and this is why the elxiperor says that he subjects his "  prin- 
Gip~t~S  " to the laws.' 
In a  work  of  Jason  de  Mayno, an important  civilian  of 
the  fifteenth  century (' Comm. on  Digest,' i. 4. I),  we  have 
found an important reference to Baldus  as having said that 
the  Pope  and the Prince  can  do  anything  "supra  ius, et; 
contra  ius,  et  extra  ius."  Unfortunately  Jason  gives  no 
indication of  the place from which he cites this. 
What are we to understand by all this ?  Baldus thinks that 
a good prince is better than a good law ; he admits, and indeed 
is clear, that a good  prince should normally respect the law, 
but he is also clear that he is not, strictly speaking, under the 
law,  and he  suggests an important  distinction  between  the 
ordinasy and the absolute power of  the prince. 
We  might then incline to the conclusion that the theory  of 
monarchy of  these great civilians of  the fourteenth  century 
was  very different from that of  the normal  theoretical  and 
constitutional tradition of  the Niddle Ages  and of  the four- 
teenth century, but before we draw such a conclusion we must 
re~iieinber  some other aspects of  their theory which we  have 
already considered.  We have  already  dealt  with their dis- 
cussion  of  the  question  whether  indeed  the prince was the 
sole  source  of  law, and have  seen that with  respect to the 
custom  of  the  people  they  are  at  least  hesitating  and 
uncertain,2  and  we  must  remember  that  other  question 
Id. id., '  Commentary on Code,'  i. 
4 (fol.  56,  v.) :  "  Princops  debet 
"ivero  socundlun  legos,  quia  ex  loge 
eiusdom  pondit  auctoritas.  Intollige 
quad  istud  vorbum  debot  intolligi  do 
debilo honostatis  quae  summa  debet 
esse  in  principo,  sed  non  intelligitur 
precise;  quia  suprema  et  absolutn 
Patestas  principis  lion  est  sub  loge, 
lox  ista  hsbet  respectum  ad 
pOtestatern ordinariam, non ad poites- 
tatem  absolutm . . , nota  quod Lm- 
porator dicit se esse legibus alligatum, 
et hoe  ex benignitate non ex necessi- 
tato.  Secundo,  nota,  quad nuctoritas 
imperatoris peudit ex loge  rogilt, quae 
fuit  nutu  Divino  promulgatn  ot  i&o 
imperium clicitur esee immediate a Uoo 
. . .  Quarto nota quod  ille  bene prin- 
cipatur  qui  vult  principari  Deum  et 
leges, undo dicit imporator so submittore 
principatum suum legibus." 
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even deals with this in relation to taxation, and, while he seems 
to think that the prince has the right to impose a " collecta " on 
his subjects and that they are bound by "  natural obligation " 
to pay this if  it is useful for the service and necessity of  the 
commonwealth, they are not bound by "  natural obligation " 
to do this if the tax is levied merely by the arbitrary will of 
the prince.' 
Joannes  Faber,  an  important  French  civilian,  in  one 
passage says that the prince can take away.a man's property 
for some  definite  cause,  but  the person  to whom  he  may 
give it has not  a  just  title before  God  unless  there was  a 
just  cause-Le.,  for  the  action  of  the  prin~e.~  Finally, 
Angelo  de Perusia,  a civilian of  the later part of  the four- 
teenth  century,  says  plainly  that  the  prince  cannot  take 
away a  man's  property  without  cause,  aqd  he  refers  for  a 
frill discussion to the passage of  Cynus just  ~uoted.~ 
It inay possibly appear that this is not  a sufficiently im- 
portant  point  to deal with  so fully, but that is a  mistake. 
For it will be evident, on alittle reflection, that the principle 
of  the civilians is clearly related to, if not identical with, tho 
more  precisely stated  principle that the king cannot proceed 
against a man's property except by process of  law.* 
We return to one very important question : What did the 
culpa ?  Respondit  glossa  quod  non 
est  ratio :  quia  bonae  et  naturales 
consuetudines  ligant  principem,  quia 
potentius  est  jus  naturale  yuam 
principatus." 
1 Id.,  'Commentary  on  Digest,'  i. 
1, 6 (fol. 11, v.) :  "  Dccimo quaeritur 
si princeps imponit subditis collectam ; 
utrum ex boc oritur obligatio naturalis ; 
et  dic  quod  si  concernit  reipublicae 
utilitatem et necessitatem,  quod tunc 
sic  . . . sed  solius  principis  effren- 
atam  voluntatem,  tunc  non  oritur 
obligatio naturalis." 
Joannes Faber, ' In Quatuor Libros 
Institutionum ' i.,  2  (fol. 8) :  "  Quid 
si  (prinreps)  rescribat  in possessorio.  . .  .  Dico ergo quod princeps ex causa 
possit  tollere  dominium,  dum  tamen 
faciat ex certa scientia. . . .  Caveat 
tamen  de  conscientia,  ut forte sciens 
et recipiens non habeat justum titulum 
quoad Deum : nisi subisset causa Vera 
justa :  et  princeps  male  informatus 
debet revocare, facta informatione." 
3  Angelo  de  Perusia,  '  Super  Codi- 
cem,' 'De rei vindicationo,' Lox xii. (fol. 
62) : "In tex. ibi, ex nostro rescripto ; 
et sic patot per principem non auferri 
alteri  dominium  per  rescripturn,  cum 
sit de jure  gentium,  nulla  causa sub- 
sistente, alias seeus ; ut plena disputa- 
tur  per  Cynum  in  1.  Rescripta,  0.  si 
contra jus  vel uti. pub." 
Cf.  chap.  4.  For  tlic  opinions  of 
the earlier civilian& see vol. ii. p.  72 
civilians of  the fourteenth century think about the right  of 
the community to depose the ruler?  Bartolus in his  com- 
ment~~  on  the  'Digest ' raises  the  question  whether  the 
Roman  people  can  revoke  the  authority  which  they  had 
given  to the emperor,  and  he  says  that  two  of  his  pre- 
decessors  among the Civilians, William  of  Cuneo  and  Cynus 
of  pistoia, maintained  that they could do  this,l and  in  his 
treatise  'De  Guelfis  et  Gebellinis,' which  we  have  already 
cited,  he  asserts  that  it is  lawful  for  a  proper  cause  to 
depose  a  t~rant.~ 
Baldus discusses the subject, but his own conclusion is, at 
least technically, adverse.  He asks whether the subjects may 
expel their  king  on  account  of  his intolerable injustice and 
tyranny, for an evil king is a tyrant.  His answer is first in 
the affirmative, but then he says that the truth is the opposite, 
for  subjects cannot  derogate from the right of  the superior. 
They may, in fact, expel him, but the superior docs not lose 
his "  dignitas."  Joannes Faber is confident in his assertion 
that  the  people  could  depose  the emperor.  The  emperor 
receives his jurisdiction from the people, and it is reasonable 
to hold that the people have the power to revoke it ; besides, 
1 Bartolus, 'Commentary on Digest,' 
i.  3,  8 : "  Quaero  numquid  Romanus 
populus  possit  revocare  potestatem 
imperatoris, et videtur  quod sic. . . . 
Gulielmus do Cuneo tenet quod populus 
Romanus  possot  revocare,  maxime 
yuum  primus imperator, cui fuit data 
ills  potestas,  non  potuit  quaerere 
successori,  nam  creatio  imperatoris 
non est ex successione, sed ex electione. 
Nam iste non est de casibus, in quibus 
luaeritur  per  alium  jus.  . . .  Imo 
dieit plus  quod possit eum degradare, 
01:  C.  i.  De invest intor do : et vass : 
91l~d ita  allegat  hic  etiam  Cynus. 
Item  dicitur  quod  hie  equiparatur 
imperatori." 
16  Do  Guelfis et Gebellinis,'  9 (cf. p. 
84).  We wish to refer our rcaders again 
Professor Ercole's  ' Da Bartolo  all' 
Althusio ' for a very  full and interest. 
ing  discussion  of  the  treatment  of 
Tyranny  in  Bartolus,  and  also  in 
Coluccio  Salutati's  '  Tractatus de Ty- 
ranno,'  which  belon~s  to  tho  last 
years of  the fourtronth century. 
q~eldus,  '  Commentary  on  Digest ' 
(fol.  10,  v.):  Secundo  quoritur  an 
regom  propter  snas iniusticias intoler- 
abiles,  et facientem tyrannica, subditi 
possent  expellere, et videtur  quod sic 
. . . cum  malus  rex  tyranniis  sit. 
Item unusquisquo potest suam salutom 
tueri.  . . .  Item  a  quo  removotur 
effectus nominis dobet removere ipsum 
nomcn et dignitas, nam reatus omnem 
honorem  excludit. . . .  Contrarium 
est  verum,  quia  subditi  non  possunt 
derogaro  juri  superioris.  Undo  licet 
do facto expellant, tamen superior non 
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he says, it is known that this had been done in former times. 
He adds, however, that this is a dangerous thing to do.' 
Joannes  Faber, '  In quatuor libros 
Institutionurn,'  i.  2  (fol.  6)  :  "  Sed 
an  populus  potest  imperatorem  de- 
ponere.  Videtur  quod SIC,  quia quum 
ad  populum  pertinet  ejus  creatlo  ut 
hio . . . et  depositio  seu  restoraiio 
. .  .  praeterea quum mandakum juris- 
dictionis  sit  revocablle  de  sui  natura 
. . . et  imperator  jurisdictionem  tt 
potestatem  habet  a  popdo,  ut  hic 
concordatur. videtur  quod populus re- 
vocare potest.  Praeterea  constat  hoc 
factum  fuisse  antiquis  temporibus." 
(He gives  various  arguments  against 
this,  but  concludes)  "  sed  tamen 
satis  possit  dici  quod  populus  ex 
causa  posset  eum  destruere,  ut  in 
contrariis,  ff.  De  Excuea, tuto 1.  8ed 
et  reprobari.  Hoc  tamen  attentum 
p~rioulosum  eat." 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF 
REPRESENTATIVE  INSTITUTIONS. 
WE have in the last  volume  given  a  short account  of  the 
beginnings  of  the  system  of  representative  assemblies  in 
Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and 
have pointed  out  that this was the natural and logical out- 
come  of  the  character  and  principles  of  medimval  society, 
and  above  all  of  that  principle  which  lies behind  a11  the 
complex  forms of  medimval  civilisation,  the principle  that 
political  authority  is  the  expression  of  the  character  and 
life  of  the community.  It is  unfortunate  that  even  mell- 
informed  persons  should  still  sometimes  seem  unable  to 
understand  that  medimval  society  was  not  irrational,  or 
should seek  to find its real  quality in what  seem  to them 
its unintelligible superstitions.  At any rate, the representa- 
tion of the community was evidently a highly rational expedient 
for obtaining some kind of  method for the expression of  the 
common  judgment  of  the  community-a  judgment  which 
was  indeed liable to error and to confusion like that of  any 
ruler, but which did impose some limitations upon the frequent 
stu~idit~y  or incapacity or caprice of  the foolish ruler, and which 
also  added  greatly  to  the  efEectiveness  and  power  of  the 
capable ruler. 
Wc  ha,ve in this chapter  to examine  very  briefly  the de- 
velopment  of  this system in the fourteenth century, and to 
consider  the  purposes for  which  it was  used:  very  brielly 
indeed, for we  are not  writing the constitutional history  of 
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detail to render it reasonably clear what were its most siguifi- 
cant features in this century. 
We begin with Spain, which, as we  have pointed out, was 
the  country  in  which  the  representative  system  was  first 
developed.  And  we  do  this  also  in  order  once  again  to 
make it clear that the political civilisation of  Western Europe 
in the Middle  Ages  was  homogeneous, that, whatever  may 
have been the cause of  the later divergence of  the political 
organisation of England from that of  the Continental countries, 
the mediroval political systems were in their origin similar- 
we  would  almost  say identical-and  the ideas  or  principles 
they embodied were  the same. 
We  have pointed  out l  that by the end  of  the thirteenth 
century the Cortes of Castile and Leon were meeting very fre- 
quently, and that they were regularly attended not only by the 
prelates  and magnates,  but by  the representat,ives of  cities. 
It is well therefore to begin by pointing out that this continued 
throughout  the fourteenth century.  It  is  clear  that  they 
had become a normal part of the machinery of  government, 
and not only a normal but a very important part. 
During the minorities of  the kings, and they were frequent, 
the Cortes assumed almost the form of  a permanent Council 
of  Government.  We have pointed out that at the Cortes of 
Palencia  in  1313 the guardians  of  the king  undertook  to 
call  together  the  Cortes  every  second  year,  and  agreed 
that if  they  should  fail to do  this,  the Cortes  was  to be 
summoned  by the prelates  and  sixteen knights  and "good 
men "  whom the Cortes had appointed to act as counsel1or.s of 
the g~ardians.~  In  1315, at  the Cortes of  Burgos the guardians 
confirmed all  the  "liberties,"  &c., of  the cities,  and it is 
clearly laid down that if they did not carry out their obliga- 
tions the Cortes were to elect othex3 The Cortes of  Valladolid 
in 1322 appointed  Don Felipe as guardian of  the king, and 
provided that there should always be with the king s council 
1 Cf. vol. v. pp. 134-136.  '  Cortes  of  Castile,'  vol.  i.  39, 
2  ' Cortes  of  Castile  and  Leon,'  i.  66. 
41 and ;I.  Cf. vol. v. p. 136. 
of twenty-four  "  caualleros  e  onlmes  buenos,"  represent-  -  - 
ing the people of  Castile, Leon, Estren~adnra,  and Andal~sia,, 
to hear and determine  all matters brought  before  the king, 
and  that  a11  officials of  the household  of  the king  or  his 
guardian  should  be  punished  for  any  offcnce  which  they 
Light commit, even if they pleaded that they had acted under  - 
the order of the guardian.l 
Alfonso  XI. attained his  majority in 1325, and held the 
aortes  at Valladolid.  This  was  composed  of  the prelates, 
magnates,  and  procurators  of  the  cities,  &c.  The  Cortes 
demanded, and the king promised, that he would  not  take 
any action against the person or property of  any one till he 
had been heard and examined accorcling to "  ffuero e dcrech~."~ 
The  Cortes  of  Madrid  in 1329  conlplained  that  various 
officials had  violated  their  privileges, and desired  that the 
king  should  appoint  others,  and they asked, and the king 
promised, that no illegal taxation, either particular or genera< 
should be raised without consultation with the Cortes ; they 
complained also that the Chancery was issuing illegal briefs 
(cartas desafforadas), which caused many imprisonments  and 
deaths,  and  other  violations  of  their  "  ffueros " and privi- 
leges, and they requested that instruction should be given to 
the  officials  of  the  cities  that  they  should  disregard  such 
 brief^.^  The answer of  the king to this was somewhat evasive, 
1 Id. id., 43, 4 : "  Et estos caualleros 
e ommes buenos que ssean en guardalo 
nostro sennor el Rey.  Et quo ssoan en 
oyer  e  librar  todos  10s  ffochos  que 
veniesen ante el Rey. . . . 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
12. Et quo alcalle o 10s alcalles que 
andodieren  on  casa  del  Rey  o  en  la 
mia, que non scan exrusados do la pena, 
si enella cayercn, maguer dija quo golo 
Yo  mand6,  et maguer  yo diga  que yo 
gel0 mand6." 
Id. id.,  45,  26:  " Otrossi  a10  que 
me  pidieron  por  merced  que  non 
nand0  matar  nin  prender,  nin lisiar, 
nin  deupechar,  nin  tomm  aninguno 
"nguno  cosa  delo suyo, sin sser  ante 
llamado  e  oydo  e  venrido  por  ffuero 
e  por  derecho  por  querella  nin  por 
querellas que del den. 
A  esto  respondo  que  tengo  par 
bien  do  non  rnandar  nin  liaiar  nin 
despechar  nin  tomar  aninguno,  nin- 
guna  cosa  del  suyo,  sin  sseer  ante 
oydo e venpido por ffuero ot por derecho. 
Otrossi do non mendar aningunos pren- 
der ssin guardar ssu ffuero e su derecho 
a cadu uno, E juro dolo guardar." 
Id.  id.. 47,  68 : "  Otrossi a10 que me 
pidioron  por  merced  que  tenga  por 
bien  deles  non  echar  nin  mrtndar 
pagar  pecho  desafforado  ninguno  es- 
pecial nin general en todo la mia tierra 
ssin  sser  llamaclos  primeramiente  a 
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bzt, as we have seen, the matter was dealt with more decisively 
at the Cortes of  Bribiesca in 1357.l 
We  do not, however, attempt here to give an account  of 
all the important  of  the Cortes:  what  we  are 
concerned to make clear is that the Cortes played an important 
part in all public affairs.  There has been  somet,inies a ten- 
dency  to  think  that  these  representative  bodies  had  few 
functions  except  to  provide  the  finance  required  by  the 
ruler.  This  impression  is  curiously  inconsistent  with  the 
v~ried  character of  the functions of  the Cortes of Castile and 
Leon. 
Not,  of  course,  that  their  financial  power  was  unim- 
portant.  From  the beginning of  the fourteenth  cent~~ry  to 
the end it is  clew that the Cortes  constalltly asserted  that 
they, and they only, could grant the money required by the 
Crown  beyond the normal  and customary revenues.  It was 
plainly asserted  in the Cortes  of  Valladolid  in 1307 that if 
any tax-i.e.,  any  special  tax-was  needed,  the  king  (or 
regent) must ask for  it, and that he  could in no  other way 
impose it,2  and the king assented. 
At the Cortes  of  Madrid  in 1391 it was declared that the 
Council of  Ptegency just  appointed for the minorit,y of  Henry 
111. should have no power to raise any tax unless it had been 
authorised  by  the Cortcs, or  in  a  case  of  special urgency, 
by  the  procurators  of  the  cities  who  had  been  placed  in 
the  Council  of  Regen~y.~  In 1393 the  Cortes  of  Madrid, 
after granting the king, who had just  attained his majority, 
a tax of  a "  twentieth " for a year, demanded that he should 
1 Cf. p. 5. 
Id. id., 34,  6 : " 4 wto dig0 quelo 
tengo por  bien,  pero  si armsriere qur 
pecho sviese mester alguno, pedir gclcs 
he,  et in otra manera no ocharo pecho 
ninguno enella tierra." 
Cf.  id.  id.,  i.  47,  fi8  (Alfonso XI., 
1329) :  "  Otrossi alo que  me  pidieron 
por  mercet  que  tenga  por  bien  delos 
non  echar,  nin  mandar  pagar  des- 
affcrado ninguno especial  nin  general 
en toda la mi tierrn. ssin sseer ll~mado~ 
primcramiente  a Cortes 
A.  esto  respond0  quelo  tengo  por 
bien e quolo otorgo." 
3  Id.,ii. 30, 8 : "  Otrossi non rcharan 
pecho  ninguno  mas  delo  quo  fuere 
otorgardo  por  Cortes  e  par  ayunta- 
mento dcl rregno ; pero sy fuere caqo 
muy  necessario  de  perra,  quel0 
pueden  fazer  con  consejo  e  otroga- 
miento  dclos  procuradores  delas  cib- 
(lades  e  villas  que  entovieren  enel 
Consejo." 
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take a solemn oath "  in the hmd " of one of the archbishops, 
that he would not ililp0~0  any tax or loan upon the cities, or 
upon individuals, until he had called together the estates in 
Cartes,  in accordance with  the  good  and  ancient  custoil~  ; 
alld  that, if  any roy'il  briefs  or  con~mands  with  regard  to 
lJn~ation  were granted (without the consent of  Cortes), they 
were to be disobeyed wilhout incurring any pena1ty.l 
This  constitutional authority  of  the Cortes  over  taxation 
is clear, but it is a colllplete inista,ke to suppose that this was 
the only important aspect of  their position.  We  must again 
insist upon  t'he point  with  which  we  have  already dealt in 
Chapter  I., that  while  in Csatile, as elsewhere  in Western 
Europe,  the king  was  the proper  person  to  make  law,  he 
could  not  do  this  alone but only  with  the  consent  of  the 
prelates,  niagnates,  and  the  representatives  of  the  cities 
assenibled in CorLes.  The king could neither legislate alone, 
nor  could the legislature of the king ill Cortes be abrogated 
except in C~rtes.~  Even when, however, we  have recognised 
the powers of  the Cortes in legislation and taxation, we have 
not yet adequately appreciated its functions.  The Cortes  of 
Madrid, for instance, was  sumn~oned  in 1329 by Nfonso  VI. 
for the purpose of dealing with the various abuses which had 
been prevalent in thc kingdom since the death of  his father.3 
The Cortcs constantly rliade representations to the king about 
ecclesiastical abuses, such as the interference of  ecclesiastical 
Id.. ii. 42 (p.  526) : "  Et finalmente 
lo  quo  ende  concluymos  es  esto: 
aucordemos do  vos  otorgar  para  este 
primer0  anno,  para  con  10s  vuestros 
p~chos e  derechos  ord~narios,  la 
alcuala  del  mr.  tres  meajns, quo  o~ 
llamada veyntena. . . . (p. 527).  La 
tercera  es  quo  pues  vos  asi  0s  e sora 
~torgado  lo  que  abastere  asaz  para 
COmplir  10s  vuostros  menesteres. . . . 
9"  nos  promctades  0  juradcs  luego, 
en  mano  de  uno  delos  dichos  arpo- 
bispos.  que non echaredes nin  deman- 
daredes mas mr.  nin  otra cosa alguna 
(le &lcualas nin  do  n~onedas,  nin  de 
Yervipio  nin de enprestido, nin de  otra 
Inancra qua1 quier, alas dichas cibdades 
e  villas e lugares, nin  personas singu- 
lares  dellas,  no  de  alguna  dellas, por 
mesteres que digados que vos rrecreyen, 
arnenos de ser prirnrramente llamados 
o ayuntados 10s tres cstades quo deuen 
venir  a  vuestras  Cortes  e  ayunta- 
mientos, segullt se deue fazer e  es  de 
buena  costumbrc  antigua ;  e  demos 
si  algunas  cartes o alcualas 10s fueren 
mostradas  o mandamientos  fechos  de 
vuestra  parte  sobre  ello,  que  Sean 
obedi~idas  o non complidas, sin pena e 
sin error alguno." 
Cf. pp.  5.  G. 
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courts in cases which did not belong to them ;  they protested 
against  the presence of  ecclesiastics in the Chancery on  the 
ground that clerical officials could not  be proceeded against 
like others,2 and elso against the abuse of  excomm~nication.~ 
a ions  They  made representations  to the king about  combin 1' 
of  inen in various einpl~yinents.~  It mas  in  Cortes that the 
king  made  ordinances  about  the coinage  and  aboub  debts 
contracted in the deprecided c~rrency.~ 
TVe  have already pointed out the important position occupied 
by the Cortes  during the ininority of  tho king, and we  ht~ve 
another  very important exarnple  of  this in the proceedings 
of  the Cortes of  illadrid in 1391, on the accession of  Henry 
III., who  was  still under  age.  While in the cases we  have 
mentioned before, they had appointed one of  the princes of 
the royal house as guardian, they now  determined that the 
government of  the kingdom during E-Ienry's minority should 
be entrusted to a Council to be appointed by a Cornmission 
of  eleven nobles  and thirteen procurators  of  the cities.  To 
this Council they  entrusted  all  the  powers  of  governnlent 
except  certain  points,  such  as the making  war  and peace; 
arid the Cortes was careful to add that they could not impose 
any tax without the authority  of  the Cortes, or  take  pro- 
ceedings against auyone without due process of  law." 
2  Id., i. 42, 2, and i. 24, 10. 
Id., i. 43,  6. 
8  Id., i. 47, 61. 
4  Id., ii.  1,  49. 
Id., ii.  27,  5. 
8  Id.,  ii.  39  (p.  465) :  "  (The 
members of  the Cortes) fueron llama- 
dos  per  cartaa  e  mandanlientos  de 
nuestro  Sennor ol  Rey, Don Enrique, 
quo  Dios  mantcnga,  para  ordenar  ol 
rrogimiento  del  dicho  Scnnor  Roy,  o 
dolos  dicllos  sus  rregnos  . . . per 
rrazon  dalln  menor  hedat  del  clicho 
Sounor Roy (they tlecido that the best 
courso)  era  e  es  quo1  dicho  Sennor 
Roy e 10s dichos sus regnos, se rrogiesen 
e  gouernasen por  Consejo,  en la qua1 
fuosen  dt:los  grandes  drl rregno . . . 
e  otrosi  deloo vezinos delas pibdades e 
villas.  Et  que  para  escojer  quales  e 
quantos fuesen  del  dicho consejo . . . 
quo  dauan  e  dieron  todo  su  poder 
cornpplido  ahonze  sennores  e  rriccos 
omes e caualleros, e a treze delos dichos 
procuradoros.  . . .  1.  Los del consejo 
ayan poder  de fazer todos 10s cosas e 
cada  una dellas  que fueren  a  servipio 
do1 re, e provecho do sus rregnos, saluo 
las  cosas  que  aqui  se  contienen,  en 
quelos non dan poder. . . .  7.  Otrossi 
non  moueran  guorra  a  ningund  IZey 
vozino.  sin corlsejo e mandamionl o do1 
rregno. . . .  8.  Otrossi  non  ecllaran 
pecho  ninguno  mas  delo  que  fuere 
otorgado  por  Cortes. . . .  9.  Otrossi 
non  daran  cartas  para  matar,  nin 
lisiar,  nin  desterrar  a  ninguntl  ome, 
mns que  so^ judgado por SUB alcallea." 
This is important, but perhaps more significant still is the 
fact that  in the  second  half  of  the  century  we  find  the 
Cartes  demanding  that  there  should  be  a  certain  number 
of  citizens  on  the  King's  Council.  In 1367  the Cortes  of 
~~rgos  den~anded  that twelve good men of  the cities should 
be  chosen to serve with  the King's  Council  for  the special 
purpose of seeing that the customs and "  fueros " of  the cities 
thc kingdom should be better kept and maintained.  The 
king, Ilenry II., assen6ed.l  At  the Cortes  of  Toro in  1371 
Izenry TI.  announced that he would appoint certain good men 
of the cities to go  through the provinces of  the kingdom to 
report  on the adn~inistration  of law ; and the king  assented 
to the request  of  the same  Cortes that he  should  appoint 
sollle  prudent  men  of  the cities  to  serve  on  his  council.2 
The same demand was  put forward to Juan I. by the Cortes 
of  Burgos in 1379.3 
The Cortes of  Castile and Leon was in the fourteenth century 
not merely a body which the king mighl; from time to time 
consult, to whom  he  might  turn for advice  in  legislation, 
or  for  financial  assistance  in  emergencies,  but  it repre- 
sented the  claim  that  the  conlmunity  as  a  whole  should 
exercise  some  control  over  every  aspect  of  the  national 
affairs. 
Id.,  ii.  9,  6 : "  Otrossi  a10  que 
nos  disieron  que  porque  10s  usos  e 
las costmnbres e ffueros delos pibdades 
e villas e logares  de nuostros  rregnos 
puedan  sor mojor  guardados e manto- 
nidos, que nos pedion por merped que 
mandasornos  tomar  doze  omes  bonos 
que fluesen do1 nuestro consejo.  (Two 
from Castile, two from Leon, two from 
Calicia,  two  from  Tolodo,  two  from 
Estremadura, and two from Andnln.jia). 
. . . A esto respondemus quo nos plaze 
lo tenamox por  b~en." 
Id.,  ii.  13,  24 :  "  Tenemos  por 
do  ordenar, ot ordennrno.;  do  dar 
Ornos buenos  de  cibdadcs  o  vlllas  o 
logares  quantos  o  quales  la  nuestra 
""r~ed  fuero, para  que anden per  la8 
L'rovinr;inr:  delos  nuestros  rregiios  e 
por totos 10s logares, a ver . . .  commo 
fazen  complimiento  de  derecho  alas 
partes." 
Id., ii.  14,  13 : "  Alo  que  pedieron 
que fuese nuestra merped que tornare- 
mos  e  excogiesemos  delos  cibdadanos 
nuestros  naturales  delos  pibdades  o 
villas e logares  delos  nuestros rregnos, 
omes  buenos  entendidos  e  pertines- 
ciorltes  quo  fuoscn  del  nuestro  con. 
sejo." 
Id. id., 22,  4 : "  Otrossi nos podie- 
ron por rnerpod que quisiesernos tomar 
ornes  bonos  delos  cibdades  e  villas  o 
logares  dolos  nuostros  rregnos,  para 
quo  con  10s  do1  nuestro  consejo  nos 
conuejasen  lo  quo  cunple  a  nuostro 
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We  must  now  examine  the  development  of  the  States 
General  of  the Provinc.ia1 Estates in France, and, while 
this is not the same as that of  the Castilian Cortes, it  does 
also illustrate  very clearly the growth  and  developlnent  of 
the representative element in government. 
In the Grst  place, the States General or analogons bodies 
rnet frequently.  The proceedings of  these meetings have not 
been preserved for us in the same forin  as those  of  Casttile, 
alld it is not possible always to say whether all these meetings 
can be described as technically meetings of  the States General. 
This, however, is  a  question  which belongs  to the detailed 
constitutional history of  France ; for our purpose it is enough 
to observe that they have  a representative  character.  We 
have in addition frequent references to the meetings of  the 
representatives  of  particular  provinces  (Provincial Estates), 
and sornei,imes even of  particular towns.  It  must be remem- 
bered  that  the  kingdom  of  France  was  not  unified  in 
the  same  sense  as  that  of  Castile  and  Leon,  or  that  of 
England. 
When we now attempt to consider the powers and functions 
of  the States General, we  shall find t,hat they were not unlike 
those of  the Cortes in Spain-that  is, that they were manifold, 
in some respects  clcax  and determined, in  others vague  and 
undetermined;  but  the  history  of  the fourteenth  century 
shows very clearly  thot  they  were  summoned  not  only  $0 
deal with taxation, but rather that any question of  general 
national importance might and did come before them. 
In the last volume we  have  dealt  with the first  meeting 
of  the States General, which  was  called  together  by  Philip 
the Fair in 1302 to deal with the situation produced by the 
coniiict with Boniface VLII.,l and it is noticeable that their 
second meeting was also called to deal with a great ecclesiastical 
matter-that  is, the question of the Templars. 
It is important to observe the terms in which the summons 
to the " coxnmunitates " is  expressed.  Philip  the Fak calls 
them to take part in what he calls the " sacred task," and bids 
each of them to send two men who, in the name of  the "  com- 
'  Cf. VO~.  V.  p.  139 and p. 388. 
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munities," are to assist him in carrying out what was required.l 
~t  the end of the century again it was in the name and with 
the advice and consent of  an assembly which was  taken to 
the whole people, as well as of  the Church of  France, 
that Charles VI. renounced the allegiance of  France to Pope 
 ene edict XIII.2 
We  are not here concerned with the motives or the merits 
of  these  actions  with  regard  either  to tho  Templars  or  to 
 ene edict XIII., but it  is obviously highly significant that the 
Crown should have felt it to be proper and desirable that the 
whole  community should, through its representatives,  share 
the responsibility of the Crown.  It is scarcely less significant 
that on  some occasions  at least during the great  war  with 
~ngland  the Crown summoned assemblies which had at least 
the character of  States General to deliberate upon  questions 
of  war  and  peace.  In 1359 the terms  of  peace  dema,nded 
by England were laid before the Estates ; they are reported 
as  being  indignant, as  demanding  the  continuance  of  the 
war, and  as  offering a  subsidy for the purpo~e.~  In 1363 
John I. issued an ordinance after a meeting of  many prelates 
and clergy, the princes of  the blood, many other nobles, and 
many of the good cities of the kingdom, assembled at Amiens, 
at which  he  had taken counsel  with  them  on  tho business 
of  the war.4  And  in 1385 it was  with  the advice  of  the 
'  '  Documents  relatifs  aux  gtats  universitatum,  plurium  sacre paginae, 
GBn6raux et Assombl6es sous I'hilippe  et  utriusque  iuris  doctorum,  religio- 
19 Bel,' No.  660 (ed. G. Picot) : "  Cujus  sorumque  devotorum, et aliorum  pro. 
operia  sancti  vos  volumus  esse  par-  cerum regni nostri  . . .  (p. 821).  Nos 
ticipoq,  qui  participos  estis  et  fidolis-  ecclesia, clerus, et poprllus rogni nostri 
"mi  zelatoros fidei  Christianae ;  vobis-  ac  Delphinatus,  de  ;,rodictorum  con- 
We  pr~cipimus  quatinus  do  singulis  silio  et  assensu  racedimus,  nur~cia- 
"illis  predictis  insignibus  duos  viros  musqne  auctoritate presencium  reces. 
fervore  vigentes,  Turonis,  ad  sisse"  (i.e.,  from  the  obedience  of 
tres  Septimanas  instantis  feste  Pas-  Benedict XIII.). 
chalis, nobis  mittere  non  tardetis, qui  Id., vol. v. p.  56. 
assistant  in  premissis,  com-  Id.,  vol.  v.  No.  363  (p.  156): 
munitaturn  vestrarum  nomine,  ad  ea  "  Jehan, par  la grace de Dieu, Roi  de 
quae sint dictis negotiis opportuna."  France ; scevoir faisons I\ toud  pr6sena 
2  '  Recouil  C6n6ral  des  Anciens  et 8. venir, qu6 sur plusieurs requestes 8. 
Rranqaises,'  vol.  vi.  p.  809:  nous  faites  par  plusieurs  prola.  et 
"Noq  . . . convocavimus  concilium  autres  gens  d'dglise, plusieurs  nobles 
prelatorum,  capitulorum,  nobilium,  tant  de  nostre  sang  come  sutrea,  et 
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council, at which were  present  many  princes  of  the blood, 
prelates, nobles, and citizens, that it was  decided to send an 
army to Scot1and.l 
Again it is not  unimportant  to observe that it  was  with 
the counsel and advice of  the cities that Charles IV. issued an 
ordinance in 1322 for the reform of  the c~rrency,~  and Philip 
of  Valois did the same in 1329 and 1332, with the advice of 
the prelates, barons, and citie~.~ 
It is time, however, that we should turn to the questlion of 
taxation, for it is no doubt true that we find here one of the 
best illustrations of  the principle of  the limitation of the royal 
authority  and  of  the  development  of  the  representative 
system.  Y  is  clear that normally the Crown  procured  the 
money which it required, over and above that which formed 
its normal revenue, by grants, either from particular provinces 
or towns  or from  assemblies  which  represented  the  whole 
country.  This is well illustrated in a letter of  Philip V.  in 
1318, in which he recognised that a grant of  a fifteenth made 
to him  by the nobles of  Berri was  made by their free will 
and liberality,  and that neither he nor  his  successors could 
claiill that it had conferred upon him any rights which they 
plusieurs  bonnos  villes  de  notre  voullons sur co  pourvenir convenable- 
royaume,  qui  darrainement  ont 6t6  B  ment, eu  avis,  el pleine  ddlibdration 
Amiens  B  notre  mandement,  pour  avec nos bonncs  villes, lesquelles  nous 
avoir avis et deliberacion avec eux sur  avons mandds sur ce, avec notre grand 
le  ftiit  de  la  guerre  et provision  de  conseil,  appellez  It  ce  plusieurs  sage 
deffcnce de notre royaume,  nous  par  conoissons  e  experts . . .  avous  or- 
1s doliberacion  de notre grant conseil  donne et ordonnons en la manibe q~i 
avons  ordonn6  ot  ordonnons  en  la 
matiere qui s'cnsuit." 
1 Id., "01.  vii. p.  59 : "  Charlos . . 
comme par grand avis e meure deliber- 
ation  do  Conmil,  on  quels  cstoicnt 
plab~eurs  do  uotre  sang,  prblate, 
nobles,  bourgeois  et  autres,  ayous 
nagueres ordouu6 une arm60 . . .  pour 
passer  et descendre  au pays  d'Ihosse 
. . . nous  avons  de  nouvel  ordonnb 
estre mis sus, cueillez  e lev6  outre ce 
que  dit  est . . .  certaines  sommes 
de deniers." 
s'onsuit." 
a  '  Ordonnances,'  vol.  ii.  page  34 : 
"  Philippus  . . . orclinamus,  habita 
plenaria nostri magni concilii delibera- 
tione, cum prdatis, baronibus et corn- 
munitatibus  regni  uostri,  de faciendo 
bonam monetam." 
'  Recueil,'  vol.  iv. page  404 : " . . 
par  deliberation  de  notre  grand 
Conseil, mandames e feismes assemble2 
B  Orliens,  plusieurs  de  nos  prela2, 
barons,  e  bonnes  villes,  et  autres 
saiges et cognoisseurs  su  fait do0  dltes  -  - 
:  Id.,  vol.  iii.  p.  296 :  "  Nous  ~nonoies." 
did  not  possess  bef0re.l  In 1349 Philip  VI.  says  that  he 
bad  asked  the inhabitants of  Paris for  an aid and subsidy 
for the war with  Edward III., and that they had liberally 
granted  him  for the period of one year an imposition on the 
merchandise sold in the city.2 
In 1350 John I. asked  for aid  of  the nobles, communes, 
md  cities of  Vermandois  towards the expenses  of  the war 
with England,  and  says  that  they  had  of  their  good  will 
granted him this.3  In the case of a similar grant from Nor- 
mandy in the same year there are some additional and impor- 
tant details ; the prelates, barons, and communities had met 
in Paris, and had agreed in principle on the grant of  an aid 
to the king, but the representatives of  the communities were 
not clear that they had sufficient authority to grant the aid 
in the name of  the cities, and they were therefore sent back 
to deliberate and consult with them, and to reoeive authority 
to make this aid and s~bsidy.~  It is worth observing how 
'  Ordonnances,'  vol.  i.  page  677  :  accomply, soit lev6e, et iL  nous payee, 
"  Nous,  voullons  quo  leur  dictes  une imposition  ou  assise sur toutes lea 
liberalit6s no  leur puisso,  ne  dois estre  marcl~andises et  denr6es  qui  serout 
Q euls, ne  leurs hoirs, pr6judicials, ne  vendues en notre dit6 villo cle  Paris." 
domaigens en temps Q venir.  Voulons,  Cf.  id.  id.,  p.  628,  for  Carcassonne 
ordonnons, et leur octroions, que nous,  and Narbonne, and p.  654 for Amiens. 
ne  nos succosscurs, ne puisent  dire que  ' Recucil,'  vol.  iv.  168  (p.  631) : 
par  cette  grace,  et  ce  service  quils  "Lesquiex  (i.s.,  the  burdell  of  the 
nous  ont  fait et donn6,  aucun  droit  War) ne  porriens souffrir,  ne soustenir 
n~uvel,  autre que nous n'avions  avant  sans l'aide  de nos si~bgiez,  ayons pour 
cette  grace,  nous  soit  accluis  contre  ce, fait requierir par notre am6 et feel 
eulsl aux temps 9,  venir,  ne  que nous,  conseiller I'evesque  de Laon, nos  bicn 
ne  nos  successeurs,  pour  raison  de  amez les  nobles,  communes, cschevin- 
cette  grace,  leur  doiens  demander  egos, ot autres gem des villes de notre 
Rucun service  on  aucune  relevance,  bailliage  do  Vermandois,  que  h,  ce 
ausqll@ls  ils  n'dtaient  tenuz  It  nous  nous voulsissent faire aide oonvenable; 
avant  la dite grace."  et  de  leur  bonne  volent6,  ils  nous 
'  Recueil,'  "01.  iv.  154  (p.  559) :  ayent grtltiensement octroie eb  accord6 
I' phili~~e  .  . 0  fairons  que  en aide. pour le fait d3 nohdites guerres, 
cons id or^^^^ 10s chosoa clcssusrlites,  une  imposition  de  six  deNers  pour 
Pour et en nom de subside, ont liborale.  Iivre." 
~oulu  et accord6 pour toute leur  4  Id. id.  (p.  636)  :  "Mais  pour  ce 
Cornmunit& entant  comme  il  leur  que  lesdites  communautez  n'estoient  touche  ap~artient  st pet  Loucher  pas  fondics  pour  le dit aide accorder 
Ot  '~~artenir  :  0.6  mr ce   rem mi ere-  au  nom  des  dites  rilles,  11s  fllrent 
Cnt  bonne  delib6rotion at oilvis.  que  renvoy6os  aur dites villm,  pour  avoir 
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carefully gua,rded were the rights of  the communities to tax 
themselves. 
We do not for the moment deal with the important con- 
stitutional movements of  the years from 1365 to 1358 : these 
are so  important that they need  a  separate treatment.  It 
must not, however, be imagined that the victory of  the Crown 
meant  that it  had  established  any  constitutional  right  to 
impose  taxation  at  its  pleasure.  In 1363 the  estates  of 
Beaucaire and Niines while continuing the gabelle on salt for 
the year, and promising that,  if this should prove insufficient, 
they would with the king's authority impose other "  imposi- 
tions et gabelles," protest energetically that no royal justiciary, 
whatever  his rank  or  dignity,  should interfere in any way 
in raising these taxes, but only those who  had been  chosen 
by  the representatives  or those deputed  by then1 ; that if 
the king  himself  or  his representative,  or  any of  the royal 
officials, were to do this, all the impositions should fall to the 
ground, and the inhabitants should be free from the1n.l 
In 1364 the king,  Charles V.,  says that the burgesses  of 
Paris were disposed to make him  aids and subsidies for  the 
conduct  of  the  war.2  In  1367  the  prelates,  barons, 
ecclesiastics,  and  communities of  Dauphind,  in  return  for 
the confirmation of  their  liberties  and franchises,  made  a 
gens  d'icelles,  et pooir  dudit  aide  st 
subside accorder et octroyer." 
Cf.  id.  id.  (p.  709)  for  Anjou  and 
Maine.  "  Quo autrefoiz aide somblable 
ne pilisse ostro lev& esdiz pais an  temps 
&  venir,  si  ce  n'estoit  par l'accort  ot 
de  l'ar,sentoment  expr6s  des  ditcs 
gens d'cgli~e,  desdiz nobles et des dites 
communes." 
1 '  Recuell,'  vol. v. 346, 40 (p. 142) : 
"  Quod mullus  justitiurius  rogius, cujus 
cunque  status  seu  dignitatis  existat, 
do dicta gabella st  aliis impositionibus, 
neo etiam de dictis pecuniis inde levan- 
dis  et  oxigendis,  custodiendis  seu 
erogandis,  et in stipendiariis  et aliis 
usibus  necessariis  convertendis,  nec 
etiam  super  cornpotis  audiendis  par- 
tioularium  receptorurn,  se  habeant 
aliqnaliter  intromittere,  nec  etiam 
impedire ;  sed  illi  duntaxat  qui  per 
ipsos seu deputatos aut deputandos ab 
eis fuerint super hoc electi. . . . Quod 
si dominus noster Rex, sou ejtls locum- 
tenens, aut qu~vis  alius justitiarins  st 
officialis  cujuscunque  conditionis  et 
preeminentiae  existat,  contrarilrm 
faceret,  extunc  omnis  impositio  et 
gabella ipso facto cossit,  et quod ipsi 
et  omnes  habitantes  et  subditi  in 
dicta  senescallia,  ad  praemissorum 
observantiam  minime  teneantur,  fed 
ab  omnibus  et sinplis  supra  d~ctis 
oneribus  sint  quittl,  libcri  penitus  et 
immunes,  et  quad  impune  possint 
desistere  a  predictis." 
'  Recueil,'  vol.  v. 364 (p. 212), 
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lc gacion~ gift"  of  thirty thousand florins to the king and 
dauphin.'  In  the  same  year  the  nobles  and  cities  of 
&tois,  the "  Boulenois," and  S.  Pol  granted  an aid  to the 
king,  but  with the express condition  that this was  not  to 
prejudice their liberties and freedom ; and we  find this par- 
ticular grant constantly repeated to the end of  the cent~ry.~ 
In 1369 we  find Charles V.  promising the towns  and  other 
"lieux " of  Ponthieu that for the future no  aid or  subsidy 
to be imposed on them  without  their consent, and we 
find the same  promise  made  to the towns  of  Crotroy and 
~hodez.~  The  ' Grand  Chronique '  refers  to  a  meeting 
of  estates  in  1369,  which  voted  a  subsidy.$  In  1372, 
Charles V. gave authority to the Bishop of  Limoges to impose 
"  tailles et subsides "  in the diocese and viscounty of  Lilnoges 
"  se la plus saine partie d'icelle pais s'y accorde." 6 
In 1381 we  come to the very important ordinance by which 
the regent, in the name  of  the king, Charles VI., during his 
minority,  abolished the  aids,  &c.,  imposed in  the  time  of 
his  father and his predecessors  since the time of  Philip the 
Fair.  This ordinance was issued after an assembly, held at 
Paris, of  the ecclesiastics, nobles, and citizens of  the towns of 
Languedoyl.  It has been  disputed whether the meeting was 
formally a States General or not,6 but the question is not of 
much importance from our point of view.  It  cannot be doubted 
that it had a representative character ;  and it was these repre- 
sentatives who presented the complaints against the subsidies 
and subventions as having been contrary to their immunities, 
liberties,  privileges,  constitutions,  and  customs,  and  also 
against  the  ancient  royal  ordinances.  The  king  therefore 
orders that all such aids, &c., of  whatever  kind  they were, 
which  had been imposed since the time of  Philip the Fair, 
should be annulled and abolished ; and hc adds that the fact 
that they had been imposed should not be taken as having  .., 
1'  Recuoil,' vol. V. 421 (p. 298). 
2  '  '  Grand Chroniquo,'  vol. vi. p.  321. 
Ordonnances,'  vol. v. p.  82. 
a  '  ' Ordonnances,' vol. v. p.  719. 
Orclonnances,'  vol.  v.  pp.  82,  Cf.  especially  Picot:  LHistoire 
257, 410.  des  1Ztats  Gdnbraux,'  vol.  i.  p.  2:!9, 
Cf.  Picot :  Histoire  des   tats  kc. 
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given either hiinself  or his predecessors or his successors any 
new rights, or as having in any way prejudiced the immunities, 
liberties, customs, &c., of  his people.  He reserves only "  noz 
rentes, yssiies, travers, et prouffiz des vivres et denrkes menkes 
hers  de  notre  royaunie " and  the  "  redevances " of  the 
Genoese,  Lombards,  " Tresmontains,"  and  other  a1iens.l 
It seems to us clear that this represents the admission by the 
regent  that such taxation had been  and was  illegal, and he 
not  only annulled it, but  also emphatically assented to the 
1 '  Recueil,'  vol.  vi.  14  (p.  553): 
"Savoir  faisons 8.  tous  pr6sens  et b 
venir, que comme 8. la la convocation 
et assembl6e general8 que nous avons 
fait faire  et tenir  8.  Paris,  des  gens 
d'bgliso,  nobles, bourgeois et habitants 
des  bonnes  villes  de  notre  royaume 
do  la  Languedoyl,  pour  avoir  advis 
sur la deffence et provision d'icellui, ils 
se  fuasent  complains  des  aides,  sub- 
sides  et  subvcncions  que  feu  notre 
trds chier seigneur et pdre . . . faisait 
et avoit fait. imposer et lever sur eulz, 
et  aussi  de  plusieurs  autres  choses 
qu'ils  disoient  avoir  est6  faiz  en leur 
prejudice  du temps de notre dit seig- 
neur et pdre et so8  pr6decesseurs, par 
lours  gens  et  officiers,  contre  leurs 
immunitez,  nobleces, franchises,  liber- 
tez, privildges, constitucions, usaiges et 
coustumos  des pays,  et contre  les  or- 
donnances  anciennos ;  requorans  leur 
Btre sur ce pourveu de remede oonven- 
able-nous  voulans noz  dictcs gens et 
subgiex  en  leur  dictes  immunitez, 
nobleces, franchises, libertez, privileges, 
constitucions,  usaiges  et  coustumes 
anciennos remattre, ressaisir, restituer, 
maintenir  et garder,  et les  relever  h 
tout  notre  pouvoir,  de  tous  griefs, 
charges, et oppressions quelconques . . . 
Voulons,  ordonnons  et  octroyons  de 
notre pleine puissance, certaine science 
et auctorit6 royale. 
Que les sides, subsides, imposicions, 
et  subvencions quelconques, de quelque 
nom  ou  condicion  qui  soient,  et par 
quolquc maniere ils aient eat6 iinpofiez 
sur nos dites gens et peuples, qui aient 
eu  cours  en  notre  dicte  royaume  du 
temps de notre dit seigneur  et autres 
nos pr6decesseur8, depuis le temps du 
roi Philippe le Be1 notre prcdecessenr. 
soient cass6es, ostees et abolios, et  ycelle 
ostons, cassons et  abolissons, et  mettons 
au n6ant du tout par la teneur de ces 
pr6sentes ; 
Et voulons  et decernons  que par 1e 
cours que ycelles irnposicions, subsides, 
ot  subvencions  ont  eu  en  notre  dit 
royaume,  nous,  nos  predecesseurs. 
SUCC~~S~U~S,  ou  aucun de nous,  ne  en 
puissions avoir acquis aucun  droit, ne 
aucun ~rejudice  6tre engendrez  h  noz 
dictes gens et peuple,  ne  8.  leurs im- 
munit&,  nobleces, franchises, libertez, 
privileges,  constitucions,  usaiges  et 
coustumes  dessus dictes, ne  8.  aucune 
d'icelles  en  quelque  manidre  quo  co 
soit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Voulons  et  d6cernons  que  se  8. 
l'encontre  de  ce  aucune  chose  e est6 
faiete  depuis  ycellui  temps  jusquos  il 
ores, nous, ne noz successeurs ne  11odS 
en  puissious  aidier  aucunement,  mitis 
les mettons du tout au n6ant  par  ces 
mesmcs presentes. . . . 
(The King  reserves)  "  nos  rentes, 
ysseiis,  travers, et prouffiz  des  vivros 
et  denr6es  menecs  hors  de  notre 
royaume,  qui  nous  domeurent.  . . . 
Et  aussi  sanz  y  comprendre  les 
redevances  des  Gennevois,  Lombars, 
et  Tresmontsins,  et  nez  hors  notre 
royaume,  et de  leur  donr6es." 
Cf. ' Ordonnances,'  vol. vi. p.  564. 
that  such illegal action should not  be taken  as a 
precedent.  It  is  true that  there  is  no  statement  of  ho\~ 
such taxation  could legally be  imposed ; but it  is implied 
that it conld only be made legally by  the consent of  those 
who were  to  pay  the  taxes,  and  that  this  implied  some 
systcl~l  of  representation, either local or general. 
~t may  be  urged  that this concession was  only  made  in 
view  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  the regency,  and 
there is probably some truth in this, but it must be observed 
that from this time down to the end of the century the refer- 
ences which we can find to taxation seem in almost all cases 
to imply that the Crown was careful to pay at least a,  formal 
deference to the principle of  taxation by consent.  In 1384 
the "  Universitates " of  Briancon  made  of  their  free will  a 
grant of  12,000 florins to the Dauphin.l  In 1384 a letter of 
Charles  VI.  speaks  of  "certaines  aides  nous  accordkes 
par  les  gens  d'aglise,  nobles, bourgeois et habitans " of  the 
province of  Ro~en.~  In 1382, Juvenal des Ursins says that 
an assembly which had the nature of  a "  States General " had 
been  called together  at Compiegne,  and had been  asked to 
sanction  an  aid, but  the representatives  of  the  cities  said 
that they had no power to act.3  In 1383 the instructions to 
the royal officers about the levy of a new aid speak of  this as 
having been imposed with the advice of  several of  the princes 
of the blood, prelates, nobles, and others."other  ordinance 
of  1383 mentions  that in the previous year  the citizens  of 
Paris had granted various aids.5  In 1385 Charles TI. refers 
to a decision to make an expedition into Scotland, and says 
that this had been done by the advice and after long delibera- 
tion of his council, at which there were present several of  the 
princes  of  the blood,  prelates,  nobles, citizens, and  others, 
and that in view of this he had ordered the levy of a certain 
of  money.6  In 1388 we  find  a reference which might 
1  r Or,lonnances,'  vol.  vii.  p.  719  Picot : vol. i. p. 235). 
(41).  4  ' Ordonnances,'  vol. vi. p. 705. 
'  Id., vi. p. 659.  Recueil,'  vol. vi. 41  (p. 5'10). 
Juvenal  des  Ursins,  '  Histoire  de  ' '  Ordonnances,'  vol.  vii. p.  759. 
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be interpreted in a  contrary sense : a tax is imposed "  par 
mani&re  de taille," with the advice of  some of  the princes of 
the blood and the great council-no  other persons are men- 
tioned.1  In 1393  Charles  VI.  writes  to the  Governor  of 
Dauphin6  instructing  him  to summon  the assembly  of  the 
prelates,  clergy, nobles, and "  communes " of  Dauphin6, and 
t,o  request then1 to grant an aid, as they had done before when 
he was in Lang~edoc.~  In 1395 we find an aid being levied 
for the marriage of the king's daughter to the King of England ; 
there is no reference to any assembly as granting this, but this 
would have been one of the.norma1 feudal dues, except that 
it was  apparently  not being levied  on  the   noble^.^  In the 
same year we  find Charles appointing a Commission to call 
together the clergy, nobles, and other persons  of  Dauphin6, 
and instructing them to ask for an aid for the same purpose." 
In 1398 Charles announces that he had determined to levy 
an aid on  all the clergy, and that he had done this by the 
order of  the princes and the great Council and the consent of 
the prelatis and ~lergy.~ 
It would seem to be clear that throughout the fourteenth 
century it was assumed in France that the king had normally 
no arbitrary right of  taxation, that if  he needed money beyond 
the ordinary revenues of the Crown he had to ask for it, and 
that it could only properly be granted by the local or national 
community.  It is also obvious, if  only from the provisions 
of  the Ordinance of  1381, that the kings had often exceeded 
their constitutional rights and had imposed and levied taxes 
by their own authority.  It is possible that we  can find an 
illustration of this in an ordinance issued by John I. in 1360 
on his return from captivity in England, when with the advice 
of  his  Council, and no other body or persons  are  mentioned, 
he imposed a tax upon all sales throughout the Lang~edoyl.~ 
We  may  perhaps  conjecture  that  the  Crown  might  have 
justified itself for its action under the terms of  an ordinance 
of Louis X. addressed to Normandy in 1315.  Louis recognised 
' Rccueil,'  vol. vi. Z07  (p. 630).  '  '  Ordonnances,'  vol. viii. (p. 67.) 
"Id.,  vol.  vi.  185 (p. 734).  Id., vol. viii. p.  280. 
Id., vol. vi. 214 (p. 769).  ' Itecueil,'  voi. v.  310 (p. 108,  9). 
reserve that he was not entitled to impose tallages, 
subventions, or impositions on the people of  Nor- 
mandy  beyond  the  "redditus  communes  et  servit,ia nobis 
debit%," but  he  added  an important  qualification-that  is, 
6r nisi evidens utilitas vel emergens neccssitas id exposcat." 1 
This does not, however, affect the fact that it was  recog- 
&ed  in France throughout the fourteenth century as clearly 
as in England  and  Spain that taxes  could not be  imposed 
without the consent of  the community. 
We  have not  yet,  however,  exhausted the subject  of  the 
development of  the representative  system  in France.  We 
have still  to observe that as in England  and in  Spain the 
representative  bodies  sometimes  claimed  a  share  in  the 
control  not only of  taxation, but also of  administration, as 
we  should now oall it. 
We  cannot here enter into any detailed discussion of  what 
may be called the constitutional crisis in France of  the years 
1355-1358 :  this has indeed been described by many historians. 
We  must,  however, for our purpose draw attention to some 
aspects  of  it, and  the first  point  to which  we  must  draw 
attention is the claim of the Estates not merely to make grants 
to the Crown, but to control the expenditure of  these grants. 
The first example we  have found of  this is in the proceedings 
of  an assembly of  the prelates,  barons,  and communities of 
hjou and Maine in July 1355.  After  protesting  that aids 
were  not  to be levied without  their consent, they proceeded 
to appoint a Commission of  two bishops, two nobles, and two 
burgesses, who  were  to appoint  persons to collect the aid, 
and to whom the collectors were to render account ; and, not 
satisfied with  this, the money thus  raised  was  appropriated 
to  the  defence of  the  country,  and was  only  to be  spent 
(distribut5e et convertie) with the consent and advice of  the 
six coin missioner^.^ 
These principles--control  of levy, appropriation, and control 
of  expenditure-are  the first and  most f~mdamental  aspects 
of  the regulations  laid  down  by  the great  meeting  of  the 
'  Itecueil,'  vol. iii.  476, 5 (p. 80).  '  Reoueil,' vol. iv. 215,  1-4 (p.  709). 108  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
grant  chambre  de parlenlent  B  Pdris,"  at which there were 
present not only the princes, prelate"  and nobles, but also men 
if  the "  great towns." 
It seems to us that it is a serious error to look upon the 
failure of  the movements of  1355 to 1358 as implying that 
the representative system and its limitation of  the arbitrary 
royal authority had ceased to be important in France.  We 
shall presently consider its place in the fifteenth century in 
detail;  for the moment  we  have  seen enough to recognise 
that its history in the fourteenth century is not indeed  the 
same as that in England  and Spain, but that it  is at least 
closely parallel to it. 
It is not necessary to deal at length with the development 
of  the representative  system in England, for  this has  been 
fully  treated  by  the  constitutional  historians  like  Bishop 
Stubbs, and, though it may be that some modification of this 
treatment  is  necessary in detail, its substantial correctness 
cannot be seriously impugned.  It is only necessary from our 
point of  view to put together a few illustrations of  its character. 
We cannot, it seems to us, do better than begin by citing 
again the famous phrase of the revocation of  the Ordinances 
of  1310-11 in the Parliament  of  1322.  Those things which 
are to be established for the kingdom and the people are to be 
discussed, agreed upon, and  determined in Parliament  by our 
lord the king with the assent of  the prelates, counts, barons, 
and the conlmonalty of  the kingdom, as had been the former 
custom.2  We do not feel that it is necessary to enter into 
any  account  of  the complex  antecedents  of  this statement, 
for it seems to us to be important primarily as laying down 
shortly but distinctly the general principle which lay behind 
the  whole  constitutional  development  of  the  country.  If 
these words may be taken as a general statement of  the con- 
1 '  Recue~l,'  vol. v. 291 (p. 68).  trestes,  accordees, estabhes,  en parle- 
a  '  Statutes  of  the  Realm;  vol.  I.  mentz par notre selgneur le rol, et par 
p.  189 (Edward II., 1322) : "  Mes  les  l'assent des prelatz, countes et barouns, 
rlloses  rl'srount  h  estnhllr, . . . pour  et la comlnunalte  du rolalmo ; ausclnt 
l'estat du ~olalme  et du puple, solent  come ad evte acustumo cea enarere." 
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stitutional  position  of  the representative  assembly,  we  can 
also find  some very significant illustrations  of  the tendency 
of parliament to claim a certain control over the administra- 
tion of  government. 
In May  1341 the Conlmons  appointed  a  Commission  to 
audit the accounts of the royal officers who had received money 
for the king,  and  they  demanded  that for  the future any 
vacant office was to be filled by the king with the consent of 
the magnates,  and that those  appointed  were  to be  sworn 
in Parliament to obey the laws ; they even went so far as to 
demand that at the meeting of each Parliament these offices 
were to  be taken "  into the hand "  of the  king, and the Ministers 
were to be required to answer the complaints which might be 
made  against  them.  If complaint  was  made  against  any 
Minister of  any "mi8prision,"  "et de ce soit atteint en Parle- 
ment,"  he was to be deprived of  his office  and punished by 
the judgment  of the peers.l  It  is true that Edward 111. in 
October  revoked  his  consent  to  these  measures,  and  that 
Paslianzent in 1343 formally annulled them,2 but the demand 
remains of great significance. 
The proceedings of the Parliament  of 1376 were  of  equal 
importance, as illustrating the tendencies  of  the times ; for 
it  proceeded  to  a  formal  examination  of  the  conduct  of 
some of  the king's Ministers and agents ; Lord Latimer, the 
Chamberlain, was  condemned  to imprisonment  and  to  be 
fined at the king's  discretion,  and  Parliament  prayed  the 
king to remove  him from  his  office and from  the Council ; 
and Richard Lyons, one of the king's agents, was condemned 
to imprisonment and forfeit~re.~ 
The Comnlons also denlanded that the council of  the hing 
should be "  afforced " with ten or twelve lords, prelates, and 
others, and that no important business should be done without 
the consent of  all of these, or in the case of  less important 
business, of  at least four." 
'  Stubba,  '  Const~tutlollal Hlstory,'  Stubbs,  '  Const~tutlonal  Hlstory,' 
V01.11. pp. 387-391 (ed. 1877).  vol. in. pp  428 seq  (ed  1877). 
' Rolls of  Parhament,'  vol.  11  pp.  4  ' Rolls  of  Parliament,'  vol  11. 
126,  289  (Edward 111,  1341), Clause  p. 322 (Edward III., 1376), Clause 10: 
38, Clauqc  41. 
"  Item  lea  communes  com~deront  les 110  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  1. 
It is not necessary to multiply illustrations of  the devclgp- 
ment of  the representative system in England, but it should 
be  observed how  closely parallel  this was  to what we  have 
already considered in relation to Castile and France. 
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prient, quo le Conseil, not re Seigneur le 
Roi, soit enforcez  de  Seigneurs  de  la 
Terre,  Prelatz  et autres,  B  demurror 
continuollement tant que au nombre de 
dys ou  xii, selonc la volunt6  du  roi ; 
par  manidre  tielle,  que  nulle  gros 
besoigne y  passe  ou  soit  d6livr4 sans 
l'assent  et  advis  de  touz:  et autree 
meyndrcs  besolgnes  par  l'advis  et 
assent  de  sys  ou  quatre  au  meyn-, 
selonc  ce  que  le  cas  requert.  Issint 
au meins, que six ou  quatre des tielx 
conselllers soient continuellement resi- 
dentz  du  Conseil  du  Roi,  et  notre 
Seigneur  le  roi  entendant  la  dite 
requeste  estre  honurablos  et  bien 
profitablos B luy et a tout son royaume, 
l'ad  obtroie.  Pourvcuz  toutes  voles, 
quo chancellor, trksoror,  st gardein  do 
Prive  Soal  et tous  autres  officers  du 
roi,  purrant  faire  et  esploiter  10s 
busoignes  qui  touchent  leurs  offices 
sanz  In,  pr6senee  des  dltz  conseillcrs, 
los queux le roi ad assignez et assignera 
de temps en temps de tiem come luy 
plerra." 
CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  POLITICAL  UNITY  IN EUROPE. 
THE idea  of  a  universal  monarchy of  the Western  Christian 
world  ceased  to  be  effective  in Europe  generally  after  the 
break-up of  the  Carolingian empire ; and after the death of 
Frederick  11.  the  empire  was  no  lunger  even  the greatest 
Power in Western  Europe.  There were, however, two  coun- 
tries, Italy and Germany, where the empire was still actually 
or  potentially  a  power  to  be  reckoned  with,  and in these 
countries at least the idea of  a world monarchy still survived. 
In Italy, after the death of  Frederick, there was no effective 
central control over the city states outside of  the Neapolitan 
kingdom, and internecine conflicts in the towns gave occasion, 
even before the close of  tho thirteenth century, to the rise of 
the tyrants.  The  majority  of  the cities,  however,  had not 
yet lost their freedom, the nobles had generally been deprived 
of  power,  and city life was still vigorous  but turbulent.  In 
the '  Purgatorio ' Dante thus apostrophises Italy :- 
"  Ahi serva Italia, di dolore ostello, 
Nave senza nocchiere in gran tempesta, 
Non donna di provincie, ma bordello ! 
Ed ora in te non stanno senza guerra 
Li vivi tuoi, e l'un l'altro si rode 
Di quei che un muro ed una fossa serra." 
and he invites the German Emperor to come- 
"  Vieni, crudel, e vedi la pressura 
Do' tuoi gentili, e cura lor magagne." FODBTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  I.  CHAP.  1'11.1  POLITICAL  UNITY  IN  EUROPE.  113 
"  ChB  le citt&  d31talia  tutte piene 
Son di tiranni, ecl  un Marcel diventa 
Ogni villan che parteggiando viene." 
Like Marsiglius  of  Padua a  few  years  later,  Dmte attri- 
butes the blame for this largely to the Church :- 
"  Ahi gent~,  cho dovresti esser devota, 
E lasciar sedor Cesare in la srlla, 
Se bene intendi cib che Dio ti nota ! 
Guarda come esta fiera e fatta fella, 
Per non esser corretta dagli sproni, 
Poi clle ponesti mano alla predella."  l 
Dante was  himself  a victim, and  though in the '  Convivio ' 
or in the ' De Monarchia ' he may discuss Church and Empire 
as a  philosopher, in the ' Commedia ' he  shows his burning 
sense  of  wrongs  inflictcd  because  there  was  no  peace  nor 
justice in tho country in the absence of  a strong ruler standing 
above and aloof  from local jealousies. 
Danto was by birth a member of  a Guclf  family which had 
suffered in the cause after the battle of  Montaperti ; not one 
of  the great houses, but not to be despised,  even by such a 
haughty Ghibelline  as Farinata degli Uberti.  At thirty-five 
years  of  age  he was  elected  one  of  the Priors.  The Pope, 
Boniface VIII., summoned Charles  of  Valois to support him, 
especially in Tuscany  and the Romagna ; and Charles,  once 
admitted  to Florence,  despite his  vows  of  impartial  justice, 
allowed  the extreme party of  the Nori  to oust  the Bianchi. 
Dante was one of  the excluded party, and with others of  his 
former  associates in the Government  he was  condemned  to 
death, and went into exile.  For a short time Dante joined with 
other exiles, Guelf and Ghibelline, in attempts to force his way 
back to Florence ; but the attempts failed, and Dante, eqnally 
dissatisfied  with  both  parties,  ceased  his  efforts.  Later  on 
he  refused  to avail himself  of  opportunities for  pardon,  on 
account of  the indignities involved in making his submission 
to the Florentine Go~ernment.~  He enthusiastically welcomed 
Henry VII. on his arrival in Italy in 1311,l and looked for t,he 
condign  punishment  of  Fl~rence,~  but Henry  died  in 1313 
without  taking  the  city.  There  is  in  the '  Commedia ' a 
magnificent  testimony  to  Henry VII.,  for  whom  a  throne 
is set apart in heaven, where- 
"  SederA l'alma, che fia gia agosta, 
Dell'alto Enrico, ch' a drizzare Italia 
VerrA in prima che ella sia disposta."  8 
There is  not  a  line in the '  Commedia ' to indicate t,hat 
Dante  had  abandoned  hope  of  the  "  veltro,"  the  future 
emperor,  who  would  come  at  a  more  opportune  time  to 
restore Dante's beloved Italy, the ''  giardino dell' impero." 
Dantc was not a mere theorist, the false prophet of  a dead 
empire.  He had  everything in his  experience  to  open  his 
eyes to the need of  a strong ruler in Italy, to control a turbulent 
people.  It is easy for us now  looking  back  to see that the 
time for a world monarchy was over ; but in Dante's lifetime 
the Papacy, in outward appearance at the height of  its power, 
had been mastered by the ruler of  France, and now that the 
papacy  had been  so  much  weakened  by  Philip  the Fair it 
was diEcult to set limits to the power of  a renovated Roman 
empire.  There was nothing intrinsically absurd in the vision 
of  a great emperor ruling the world in temporal matters hand 
in  hand  with  a  reformed  and chastened  papacy  governing 
in spiritual matters. 
The earliest  statement of  Dante's  political theories is con- 
tained in the '  Convivio,' and was probably written not later 
than 1308.  The '  Convivio ' is a fragment, and Dante wrote 
only four out of  the fifteen  books he had projected.  In the 
last  book  of  the '  Convivio ' he  discusses  the  question  of 
what constitutes true nobility, and as he quotes and disagrees 
with the dictum on this subject of  Frederick II.,  he digresses 
into the question  of  the nature of  imperial authority.  His 
two  chapters  on  the  subject  contain  in  a  condensed  form 
some  of  his  arguments  in  the '  De Monarchia.'  Between 
Epistoln  v. 
Epistola  vi. 
VOL.  VI. 
a  '  Parad180,' XXX. 
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the '  Convivio ' and  the ' De  Monarchia ' come his  letters 
to the kings  and  other  rulers  of  Italy, to the Florentines, 
and  to  Henry  VII.,  written  in  connection  with  Henry's 
expedition  to Italy.  The  last  of  his  political  letters  was 
addressed, to the Italian cardinals, some time (probably early) 
during the long interregnum between the death of  Clement V. 
and the election of  John XXII. 
References to the empire and the papacy occur throughout 
the '  Commedia.'  In the first canto of  the  Inferno,'  Virgil, 
the poet  of  the empire, is sent to guide Dante through hell 
' 
and purgatory, and it is not till they arrive at the terrestrial 
paradise that he leaves him in the charge of  Beatrice.  The 
thirtieth  canto  of  the '  Paradiso ' ends  with  the  stern  de- 
nunciation by Beatrice of  Clement V. :- 
"  E fia prefetto nel foro divino 
Allora tal, che paleso e oopcrto 
Non anderB con lui per un cammino. 
Plla  poco poi sarit do Dio sofforto 
Nel santo offizio ; cli'ei sara' detruso 
La' dove Simon mago 6 per suo mertjo 
E far&  quel d'Anagna entrar pih giuso." 
While  Dante  makes  no  attempt in  the '  Commedia'  to 
moderate his  language in order  to conciliate  his  opponents, 
there is a  studied moderation in the ' De Monarchia,'  which 
would  fit  in well  with  an attempt on  his  part, to  write  a 
defence of  the empire and an assertion of  its complete freedom, 
on the temporal side, from papal control, without exasperating 
the Curia. 
According to Dante, man's end is twofold, in the first place 
happiness in  this life,  consisting  in  the uncheclied  develop- 
ment  of  his  special ('  virtus."  The  other  end of  man is to 
secure the happiness of  life eternal, to which  man can  only 
attain by the help of  the divine light.2  Inasmuch, howover, 
1 '  Paradim,' Canto sxx., 142-148.  et per torrcstren Paradisum figuratur ; 
'  De  Monarcllia,'  iii.  16 :  "  Duos  et  beatitudinem  vitae  aeternae,  qua0 
iyitur  fines  Providontia  ill5  inenrtrra-  consistit in fruition8 divini aspcctus ad 
bilis  homini  proposuit  intendondos ;  quam propria  virtus ascenclcrc non po- 
bestitudinem  scilicet huiua vitae, qua0  test, nisi lumine divino adiuta, quno por 
in operationc propriae virtutis consistit,  Paradisum coclostem intelligi  clittur." 
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as  man's  happiness in thCs  life  is in some measure  ordered 
for immortal felicity  the  emperor,  who  provides  for man's 
temporal welfare, should show Peter that reverence which is 
due from a first-born son  to his  father, so  lhat illuminated 
by the light of  paternal favour he may the better rule this 
world,  to whose government he has been appointed by God, 
to whom are subject all things alike, temporal and spiritual.1 
Dante points  out that just  as nature produces  the thumb 
for one purpose and the whole hand for another and so  on, 
in like manner we  come finally  to an end for which  God has 
created the whole human race.  Now the special capacity of 
man is apprehension by means of  the potential ("  possibilis ") 
intellect, and to make this capacity operative, many men are 
needed, for the work  could not be  done by one  man or by 
some limited association of men.  The function proper to the 
human race is to put into operation the whole of  this capacity, 
not only for speculation but also for action.  And just as each 
individual  requires  peace  and  quietness  if  he  is  to attailz 
to  perfection  in  knowledge  (prudentia) and  in  wisdom,  so 
too it is peace that enables the human race as a whole best 
to achieve its almost  divine work.  Universal  peace is thus 
the best of  those things which are ordered for our happiness. 
We  have  it  on  the  authority  of  the  great  philosopher 
in  his  Politics,  and we  can  also  prove  that  when  several 
things  are ordered for one end, one of  them must direct the 
others.  This is true of  the home,  of  the village,  and so  on, 
up  to the kingdom, and it applies  also  to the whole human 
race, sincc it also is ordered to one end.  It is therefore clear 
that a  monarchy  or empire is necessary for tho wellbeing  of 
the world.2 
Dante  gives  other  reasons  for  holding  that  the  whole 
' De Monarchia,' iii. 16: "  Quae qui-  genitas filius debeat uti ad patrem ; ut 
dem  veritas  ultimao  quaestionis  non  luce  patornae  gratiao  illustratus,  vir. 
"c  strict0 rccipicncla est. ut Romanus  tuosius  orbom  terrae irracliet,  cui  ab 
Princcpsin aliquo Romano Pontifici non  1110 solo praefectus cst qui est omnium 
aubiaceat ; quum mortalis ista felicita~  spiritualium  et  temporalium  gubor- 
quodammodo  ad  immortalem  feliui-  notor." 
tatem ordinetur.  Illa igitllr reverentia  'Do Mouarchia,' i. 3-7. 
Cdcsar  utatur ad I'alrurn,  qua primo- 116  FOURTEENTH CENTURY.  [PART  I. 
human race should be under one ruler ; as, for instance, that 
it is the purpose  of  God  that  every  created  being  should 
be  in the divine  likeness,  so  far as his  nature will  permit, 
and that therefore the human race is best  disposed when  it 
is most like to God ;  and as the essence of  unity (" vera ratio 
unius 17) is in the Deity, it is likest Him when it is most one, 
and this can only be when it  is  subject to one ruler (" princeps 17). 
Wherever  disputes occur  a judge  is required, and as disputes 
are possible, where there are rulers not subject to one another, 
it is necessary to have a third person with  an amplor juris- 
diction  who  includes  both  in his  government.  A  monarch 
is necessary  for the whole world.  The world is best ordered 
when justice  is most powerful,  and this can only be when it 
is under  a  monarch,  who  is more  powerful  than any other 
ruler  and can  thus most  effectively  do  justice.  He is  also 
free from greed, the chief enemy of  justice,  as there is nothing 
left for him to desire.  He is also in closer connection in every 
respect with his subjects than any other ruler, for their rela- 
tions with their  subjects  arc only  partial.  Moreover, other 
rulers derive their power from the monarch, while the monarch 
has  his  power  over  the  subjects  directly  and  prior  to all 
others.  The monarch, therefore, being closer to his subjects 
than any other ruler will beyond  all others seek  their  good. 
That the monarch has  more power  than anyone else to do 
justice is clear, for he can have no enemies.l 
The human race is also at its best when it is most free, and 
this according to Dante 1s another argument in favour of  mon- 
archy, for it is under a monarch that it is most free.  Freedom 
is the greatest  gift  conferred  by  God  on man, and as only 
that is free which exists for its own sake, it can only be attained 
under  a  monarchy ;  for  it is  only  under  a  monarchy  that 
perverted  forms  of  government  can  be  corrected,  and  the 
monarch,  who  beyond  all  others  loves  mankind,  although 
the master as regards the means, is the servant of  all as regards 
the end of  his go~ernment.~  Dante is careful to explain that 
1 Id,  I. 8, 10, 11.  Hoc  erlt  man~festum,  sl  prmc~pmm 
2  Id.,  I.  12  "  Et humanum  genus,  pateat hbertat~s. Propter quod scien. 
potlsslme  llbcrum,  optime  se  habet.  dum  est,  quod  prlmum  pr~nclplum 
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nations,  kingdoms,  and  states  have  their  own  special  con- 
ditions, which  ought to be regulated by special laws.  It is 
only as regards  things  which  are common  to all, that  men 
should be governed by the one ru1er.l 
In concluding  his  arguments  to show that a  monarch  is 
required  for  the wellbeing  of  the world,  Dante  sees  them 
confirmed by the state of  the world  when  the Son  of  God 
became  man.  At  no  other  time  since  the fall of  our  first 
parents was the whole world at peace, as was tile case under 
the perfect monarchy of "  divus August~s.~~ 
nostrae  llbertatls eat hbertas arbltrtl,  phum  In  qulnto  ad  N~chomachum, 
qnam multl habent in ore, In lntellectu  Cnrrraerav  commendantem.  Habent 
vero  paucl  . . . lterum  maulfestum  namque  natlones,  regna  et  clvltates 
esse  potest,  quod  haec  hbertas,  slve  lnter se proprletates, quaa leglbus dd- 
prlnclplum hoc totlus l~bertatls  nostrae,  ferentlbus regular] oportet. . . . Sed stc 
est maximum donun1 humanae naturae  ~ntolhgendum  est, ut humanum  genus 
a  Deo  collatum . . . qula  per  ~psum  secundum sua communla, quae omntbus 
hlc  fellc~tamur  ut  homlnes,  per  competunt, ab eo regatur, et commuul 
lpsum allbl fel~cltamur  nt DII  Quod  regula  gubernetur  ad pacem.  Quam 
sl ~ta  est, qu~s  erlt qu~  humanum genus  qu~dem  regulam,  slve  legom,  partlcu- 
opt~me  se  habere  non  dlcat,  quum  lares  prlnclpes  ab eo  reclpere  debent, 
potlsslme  hoc  prlnclplo  posslt  utl ?  tanquam lntellectus practlcus ad con- 
Sed exlstens sub monarcha,  est potls-  cluslonem operativam reclplt  malorom 
slme llberum.  Propter quod sclendum,  propos~tlonem  ab lntellectu speculatlvo 
quod lllud est l~berum  quod sulmet et  . . .  Et hoc non solum posslb~lo  est um, 
non  alterlus  gratra  est . . . Genus  sed  necesse  est ab uno  procedere,  ut 
humanum, solum lmperante monar~ha,  omnls  confuslo  de  princlpns  umvor- 
su~  et non  alterms gratla  est ;  tunc  sallbus auferatur " 
emm solum pohtlae dlrlgu~itur  obllquae,  Id ,  I.  16 : "  Rat~on~bus  omn~bus 
democrattcae scil~cet,  ollgarchlae  atquo  supra posltls,  expetlentla memorabllls 
tyrannldes,  quae In servltutem  cogunt  attestatur , status vldehcet 1111~s  mor- 
genus  hnmanum.  . .  Hlnc  en~m  tnhum,  quem  Del  Flllus  In  salutem 
Patet, quod  quamvls  consul slve Itex  homlms  hom~nem adsumpturus,  vel 
respectu  vlae  smt  dornlu~ allorum ;  expectav~t, vel  quum  volult  lpse 
respectu  autem termlm,  al~orum  mln  dlsposult.  Nam  81  a  lapsu primorurn 
lstrl  sunt, et maxime  Monarcha,  qut  parentum, qul d~vert~oulum  futt tot~us 
mlm.;ter  omnlum  procul  dublo haben-  nostrae dev~atlonls,  cll~pos~t~ones  horn 
dns est."  lnum  et tempore rocolamus;  non  111- 
'  Id,  I.  14: "  Propter  quod  adver  venlemus nlsl  sub dlvo Augusto  Mon- 
tendum  sane  quod  quum  dlcltur,  archa,  exlstente  Monarchta  perfects, 
humanum genus potest reg1 pcr  unum  mundum  undlquo  fulsse  quletum. 
supremum  Pnnclpem,  non  SIC  lntclll-  . . . (Slnce then) 0 genus humanum ! 
gendum  est, ut mlmma  ludlcla culus-  quantls  procelhs  atque  lacturls, 
cumquo rnunlclpu ab  1110 uno ~rnmedlato  quantlsque naufragns agltarl te necesse 
Prodlre posslnt  quum etlam leges mum-  est,  dum  bellua  multorum  cap~tum 
cl~ales  quandoque  dcfic ]ant,  et  opus  factum,  ln  &versa  conari~." 
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Dante devotes the second book of  the '  De Monarchia ' to 
proving that the Roman people acquired lawfully the empire 
over  all mankind.  At  one  time, like many others, he be- 
lieved that they had gained it unlawfully by violence.  Later 
on the conviction  was forced on  him by most manifest signs 
that they owed the "  imperium " to divine providence.  He 
now deplored the grievous sight of  liings and princes, agreeing 
only  in  this,  to  oppose  their  Lord  and  His  anointed,  the 
Roman  Prince.=  Dante  accordingly  sought  to  prove  by 
divine authority, and by the light of  hunian reason, that the 
Roman empire existed  LL de jure.,'  During its progress the 
Roman  empire  was  supported by miracles which  showed  it 
was willed by God, and consequently that it was 'L  de jure."  3 
The  Romans  showed in their history  their  devotion  to the 
common  good  of  the Republic,  and therefore  to what  was 
just ;  they  gave  the  world  universal  peace  and  liberty, 
and it has  been  well  said  that the  Roman  empire  sprang 
from  the fount  of  religion  (LL de fonte nascitur  pietatis "). 
He  gives  a  number  of  instances  of  the  devotion  to the 
common  good  of  Roman citizens,  such  as  Cincinnatus,  the 
Decii,  ~abricius,  and  ~thers.~  Nature  always  acts  with  a 
view 'to its final  goal,  and this cannot  be  attained  by  one 
man  working  alone, but only  by  a  multitude  ordained  for 
divers  operations.  There  are not  only  individuals  but also 
whole nations with an aptitude for government, while other 
nations are only fit to be subjects and to serve, and for such 
it is not only expedient  but just  that they should be ruled, 
1 Id.,  ii.  1 : "  Admirabar  equidem 
aliquando,  Romanum  populum  in 
Orbe  terrarum  sine  ulla  rosistentia 
fuisse praefectum ; quum tamen super- 
ficialiter  intuens,  illum  null0  iure, 
sed  armoru~m tantummodo  violentia, 
obtinuisse  arbitrabar.  Sed  postquam 
medullitus  oculos  mentis  infixi,  et 
per  efficecissima signa divinnm provi- 
dentiam hoc effecisse cognovi, admira- 
tione cedente, derisiva quaednm super- 
venit despectio, quurn gentes noverim 
contra Romani populi ~raeeminentiam 
fremuisse, quum videam  populos vaz~s 
meditantes,  ut  ips8  solebam,  quum 
insuper doleam, Reges et Principes  in 
hoc vitio concordantes, ut adversentur 
Domino  suo,  et  unico  suo  Romano 
principi.  Propter  quod  derisive,  non 
sine  dolore quodam,  cum illo  clamare 
possum  pro  populo  glorioso  et  pro 
Caesare, qui pro Principe Coeli  clama- 
bat : '  Quare  fremuerunt  gentes,  et 
populi meditati sunt inania.' " 
Id., ii. 1. 
a  Id., 11.  4. 
Id., ii. 6. 
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even under comp~lsion.~  Now clearly the Romans were the 
people ordained by nature for command.  That this was the 
judgment  of  God appears clear from the fact that it was the 
Roman ~eople  which prevailed when all were striving for the 
of  the world.  Dante appeals to history for evidence 
of  this.  Among  other  witnesses  Luke,  the scribe of  Christ, 
writes  that "  thcre  went  out  an edict  from Augustus  that 
the whole  world  should be enrolled,"  thus showing that the 
Romans at  that time held universal  sway.2  This empire was 
acquired  as in single  combat  by  the ordeal  of  battle,  and 
whatever is so acquired is rightly acquired, for it is obtained 
by divine j~dgment.~ 
The '  Commedia '  breathes the same spirit in every reference 
to  the  empire,  from  the beginning  of  the '  Inferno ' right 
through to the vision of  the throne set apart for Henry VII. 
in the empyrean.  Dante's guide through hell and purgatory 
is  Virgil,  the great poet  of  the empire.  In limbo  wo  find 
Caesar,  Cesare  armato con  gli  occhi grifagni,"  and  many 
of  his great predecessors in Roman story.4  Ulysses and Diorned 
groan in the flames for the horse,  LL che fe' la ports Ond7  usci 
de' Romani il gentil seme."  One  of  the lowest subdivisions 
of the 'Inferno ' is named  after the Trojan traitor Anten~r,~ 
and in the very  lowest  depths  of  all Judas Iscariot  has  as 
his  follow  sufferers  Brutua  and  Caseius,  the  murderers  of 
Julius  Caesar.' 
In the '  Purgatorio ' wc have the magnificent  lines, partly 
quoted  above,  in  which  Dante  deplores  the  fate  of  Italy 
enslaved and full of  woes, because it has no emperor to guide 
it,  and  he  attacks  the "  German  Albert " and  his  father 
Rudolf for neglecting Italy, the garden of  the em~ire.~ 
In the sixteenth canto  Dante  places  in the mouth  of  a 
Lombard  (Marco Lombardo) a  violent  attack on  the papacy 
for combining  the temporal  with  the  spiritual  power.g  In 
another canto we are told how the good Titus, with the help 
Id., ii. 7.  6  Id. id.,  32. 
Id., ii. 9.  7  Id. id., 34. 
a  Id., ii. 10.  Id., Purgatorio,  vi. 76. 
' Cornmedia,' Inferno, 4.  9  Id. id., xvi. 46. 
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of  the Deity, revenged the treachery of  Judas.l  Finally, in 
the  earthly  paradise,  on  the  summit  of  the  mountain  of 
purgatory, we  have the symbolical vision of  Christ, under the 
form of a gryphon.  We cannot enter into details of  the vision 
and its  symbolical meaning,  but  it shows  how  throughout 
this canto Dante has  constantly in mind the empire and its 
importance to the world in connection with thc divine scheme 
for its  ellb being.^  The last canto of  the ' Paradiso ' shows no 
change in Dante's conception of  the importance of  the empire 
in  the government  of  this  world.  One  of  the first  human 
beings on whom Dante sets eyes in heaven is Constance :- 
"  Che del second~  vento di Suave 
gerlero il terzo, e l'ultime possanza," 
the wife of  Henry VI. and the mother of  Frederick II.Vhis 
is in the circle of  the moon.  In  the next circle, that of  Mercury, 
Justinian sets forth the praises of  the Roman empire and of 
its great exploits, and tells how under Augustus it gave peace 
to the whole world, so that the gates of  the temple of  Janus 
were closed.  He refers to the great crime done under Tiberius 
and to the vengeance on the Jews under Titus.  He tells of 
Charlemagne and how  he saved  the Church from  the Lom- 
bards.  The Guelfs  and Ghibellines sin alike, the one party 
by its opposition to the empire and the other by seeking to 
annex it to a faction ; by their sins they are the cause of  the 
ills of Italy.4  In  the sphere of  Jupiter the spirits, before Dante 
leaves,  form  themselves  into the  shape  of  an eagle's  head 
and  neck  (the  Roman  ~yrnbol),~  and  the  eagle  tells  how 
Constantine  now  knows  how  grievously  the  world  has 
suffered from his well-intentioned act (the d~nation).~ 
There  is  one  more  reference to  the empire  when  Dante, 
still  accompanied  by  Beatrice,  has  reached  the  empyrean, 
the heaven which is pure light, where he sees the whole com- 
pany  of  heaven,  and  where  there  is  neither  far  nor  near. 
Beatrice points out to our poet the great throne reserved for 
1 Id. id., xxi. 
8  Id. id., xxxii. 
a  Id., ' Paradiso,'  iii. 
Id. id., vi. 
5  Id. id., xviii, 
Id. id., xx. 
the exalted  Henry,  who  will come to govern Italy before it 
is ready for his rule.  The Pope, on the other hand, his secret 
open  opponent, will  shortly  thereafter  be  thrust  down 
whore  Simon  Magus  has  his  p1ace.l  Thus  we  find  in  the 
6  Commedia ' from first  to last the same exalted view of  the 
empire as in  the '  Convivio ' and in  ' De  Monarchia,'  and 
th&ughout  it is the one government  that can secure justice 
and liberty, and therewith peace. 
But the emperor was to be no mere faindant.  In his letter 
to the Florentines he warns them of  the dreadful consequcnces 
if  they  do  not  submit  to the Roman  Prince,  and  reminds 
them  of  the  destruction  by  Frederick  I.  of  Spoleto  and 
Milan,  and he  prophesies  that their city will be taken, the 
greater part of  the inhabitants slain or made prisoners, and 
that they will endure the same sufferings for their perfidy as 
the glorious city of  Saguntum bore voluntarily in its faithful 
struggle for liberty.  The guardian of  the Roman state, the 
"  divus,"  and triumphant  Henry has  come thirsting  not  for 
his own but the public wed2 
Similarly in his letter addressed to the princes and rulers 
of  Italy, Dante gives them the glorious n&s  of  the coming 
of  Henry,  who  will  release  Italy  from bondage  and  show 
mercy to all who seek it, while avenging the crimes of  back- 
sliders.  He calls  on  them  not  only  to  arise,  but  to  stand 
in  awe,  before  one  whose  waters  they  drink,  on  whose 
seas  they  sail,  and  who  possess  whatever  they  hold,  by 
virtue  of  his  law.  The  Roman  Prince  is  predestined 
by   GO^.^ 
Id. id., xxx. : 
"In quel gran seggio, a che tu gli occhi 
tieni 
Per la corona che gia' v'B  su posta, 
Prima che tu B queste rlozze ceni, 
Sederit l'alma, che fia giu agosxa, 
Dell'  alto  Arrigo,  ch'a  dsizzare 
Italia 
Verrd in prima che ella sia disposta. 
La cieca cupidigia che vi ammalia, 
Sinhli' fatti v'ha  a1 fantolino, 
Che muor di  fame  e caccia via  la 
balia ; 
E fia prefetto nel foro divino 
Allora tal, che palese e coperto 
Non anderit con lui per un cammino. 
Ms poco poi sara de Dio soffesto 
Nel  santo  offizio ;  ch'ei  sarA 
detruso 
La  dove  Simon  mBgo  8'  per  suo 
merto, 
E  far&  quel  d'bnagna  entrar  piu 
giuso." 
Id., Ep. vi. 
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Dante  throughout  his  writings  treat,s the  empire  of  his 
time as one  with the old  Roman  empire, divinely conferred 
on the Romans on account of  their capacity for righteousness. 
Of  Rome  he says that he firmly holds  that the very  stones 
of  its walls are worthy of  reverence,  and that the ground on 
which she is built is excellent beyond all that man can utter.l 
As regards the German electors, he looked on them as merely 
the heralds of  the divine pr~vidence.~ 
Dante  devotes  the third book  of  the '  De  Monarchia ' to 
proving  that  the emperor  receives  his  power  directly  from 
God, and that the Church is not qualified to exercise temporal 
power.  There were three classes with whom  he had to deal 
in proving that the emperor did not derive his power from tho 
'  Church.  First oame the Pope and certain of  the clergy and 
others,  whom  he  believed  to  be  moved  entirely  by  zeal 
and  not  by  pride.  Next  came  those  influenced  by 
greed, and  last  of  all the Decretalists, who  maintained that 
the traditions of the Church were the foundations of  the faith.3 
He contends  that the  temporal  power  does  not  derive  its 
being, nor its authority, from the spiritual, though it operates 
more  efficiently  when  aided  by the light  of  grace imparted 
on  earth by the blessing  of  the supreme P~ntiff.~  It is un- 
necessary  to  follow  Dante in his  answers  to  the  ordinary 
arguments on behalf of the Church, such as that the sun repre- 
sents the Church, and the moon, with its borrowed Light, the 
empire.5  As  regards  Constantine's  donation,  he  does  not 
dispute the historical  fact, but maintains it was  invalid, as 
no one has the right as holder of  an office to do things incon- 
sistent with that office ("  contra illud officium ").  Constantine 
had no power  to make  such  a  gift, and the Church had no 
authority to receive it, for it was inconsistent with the express 
commands in the Gospels that the Church should not possess 
gold  and  silver.  This  would  not,  however,  prevent  the 
emperor from granting  a  patrimony  to the Church,  so long 
as he  retained  Lb the superior  dominion."  The  Pope  might 
l  Id., '  Convivio,' iv. 6.  4  Id. id.,  iii. 4. 
Id., '  De Alon.,'  iii.  16.  Id.  id.,  iii.  4.  Seo  also following 
8  Id. id., ~ii.  3.  chapters for other commorl  arguments. 
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also receive gifts, not as a proprietor but as a steward on behalf 
of  the poor.' 
Thus Dante derives the temporal power directly from God 
and  not,  as  we  have  already  said,  from  the  Church, 
wllich has not even the right to exercise such power, but the 
very last words of  the  De Monarchia ' are a warning to the 
temporal  ruler  to  show  such  reverence  to Peter  as is  due 
from the  first-born  to  his  father,  so  that  enlightened  by 
this  paternal  grace  he  may  better  rule  the world,  over 
which he has been set by God, who is the supreme Ruler of 
all things, spiritual and temporal." 
Dante's  conception  of  the need  of  a  universal  monarchy 
arose,  no  doubt,  primarily  from  the  lamentable  political 
conditioil of  Italy, the violent intestine quarrels in the cities, 
and  the continual  conflicts  between  these,  but it also  had 
reference to the need  of  some system of  international  peace 
for  Europe.  It has been  contended by Professor Ercole  in 
an important and learned work that, while Dante urges with 
such  eloquence  the  need  of  the  universal  empire  to  give 
justice  and peace to the world, he does not conceive of  this 
authority  as  implying  a  continual  interference  with  the 
internal laws  and conditions  of  particular  states; as indeed 
is  indicated in a  passage  of  the ' De  Monarchia,'  which  we 
have  cited.3  Professor  Ercole  has  also  drawn attention to 
some  very  important  passages  in  Engelbert  of  Adrnont's 
work, '  De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii,' which seem to express 
the same c~nception.~  He also points out that while Bartolus 
maintained the independence or autonomy of  the great Italian 
cities as being  universitates superiorem non recognoscentes," 
when  his  position  is  more  closely examined we find that he 
thought of  the imperial authority as  still  continuing, not  as 
exercising a  direct  control  over  those  and other  states, but 
as a supre-national power whose function it was  to maintain 
justice  and peace in the world.5 
'  Id. id.,  iii. 10.  Althusio,'  pp. 134-137. 
'  Id. id., iii. 16.  6  Id. id., pp.  131-134. 
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Dante was not then alone in the fourteenth century in the 
conception  of  some  system  of  authority  and  order  which 
should  give  peace  to the world,  and it is this which  gives 
some real interest to the work of  Pierre Dubois' '  De Recupera- 
tione Terrae Sanctae.'  There  is indeed in this  much which 
is  fantastic  and much  which  merely  expresses  the national 
ambition of  some Frenchmen ; but at the same time there is 
not a little which is ~ignificant.~ 
Dubois  had not indeed anything of  the imaginative magni- 
ficence of  the great poet : he was  a  man  of  pedestrian  and 
even in some respects  of  confused  mind, but, in some ways 
at least, his  conceptions  were  perhaps  nearer  to the actual 
conditions of  the time than those of  Dante. 
The  nominal  subject  of  the work  is  the recovery  of  the 
Holy Land from the infidel ; but this is only a starting-point 
for  the expression  of  the urgent  need  of  peace  arrlong  tho 
Christian  people,  who  were  obedient  to  R~ine.~  Obedient, 
that is,  in  spiritual  things,  not in temporal,  for,  as  in  the 
controversial pamphlets of  the conflict between Boniface VIII. 
and Philip the Fair, he denounces  the attempt of  Roine to 
assert a temporal authority over the French kingd~m.~ 
We shall return presently to the question of  the creation of 
a  universal  authority  which  should  maintain  peace  among 
Christian  people.  In the meantime  we  must  observe  what 
Dubois  says about the causes  of  the divisions  and conflicts 
in Europe.  The prelates of  the Church and the Pope himself 
were, in Duboisl opinion, among the principal causes of  these ; 
and it is to the Pope that Dubois specially addresses himself. 
He begs him to consider how many and how great have been 
the wars in which he has been involved for the defence of  the 
patrimony  of  St  Peter.4  He  therefore  suggests  that  the 
Pope  should  divest  himself  of  the  charge  of  his  temporal 
dominions,  and, while  retaining  the right  to the revenues 
derived  from  them,  should  hand  them  over  to some  king 
1 For a careful discussion of  the date  Schbnen und Bonifaz VIII.' 
and  authorship  of  this  work,  we  2  P.  Duboia'  'De  Recuperatione 
should refer  to the edition  by  C.  V.  Terrae Sanctae,'  3. 
Langlois,  and  to  R.  Scholz,  'Die  3  Id. id.,  iii. 
Publikstik  zur  Zeit  Philipps  des  4  Id. id..  33. 
or prince to be held in a perpetual "  amphiteosis."  If  he mould 
do this he would not be the cause of  war and of  men's  deaths, 
but would be able to give himself  to prayer and contempla- 
tion and the care of  spiritual things.1  He proposes that the 
bishops  and abbots  should  do  the  same,  that they  should 
resign their feudal domains and receive in their place a fixed 
This may seem very extravagant, but it should be remem- 
bered that a proposal of  much the same kind had been made 
by  Puschal  II., in  his  negotiations  about  the  Investiture 
question  with  the Emperor  Henry  V.  in 1111,  with  regard 
to  the feudal  domain  of  the bishops ; and it is  clear  that 
while the proposal was then repudiated by the bishops, there 
had been devoted churchmen like Gerhoh of  Reichersberg who 
felt that there was much to commend such  proposal^.^ 
No doubt when Dubois speaks of  the Pope surrendering his 
temporal  dominions  to  sonlo  king,  he  was  really  thinking 
of  the King  of  France, as indeed  he makes  plain in a  Iater 
~hapter.~  It  would  seem  that there is  some  evidence  that 
such  a.  proposal  had actually  been  made  by  Philip  111.  to 
Pope Gregory X. in 1273,5 and such  a proposal is intelligible 
in view of  the Angevin  occupation  of  the Sicilian kingdoms, 
which were fiefs of  the papacy. 
We  return  to Dubois'  proposals  for  the creation  of  some 
system for the establishment and maintenance of  peace among 
the Catholic peoples of  Europe.  In order to do this he pro- 
poses  that a Council should be called together, arid that the 
Id.  id.,  40:  "  Que  reformatio 
status proptor has fines taliter devotis- 
sime  postuletur,  videlicet  quod  sum- 
mus  pontifex,  qui  circa  maximam 
spiritualium  curam  plurimum  est 
honeratus  et  occupatus,  ita  quod 
sine  spiritualium  prejudicio  regimini 
suorum temporalium sufficienter vaoare 
"on  posse creditur, inspectis que sixper 
fructihus,  proventlbus  et  exitlbus, 
impensis dcductis, et honeribus sohtis, 
ad  ipsum  pcrvenire  sibique  remanere 
consueverunt,  alicui  magno  regi  seu 
Principi,  vel  aliclr~i)Jus,  tradantur  in 
perptuam amphiteosin." 
Id. ld.,  45 and 50. 
Cf. vol. iv. part iv. chap. 3. 
4  Id. id., 111 : "  Vcrisimile plurimum 
est, quod dominus papa, guerris sedatis 
secundum modos prescriptos,et regimine 
suorum  temperalium,  possessione  et 
districtlone,  pro certa  annua  pensione 
perpetua  domino  regi  Franciae  com- 
missis,  per fratres snos et filios, protit 
expedire  viderit, gubernandis poterit  1 " 
Cf. Note  hy M.  Langlois  on  p. 48 
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king should invite the Pope to secure an agreement  among 
the  princes  end prelates  for  the  establishment  of  a  Court 
to which the complaints of  those who said that they had been 
injured  might  be  referred.  The  Council  should  appoint  a 
body  of  wise  and competent men, who  should in their turn 
appoint  three  clerical  and three  lay  judges  to inquire  into 
and  deal  with  these  complaints.  If  either  party  were  not 
satisfied  with  their  decision  the judges  should  transmit  the 
case and their judgment  to the supreme Pontiff, to be amended 
or  confirmed by him.l  Dubois also proposes that obedience 
to these judgments  should be enforced by coercive measures, 
to be applied if  necessary by the other  state^.^ 
These  are far-rcaching proposals,  but  they are not  unin- 
telligible under thc conditions of  those times.  The conception 
of  a General Council, which should represent all Christendom 
for spiritual purposes,  was  familiar to the Middle Ages,  and 
was  about to receive a great  development  in the fourteenth 
century ;  and  it  is  therefore  intelligible  that  men  might 
conceive of  such a, Council as a body which could also be used 
for the settlement  of  political disputes.  It is also true that 
both  Innocent 111.  and  Boniface  VIII. had  actually  inter- 
vened  in the  disputes  between  England  and  France.  But 
1 Id.  id.,  3 : "  Convocato  concilio, 
propter ordinem salutis Terre Sanctae, 
summa  regalis  experioncia  petero 
potorit  per  dominum papnm, pri~icipes 
et prelatos concordari  at statui taliter 
quod quibuscnnque dicentibus se passos 
ininrias snundum leges et  consuetadinos 
rcgnorum et regionum, per iudiccs in eis 
statutoa, et ubi stntuti non  sunt, in- 
frascripto  modo  statuendos,  fiat  cele- 
rius  quam  solitum  ost  iusticiae  com- 
plemenlum.  Nullus  catliolicus currat 
ad  arma,  nullus  sanguinem  baptiza- 
torum effundat." 
Id.  id., 12 : "  Responderi potost quod 
concilium  statuat arbitros religiosos ad 
slios  eligendos  viros  prudentes  et 
expertos  ac  fideles,  qui  jurati  tres 
judiccs  prelatos  et  tres  alios  pro 
utraquo  pnrto,  locupletos,  el  talos 
quod  sit  verisimile  ipsos  non  posse 
corrumpi  amore,  odio,  timore,  concu- 
piscentia, vel alias ; qui convenientes in 
loco ad hoe aptiorc,  iurati strictissime, 
datis  entequam  conveniant  articulos 
potitionum et defensorum singulorum, 
summarie  et de  pleno,  rejectis  primo 
suporfluis  et ineptis,  testes  et instru- 
moi~ta  recipiant,  diligentissimo  exnmi 
nent.  . . . Si  altera  pars de ipsorum 
se~il  oncia  non  est contenla ipsi iudicos 
pro omni lite processus cum sentenciis 
mittunt  ad  apostolicam  sodom,  per 
sutnmum  pontificem,  pro  tempore 
existentem, emendandas  ct  mutandas, 
prout  at si iustum fuerit;  vel  si non, 
salubriter  ad perpetuam rei memoriam 
confirmandas  et  in  cronicis  sancte 
Romano ecclcsie inregistrandas." 
Id. id., 4,  6. 
certainly both Philip Augustus and Philip the Fair had very 
emphatically  and  successfully  refused  to  allow  any  such 
official action on the part  of  the Pope ; and it is  certainly 
remarl<abl~  that Dubois, who had, as we have seen, repudiated 
very emphatically the real or supposed claim of  Boniface VIII. 
to temporal superiority, should have been prepared to recog- 
nise  the  Papal  See  as  the  final  arbitrator  in  international 
political disputes.l 
It  is  difficult  to judge  what  importance  exactly  we  can 
attach to this work, but it seems reasonable to us that when 
wc  put  it  beside  that  of  Dante  and  of  Bartolus  and  of 
Engelbert of Admont, it receives a new significance,  It seems 
clear  to us  that  the general trend  of  mediaeval society was 
towards  the  disintegration  of  political  unity  in  the  West 
and tho development of the independent political societies of 
modern  Europe ;  but  the  conception  of  a  larger  political 
unity was  not wholly lost, and we  in the modern  world  are 
only taking up again the necessary task of  civilisation. 
Xf.  vol.  v. pp.  166.171 ; p.  387. OHM.  MII.]  STJMXARY.  129 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
SUIMMARY  OF THE POLITICAL  THEORY  OF THE 
SOURTEENTH CENTURY. 
WE have endeavoured to set out the political  principles  of 
Western  Europe in the fourteenth  century as expressed by 
the writers whom we may call  political  thinkers or theorists, 
as  implied  or  expressed  in  constitutional  documents  and 
practice,  and  as  set  out  by  the Civilians.  It is, we  think, 
clear  that  the  conceptions  of  the  political  thinkers  were, 
speaking broadly, closely related  to constitutional practice, 
while those of  the Civilians were not, and that thus the latter 
had little influence on the development of  political conceptions 
in the fourteenth century in Northern and Western Europe. 
There was indeed no difference between the theorists  and 
the Civilians on the question of  the  source of  political authority ; 
they were all agreed that political authority was derived from 
the community, from  God indeed ultimately, but from  God 
through the community.  There is no trace in the Civilians, 
any more than in the other political writers, with the excep- 
tion of  Wycliffe, of  that fantastic orientalism of  Gregory the 
Great, which had practically died out in the Middle Ages, but 
was revived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
theory of  what is traditionally called the Divine Right of  Kings. 
The  community,  the universitas, the populus  was  the im- 
mediate  source of  all  political  authority. 
There  were,  however,  also  profound  differences  between 
the Civilians  and  the  political  theorists  and constitutional 
practice  of  Western  Europe. 
Tnle  have pointed out in previous volumes that, as it seems 
to us,  the fundamental political  conception  of  the Middle 
Ages  was  that of  the supremacy  of  law, and that law was 
primarily the custom which expressed the habit of  life of  the 
cominunity-habit  and custom  rather than deliberate  will. 
This conception continues to have an important place in the 
fourteenth century.  When, however, as perhaps in the ninth 
century,  and certainly in the thirteenth,  the rapid  develop- 
ment  of  mediaeval  civilisation  made  something  like  direct 
legislation  sometimes  necessary,  this  was  conceived  of  as 
expressing  the  consent  and  will  of  the whole  community. 
This is the principle  which  was  normally expressed in  the 
fourteenth century in the constitutional methods of  Western 
Europe and in the political theory. 
It  is  here  that  we  find  the  first  important  divergence 
between the Civilians and the norm J  mediaeval conceptions and 
practice.  The Civilians of  the fourteenth century, as we have 
said, always and frankly  recognised that the original lawgiver 
was the community, and that, whatever was the authority of 
the prince, it was from the comniunity that he derived it, but 
they  also,  and  naturally,  for  they  were  interpreting  the 
"  Corpus Juris Civilis," conceive of  the community as having 
transferred  its authority  to the prince.  To them therefore 
the  prince  had  beaome  the legislator,  the  source  of  law; 
and it is impossible to overrate the importance of  the appear- 
ance of  this conception, not indeed in relation  to the four- 
teenth century, but to later periods. 
We  must  not, however,  imagine  that the Oivilialis  were 
thoroughgoing  in  their  affirmation  of  this.  As  we  have 
pointed  out  at lengt,h in earlier volumes, while some of  the 
Civilians  of  the twelfth  and thirteenth  centuries  held  that 
the  Roman  people  had  transferred  their  authority  to  the 
emperor so conlpletely that even their custom had ceased to 
have  any legislative  authority,  others  maiutainod  that this 
was  not so ; the people had indeed given their authority to 
the prince, but they could resume it, and their custom still 
made and abrogated 1aw.l 
Cf. vol. ii. part i.  chap. 7 ; vol.  v. part i, chap.  6,  pp.  664-667. 
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In the fourteenth  century,  as  far as we  can judge,  the 
most  important  Civilians, while  refusing  to allow  that the 
people  possess~d  the forxnal  legislative  authority,  seen1  LO 
allow that their custom still made and unmade 1aw.l 
The  second  divergence  is  equally,  perhaps  even  more, 
important.  The prince, no doubt, in the political constitution 
and theory  of  the Middle  Ages,  was  the head  of  the com- 
niunitly, and had his share, a very important one, in nraking 
the law ; but his authority was a linzitcd one.  Re was limited 
by the law, by the custom and habit of  life of  the community ; 
the property and persons of  the members of  the commlmnity 
were not subject to his arbitrary authority, but were protected 
by  the law.  This  principle  evidently  was  generally  main- 
tained in the fourteenth century. 
To the Civilians the prince was normally the source of  the 
law, and, no doubt, mainly because he wab  the source of the 
law, he was thought of  as being above it.  They were indeed 
perplexed by  an apparent inconsistency in the texts of  the 
Roman law books.  In  some of  these the prince was described 
as "  legibus solutus."  (We do not, of  course, here or elsewhere, 
pretend to interpret the original meaning of  these words.)  In 
other places, and especially in the famous words of  ' Cod. i., 
14, 4,' the prince appears  as saying that it was seemly that 
he should acknowledge that he was bound by the law : "  1)igna 
vox  maiestate  reegnntis  legibus  alligatum  se  principem 
profiteri."  (Again  we are not interpreting the original meaning.) 
The Civilians were indeed perplexed, but, on the whole, they 
tended in the fourteenth century to the judgment, that while 
tho  prince  was  not  forlnally  bound by  the law,  he  should  , 
habitually  respect  it.  It is  in  this  connection  that  the 
distinction,  perhaps  incidental rather than deliberate,  made 
by  Baldus  between the ordinary  and the absolute power of 
the prince is significant. 
acre  then we have a revolutionary concaplion intruded into 
the system of  medizcval life and thought.  1t must, however, be 
observed that we find in the Civilians of  the  fourteenth century 
two  principles  which  in  a  considerable  measure  modified 
1 Cf. pp.  16-19. 
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their tendency to  think of the prince as possessing an authority 
unlimited by law.  In the first place, they recognised that the 
~rince  might enter into contractual relations with his subjects, 
and that such contracts were binding upon him.  As  Baldus 
says, God had subjected the lawto the prince but not contracts ; 
by these he was  bound.  It appears to us from the context 
of  many of thesc statenlents that their primary reference was 
to  treaties  which  various  emperors  had  made  with  cities 
in  Italy,  but  the principle is  stated in  general terms,  and 
sometimes is related to the contractual system of  feudal law. 
The Civilians were also clear that the extra-legal powers of  the 
prince do not entitle him to deal at his pleasure with private 
property ; he cannot  do this "  de  iure,"  whatever  he  might 
do "  de facto." 
There is, however,  another  aspect  of  the political  theory 
of  the fourteenth century where we find, rather unexpectedly, 
that some of the Civilians werein agreement with the theorists. 
This is the principle that in the last resort it was lawful for 
the community to resist  and even to depose the unjust  and 
tyrannical prince.  This was afimed by Marsilius of  Padua, 
by William of Occam, by the author of the 'Somnium Viridarii,' 
and is cited  as the opinion  of  great  jurists  by  Leopold  of 
Babenberg;  and the century  ended  with the deposition of 
llichard 11.  Thcre was indeed nothing new in this ; as we 
hope we have nlade clear in foriner volumes, it was the normal 
principle  of  the  Middle  Ages  that  resistance  to  unlawful 
authority, and even the deposition of  tyrannical princes, was 
legiti1nate.l  It is, however, interesting to observe that some 
at least of  the Civilians, notably Bartolus, Joannes Paber and 
Jacobus  Butriprius, seem  clearly to maintain that in  the 
last resort  subjects  might  lawfully  resist  and  even  depose 
an unjust and tyrannical ruler. 
We  have dealt  at some length  with tho political  opinions 
of  the  Civilians,  for  we  are  in  this  volume  concerned 
with  the  question  how fax we  can trace in these  cen1,uries 
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the beginnings  of  that concepi.ion of  the absolute authority 
of  the  prince  which  is  characteristic  of  the  seventeent~h 
century.  It  is,  however,  evident  that  there  is  very  little 
trace  of  this  in  the  fourteenth  century  outside  of  the 
Civilians,  and  there  is  very  little  to indicate  that  these 
exercised any great practical influence on the political theory 
and institutions of  the time outside of  1taly.l 
It  seems  to us  that in  the fourteenth  century  ~olitical 
theory  continued to be very much the same as that of  the 
thirteenth,  while  the  constitutional  forms  and  methods 
represented  the more  or  less  normal  development  of  those 
which  the political  genius  of  the Middle  Ages  had  slowly 
created. 
Wo  wish,  however,  to  draw  the  the French Icing  as  possessing  in  his 
attention of  students of  Politics to the  own  country  all  the  powers  of  tho 
vory interesting and important studies  Emperor.  These  studies,  originally 
by  Professor  F.  Ercole,  primarily  on  published  in various Reviews  in  1915 
Bartolus,  but also on the relations be-  and  1917, are  now republished,  along 
tween the political  theories  of Italian  with  others,  in  the  volume  entitled 
and  French  Civilians with  regard  to  '  Da Bartolo all' Althusio.' 
PAR?!  IT. 
THE SOURCE  AND AUTHORITY  OF LAW.  CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL PRACTICE  AND THEORY. 
WE again begin with the consideration of  this subject, for it 
seems  to us  clear  that in  the fourteenth  century as  in  the 
Middle  Ages  the  principle  that  the  authority  of  law  was 
derived from the community, and that the law was supreme, 
not only over subjects but over rulers, wao  sttill  the foundation 
of  all the normal political thought  of  Western  Europe.  We 
have  now  to  enquire  how  far  this  principle  continued  to 
prevail in the fifteenth century. 
It appears to us that some of  the best illustrations of  the 
constitutional  conceptions of  the fifteenth century  are to be 
found in the proceedings of  the Cortes of  Castile anii Ideon. 
Juan 11. had, apparently, at the Cortes of  Palencia in 1431, 
repudiated  the  constitutional  provisions  of  the  Cortes  of 
Bribiesca, (1387), by wllicb laws were not to be annulled except 
by ordinances mark in Cortes, and royal Briefs contrary to the 
laws  were  to  be  (1jsregarrleil.l  At Valladolid,  however,  in 
Cortes iii.  9,  19,  p.  111 (Palencia,  derogo, e  eapecialmente Ias Ieyes  que 
1431) :  L'  Non  embargantes  quales  dizen  quelas  cartas  dadas  contra  ley 
quier  leyes fueres  et dereches ordina-  o fueno o derecho deuen ser obedespidas 
mientos e constitnriones  . . . ca  en  e  non  conplidas,  aunque  contengan 
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1440, the Cortes asked the King to give orders that any Briefs 
iss~~ed  in his name, which were contrary to the laws, should be 
disregarded, and the King assented1  A more detailed  state- 
ment of  this constitutional principle was made at Valladolid 
in  1442.  The  Cortes complained  that the Xing  (Juan 11.) 
was  permitting  Briefs  to be  issued  which  contained  'L  non 
obstante "  clauses, mcl  in which he appeared as issuing com- 
mailds  LL of  his certain knowledge and absolute royal power," 
and they request  that such extravagant phrases should not 
appear in the royal Briefs, and that if  they did so appear, the 
Briefs should be held as null and void, and that the secretary 
who  inserted  them  should  be  deprived  of  his  office.  The 
King  replied  that  the  law  made  at  Bribiesca  should  be 
observed, and that it was his will to command that in all cases 
betwccn  partes e privadas personas " justice should be done 
according  to  low,  notwithstancling  any  Briefs  which  con- 
tained  abrogations  or  dispensations,  general  or  particular, 
professing that they were issued  Lb proprio  motu,"  and with 
certain knowledge, and by  the King's  absolute power ; and 
he ordered  that none  of  his  secretaries  were to issue Briefs 
containing such extravagant phrases,  on pain  of  losing t,heir 
officcs, and that if  they did  so, such  Briefs  should  have  no 
force. 
quelas  leyes  e  fueros  e  derechos  e 
ordinamientos  non  pneden  ser  rreno- 
catlos saluo por  Cortes. 
Cf. p. 5. 
1  Cortes iii. 15, 14 (Valladolid, 1440) : 
"  Fazemos avuestra muy alta sonnoria 
. . . dos  peticiones  . . . la  secunda, 
quo mande que on caso que senn datlas 
oartas o sobre cartas de vuostra alloza 
o se den do aqui adelante motu proprio 
o a  instanpia de otras personas qualos 
quier en rreuocamiento o on quebmnta- 
misnto  delas  rosas  sobre  dichas  por 
vuostra  sennoria  rreqpondiclas,  o  cn 
algunt  amengnamiento  delas  por  pri- 
mera e soquncla o tercera jusion  o mas, 
o  con  quales  quier  clausulas  tloroga- 
torias  quo  enellas  se  contongan,  que 
Sean obedespidas  e  non  cornplidas yin 
po In  alguna delos qnelas non cunplieren, 
e  10s  que  por  vertucl  dellas  fueron 
enplazados non soan tenuclos  clo  seguir 
10s emplazamientos, e que por ollo non 
incurrau en pena alguna.  . . . Aesf,o 
vos rrespondo  . . . en cauo que sean 
dadas mis cartas e sobro cartas . . . en 
rreuocamiento o on quebramiento delas 
cosns suso dichas por mi rrespondidas, 
o en alqunt amrngoamionto dellas por 
primcra o sogoncla o tersora jusion o mas 
con  quales  quier  claunsulas  derogato- 
rim quo on olla so contengnn, quo iiean 
obedcsqidas  e  non complidas sin pena 
alguna delos quelas non conplierc-n." 
2  Cortes iii. 16, 11 ( Valladolid  1442) : 
" Otrosy muy eccellcnto rrey e sennor 
por  quanto enlas oartas que emanan de 
vurslra  alteza  se  ponen  muchss  ex- 
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The same principle was affirmed in the Cortes at Valladolid 
in 1451  l; and soon after the accession of  Henry IV. we find 
the Cortes at Cordova in 1455 requesting that nothing should 
be done contrary to the laws  and ordinances  of  the former 
kings,  unless  these had been  revoked  by the Cortes on  the 
supplication of  the representatives of  the Kingdoni.2 
It  is clear that the Cortes of  Gastile and Leon in the fifteenth 
orhitancias do derecho, enlas qualos so 
dizo, non obslantes loyes e ordinamien- 
tos e otros dcrechos, quese cunpla e faga 
lo quo vuestra sonnoria manda, e quelo 
manda de cierte scioncia e sahiduria e 
poderio rreal abqoluto, e que rrevocn  e 
cassa  e  annulla  las  dichas  leyes  que 
contra aquello fazen o fnzor pueden, por 
lo  qual  non  aprouechan  a  vuestra 
mercut  fazer  leyes  nin  ordonananqas 
pucsosta onpodorio do1 que ordena las 
dichne  carlar rleuocar  a  quellas.  Por 
ende muy virtuoso rrey e sennor, sup- 
plicamos avuestra sonlloria que le plega 
quelas  tales  exorbitancias  non  se 
pongiln enlas dichas oartas, e qua1 quier 
seoretario o escrivano de camera quelas 
pusiere, por ese mesmo fecho sea felso 
e prinado del dicho officio, e quclas tales 
cartas non sean conplidas e  soan nin- 
gunas e de ningunt valor. 
A esto vos rrcspondo que mi mercet 
e voluntad es do mandar o mando que 
so guarde onesta pr.rto  la loy do Briui- 
osca  fccha  por  el  Rey  Don  Juan mi 
avuelo  . . . que fat~la,  en csta rrazon, 
en qual quier oosa quo soa o tnnga entre 
partes  e  priuadaa  poreonas,  non  em- 
bagante qne sobro ello se di scgunda 
jusion  nin  otras quales quier cartas, e 
sobre  cartas con  quales quier ponas  e 
clausulas  derogatorias o otras firmezas 
e  abrogaqionos ot  derognpiones  o  dis- 
pensaplonos  genoralos  o  espepiales,  e 
aunque  qne  se digan  proqcder  de  mi 
proprio motu o piorta spiencia e poderio 
meal absoluto, por que syn embargo de 
todo ello ;  toda via es  mi merpet e volun- 
t~d  qllola jn~tiqia  finresca, e sea war- 
dado cl~tora~nerlte  su clorocho acada uno 
e  non  rresgiba  agraio  nin  perjuyeio 
alguno  en  su  justipia,  para  lo  qua1 
mando  e  ordeno  quo  ningund  mi 
segretorio o  escriuano  de ramara  non 
sea osado de poner enlas tales niu selno- 
jantes cartas exorbitanpias nin clausulas 
derogatorias, nin abrogclpiones nin dero- 
gapjones de  leyes nin fuoros nin dorechos 
nin ordinamientos nin desta mi ley nin 
dela dicha ley do Briuicsca, nin pongan 
onellas que propedou nin las yo do de mi 
proprio motu, nin do mi cierte piellpin 
nin de mi podoro rreal absoluto  . . .  e 
el escrivano quo firmare o libraro contrta 
esto qual quior carta o nluala o preuil- 
legio quo cayga enla pena dela dicha ley 
de Rriuiesca, que manda quo picrda el 
oficio e quela tale carta o alcuala o pre- 
uillegio  en quanto ala tal exorbitapion 
Q  abroga~ion  o derogapion  o otra qual 
quier  cosa  quo  contengn  por  donde 
so quite el derecho e justicia dela parte, 
non vala nin aya fuer~a  nin vigor alguno 
bien asy commo si nunca fuese dado  nin 
ganado." 
Id., iii. 20,  13. 
Id.,  iii.  22,  21  (Cordoba,  1485): 
"  Suplicamos a  vuestra  merped  quele 
plega  mnndar  e  ordinar  quo  todas  o 
quales  quier  leyes  e  ordenamientos 
quelos rreyes pasados dieren a vuestras 
pibdadcs  e  villas,  que  sean usadas  e 
quardadas  commo  sy  nuevamente 
fuoson ordorlados, e que contra ellas non 
pueda ser alegado queen algund t,iempo 
no  fueren  usadas  e  guardadas,  saluo 
contra aquollas  quo  fueren rrevocadncl 
por  cortes  a  suplicnrionor  delos  pro- 
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century  maintained  as  strictly  as those  of  the fourteenth, 
that the law was not the expression of  the mere will of  the 
King, but that, while it was the King's law, it required also the 
authority of  the great men  and of  the representatives of  the 
cities.  The proper form of  legislation is well illustrated in the 
first clause of the proceedings of  the Cortes at Madrid in 1435. 
They refer to the laws and ordinances made by the Iijng at 
Bamora, with the advice and consent of  the great men of %he 
Council, and of  the procurators  of  the cities and villas of  his 
kingd0m.l  We shall return to the nature and authority of  the 
Cortes in a later chapter, but we  think we  have said enough 
to make clear the constitutional conception of  the source and 
authority of  law in Castile and Leon in the fifteenth century. 
When we  turn to the German Empire it is hardly necessary 
to say anything about the constitutional principles of  legis- 
lation.  We have, however, a very interesting and important 
general treatment  of  the source and nature of  the authority 
of  law by Cardinal Nicolas of  Cusa, one of  the most important 
thinkers of  the fifteenth century. 
In the Preface to the third Book of  his treatise, '  De Con- 
cordaiitia Catholica,' he says that legislation bolongs properly 
to those who are bound by the law, or to the greater part of 
them ; for that which concerns all should be approved by all, 
and a man cannot excuse his disobedience to the law when he 
himself has made it.  =ow  much better it is that the Common- 
wealth  should be nilcd by laws than even by tlic best  man 
or King ; as Aristotle had said, when the laws are not supreme 
there  is  no  "  Politia."  The  Prince  must  therefore  rule 
according to the laws,  and is supreme  only  with respect  to 
1 Id.,  iii.  12,  1  (Madrid,  1435) : 
"  Muy  alto  sennor,  bien  sabe vuestm 
altezn como en  lrts lay os o ordinamientos 
quo vuestra sennoria fie0 en 11% pihdad 
de @morn  . . . con acuerdo e consejo 
drlos  granrles  e  muy honorrndos  scn- 
nores  dal vuestro  muy alto consojo, o 
con 10s  procuradoros  delas cibdsdos e 
villas de vuestros rregnos que se ac8.e~- 
yieren enel dicho ayuntnmiento, vuestra 
merced  fizo  e  orden6  cicrtas leyes  o 
ordcnnnqos  para  bien  o pro  comun  o 
buen  rregimiento  e  gouernapion  dela 
vuestxa  j nst,iyia e  dela rropuhlica dclos 
vuestros rregnos e sen no ria^." 
Of.  Id., iii. 14,  I. 
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tllose matters which are not clearly defined by the laws.  Any 
form of  government,  therefore,  is  just  and  LL temperatus " 
whether Monarchical or Aristocratic,  or controlled by all the 
citizens, if  it is directed to the common good, and is in accord- 
ance with the will of  the subjects ; but it is "  intemperatus 
when it is directed to the good of  the ruler, and is contrary to 
the will of  the subjects.l 
In another place Nicolas says that it is the general opinion 
of all experienced men that the power of  making the laws of 
tho Roman people could be taken away from the Emperor, as 
it was  from the Roman  people that he received this power. 
And, in yet another place, while he admits that thc King has 
the right to interpret and to dispense with the law in doubtful 
cases, for the public good and to secure justice, he insists that 
this  does not mean  that he can annul the law without that 
1 Nicolas  of  Cusa :  '  De  Concor-  experientia  suffultam,  ut,  secundo 
dantia Catholica,' III.,  Proface (p. 354):  Politicae 2 Cap. dicitur.  Oportet dein- 
"  Logis  autem  latio,  per  00s  omnes  cops  principantes  ossc  pro  legum 
qui per eam stringi debent, aut majorem  observatione,  quos  primo  secundum 
partem,  sliorum electione fieri  debet ;  ipsas leges domillare oportet. . . . Et 
quoniam  ad commune  conferre debet.  quanquam  secundum  leges  princeps 
Et  quod  omnes  tangit,  ab omnibus  dominare debeat; tamen  quin  de his 
approbari  debet :  et  communis  de-  eet dominus do quibus secundum leges 
finitio,  ex  omnium  consensu,  aut  nihit  dicitur certitudinaliter,  ut tertio 
majoris partis, solum elicitur.  Nec pot-  Politicae Cap. 6., ideo oportet eum esse 
est excusatio de obedientia legum sibi  prudentem,  ut  tertio  Politicae  Cap. 
tunc locum vendicaro, quando yuisque  secnndo, et quinto Ethicorum tractatu 
sibi ipsi legem condidit:  non est enim  de  justitia,  ut epikeizare  rorto valeat 
bona  dispositio,  bene  leges  poni,  non  per directionem legis ubi deficit propter 
obedire  autem,  ut  dicit  Aristoteles,  particularo.  Et  tunc ipse omnis prin- 
quarto  Politicorum,  Cap.  7.  E8t  cipatus,  sive  Monarchicus  per  unum, 
itaque etiam eorum interpretari,  qnor-  sive Aristocraticus  plurium sapienturn, 
nm condere.  His enim leglbus regnum  sive Politicus omnium civium simul, et 
bwbernaro necessa cst ; amare enim et  cujuslibet  socundum  suum  grad-, 
obediro omnibus insunt.  Quare etiam  quando  secundum  voluntntem  sub. 
melius  pro  republica  extitit,  legibus  joctorum existit, ad communom tendens 
quam optimo viri regi, ut ex intnnbione  utilitatem, temporatus et justus dicitur, 
tortio  Politicae,  9  Cap.,  hoc  Aristo-  ut  haec  par  ilristotolcm  tertio  et 
tales  perquirens  concludit, ac I. Rhe-  quarto Politicorum.  Si autem praeter 
torice  Cap.  1.  Ubi  enim  non  prin-  voluntatem  subjectorum, ad proprium 
cipantur  leges  ibi  non  est  politia,  ut  tendens  utilitatem  prinoipatus  existit, 
quarto Polit,icae 4 Cap.  Statui autem  intemporatus  existit,  ut tertio  Politi- 
QPortet leges cum gravitate magna, ar  coruln capite quinto." 
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counscl with which it was issued, but only that he can declare 
the "  ratio legis  in relation  to some particular case.l  We 
shall have occasion to discuss the principles of  Nicolas of  Cuss 
when we  deal with the position  of  the ruler, and the source 
of  his  authority,  but in  the meanwhile  it is  impol'tant  to 
observe that he is clear  and emphatic in asserting that the 
authority  of  the law is  derived  from  the  community,  and 
that it  is  the law  which  should  be  supreme,  and  not  the 
Prince ;  his  authority is  related  properly  to those  matters 
which are not determined by the law. 
If  we turn now to France, it  must be acknowledged that it  is 
difficult  to lind  much  dircct  evidence  in  the  constitutional 
documents, about the theory of  legislation.  As we  shall see 
later, we have a great deal of  information about the representa- 
tive  assemblies  of  the  whole  kingdom, the  States General, 
and the Estates of  the various provinces, and the authority 
which  they  claimed  or  possessed,  but  we  have  not  found 
a ion.  much direct evidence about the formal methods of  legisl t' 
There is, however, one great legislative enactment, about the 
method of  which we have direct evidence, that is the Ordon- 
nance  establishing  the  new  military  organisation  of  the 
"  Gens  d'Armes." 
This Ordonnance was issued by the Icing at  a meeting of  the 
States General at  Orleans in 1439, after representations made to 
the King by the members of  all the three Estates of  the King- 
dom ; and it was made with the deliberation and (( advis "  of 
the Princes  of  the Blood  Royal,  many  Prelates  and great 
Lords, and of  the nobles and the men of  the good cities. 
We are not here properly  concerned with the purpose and 
details of  the Ordonnance, it is sufficient to notice its general 
1 Id. id., iii. 4 (p. 361) : " Et  hoc est 
commune  omnium  pcritorum  dictum, 
potestatem  condnudi  legea  populi 
IZomani  ab  imporatore  tollere  posse, 
quoniam ab ipsis potestatem  habet." 
Id. id.,  iii.  12 : "  Et  licet rex  dis- 
pensare  aut interpretare,  nihilominus, 
ipsam  sic  conditam  logem,  in  duhiis 
occurrentibus,  pro bono publico,  et ad 
finom  justitiae,  possit,  per  inr6;~la~ 
virtutom : talien hoc suo modo, FI~CU~ 
in Romano pontifice et canonibus supra 
dictum est, intelligi debet.  Non  quod 
rex  tollore  legom  sic  editam  possit 
absque  Concilio,  qua8  cum  Concilio 
edita est, sed derlarare rationem logis 
in occurrento casu. 
character.  Its immediate  purpose  was  the disbandment  of 
the companies of  soldiers raised by many different persons, and 
the substitution for these of  a body of  soldiers raised by the 
command  of  the King,  and under  the  command  of  officers 
appointed by the King.  Its ostensible object, and no doubt a 
real one,  was  the prevention  of  the pillage  of  the people  of 
France by the creation of  a body of  disciplined troops under the 
control of the Crown.  We cannot here deal with the results 01 
the creation of what was apparently intended to be a, perma- 
nent royal military force.  We are here concerned to observe 
that this highly important statute was  issued  by the King, 
not  simply  on  his  own  authority,  but  after  a  meeting  of, 
and representations from the States Genere1.l 
While,  however,  we  may not be able  to find  many  clear 
illustrations  of  the  forms  of  legislation  in  France  in  the 
fifteenth century, we have, in the worbs of  John Gerson, at  one 
time Chancellor of  the University of  Paris, and the most im- 
portant representative of  the French Church at the Council of 
Constance, some very important statements of  his conception 
1 '  Ordonnances,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  306. 
Orleans,  Nov.  2,  1439 : "  Pour obvicr 
et  donner  remede  B  faire  cesser  18s 
grands excez et pillories faites et com- 
mises par les  gens  do  guerre,  qui par 
longtornps  onL  vescuc et vivent sur le 
peuplo sans ordre de junt,ioe, ainsi que 
bien  au  long  a  est6  dit  e  remonstre 
au Roi par les geus des trois estats de 
son  Royaume,  de  present  estant 
assembles en cette ville  cl'Orl6ans : le 
Roi  par  I'advis  et  d6lib6ration  des 
seigneurs cle  son ssng  . . .  plusieurs 
prelats  et  autres  seigneurs  notable?, 
bsron~  et autres, gens  rl'eglise, nobles 
et gens des bonnes villes, considerant la 
pauvret6, oppression et destruction, de 
son  peuple  ainsi  delruit ot foullie  par 
losdits  pilleries  . . . et n'est  pas son 
intention de 18s plus tolerer, ne soustenir 
gen6ra1, porpetuel e non revocable, par 
forme  do  Pragmatiqne  Sanction,  les 
Bdicts, lois,  statuts, e  ordonnances  qui 
s'ensuyvont. 
(1)  Premidremait.  Pour  ce  que 
grands n~ultitudes  de capitaines ce sont 
mi8  sus  de  leur  auctorite  et ont as- 
semble grand nombre de gens d'armes ot 
(18 traict, sans conge et license  du Roi, 
dont grnnds maux ot inconvenions sor~t 
advenus,  le  roi voulant  bon  ordre  et 
discipline Btrc misefi nu fait de la guorre, 
et restraindre  teilles voyos,  a  ordonn6 
quo  certain  nombro  dn  Capitainas  do 
gens d'armes ot cle  traict, sera ordonub 
pour la conduit0 do In  guerre, 18s quels 
capitaines seront nomr~~ce  o oslouz par 
lo  Roi,  prudcns  et sages  gens ; et a 
cl~acun  capitamine sera  bail16  ccrtain 
nombre (lo gens qui par lui seront esleuz 
en  aucune  rnani$re,  mais  en ce,  bon  rle  fait ou  office  de capitnine do  gcns 
ordre et provision y estre mis et don-  d'armes et de guerre;  et leur deffend 
nees, par le moyen et  aide de Dieu nostre  de plus eux nommer ne porter le nom de 
CrBateur, a faict, constitu6, ordonn6 et  cnpilaino,  sur  les  peines  cy-aprds 
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of  the souroe and authority of  law, and the relation of  the King 
of  France to it. 
In the Tract entitled '  Begulae ilforalis ' we  find him  re- 
stating  the important  doctrine  of  Gratian  that  law  is  not 
instituted until it is  promulgated,  and that it has  no  force 
unless it is approved by the custom of  those who are concerned 
(moyibus uter~tium).~  The same principle is repeated in a Tract, 
Liber de Via Spirituali Animae,' and Gerson points out that 
this means that the people have much authority in making and 
abrogating laws.' 
More important, however, are Gerson's statements about the 
relation  of  the King to the Law  when  established.  In the 
Treatise  ' De  Potestate  Ecclesiastica,'  he  enumerates  the 
forms of  Government, which, according to Aristotle, are good, 
and he describes them all, the monarchy, the ari~tocracy,  and 
the L'  Politia,'' as ruling according to Law.3  In another place 
he says that the Ring of  France had created the "  Parlemcnt," 
and  did  not  hesitate  to  submit  to its  j~dgment.~  In yet 
another place he maintains that even the King cannot slay 
any man  except  by  procoss  of  And  again,  in  terms 
1 Gerson  Rcgulao Morahs,' Opera, 
vol.  I, Part  II., col.  10  "  Lex  non 
lnstitu~tur nlsz  etlam  promulgatur, 
neque vlgolern habet nlsl cum monbus 
utent~um  approbatur." 
2  Id.  '  Llber  de  Vla  Splrltuall 
Animae,'  Opera,  vol.  n  part  11.  col. 
209  "  Praeterea  posltum  est  In 
dccretls  dl  IV.  (Gratlan  Decretum 
D.  4)  quod  loges  lnstituuntur  cum 
promulgantur,  firmantur  cum  mon- 
bus  utentmm  approbantur.  Igltur 
per  argumentum  a  contrarlo  sonsu: 
61 morlhus utentium nequaqilam appro- 
bantur, illao nullum  liabont firmamen- 
tum, et ita  pop111us hahot  multum In 
sua  potestate  dare  robur  legibus  aut 
tollore, prar.;ertlm ab iuit~o. 
Id , '  De  Potestate  Eccle\lastlca,' 
Opera,  vol  1  part  1 ,  Cons~deratlo 
xn1.  col  138  "  Doscrlb~tur regnum 
communitat~s  perfectae sub uno, secun- 
dum  leges  SUSS  bonas  pro  republlca 
. . . Descrlb~tur  arlstocrat~a  quod est 
politla  sub panels bonls, vel expresslus 
quod  est  congrogatlo  communitatis 
perfectae  sub paucls  bon~s  ropublicae 
per  leqes  suas princlpallter  Intenden- 
tibus, ut senatus.  Dosrnbitur polltla 
appropriato  nomlne  seu  Tlmocratla 
quod  est  congrngatio  communitat~s 
perfectae  sub  plurimis  utlhtatl  rei- 
publicae  per  leges  suas  prlncipdlter 
~ntendrntlbus. 
*  Icl ,  '  Sermo  pro  visglo  Reg18 
Romanorum,'  Opera,  vol  I.  part  1. 
col.  162  "  Ubl  rex  institmt  parla- 
mentum, a  que iudicar6 non refuglt." 
6  Id ,  '  Summa  Elusdem  contra 
Mag.  Ioannom  Parisienom,'  Opera, 
vol.  I.  part  I  col  399.  "  Slcut  est 
rex, qui quldom non  posset slne iuns 
quod  est  polltla  sub  uno  bono.  ordine,  non  morutum,  non  vocatum, 
Vcl  expresslus  quod  est  congregatio  non  ronvlctum  interficere 
which remind us of  Bracton, Gerson urges upon every Prince 
and Prelate that even if  he is said to be "  legibus solutus," he 
should follow the example of  Jesus, who accepted the Law of 
Circumcision, and should subinit  to the laws which  he  had 
made, both as an example to his subjects, and as showing his 
reverence to G0d.l 
We find that the same principle, of  the relation of  the King 
of France to the Courts of  Law, is expressed by Gcrson's great 
contemporary, Peter d'Aillg, the Archbishop of  Cambrai.  In 
discussing the question whether the Fope should submit to the 
judgment  of  a General Council, and the saying "  Major non 
judicatur  a  rninore,"  he  contiiiues that this was not  always 
true, for the King of  France, who was  major et superior"  in 
his kingdom, was frequently in certain cases judged by his own 
"  Parlement," and judgment given against him.2 
We shall have more to say about Gerson's conccption of  the 
nakure of  Kingship in a later chapter, but we  think that his 
statements about the relation of  the King of  Prance to the law, 
and his great Court of  Law, the Parlement of  Paris, are very 
important. 
It is hardly necessary to set out again the evidence as to the 
general  constitutional principles of  the source and authority 
of  law in England in the fifteenth centur~.~  We  must, how- 
ever, consider briefly the treatment of  this subject by Sir John 
Fortescue, for his works are important not only in themselves, 
but  as illustrating  the continuity  of  political  thought.  We 
must  not  indeed  assume  that  his  judgments  corresponded 
1 '  Sormo  in  die  c~rcumc~siones 
Domlnl,'  Opera,  vol.  I  part  I.  col. 
240,  41  "  Ad  apparentem  gratlam 
Del  In  ctrcumcisiono  humlllv  pnerl 
Iesu, prlnceps  ot  prclatus  quillbet,  et 
61  dlcatur  solutus loglbus,  pat1 debot 
legem quam lpse tulorit, tum pro sub- 
ditorum  oxemplo, tum pro  reverentla 
Praestanda  Deo,  ut  appareat  gratia 
Dei  In  eo,  et  non  seculalia  desldoria 
vldeantur  dom~narl  " 
Peter  d'Ailly  '  De  Ecclesiae 
et  Cardlnalium  auctontate,'  part 
in  cap  iv.  col.  071  "Ad  hanc 
autem  ratlonem  respondetur  prlmo 
quod  major  ration~s,  llcet  rog~lanter 
sit  vora,  tarren  quandoque  falht. 
Nam  Rox  Fmnciae,  qul  est  major  et 
fiupoiior  In toto regno sraepe in allqmbus 
casis ~udicatur,  et  contra  eum  fertur 
sententla In sno Palllamento " 
a  Blshop  Stubbs  has  discussed  thls 
with  great care  In h18 '  Constitut~onal 
History.'  Cf  especially, vol.  111.  ed.- 
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completely  with  all  the  actual  conditions,  in  England  or 
elsewhere, but it is even further from the historical reality to 
imagine that they express an eccentric opinion. 
We  have  three  important  treatises  by  Fortescue : '  De 
Natura Legis Naturae,' '  De Laudibus Legis Angliae,' and the 
'  Governance  (or Monarchy) of  England17  and they represent 
the same general principles. 
Fortescue cites as from St Thomas Aquinas' '  De Regimine 
Principum,' ii. 8, 19 (but this part of  the work is not by St 
Thomas,  but  probably  by  Ptolemy  of  Luccal),  and  from 
Egidius Romanus, the description of the two forms of  govern- 
ment, the "  dominium regale "  and the "  dominium politicum." 
The ruler who has the "  dominium regale " governs according 
to laws which he has himself made, while the ruler who has the 
"  dominium politicum " governs according to laws made by 
the citizens." 
Fortescue,  however,  adds  that  there  is  a  third  form  of 
"  dominium "  which is "  politicum et regale,''  and he gives as 
an example of  this, the Kingdom of  England, where the King 
cannot make laws without the consent of  his three Estates, and 
the judges are bound by their oaths to give judgment according 
to the law of  the land, even if  the Icing were to command the 
contrary;  while on  the other hand the people cannot make 
laws without the authority of  the kings, who succeed each othor 
by hereditary right.3 
1  Cf.  vol.  v. p. 24. 
2 Fortescue,  'Do  Natura  Legis 
Naturaa,'  i.  16. 
a  Id.,  '  De  Kilturn  Legis  Naturae,' 
i.  16 : "  Sod et tcrtium esse DonAinium 
non minus his dignitate ct Iaucle, quod 
politicum  et regalc  nominatur, nedum 
experientia et veterum  histor~is  edoce- 
mur,  sed et dicti Sanct  Thomae doc- 
trine edoctum  esse  cognoscimus.  In 
regno  namque  Angliao  reges  fiine 
trium  Statuum  regni  illius  consonsu 
leges  non  condunt,  nec  subsidia  im- 
ponunt  subditis  suis ; sed  et judices 
regni illius, ne ipsi contra leges terrae, 
quainvis  mandata  ~lri:~c,ipii  ad  con- 
trariam  aud~erint, judicia  reddant, 
omnes SU~S  constringuhtur sacramentis. 
Numquid tunc hoc dominium politl- 
cum,  id  est  plurium  dispensatione 
regulatus  dici posset,  verum  otiam et 
regalo  dominium  nominari  mereatur, 
cum nec ipsi subditi sino regia auctori- 
tate  legos  conclere  valeant,  st  cum 
regnum illud,  regiao  dignitati ~upposi- 
turn, per  reges  at ecrrum  heredes  suc- 
cessive  heraditario  jure  possidoatur, 
qualiter non possidentur dominia aliqun 
politice tantum regulata." 
Cf.  for  the position  of  the  judges 
'  Do  Laudibus  Legum  Angliae,'  61 : 
"  Justiciarius  iste  inter  cetera  tunc 
jurabit,  quod  justiciam  ministrabit 
indifferentor omnibus hominibus coram 
Fortescue deals with this subject again in other terms in t,he 
treatise '  De Laudibus,' and contrasts the character of  English 
Constitutional  Law  with  that  of  the  Roman  Law,  and its 
doctrine, "  Quod  Principi  placuit  legis  habit vigorem,"  and 
with  the "  Regimen Regale " of  the  King of  France  ; and 
again, in the "  Governance of  England," where he suggests that 
the earliest kings possessed the '' Dominium Regale," and that 
such a government might have been good under good Princes, 
but when men grew more civilised (mansuete) and more dis- 
posed  to virtue, great communities grew up  such as that of 
those  who  came to England with  Brutus, and incorporated 
and united themselves into a realin which should be governed 
by such laws as they should agree upon.2 
We  have  thus so  far found  nothing  to suggest  that the 
conception of  the source and authority of  law was different in 
the fifteenth  century  from  that  of  the fourteenth  century. 
The law proceeded from the Prince, no doubt, but it was from 
the  Prince  acting  with  the community.  We  have  indeed 
observed in the proceedings of  the Cortes of  Castile and Leon 
reference to the use by the kings  of  such phrases as ''  motu 
proprio,"  or "  of  his certain knowledge and absolute power," 
but  we  have  also  seen  that  the  Cortes  emphatically  and 
repeatedly  protested  against  the  use  of  such  extravagant 
phrases, and that the kings repeatedly agreed that they were 
not to be used in the royal Briefs.  The law, not the King, 
was supreme. 
eo  placilantibus,  inimicis  et  amicis, 
ncc  sic faccre  difleret etiamsi rex  pcr 
litcras  suas,  aut oretenus,  contrariunl 
jusserit." 
Cf. for relation of  Parliament to  legis- 
lalion, '  Do Laudibus,' 18. 
Id., '  Do Laudibus,'  0, 34. 
Id.,  Governance  of  12ngla11cl 11. : 
"  EuL  afterwards  when  mankynd  was 
more mansucte and better dibposed to 
virtu(+,  grcte  comunaltes,  as was  the 
felcrwshipDo  that came into this lande 
wit11 Brute, wyllynge to he unitod and 
made a body politilie callctl  a  Rcnume 
llavyngo an hod to  govern it . . . tlrnn 
they chose the same l3ruto to be tllc~r 
hed and Irynge.  And thai and he upon 
this  incorporation  and  institution, 
and  onynge  of  themselves  into  a 
Reaume  ordoyned  the  same  Reaumo 
to  he  ruled  and  justified  by  suche 
lawes  as thai all  wolde  assent  unto; 
which lawe therefore is called  '  Politi- 
cum.'  And  because it is ministred by 
a kyng. it is called '  Regale.' " CHAP.  11.1  THE LAW : CIVILIANS  AND  CANONISTS.  145 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF LAW. 
CIVILIANS  AND  CANONISTS. 
WE have so far considered this subject as it is illustrated in 
the  constitutional  documents,  and in  some  of  the political 
writers of  the fifteenth century.  We must now, however, turn 
to a body  of  literature whose traditions were  very different, 
that is, to the work of  the Civilians. 
They,  indeed,  like  the  Constitutional  lawyers,  accepted 
the principle that it was  from  the community that all legis- 
lative  authority  was  immediately  derived.  The  Civilians, 
however, also,  and naturally,  as they were interpreting  the 
law  of  the  Roman  Empire,  conceived  of  this  legislative 
authority  as  having  been  conferred  by  the  Roman  people 
upon  the Emperor.  This  conception,  as we  hope  we  have 
made clear, was  wholly alien to the normal political theory 
of  the Middle Ages. 
We must, however, always bear in mind that, while all the 
Civilians had accepted the principle that the Roman people 
had conferred the legislative authority on the Emperor, the 
Civilians  of  the  twelfth and  thirteenth  centuries  had  been 
sharply divided on the question whether, in doing this, they had 
completely and permanently  alienated the legislative power 
from themselves, or whether they could, if  they wished, still 
resume it.  And especially they were divided upon the ques- 
t'ion whether, and how far, the custoni of  the people retained 
its auth0rity.l 
We  have  considered the position  of  the Civilians  of  the 
Cf. vol. ii. pp.  69-67, and vol.  v.  p.  66. 
fourteenth century with regard to these questions in the first 
Part of  this Volume, we must now consider how far there was 
any important development in the Civilians of  the fifteenth 
century. 
The first question we have to discuss is whether these fifteenth 
century Civilians thought that the Roman people had conferred 
its legislative power upon the Emperor in such a sense that 
they  had  finally and completely lost  this,  or  whether  they 
thought  that the Roman people still retained their power of 
legislation or could resume it. 
There is an interesting and important passage in a Commen- 
tary  on  the Institutes, written  by Christophorus Porcius,  a 
Jurist of  the middle of  the fifteenth century, which raises the 
question  very  sharply.  He is  commenting  on  the  words, 
"  Sed et quod Principi placuit legis habit vigorem,"  &c., and 
points out that the gloss indicated that there were two opinions 
among the Civilians, the one, that the Roman people could not 
now  establish a "general  law,"  the other  that it  could still 
do so.  The first opinion was held, Porcius says, by Bartolus, 
and  commonly by the "  Citra Montani,"  the second by  the 
"  Ultra Montani."  The latter was the opinion which Porcius 
himself  preferred,  and he  gives  reasons  for  this.  He  cites 
various texts from the Corpus Juris, and especially urges that 
the Roman people could create a 'L general custom," and could 
therefore  establish  a  ('  general  law,"  and  that  the  Roman 
people had not transferred (non transtulit) its jurisdiction  to 
the Emperor, but had only granted  (concessit) this to him ; 
the word  LL concessit  signifies the ''  translatio  usus " ; not 
"  dominium," and the people can revoke this.  He adds that 
while they had granted jurisdiction to the first Emperor, this 
did not mean  that it went necessarily to his successor,  and 
the fact that tho Emperor was now elected by the German 
l'rinces,  and confirmed by the Pope, did not destroy the right 
of  the Roman people to revoke the election of  the Emper0r.l 
'  Christophorus  Porcius :  Comm.  non possit condere lcgem generalem, et 
on  Institutes, i.  2,  6 : "  Sed et quod  hanc  sententiam  tenuit  gl.  in  1.  non 
Principi.  . . . In fi.  glos.  in  verb.  arnhig~tur  ff. De Legihus (Dig, i. 3,  9). 
concessit, colligitis duplicom opinionem.  Quam  opinionem  sequuntur  Bartolus 
Primam, quod populus  Romanus hodie  et  cornmuniter  citrs.  moniani.  . . . Whatever may be the more immediate source of  the opinion 
of  Porcius,  it is clear that it  represents  the survival  of  the 
conceptions of  Azo  and Hugolinus and Odofridus, which we 
have discussed in earlier vo1umes.l 
His reference to the "  Ultramontani " as having held this 
opinion and the "  Citramontani 77 as maintailling the other is 
very interesting, but presents us with considerable difficulty. In 
the meanwhile we must consider what light may be thrown upon 
it by an examination of  other Civilians of  the fifteenth century. 
We begin with the conception of  the legislative authority of 
the Roman people.  Bartholomew de SrtLiceto, a Civilian of the 
last years of  the fourteenth and the early years of  the fifteenth 
century,  cites Jacobus  Butrigarius,  an important Civilian of 
the  fourteenth  century,  as  maintaining  that  the  Roman 
people  could still revoke the authority which they had con- 
ferred upon  the Emperor,  and that they  thus possessed the 
power  of  legislation.  Saliceto himself  does  not  agree with 
Butrigarius, for  the election  of  the Emperor, he  says, now 
belongs to the German Princes, and his deposition to the Pope, 
and  therefore  the  Roman  people  could  not  now  make  a 
"  general law,"  even  during  the vacancy of  the Empire, for 
Contrariam  sentontiam, 6.  quod popu- 
lus  Itomanus  hodie  possit  condere 
legem goneialem, videtur hlc tenere gl. 
et aptius, in 1.  fi. o.  Do Leg~bus  (Cod. I. 
14,  12), et hanc sententiam tenuerunt 
ultra  montan~,  quorum  opinlo  mlhl 
pla~ere consuevlt,  st  in  eam  sum 
procliv~or.  Prlmo per  tex  rotundum 
In  1,  non  amb~gltur  ff.  De  Lcg~  (Dig. 
I.  3,  9).  Secnndo  per  1.  nova  c  do 
Of.  Praetons,  Tsrlio,  rationem,  naln 
populus Romanus pote~t  lnducerc con- 
suetudlnen~  generalem, 1.  do  quibus ff. 
dc leglbus (Dig. I  3, 32) ergo et statuere 
legem  pneralom,  erg  1  cii.  qmd,  ff 
c.  cer. pet  (I)  Quarto qula  populus 
Romanus  non  transtulit  ommmodam 
jurl-dlct~onem  in  impcratorem,  sed 
illam slbi concebsit, ut In  d. 1 1  ff  de 
aonst.  prlnclpum  (Inst. I  2,  6), quod 
vorbum,  concebblt,  slgnlficat  transla- 
tlonem USUP,  non domin~um  . . .  ergo 
potest quemcunque revocare . . .  Dem- 
quc  qua hcet populus  Romanub con- 
cessit primo ~mperston  j~~rlsd~ctionem, 
eo  mortuo  non  cst  acqulsltum  suo 
successore. . . . Vel respond~tur  ut in 
glo  non obstat,  quod populus transtu- 
tent, qula  respondeo  quod  ills, verba 
sunt exponcnda, 1.  con~esslt,  per hunc 
textum  in  1.  1  de  constitut~on~bus 
priucipum  (Inst. 1  2,  6),  . . . non 
obstat quod ellgltur a domiuis de Ale- 
manms,  et  confirmetur  per  Papam, 
qu~a  hulusmodi  electlo, et Papae con 
firmatio  facta in lure  communi,  non 
vldotur tollere ]us alter~us  xu  Dist  c. 
praoceptls (ChatIan Decretum D  xu  2) 
unde  non  videtur  tollere  ]us  popull 
Roman1 revocand~  imperatorem " 
Cf.  vol. 11.  pp.  59 67, vol.  v. p.  66. 
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the  power  of  doing this  had  passed  to the Church  or  the 
1'ope.l 
Paulus  de Castro, one of  the most  important Civilians of 
the  fifteenth  century,  interprets  the action  of  the  Roman 
people in conferring the authority upon the Emperor by the 
"  lex rogia," in the same way as Porcius, that is, he describes 
it as a '(  concessio ', rather than a  6L translatio," and therefore, 
he says, the Roman people could, before the coming of  Christ, 
have revoked the "  lex regia l7  and deposed the Emperor.  But, 
with the coming of Christ, this was all changed, for the Empire 
was then transferred to the Church, and only the Pope could 
confirm and crown the Emperor, or depose him, for the Church 
holds the Temporal as well as the Spiritual sword.  It is evident 
that Paulus is  stating the extreme Papalist theory,  but we 
are not here concerned with this.  In another passage he set8 
out his principle in direct terms : the Roman people cannot 
now make a law or create a 'L  general custom."  It  is possible 
Bartholomaeuq De Saliceto: Comm. 
on Code I. 14,  12.  "  Opp.  quod non 
so11  imperator1  Iiceat  Iegem  condere, 
quxa  ctlam  populus  Romanus  poteht 
. . . ~tem,  non obstat, videl~cet,  quod 
hic  non  dlc~tur  solum  per  advorb~um 
sed etiam per  nomen, ad denotandunl 
quod  nullus  ahus  potest  nisi  solus 
princeps:  nam  populus  conetat  ex 
pelsonis plunhus  . . . item non obstat 
quod  populus  non  po~slt  hod~e  qula 
omnem  potestat~m  populus  transtulit 
In  prlncipem  . . . Jac.  Butrigarlus 
vldetur  volle  quod  posset,  potestatem 
principi  concessum  revocando,  quod 
assoit posse, quia per vlam 1 s  reglae 
transtulit  . . . ~gitur  per contiarlam 
le~em  revocare posset  . . . con~lud~t, 
quad lmperium ad so populus Romanus 
revocare  posset.  Haec  oplnlo  forte 
ohm  tolerarl  poterat,  sad  hodle  non 
toleratur,  cum  elect10  lmperatorls 
spectat  ad  pnnclpes  de  Alaman~a,  et 
lu8  pr~vandl  eum  spectat  ad  Papam, 
Ut  extra de re ludlcata C  ut tlpostollcae, 
et slc cum populus lrr~peno  et potestate 
lmperatorls  non  habeat  se  ~mpedlre, 
vidstur,  quad  nec  legom  generalem 
posslt  condere,  et et~am  vacante  Im- 
perlo, quia tunc donec electlo s~t  facta, 
succed~t  ecclesla, seu papa." 
Cf.  Joannes  de  Imola .  Comm.  on 
Decretals 1. 7, 1. 
Paulus  de  Castro:  Comm.  on 
D~gest  i  3,  9  (" Non  arnblg~tur  ") . 
"Ex quo  patet  quod  ills,  (leu  regla) 
fu~t  magis concessio quam translatlo , 
ut palet In I. 1.  1. tl. In  verb  contesslt 
(Inst.  1. 2, 6) ; per quam non abdicatur 
substantla,  ut  in  concedsnte,  sed 
trausfertur  usus.  . . .  Scd  expone, 
quantum  ad usum  non  quantum  ad 
substantiam.  Et  ~deo  dico quod popu- 
lus  Romanus  ante  adventum  Chnstl 
poterat  revocare  legem  reg~am, et 
ea revocata prlvare ~mperatorem  , qu~a 
non potont SI~I  lmponere legem a qua 
recedere non  potuerit  . . . Secundo, 
potest lntellig~  post adventum Chnstl, et 
tunc  dico  quod  impcrlum  Romanum 
fuit  a  populo  Romano  translatum  in 
ecclcs~am  et non remansit nisi nomen, 
et dlcltur Impenum Chrlstl vel ecclcs~e, 
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that in this last passage he is referring to the actual people 
of  the city of  Rome.  These Jurists then seem clearly to hold 
that the Roman people had no longer any general legislative 
authority. 
We  turn  to the question  of  the nature of  the legislative 
authority of  the Prince.  Paulus de Castro, commenting on the 
words  LL Quod  Principi  placuit,"  &c., aaya  that though  the 
Prince, when making laws, ought to consult the ''  periti,"  his 
laws are valid  even though he has  not  done so,  and  in his 
Commentary  on the Code  he  repeats  emphatically  that the 
Prince  can  make  laws  by  his  own  authority,  and  without 
the Counsel of  the ''  Proceres,"  and he explains the terms of 
that  rescript  of  Theodosius and  Valentinian  which  seemed 
to require some consultation of  the Senate, as expressing, not 
necessity but "  humanitas."  l  Jason  de Mayno,  one  of  the 
most  important  Civilians  of  the later  part  of  the fifteenth 
century, says the same.2  We have pointed out that some of 
the great  Civilians  of  the twelfth  and thirteenth centuries, 
slcut confirmare et coronare  . . . Et 
lurat  slb~  fidehtatem ;  nam  apud 
eccles~am  est uterque gladlus temporalls 
et  splrztual~e. . . . Nih~l  conoludo 
potest  hodie  populus  Romanus  ln 
~mperlo." 
Cf. Paulus .  Comm  on Digest 1  3, 32 : 
"  Hodie secun,  quia lmperlum nou  est 
apnd  populum  Romanum  nec  ab eo 
recognoscitur ; et sic hod10 non potost 
legem facere sod  est  apud  Romannm 
ecclesiam.  Et ldeo  non  potest  lntro- 
ducere generalem consuetudinem." 
Of  also Antonius do Butno, a Canon- 
1st  of  tho  late  fourteenth  century, 
Commentary on Decrotnls 1.  2,  3  (fol. 
xi1 ) .  "  Slcut  orlglndltcr  prlnceps 
reciperet potestatem a pop1110 Romano, 
tamen hodie potestatem lurisd~~tlona- 
lem recognosclt a Papa . .  qula in eo 
Vera  erat  hahta  potestas  utriusque 
JU~S  . . .  Romanus  populus  non 
posset  revocare  potestatem  lmperll, 
qula  non  habet  potestatem  Illam  a 
populo  sed  a  Papa.  Solus ergo  lm- 
perator habet potestatern logls unlver- 
sahs condendae,  populus  autem  non, 
vel senatus, ms1  quatenus  permltteret 
prlnceps." 
1 Paulus de Castro  Cornm  on D~gest 
i.  4,  1  "  Quod  prinupl  placuit. 
Nota hic In verbo placmt quod licet In 
loglbus con3endis  debet  adhiber~  con- 
sllium  peritorurn,  ut  In  1.  humanum 
Cod.  De  Leg  (Cod  I.  14,  8)  . . 
Si  tamen  non  requintur,  valet,  qula 
suffic~t  quod ita placu~t  leg~slaton  " 
Id,  Comm. on Code I  14,  12. "  Im- 
perial~s  (2)  Nota quod Imperator solus 
etiam  slnc  consillo  procerum  potest 
legem condore ot  SIC lllud quod dicitur 
In  1 hurnanum (Code I  14, 8), non est 
neressitat~c  sed huma~l~tatis  ut deboat 
adh~bere  consil~um  procerum " 
Cf  Bertachlnus  Repertorlum  Jurls, 
vol  111.  fol  10 
a  Jason de Mayno.  Comm  on Dlgest 
I.  21 (fol. 261. 
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and specially the author of  the Summa Trecensis (Irerius ?), 
Eoger  and  Azo,  had  maintained  that  the Emperor  must, 
when making laws, follow the method  prescribed in Code I. 
14, 8, while Bulgarus maintained the 0pposite.l 
More important, however, are some statements of  Jason de 
Mayno, with regard to the relation  of  the Prince to the laws 
when made.  In  his Commentary on the Dlgest he cites Baldus 
as having said in his treatise on Feudal Law, that the Prince 
has "  plenitudo potest,btis,"  and that when he wills anything 
"  ex certa scientia "  no one can ask him why he does it, and in 
another place again he cites Baldus, as having said that the 
Pope and the Prince can do anything "  supra jus et contra jus, 
et extra jus."  In his Commentary on the Code, Jason cites 
Bartolus, as having said in one of  his 'i Consilia " that when 
the Prince does anything "ex certa scientia " he removes all 
legal  obstacle^.^  The impression produced by these passages 
is  only  confirmed by Jason's  observation  on the well-known 
rescript  of  Theodosius  and  Valentinian,  "  Rescripts  contra 
jus  elicita a iudicibus praescribimus refutari " (Cod. I. 19, 7). 
This  does  not  mean,  Jason  says,  that  the  Prince  had  not 
authority to issue such rescripts, but only that, as there might 
be  a  doubt whether  they had not been  obtained  from  him 
"  per importunitatem,"  when the Prince issues such a rescript, 
he should add a "  non obstante "  ~lause.~  It is, however, true 
that the effect of these passages is to some extent modified by 
Vol  11  pp. 67-70. 
Jason de Mayno  Comm  on Dlgest 
1  4,  1 . "  Et dlclt  Bddus In  Prelud. 
Beud  In  x~u.  col. : '  Quod In  pnnclpe 
est  plonltudo  potestatls  et  postquam 
ahqmd  vult  ex  certa  scient~a  nemo 
potest  el  dicere, cur facis  ~sta  .  . 
Alib~  dicit Baldus, quod Papa et Prin. 
caps ex  certa sclentla Super jus at contra 
]US  et extra  us omnla possunt.' " 
Id,  Comm. on Cod  I  19, 1 (fol  40, 
V.)  "  Llcet serv~lis  .  . qulnto . . . 
confirm0 qula  quum  pnnceps  allquld 
faclt ex certa sclentia, tollit omne ob 
staculum  ]ur~s,  secundum  Bartolum, 
In  cons1110 quod lncip~t  Clv~tat~  Cam 
erm1 " 
Id,  Comm  on Code I. 19,7  "  Re- 
scnpta.  . . . No.  prlmo  regulam, 
quod  rescnpta,  contra   us  impetrata, 
non debent per judices observar~ . . . 
Sed  numqu~d  lsta regula  procedat  ex 
defectu  potestatls  pnncipls,  qua non 
possit, vel ex defectu voluntatls. 
Baldus . . . et  Paulus  . . .  hcunt 
qua ex  defectu  voluntatls,  qula  non 
presumltur  prlncipsm  ahquid  vello, 
quod slt contra ]us, et si aliqu~d  con- 
cess~t,  presumltur per  importu~lltatem 
concossisse et ldeo  SI  prlnceps  vellet, 
posset  rescr~bere  contra  jus,  adlecta 
clausula  non  obstante " 150  FIFTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  11. 
another citation which Jason  makes from Raldue : it is sacri- 
legious to dispute about the authority of  the I'lince, but it is 
lawful to discuss his knowledge and intention, for the Prince 
sometimes errs ; it is always to be presumed that the Prince 
desires what is just  and true, and he wishes his actions to be 
controlled by the justice  of  heaven  and the Courts of  Law 
(poli et fori).l  It would  seem then that these Civilians were 
clear  that the Roman  people  had no  longer  any legislative 
authority in the formal sense, while the Emperor had an abso- 
lute and unconditional authority in relation to positive law. 
There are, however, certain aspects of  the relation  of  the 
Prince  to  Law,  which  require  a  separate  treatment  and 
first, we  must consider his relation  to Custom, and here we 
must take account of  the Canonists as well as of  the Civilians. 
John of  Imola, who was both Civilian and Canonist, says first 
that (( Consuetudo "  may be called that form of  law which is 
established  by the ''  mores " of  him  who  has the power  of 
making law,  and that it  does not require the knowledge or 
consent of  the Prince ; but he adds that this was so because the 
Pope permitted the development of  a custom even if  contrary 
to the law, if  it were reasonable, and had a sufficient prescrip- 
tion, and he refers to the terms of  the Decretal of Gregory IX. 
on which he is commenting.  He adds that the Emperor had 
also permitted this by the law "  omnes populi "  (Digest i. 1,9), 
and, therefore, custom did not require the knowledge or consent 
of  either Pope or Emperor, in order to be valid.= 
1 Id,  Comm.  on  Dlgest  I  4,  1 (fol. 
26) . "  Tamen  adverts quod  licet  de 
potestate  princlpls  sacrileglum  sit ut 
d~n,  disputare, de sclent~a  et voluntate 
prlnc~pls  licitum  est  dlsputare,  quia 
prlnceps  quandoque  errat,  1  2  ff. 
De  Sup  leg  secundum  Beldum  hlc 
qui et~am  subd~t  quod In prlncipe nun- 
quam  al~quld  presumitur  placere,  nlsl 
quod lustum et verum sit. st  prlnceps 
vult actus suos regulari a ~ustlt~a  poll 
et for1 " 
John of  Imola  Comm  on  Decre 
tals  I  4,  11  ' Potest  dzcere  ut hlc 
Jo,  quod consuetudo est ]us quoddam 
mor~bus  ~llius  lnductum  qu~  ]us  Lon- 
dere  potest,  habens vim lepls  . . . 
Nam  non  v~detur  requlrl  conscusi~s 
vel  sclent~a  prlnclpls  Nam  Papa hlc 
permittit  consuetudlnem inducl et~am 
contra jus,  dummodo s~t  rationabll~a  et 
prescrlpta,  st  SIC  non requlrltur  allter 
consensus vel sc~eutia  ejus  Et siml 
liter  Imperator  concedlt  potestatem 
condendl  statuta,  et  consequenter 
consuetudrne~ In  1.  omnes  popull 
(Dig  I  1, 9) et ldeo uon requlrltur RJUS 
consensus vd  sclent~a  " 
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Bertachinus, in  his '  Repertorium ' or Dictionary  of  Law, 
of  the later fifteenth century, cites various emphatic phrases 
about  the  authority  of  custom.  Custom  and  statute have 
equal authority, a general custom creates the "  Jus Commllne," 
a custoni of  such antiquity, that there is no memory to the 
contrary,  has  the force of  a "  Privilegium " of  the Prlnce ; 
the  Emperor  is  ''  solutus  legibus,"  but  he  is  not  "  solutus 
moribus  et  ratione,"  he  is  bound  to  maintain  the  ('  con- 
~uetudines.'~  l 
That great Canonist of the early fifteenth century, Zabarella 
(generally referred to as "  the Cardinal ")  treats the subject 
of  the source and authority  of  Custom  at some length,  but 
with such caution that it is difficult to arrive at any  certain 
conclusion.  He is  commenting  upon  the Decretal  of  Pope 
Gregory IX. (Decretals i. 4,ll). Some people had maintained 
that it was  only in former times that custom could make or 
abrogate law, while others maintained that it did not follow 
because the people could not now make "  law "  that they could 
not make custom.  He cites Gul. de Cuneo as maintaining that 
while the power of making "  law "  had been transferred to the 
Prince,  the power  of  making  custom neither had been, nor 
could be transferred.  Zabarella  does not indeed agree with 
this last contention, but he is conv~nced  that at least in the 
case of Canon Law, custom would in some cases prevail against 
a canon without the consent of  the Prince (i.e. the P~pe).~ 
1 Bortachlnus, '  Repertorlum  Jur~s,'  habebat hanc auctor~tatem  ohm quum 
vol  I.  fol.  471,  v. : "Consuetudo  et  populus condebat legem . . .  nam cum 
statutum aequ~parantur. . . . Con-  leglslator~s  suffrag~o  leges  acnbantur, 
suetudo generalls faclt ]us  commune.  ejus etlam tac~to  consensu abrogantur. 
. . . Consuetudo tantl temporis quod  . . . Hanc oplmonem al~qul  Improbant, 
non slt memona In  contranum  habet  quls etlam, preesupposlta illa opinlone, 
vlm  pnv~leglt  prlncipls.  . . .  Con-  quod  hod10  populus  Romanus  non 
suetudo habet vlm const~tut~on~s  "  possit  legem  condere,  non  per  hoc 
Vol. ul. fol. 10, r . "  Imperator  est  ~nfertur,  Idem  esse  de  consuetudlne, 
solutus leglbus  . . . sed de equ~tate  nam de permlsslone leg18 proced~t,  quod 
debet vivere legtbus  . . . non tamen  consuetudo valeat  etlam ad tollendam 
eat solutus morlbus et ratlone "  . .  legem,  81  consuetudo  est  rat~onab~lls 
Fol  12,  r  "lrnpcrator  tenetur ser-  ot prescr~pta,  ut hlc lnde dlc~t  Gul  do 
vare consuotudines sues "  Cuneo ln  1  de  qulbus  (Dig  1.  3,  32)  ".  Zaharella  Comm  on  Decre-  quod  llcet  In  prlnc~pem  s~t  translata 
tals I  IV  11 (fol 86):  "Quldam  ergo,  potestas  condendl  legem,  non  est 
ut refert Inno  dlrunt quod couruetudo  tranqlata  potestas  lnducendl  con- Another great Canonist of  the fifteenth century, Nicolas de 
Tudeschis, who is generally known as Panormitanus, sets out 
very  clearly  the superiority  of  custom  over  Positive  Law, 
if it has prescription and is ''  rational," while it is invalid if it 
lacks  reason."  He maintains that it was thought (by some) 
that custom could only be created with the knowledge of  him 
who can make law, but he cites the opinion of  John (1)  as main- 
taining that the knowledge or  counsel of  the Pope was not 
necessary for the creation of  custom, otherwise it would rarely 
or never come into being1 
Yet another very important Canonist of  the same century, 
Turrecremata,  deals  in  considerable  detail  with  the  whole 
question of  the nature and authority of law, in his Commentary 
on  the Decretals of  Gratian.  It is natural that his treatment 
of  the nature of  law has something of  the breadth and scope 
of  Gratian's treatment  of  the subject.  He was  also greatly 
suetudinem,  nec  transferri  potuit,  dinem  prohibeat,  ut  In  usuris  et re- 
quum surg~t  ex tacito consensu,  quod  verent~a. .  . . (fol.  87)  Ex hoc 
tenet Bart.  1.  quae  s~t  longa  consue  infertur  quod  consuetudo  ecclesiastlca 
tudo, 1. secunda in  ropetitione (Cod. vni.  non potest iuduci contra legem canom- 
62).  cam, sine taclto consenau Papa, sicut 
Haec  ratio  non  urget,  quoniam  et nemo  citra  Papam potest  statuere 
potent hodie lnduci consuetudo, inter-  contra canones  . . . Dic verius quod 
venlente  taclto  consensu  prlncipls ;  sllquo  casu  contra  canonem  potest 
nec  potest  esse  translata  ~nrisdictio  valere consuetudo, sine comensu tacito 
in pnnolpem, quin etlam sit translata  prlncipla" 
potestas  consuetudlnis  ~nducendae,  Panmrn~tanus Comm  on Decre- 
quum sit jus  ex quo legantur  subdltl,  tals I  IV.  11 (vol. 1 fol  103)  "  Nota 
et pro  lege  servaie ut in diffimtione  In  5  hret,  quod consuetudo  praevalet 
~onsuetud~nls.  . . .  JUPI  poslt~vo, si  est  rationabll~s et 
Secundo,  solv~t  Inno,  qula  leges,  pmescripta,  e  contrano  consuetudo 
quae dlcunt quod consuetudo est abro-  ratione  carens  non  derogat  Jurl,  et 
gatrlx leg-  etc loquuntur de leg~bus  ratio  est  quia  consuetudo,  cum  s~t 
mun~c~palibus,  quas s~bi  quisque popu-  quoddam  lox,  debet  habere  rat~onem 
lus statult, quas etiam contrarla  lege  In se, alias non est lex  . . . SI ergo 
vel cousuetud~ne  potest tollere, secus In  am~ttlt  substantiaha legis,  non  potest 
leg0 imperiall quao solum lege ~mperlali  prnojudicare  leg].  .  .  .  (fol  105) 
tollitur  . Tert~o  solvit Inno quod  Quarto,  requlntur,  quod  consuetudo 
legcs primae loquuntur de consuetudlne  slt lnducta sclente 1110  qu~  potest con- 
generali,  quae  ex certa  scientla  leg~s-  dere.  Sed Joannes  . . . tenet quod 
lator13  s  prlnclpis  inducltur  . . .  consensus  Papae  seu  sciencia  non 
Qulnto,  solvlt Inno,  d~stinguendo,  an  requlritur  ad consuetudlnem lnducen 
consuetudo  praecesserit legcm, et tunc  dam,  alias raro vcl  uunquam Induce- 
lex el derogat, an e contrarlo, et tunc  retur comuetudo." 
ipsa  derogat   leg^,  nisi  lex  consuetu- 
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influenced by  the profound  treatment  of  the subject  by  St 
Thomas Aquinas.  We shall discuss his general conception of 
political  authority in  another  place, here  we  are  concerned 
with an important passage in which he treats the relation  of 
law to custom. 
We may, he says, consider the authority of  law from two 
points of view, the 'L  firmitas authoritatls " and the "  firmitas 
stabilitatis."  Laws derive the first from the authority of the 
legislator, the second from its correspondence with the con- 
ditions and customs of  those who are subject to it ; and laws 
are  therefore void  unless  are  confirmed  by  their  custom.l 
We must, however, observe that in  a later passage he seems 
to maintain that, even when the multitude has not the power 
of  making law, its custom obtains the force of  law, but subject 
to the condition that this is allowed by those who have the 
authority of  imposing laws on the multit~de.~ 
We have considered these references to the relation  of  law 
and custom, because the subject is one of  great importance, but 
we  think  that while  the jurists  are  conscious  of  the great 
importance  of  the  question  it is  not  easy  to  derive  from 
them  clear  and  complete  conclusions. 
There is, however, another conception of  the relation of  the 
Prince to the Law, of  which we must take account, and with 
regard  to  which  there  is  a  general  agreement  among  the 
Turrccremata  Comm. on Grat~nn 
Decretum  D  iv  part  111.  (p  64) 
"  Loges  ~nst~tuuntur  . . . Respondeo 
notandum,  quod  dupliclter  possumus 
de  firmltate  legum  loqu~, nut  do 
firmltate auctontatis, aut de firm~tate 
stab~l~tatis SI  de  firmltate  auctorl- 
tat~s,  istam habet  lex  ab ~nslituente, 
a quo robur et  au~torltatom  sus~ip~t  Si 
vero loquamur do firmltate stabil~tatls, 
Istam  habet  lex  ex  conveinont~a ct 
aptatlone ad mores subd~torum  Qula 
enlm ut dictum est In C erlt rtutem leu 
(Qrahan Decretum D  lv  2 ) , oportct 
9uod  lex  slt  posslb~l~s  secundum 
naturam,  secundum  consuetudlnern, 
loco  tempor~que  conveniens , dlcimus 
quod loges  firmantur firmltate stabili- 
tnt~s  et permanenclao,  quum morlbus 
utentium  approbantur,  slve  cum 
moribus  subd~torum  leges adaptantur. 
Deficlunt  antem,  tolluntur  et  abro- 
gantur  quum  utentlum  monbus  non 
conformantur " 
a  Id  ~d,  D  xi  1  (p  121)  "Si 
vero  multltudo  non  habeat  hberam 
potostatem condondl s~bi  legem  . . 
nihllominus tamell ipsa  consuetudo  111 
tali  multltudlne  prevalons  optlnet vim 
logls, In quantum tolleratur per eos ad 
quos  pertmet  mult~tudln~  legem  im- 
ponere." 154  PIFmENTH  CENTURY.  [PART 11. 
Civilians.  This  is  the  conception that the Prince  is  bound 
by any contract which he has made with his subjects.  We have 
dealt with this as it appears in the Civilians of  the fourteenth 
century, but it has  also an important place in the fifteenth 
century. 
John of Imola, in one place, says that while the Emperor and 
the Pope are not bound by "positive"  laws, they are bound by 
the divine andnatural law, and therefore by their "  Contract," 
for this is founded upon natural law.  And in another place 
the Prince is bound by a contract with his subjects, "  natur- 
aliter," though not "  iiviliter." 
Paulus de Castro, also, sets out the same general principle, 
and cites Cynus as having said that if  the Prince makes any 
contract with his subjects he is bound to keep it, just like any 
private person,  and that this also  applies to his  successor; 
and he also cites Bartolus as having said that when a Statute 
passes  into s  contract, it cannot be revoked by  those  who 
made it.2 
Franciscus  Accoltis, while asserting in the same way that 
the Prince was bound  by his contract with his subjects,  re- 
pudiates emphatically the opinion which he attributes to the 
"  Doctors " (we have just  seen that it was held by John of 
Imola) that the Prince was only bound "  naturaliter " and not 
"  civiliter,"  and  he  cites  Baldus  as having  maintained  the 
same opinion  as  himselt3 
1 John  of  Imola : Commentary  on 
Decretals  I.  2,  2  (fol.  13) : "  Item 
adverte  qu~a  llcet  Papa  t  Imperator 
non l~gantur  su1s leg~bus  poait~v~s  . . . 
tamen l~gantur  lege D~vlna  et natural].  . . . Et per predlcta patet quod Papa 
et  Imperator  etlam  suo  contractu 
l~gantur  .  qula  etlam jure  natural1 ~d 
proced~tur." 
Id. ld ,  11  19,l (Ex Eplstola), fol  54 : 
"  Nots qnod ex contractu prlncip~s  cum 
subjecto,  prlnceps  obhgatur  saltim 
naturallter.  Clvil~ter eum  obl~gar~ 
non  vldetur  quurn  11la  descendat  ex 
leg~bus  qulbus eat ~olutus." 
2  I'aulus  rle  Castro  Comm  on 
Cod.  1.  14,  4  (fol  26).  ' Ult~mo,  per 
latam legem determnantur duo.  Prlmo 
secnndum Cynum quod 61 prlnceps faat 
ahquem  contra~tum cum  subd~tls, 
debet lllnd  observare et non  rumpere, 
vel  frangere,  vel  contravenlre,  slcut 
qullibet allus prlvatus, et eodem mod0 
elus successor observare tenetur, quum 
affic~t  lpsam d~gllitatem  culus Ipse est 
administrator. 
Per  hoc  etlam determlnat  Bartolus 
In  1.  omnes pop1111 (Dig  I  1, 9) quod 
quum  statutum  translt  lo  contractu 
non  potest  a  statuentibus  revocar~." 
Cf. pp  15 and 19. 
3  Franc~scus Accoltis . Comm.  on 
Decretals  11  19  (fol  49) . "  EX Epls 
Lola.  Nota  prlmo  secundum  Doc.: 
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Bertachinus says simply, the Emperor can revoke a "  Privi- 
lcgium " given by his predecessors, unless he received money 
for it, but he cannot revoke his contract, and cites Cynus and 
~artdlus.1 
Jason  de Mayno  sets  out  the  same  principle  with  some 
important  distinctions.  He  treats  the  making  of  a  con- 
tract by  the Prince as one  of  the modes  of  legislation, for 
his contract has the force of  law ; and he cites Bartolus and 
Paulus, as holding that it has even more force than the Law, 
for though the Prince is not bound by the Law, he is bound 
by  agreement  and contract, which belong to the "  jus  gen- 
tium " ; and he cites Baldus as saying that the Pope and the 
Emperor are bound by the agreements (pacta) which they have 
made with the "  Civitates."  He then cites Bartolus as main- 
taining that while contracts are binding  on the Prince who 
made  them,  they  do  not  bind  his  successors,  unless  they 
belonged to the nature and custom of  his office, as in feudal 
matters.  He himself  distinguishes, he agrees with Bartolus 
in the case of  the Emperor and Pope, for they succeeded by 
election and not by inheritance, but when the King, or other 
Prince,  succeeded  by  inheritance  the  successor  was  bound 
to maintain all the contracts of  his predeces~ors.~ 
quod Imperator f aclens contractum cum 
subd~to,  obllgetur  saltem  naturallter 
ad observantlum pact>, et sic sentinnt 
in  dlctls  suls,  quod  prlnceps  subd~to 
non  obhgatur clvlhter,  sod  natural~ter 
tantum per 1.  digna vox (Code  I.  14, 4).  . .  . Nam quum obl~gatio  clv~he  onatur 
a lege civ111 . . .  01 lex oivllls non l~gat 
prmc~pem, ergo  non  potest  obl~garl 
c~villter  , naturallter  autem  obhgatur 
qula  lpsa  netulnaha  obhgatio  sum~t 
onpnem a  jure   natural^.  . . . Jus 
autem  naturale  non  potest  to111  per 
pnnclpem,  nec llmltarl sine causa  . . . 
Tu, autem, adverte, ad prlmum d~ctum, 
qula Baldus In 1.  priuceps ff  Do Leglbus 
(Dig. I.  3,  31) dlc~t  quod pnnceps obh- 
gatur non solum naturallter sed clvil~ter 
Bx contractu.  . . . Ego  autem  dlco 
lndubitanter  quod  prlnceps  contra 
hendo obl~gatur  c~vlllter  ot naturel~ter." 
1 Bertachlnus,  ' Repertonurn  Juns,' 
vol. 111.  fol.  10, r. : "Imperetor  potest 
revocare prlvllegum aui antecessor~a  . . . 
ma1  receper~t  pecunlam  pro  eo ;  sed 
contraotum suum non potest revocare " 
Id. ~d.  ~d.,  fol.  12, r. : "  Imperator 
tenetur servere conventiones et pacta 
et  contracta.  Cy.  et  Bar.  In  D  1. 
d~gna  vox "  (Cod. I.  14, 4). 
Jason  de  Mayno.  Comm.  on 
Digest  1.  IV.  1  (fol.  25  v.) : "  Adde 
qwntum modum (of maklnglaws by the 
Pr~nce)  , s. per vlam  contractus, qula 
contractus prtncrpls habent  vim legis. 
. . . Imo fortlus seoundum Baldum et 
Paulum hm, hcet prlnceps  non  hgetur 
lege  . . . tamen llgatur lege conven- 
t~onls  et contractus quae sunt de lure 
geutmm.  . . . Ubl  Baldus  de  nature 
Feudl, ubl etlam per eum, an princeps 
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Philip Decius, a Civilian of  the later years of  the fifteenth 
century and the early years of the sixteenth cent~vy,  asserts 
that the Prince is bound by his contract, and cannot violate 
it even Li de plenitudine potestatis " ; and he cites Baldus and 
Paulus and Peter de Anch0rano.l 
It may appear to some that these discussions of the binding 
nature of the "  Contract " of  thc Prince are of  little more than 
technical significance, but that is hardly true.  The conception 
was not new in the fifteenth century, but had a considerable 
place in the  work of the great Civilians of  the  fourteenth centnry, 
and it  reappears in  the sixteenth century in  the theory  of 
Bodin.  We venture to suggest that the question arose natur- 
ally in Italy, in connection with the great treaties which deter- 
mined the relation  of the Emperor  to the Italian cities, but 
it has aLqo  a more general significance., as indicating a limit to 
the theory of the unrestrained authority of  the Prince. 
We  began this chapter by drawing attention to the sharp 
distinotion which was  made by Christopher Porcius between 
the opinions of  the  Citra Montani  and the "  Ultra, Montani " 
nam licet Deds subjerit principi loges,  similibus,  quum regna  dofcrantur  per 
tamen non subjecit contractus.  . . .  successionem  quia  prirnogonitus  suc- 
Et dicit Baldus  . . . quod pacta que  cedit in regno ducato vel comitatu . . . 
faciunt Papa et Imperator cum civitati-  saltem  attenta  generali  consuetudine, 
bus  aunt  aervanda.  Subdit  autem  credo quod successor teneatur  servare 
BJdus  hic,  quod  licet  pacta  et con-  omnem  contractum  et  quarncunque 
tracta principis  ligent  principem,  non  conventionem  sieut  quilibet  successor 
tamenligent ejussuccessorem: . . .  et  privati." 
quia jus non transit ad sucessorem sed  1 Philippus  Decius, '  Consilium ' (in 
de novo creatur per electionen.  . . .  Goldast,  Monarchia,  vol.  iii.,  edition 
Nisi essent de natura vel consuetudine  1621), C. xix. : '' Et  hoc bene facit, quia 
sue dignitatis, prout eat, in feudo.  . . .  quum ~rinceps  ex contractu obligatur, 
Puto, licet alii non tangant, quod ista  etiam  de  plenitudine  potontatis  con- 
distinctio  sic indistinct0  non sit Vera;  Lravenire non potest, ut notanter dicit 
verum intelligo dictum Baldi procedore  Paulus  de  Costro  in  1.  Digns,  vox. 
in  Imperatore  vel  Papa,  quia  tales  Cod. do legibus et idem Baldus in C.  i. 
dignitates  non  deferuntur  suocassione  5  ad hoe, col. 5 in ver. itonl natalio, ex 
sed per electionem.  . . . Tunc  quum  G1.  de  pace  juramento  firmata, idem 
successor non habeat dignitatem a pro-  tenet Paulus de  Castro in Concil,  420, 
decessore,  sed  nova  electiono  conse-  '  Videtur  in  antiquis,'  st hoe  idem in 
quatur,  put0  verum  esse  quod  dicit  termine hujus questioni.~  tradit Petrus 
Baldus, quod non teneatur pactis.  Sed  de Anch. in Consil. 65, pro declaratione 
in  regibus,  ducibus,  marohionibus,  ct  dubiorum col. 2." 
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on the question  of  the continuing  authority  of  the Roman 
people in making laws.  We have, however, not been able to 
find much which illustrates this distinction.  This may be due 
to the fact that the Civilians whose work we have been able to 
examine, are all of  them Italian ; that is what Porcius  pre- 
sumably means by LL Citra Montani."  It is true, however, that 
if we  take account not merely of  Civilians or even Canonists, 
but of  the great political writers of  other Euro~ean  countries. 
A  -.  such as John Gerson in France, Nicolas of  Cusa in Germany, 
or Sir John Portescue in England, we should find that they held 
that  legislative  authority  bclonged  properly  and  normally 
not to the Prince alone, but to the whole communitv.  ITOW  "  far we may think that Porcius is referring to this, we are, how- 
ever, quite unable to say. 
If  we  endeavour  to summarise our conclusions about the 
position of  those Civilians with whom we  have dealt here, it 
seems to us true to say that they were clear that the Roman 
Emperor  had  an  absolute  and  unconditional  authority  in 
making "  positive " law and that the people of  the Empire had 
no legislative authority in the general sense, and that even if 
they recognised a certain authority in their custom, this rested 
upon the sanction of  the Prince or Pope.  (We are, it must be 
carefully observed, not dealing with the powers of  the groat 
Italian cities to establish municipal laws for themselves ; this 
is  a great  and complex subject  and has been  dealt with in 
detail by many learned writers.) 
Whether  they would  all have  accepted  the somewhat ex- 
treme terms cited by Jason de Mayno from Baldus, that the 
Pope and the Prince could do anything " supra jus et contra 
jus,  et extra jus,"  may possibly  be doubted.  They are all, 
including Jason himself, clear that when the Prince has entered 
- .  ..  into a " contract " with his subjects, his authority is limited 
bg tho "  contract." 
It  is evident that there was a very sharp contrast botween 
tho ~olitical  theory of most of  the writers we have dealt with 
in  this  chapter  and the general  tendencies  of  the fifteenth 
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CHAPTER  111. 
THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  PRINCE : ITS  SOURCE 
AND  NATURE.  POLITICAL  WRITERS. 
WE turn hom the conception of  the authority of  the law to 
that of  the authority of  the Prince or Ruler, and we  find  a 
number of important writers, who in different  countries  deal 
with the subject in  some  detail;  and  as we  shall  see, they 
show a remarkable agreement in their judgments. 
We begin with Gerson, for he was earliest in time and cer- 
tainly was not less representative than the others.  We cannot 
here discuss his place in the great conciliar movement, but it 
seems to us reasonable to say that his  attitude to political 
authority  is  related  to his  conception  of  the  authority  of 
General  Councils. 
In one treatise  ascribed to Gerson there is a discussion of 
the origin of political society, which is interesting as illustrating 
his relation to the Patristic and Stoic tradition.  In the state 
of  innocence man had no laws or coercive justice,  it was  sin 
which  compelled men to submit to these, and he enumerates 
in  technical  language  the  causes  of  coercive  aututhor1ty.l 
Gerson, however, adds,  a little further on,  that man  is  by 
1 J  Gerson . '  Sermo pro Just~tia  ad 
Regem'  (Opera,  vol  iv  col.  855): 
"  Med~temur  etlam horninem creatum 
fuisse slne  peccato,  et in  ]ustitla  pro 
statu  lnnocentiae.  Fec~t  Deus hom~ucm 
rectum ete.  Homo  In  1110  statu non 
ind~gebat  leglbus  aut  juqt~t~a  activa 
coerclva  ut ad bonum  converteretur. 
Non  igitur  requlrebatur  dominatio 
clvllls aut pohtlca.  . . .  Acc~d~t  autem 
quod  propter  transgress~onem legla 
quae ~mposlta  erat homln~  et  denun- 
c~ata,  et propter  mobedient~arn,  mox 
regnum hominls et domlnlum In tyran- 
nidem  et subjectionem  versum sit, ac 
ommo veluti Infirmaturn et perversum. 
. . . Et  hlc radicem habemus et causas 
domlnat~onls  et ooerc iv~  dom~llli  " 
nature "  Civilis,"  and needs the help  of  his fellow men, and 
was therefore driven to the life of  society.  The Commonwealth 
is a society in which men have to command and to obey to 
the end that they may live in peace and sufficiency, and as the 
principles of Natural Law are not sufficient for the government 
of  the temporal life, human laws were established ; but these 
must not be contrary to the Natural Law.l 
This  is  interesting,  as  illustrating  what  we  have  before 
suggested, that in spite of  the great authority of  St Thomas 
Aquinas, the Aristotelian conceptions had not made any very 
profound impression. 
We turn to Gerson7s  treatment of  our immediate subject, the 
source and nature of the authority of  the King or Prince. 
In a work described as '  Sermo ad Regem Franciae nomine 
Universitatis Parisiensis,'  which is obviously a short treatise 
on the nature of Kingship, Gerson describes the monarchy as 
having been originally created by the common consent of  men, 
and for the good of  the whole comm~nity.~  And, he goes on, 
it is  an error  and contrary  to natural equity and  the true 
character of  lordship to say that the lord is not bound by any 
obligation to his subjects ; as the subjects owe their lord help 
and service, he owes them his protection and defen~e.~  The 
Id. ~d.,  vol.  iv.  col  856.  "  Adji-  slve temporalls s~t  slve sp~rltualis. Et 
clamus lnsuper et dlcamus quod postea-  quonlam  pnncipia  juns  aut naturalis 
quam  homo  natura  sua  civlhs  est  et  ordlnatlonl~  non sufliclunt ad tempora- 
communicativus, et talem  habet indl-  lem  vitam  gubernandam,  ordlnatae 
gentiam  cui  convenientor  succurrere  fuere  et lnst~tutae  humanae  quaedam 
non  poteat  absque  alterlus  substd~o,  ordinationes  et  veluti  voluntanae, 
homo inductus fuit et velut~  compulsus  natural1 ~uri  mlnzme obviantes." 
In  communl vlvere cum ahls,  et opus  2  Id..  ' Sermo ad Regem  Franciae 
fult  lnstituere  ao  ordlnare  ahquas  nomine  umvera~tat~s Paris~ensis.' 
convlvendl modos.  Et vlrtus just~tlae,  (Opera, vol  iv. col. 798) . ''  Propterea 
quae ad hoc fac~endum  lnclinat, noml-  rex al~quls  persona prlvata non est, sed 
natur ~1~11s  aut polltlca.  Politla (ut  est una  potestas  publlca  ordlnata  pro 
dictum  est) est  horninurn soc~etas  ad  totius communit.tt~s  salute.  Sicuti ab 
bonum  ordlnata,  ad recte  praeclplen-  uno  capite  descend~t, et  dependit 
dum st obediondum, ut in pace vlvatur  totius  corporls  vita,  et  ad  hoc  reges 
et  tranqmllitate  st  suffic~cntia, aut  ordlnatl fuerunt,  et prlnclpes in  prin. 
quoad  vltam  hanc  temporalem,  aut  o~pio  per communem homlnum consen- 
quoad  spiritualem.  Justltla  polltlca  sum, et eo mod0 perseverare debent." 
eflt v~rtus  quae  lncllnat  redder9  unl-  a  Id. ~d.  id., col  799 . "  Haec ver~tas 
culque quod suum est secundum ordi-  est contra  horum  errorem  qu~  d~cere 
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words seem to be reminiscent of  the principle of  the mutual 
obligations of feudal law. 
Gerson's conception of  monarchy is clearly that of  an autho- 
rity derived from the community, and limited by obligations 
to the community.  He repudiates very emphatically the error 
of those who said that all things belonged to the lord and that 
he could do whatever hc pleasedll and the contention of  those 
who  misapplied the description  of  the conduct  of  the King 
by Samuel, and neglected the principles of  Kingship set out 
in Deuteronomy,  and the sound judgment  of  natural reason 
which is never contradicted by the divine law.2 
This  brings  Gerson  to a  discussion of  tyranny, which  he 
describes as a poison which tends to destroy all political life ; 
men ought, according to their position, to resist it.  He warns 
them indeed  against unreasonable and unjustifiable  sedition 
which may produce results worse than tyranny itself, but he 
asserts that the tyrant has lost all right to his authority, that he 
is hated by God and by man, and rarely dies a natural death.3 
He therefore  argues  that it would  be  well  that  the royal 
authority should be limited and restrained ; and he cites the 
reply of  Theopompus to his w~fe  when she complained that he 
was  leaving a diminished authority to his children;  that it 
might be diminished but it would  be  more  permanent.  It 
would be more permanent, because it would be more reasonable 
suis toner1 aut obligari, quod est contra 
JUS d~vinum  et naturalem aequltatem, 
et veram  dominii fidem,  quemadmo- 
dum subditi fidem, subsldium et servi- 
tlum  eorum  superior1  debent,  81c 
superior fidem, protectionem  st defcn- 
sionem  suis  dcbet  sub~ectis  ,  bonitas 
una aham requirlt." 
1 Id  id  id.,  col.  799 : "  HIC  mani- 
festum  cst  hos  errarc  qui  d~cunt 
domin~a  omnia  ad  lpsos  spectare,  et 
quod apere possunt ad corum arbitrium 
et voluntrttem, omnia quae subjectorurn 
uunt absque ullo tltulo ad se trahendo, 
quid hoc slbi vult." 
Cf. id. : "  Rrgulae Moralls."  (Opera, 
vol. 1  part ii. col. 22) : "  Omnia  sunt 
prin~ipis,  non qmdem proprietario Jure, 
nec  pro so, sed pro necessitate re~pub- 
hcaa " 
a  Id.,  '  Sermo ad Regem  Franciae ' 
(vol. iv. col. 800)  . "  Hic apparet ulte- 
nus,  quod  devius  rlle  perperam  et 
perverse intilligeret textum Bibhae, qur 
contra  veritatem  vertere  vellet  verba 
scr~pta,  1 Reg. vin  cap.  '  Hoc est JUS 
regis,'  quia  verus sensus literalrs alib~ 
est ot speclaliter, Deut. xviii ,  omnino 
his contrarius ; et etiam omne bonum 
rationis  naturalis  judicium,  cm  nun- 
quam contrarlatur ius Dlvinum." 
a  Id. id  id., col. 801. 
and  Inore  honourable,  for  true  authority  is  a  reasonable 
auth0rity.l 
The principle which  Gerson sets out here,  that the royal 
authority should be limited  and restrained, corresponds very 
closely with that which he expresses in other works.  In the 
Scrmo in viaegio Regis Romanorum '  of  July 1415  he cites the 
usual  definitions of  Monarchy, Aristocracy  and  Democracy, 
but adds that it would be better still to have a constitution 
composed  of  more  than  one  element,  as  for  instance,  of 
Monarchy and Aristocracy, as in France, where the king does 
not disdain to be judged by the Parliament ; while it would 
be best of  all that it should contain all the elements, Monarchy, 
Aristocracy and ''  Timo~racy.'~ In  another work he says that 
it is intolerable that the judgment  of  one man should be able 
to direct the Commonwealth at his pleasure, for the "  canon " 
says most truly that what concerns all should be approved by 
all, that is by  the greater and wiser  judgment  of  all.3  In 
another place again Gerson puts this conception into concrete 
1 Id.  ~d.  id,  601  802  "  Estque 
multo oligibilius ut  minus habeant (I  eges 
aut  principes)  dominium,  quod  slt 
retionabile  sanctum  et durans,  dando 
allqua  reetnngentla  .  . .  Tale  lo- 
sponsum dedit Theopompus uxorl buae 
quae conquerebatur de hoc quod certis 
legibus  potentlam  suam  restnnxisset, 
sicut rex se subest in multis casibus ]us- 
titiae parlamenti.  Verecundla est, dice 
bat foemina illa, liberis tuis potentiam 
diminui  sinere  quam  non  conquis~qt~. 
Respondlt  ipse  Sino  eis  minorcm 
potentlam  sed  du~abiliorem.  Quare 
durabll~orem  ?  Quia  rationabiliorem. 
Sod dlces . est autem minus honorabihs 
Sclas quod non, sed magis honorabilis, 
qula habere subjectos secundum ratlo 
nem est siiigulale domimum, singularis 
dlgnitas, honor, noblhtaa et ingenuitas. 
Et in hoe dominus non se sub~ecit  sub- 
jectis  sed  rationi,  cul  lure  divrno  et 
natural1 unusqulsque dominus st dius 
quillbet  obedientlam  debet  et bub!ec 
tronem.  De his Seneca : '  81  vls omnia 
bubl~(  ere tlbl, subij~o  LC x%tloni.'  " 
Id., 'Sermo In viagloRegisRomano 
rum ' (Opera, vol. 1  col. 152)  "  Esset 
autem  Inter  istas  politias  illa  molior 
quam alrqua singularis qnao ex regal1 
Rt  ar~ito~ratiacomponeretur,  ut in regno 
Frawiae,  ubi  reu  lnstitmt  parlamen- 
tum, a quo judicari non refugit.  Esset 
vero  omnlum  optima  st saluber~imrt 
polilia  quae  trrpl~cem hanc  bonam 
complerteretur, regalem, anstocratiam, 
et timooratiem. 
Jd.,  '  De  consrderatlonibus  quas 
debet habere princeps ' (Opera,  vol  11. 
rol  850) . "  Quid enlm mlnus tolerabile, 
quam  sl  universam  rempublicam  una 
unius  sententla  presumet  pro  11b1to 
versare  reversareque,  cum  ver~ssime 
dicit  canon,  '  Quod  omnes  tangit  ab 
omnibus  debet approbari '  Ab  omm- 
bus  intell~ge,  vel  a  majore  omrilum 
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which  one  man  rules  according to virtue is  the best  of  all 
simple forms  of  government,  but  a  mixed  government,  in 
which  Aristocratic  and  Democratic  elements  are  combined 
with Monarchy is better, for in  such a government  all have 
some part,l and he maintains as  St Thomas and Gerson had 
done, that this was the nature of  the government of  Israel as 
originally instituted by God2 
It is  also  interesting  to  observe  that,  in  discussing  the 
question whether the Pope was subject to the government oP 
a General Council, he says that the principle that the greater 
is not judged  by the less is not always true, for the King of 
France, though he is greater than any other in the Kingdom is 
often, in some cases, judged by the Parliament, and judgment 
is given against him3 
We put beside these theories of  the authority of  the ruler in 
Gerson and Peter dlAilly, those of  some of  the most important 
Canonists of  the fifteenth century, Zabarella,  Panormitanus," 
and Turrecremata, for their opinions  correspond rather with 
those of  Gerson and dlAilly than with those of  the Civilians. 
We may begin by observing that "  Panormitanus " is clear 
that political authority is the result of  sin ; if  it were not for 
this,  a11  men  would  be equal.4  This  does  not  mean  that 
1 Peter D'Ailly, '  De Ecclesiae et Car- 
dlnallum  auctoritate ' (Gerson, Opera, 
vol. 1. col. 918) : "  Sciendum est, quod 
llcet  reglmen  regmm,  ln  quo  unua 
slngularltor  prinoipatur  multitudinl 
secundum vlrtutem, s~t  melius quollbet 
a110  reglmine  slmplici,  ut  ostendit 
phllosophus 111.  Pol~t~corum,  tamen 81 
fiat mixtum  cum ar~stosratia,  in  qua 
plures dommantur secundum vlrtutem, 
et  cunl  democratla  in  qua  populus 
prlnclpatur, tale reglmen melius est, In 
quantum  in  reglmine  mixto  omnes 
ahquam partem habent m prlncipetu : 
et etiam  qua, hcet  regimen  regis  sit 
opt~mum  In  se,  si  non  coriumpatur, 
tamen  propter  magnam  potestatem, 
quae reg1 conceditur, de facile regimen 
degeneret  in  tyrannldem,  nlsl  slt  In 
rege  perfecta  vlrtus,  quae  raro  et in 
paucls reporitur." 
2  Id. id. id. 
8  Id. id.  (Gerson, Opera, vol.  I. col. 
931) :  "  Ad  hanc  autern  ratlonem, 
respondetur primo, quod malor rationis 
llcet regularlter slt Vera, talnon quan- 
doque Eallit.  Nam  rex  Franclee,  qui 
ebt  major  et superior  In  toto regno, 
saepe  in  aliquibus  casis  jud~catur,  et 
contra  sum  fertur  sententla  in  suo 
parlamento." 
4  Panormitanus.  Comm.  on  Decro- 
tals 1.  33, 6  (vol  I.  part  11.  fol.  125): 
"  Fatendum est quod exercitlum lur~s- 
dlctionis  non  compet~t  rontra  bonos ; 
unde s~ non esset peccatum non opor- 
teret  habere  supenorem,  sed  omnes 
humanitus essent  aequales." 
CHAP.  111.1  POLITICAL  ~RITERS.  165 
these  Canonists conceived  of  government as coming directly 
from God.  On the contrary, Zabarella, at least, emphatically 
maintained that norrnally it was derived immediately froin the 
community.  He  cites  the "  philosophers " as  saying  that 
the rule (regimen) of the State-(civitas) belonged to the con- 
gregation of the citizens or its "  valentior pars,"  and he infers 
that it may therefore be said that the rule of  the world be- 
longed to the congregation of  the men  of  the whole  world, 
or their ''  valentior  pars."  l  He refers  to  the  authority of 
Aristotle for the first part of  his statement, but his reference 
to the "  valentior pars " suggests rather a reference to Mar- 
silius.  In another place Zabarella says that a kingdom may 
arise in one of three ways : by the revealed will of  God, by the 
consent of  those who are ruled, or by violence ; the third, he 
says, is not to be justified, it is merely  'L de facto."  The usual 
method, he evidently means, is by consent." 
He applies this principle to the Roman Empire, for the whole 
"  Plenitudo  Potestatis " was in the first "  universitas,"  and 
thus it has been said that the Roman people, w21ile transferring 
its authority to the Prince, also retained it, for it could not 
make a law which it could not re~oke.~  Again  he  says that 
the  Roman  people  had  transferred  their  authority  to the 
Prince by the Lex Regia, and mentions that he had seen in 
the Church of  the Lateran  a brazen  tablet  which  described 
the powers given by the Roman  Senate and people to Ves- 
Zabarella  Comm. on  Decretals I. 
vl  6 (fol. 107) . Sic enlm dlcunt phllo- 
sophl  quod  reglmen  clvitatls cons~stlt 
penes congregatlonem civium, vel s psi us 
congregation~s  partem  valontlorem, 
quae  sententla  coll~gitur Aristotclo, 
tertio  pol~tlcorum,  o.  vnl.,  et confor- 
miter d~cendum  e#t quod reglmen orhls 
Penes congregatlonem hommum totlus 
orbis,  vel  lps~us  partem  valentlorem 
conslstt~t." 
Id. ~d , I.  VI  34  (foi.  149,  v ) : 
'' Regnum in terrls surglt trlbus mod~r, 
Prlmo per Del voluntatem allquo modo 
revelaturn homln~bus,  secundo modo per 
COnqensum eorum qu~  reguntur, tert~o, 
per vloient~om. . . .  Tortlo moclo lion 
exped~t  justificare,  qma  llla  est  de 
faeto." 
Id.,I.  VI.  6 (fol. 110,v.). "Namin 
prlma univers~tate  est total~s  plenitude 
potestat~s  tamquam  in  fundamento, 
ut  ibl per hoc quod dicltur quod populus 
Romanus  transferendo  jur~sd~ctionem 
in pnnclpem, etiam In so retlnult, qula 
non  potuit  a  se  abdicare,  slatuendo 
legem a qua non possct reccdore.  . . . 
Et colllpltur  quocl  malor  est  potostas 
popul~  quam maglstratus   psiu us.  1 u 
lloc  diclt  Gulielmus  de  Cuneo,  if 
de  leg].  non  amb~gltur  (Dlg.  I.  3,  b) 
populum  Rornanum  pohic  revocare 
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pasian, and he says that it was c,lear from this tablet that the 
people had not transferred all their power to the Prince, but 
had retained  the power  of  making laws ; but he adds, that 
however this might have been once, all power had come to be 
in  the hands  of  the  Prince.l  Government  then,  while  it 
arose  from the Divine  institution,  is  conceived  of  by him 
as normally taking its origin from the community ; it is there- 
fore valid and legitimate even among the infidels, and he cites 
the authority of  Innocent 
These are significant principles, about the nature and source 
of  government,  but  it is  also  important  to  observe  that 
Zabarella held that the Electors of  the Emperor acted not in 
their own names, or as individuals, but as Lupold of  Babenberg 
had said, as a Collegium,  that 1s  they elected  the Bmperor 
by  a  process  which  represented  the "  universitas 77  of  the 
Roman people.  The Electors were "  surrogati  populo Romano," 
and thus they had the same power  as the Roman people had 
exercised in the case of  Nero, of  deposing the Emperor, especi- 
ally with the tacit consent of  the Pope.3 
1 Id  ~d , I  VI  34 : "  Vid~  tamen  Cf. also vol. v. p  33. 
aeneam  tabulam,  quae  ndliuo  ebt  Id. id ,  I. vi.  34 (fol. 150, r.).  "Ad 
Romae ln Ecclesia sancti Jo  Lateran :  secundum,  do  forma  electioms,  dlco, 
in qua descnpta est potestas  per  sen  qnod  haec  quest10  presuppon~t  aham, 
atum  et populum  Romanum  tradlta  an istl ellgant  tanquam colleglum,  an 
Vespns~ano. Et ex 11la tabula constat  tanquam  singull , et  quod  tamquam 
non omnem potestatem ab lnitlo fuisse  slnguh  tenet  Hostlensis hic,  sed  quod 
translatam In princlpem,  sed sub lstls  tauquam colleglum tenet Leopoldus In 
cap~tuhs.  ita quod etiam  post transla-  trmtatu Do  Juribus Regni  et Imperil 
tionem  remausit  potestas  Romano  Romanorum  c.  vl.  . . . et movetur 
populo condendarum legum, quod vult  qula 1st~  ehgunt  lure populi  Roman1 ; 
ita $  et quod  princlpl,  et $  lex  quae  ct qul surrogatur alter1 censetur eodem 
precedit (Inst I. 2, 4-6)  Et  ff  de leg 1.  lnre  populus  aubem  Romanus  per 
de  qu~bus  (Dig.  I.  3,  32)  Quicqmd  exercltium  representantem  unlversl- 
autem tune fueiiC, postea  SIC  invaluit,  tatem  popuh  Romani  ellgobat,  . . . 
qnod omnes potcstas esset in p~inclpo  "  ct hoc vldetur consonum ver~tatl . . . 
a  Id  id, nl.  34,  8  (fol  201,  v ) .  b~ haec  praesapponlmus  quod  in  hoc 
"  Dicit  Innocentlus  quod  doml~ua,  sunt surrogatl populo  Romano,  dlcen- 
possesslones et ~ur~sdlctiones  llcite sine  d~~m  est, quod s~cut  populus Romanus 
peccato  possunt  esse  apud  mfidelcs,  cu causa potent impciatorem deponero, 
haec enim non  tantum pro ~nhdehbus  slcuti  d~citur  factum  de  Nerone,  qul, 
(fidel~bus  7) scd pro qualibet iationabill  fuit a senatu judicatus et depos~tus,  ut 
creatura facta sunt."  est ~n h~stor~~s,  ita et 1st1 ex caura hoc 
Cf  Panormitnnus  Comm. on Decre-  possunt,  precipue  tacite  approbante 
tals 11  34,  8,  fol  177.  Papa." 
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Zabarella,  however,  discusses  this  question  further  and 
says that there was a difference of  opinion about thc power of 
revoking  the  authority  granted  to  the  Pr~nce. He  cites 
Gul. de Cuneo as maintaining this could be done, and Baldus 
as maintaining  the opposite,  because  the jur~sdiction of  the 
Roman  people  had been  transferred  by Constantine  to the 
pope.  He scenis  himseIf  to agree with  Gul.  de  Cuneo,  for 
the donation  only  related to the jurisdiction  of  the Eoman 
people  over  the  City  of  Eorne,  not over  the world.  The 
Electors, as "  surrogati " of the Roman people, can therefore 
for just cause depose tho Emperor.  This at least is tho case 
when  the  Emperor  Elect  has  not  yet  been  crowned  and 
approved  by  the  Pope.  This  is,  Zabarella  says,  his  own 
opinion, but he submits his opinion to the judgment  of  those 
who might be more c0mpetent.l 
TheT@  genoral principles of government, and of  the authority 
of the rdler, are also developed by Turrecremata, and it  is worth 
while, at the risk of  a little repetition, to put his views together. 
Turrecremata was commenting, not on the Decretals like the 
majority of  the Canonists of  the time, but on the Decretum of 
Gratian,  and this gives him  occasion  for a  more systematic 
exposition of  the theory of  law and government.  It is also 
obvious  that he wrote  under  the influence  of  St  Thomas 
Aquinas, rather than that of  the Canonists. 
We may begin  with his  observation, drawn directly  from 
St Thomas  (Summa Theologica I. 2,  90, 3), that the ordering 
Id id,  I.  6, 34 (fol. 150) : "  De hoc 
tamen an populus Romanus posslt revo- 
care  potestatem  datam pnnclpi  varlc 
sc~~bltui  . . . Sod quod possit, no, I~I 
Gul  do Cuneo, et pro hoe qula populus 
non potu~t  slbl legem Imponole, a qua 
nOn  posslt ~ecedere,  ff  Do  leg^, 81 quls 
In prln, testament1  . . .  Sed belie facit 
'Ilud  c  1b1  a  cuncto  populo,  ex  quo 
colligitur,  quod  malor  est  potebtas 
Populi  quam magistratus,  st de hoe 
'bl por Baldum in contrarium .  quia 
fun 1dlct10  populi Romani quoad urbem 
Pel Uonstantlnum translata In  Papam ; 
per  hoc  non  toll~lur  ~ur~sd~ctlo 
popuh  Roman] quoad orbem, et, dato 
quod slt sublata, taman representatur 
in istls electoilbus,  qul, ut predlxl sur- 
rogantur populo Romano, et sic v~detur 
procedere,  quod proillxi,  quod possiut 
~mperatorem  ex causa  deponero  Et 
5altem  hoe  videtur  procedere,  quando 
~lectus  In  Imperatorem  nondum  est 
coronetus  et slc  non  approhatus  per 
Papam,  qua non  habet  ]us  nlsi  ab 
electorlbus  In hoe autem, quia forte 
pondet lufacto,non pretend0 sermonem, 
paratus etlam in prem~sz~s  atqulesreie 
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of  things for the common  good  belongs  either to the wllole 
multitude, or to one who holds authority in the place of  the 
whole multitude, and has the care  of  the whole  mu1titude.l 
Again he takes from St Thonlas the description of  the various 
forms  of  government,  the  monarchy,  the aristocracy,  and 
the  democracy,  and  the  statement  that  the best  form  of 
government is that which is composed of  all these elements, 
and in which  the law is made by the "  majores  natu cum 
plebib~s."~  In  another  place  he  discusses  the  question 
whether it is better to be governed by the law or by the best 
king, and he replies dogmatically that it  is better that all things 
should be ordered by the law,  than by the will  of  any one 
per~on.~  Turrecremata is really touching upon that distinction 
between tho bL regimen politicum  l7 and the Lb regimen regale " 
with  which  we  have already  dealt.4  He also  sets  out  the 
general distinction between the king and the tyrant.  The king 
is one who governs rightly  and for the common good, while 
the tyrant rules  perversely  and for his own  profit.Vt is, 
however, more important to observe that he follows St  Thomar: 
in maintaining that men are only bound to obey their primes as 
far as the order of  justice requires, and therefore subjects are 
not bound to obey them if  their authority is usurped or if  they 
issue unjust.  command^.^  In another place and in some detail 
1 Turrecremata : Comm, on Grat~an 
Decrotum, D  2, 4 (p 52) : "  Respondeo 
dlcendum, quod non cujusl~bet  homlnls 
est leges condere, aed aut prlnclpls aut 
totlus  mult~tudinis.  Probatur  lsta 
conclusio am, quod lex propne et  prlncl- 
paliter resplclt ordlnem ad bonum com- 
mune.  Ordlnare  ahqu~d  In  bonum 
commune  est  vel  totlus  rnultitud~n~pl, 
vel alicujus gcrentls vicem tot~us  multi- 
tudln~s,  ergo condere legem vel pertmet 
ad,  totam mult~tud~nom,  vel ad perso- 
nam puhl~cam,  quac totlus mult~tud~nis 
curam habet, qula et In  omlnbus  alns 
ord~naro  In  finem  est  elus  cuju5  est 
proprle 1110  finis " 
Id ld,  D  2 (p 51) 
Id  id , D  4  (p  88) . "  Quarto 
quaerehatul  Utrum  mehus  esset 
omnia lege ordlnar~,  quam reg1 opt~mo 
vlro, slve quam dimlttere ludlcls arbl- 
tr~o  . .  Respondeo, quod mehus est 
omma  ordlnari  lege,  quam  arb~trlo 
quorumcunque comm~ttere  " 
4  Cf. vol. v. pp.  71-70  and p.  142 of 
the volume. 
Id id,  D  4 (p 60) 
6  Id  ~d , D  8 (p  85).  "Ad  ter- 
tium dlcendum  quod princ~p~bus  secu- 
lanbus in tantum homo obelhre tenetur 
In  quantum ordo justlt~ae  requlr~t,  et 
~deo  SI non habent justum prlnc~patum 
sed usiirpatum, vel 61 injusta prcr~p~ant, 
non  tenentur  els  subd~ti  obcdlre,  niv 
forte per  acc~dens  propter  x~landu~n 
scandalum vcl perlculum " 
(Th~s  1s  a  dl~ect  quotat~on  from St 
Thomas  Aqulnaa'  Summa  Theologicn 
11  2,  104, G  ) 
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he follows St Thomas in the discussion of  the nature and limits- 
tion of  men's obligation to obey the law.  Laws may be unjust 
for various reasons, because they are contrary to human well- 
being,  or beeanse the ruler imposes burdensome laws on his 
subjects, not for the comnlon good, but to satisfy his own greed, 
or because the legislator exceeds the authority which has been 
given him.  Such commands should be called acts of  violence, 
rather than laws, as St Augustine had said, "  that is not law 
which is not just, and therefore some laws are not binding on 
the conscience." 
There is little or nothing in the passages on which Gratian 
is commenting to suggest this particular mode of  dealing with 
the authority of  the ruler and the law;  and Turrecrcmata 
may have intended to correct an impression  which  might be 
derived from these passages in Gratian if  taken alone,  that 
obedience  was  always binding.  It is important to observe 
that the political theory  of  St Thomas was  still understood 
and treated as having great authority. 
We can now  turn to Germany  and some very significant 
observations of Nicolas of  Cusa. 
Every ordered empire or kingdom, he says, takes its origin 
from election ; it is thus that it can be conceived of  as set up 
by the providence of  God ; and, more broadly still, all ordered 
superiority arises from an "  elective agreement of  free submis- 
sion " ;  and  all  authority is  recognised  as Divine  when  it 
arises from a common agreement  by the subjeck2  We are 
Id. ~d.,  D  10 (p  102). "Tert~o 
leges  humenae  frequenter  lngerunt 
calumn~am et  ~njunam homln~bus 
secundum lllud Isa  u , '  Vae q~u  con- 
clunt leges inlquas ' . . . Sed llcltum 
est  unlculque  oppresslonem et vlolen- 
tlam evltare, ergo  leges humanae  non 
lmponunt  homln~  noccss~tatem  quin 
turn ad consc~e~~t~am  . . . Rospondco 
dlcendum tamen juxta St  Tliomas In I. 
Secundae,  q  QG,  Art. IV.  Quod lcges 
Poblta~  human~tus  vel sunt ]ustao vel 
lnJustno, &r  (Quoted  dlrectly  from 
st Thomas Aqulnas ) 
Nlcolas of  Cusq '  De  Concordantla 
Cathohca,' III  4 (p. 360) . 'L Omne enlm 
ordlnatum  lmperlum  vel  regnum  (ut 
superlus  quodam  loco  d~ctum  est) ex 
electlone ortum cap~t  st tunc Vera Do1 
provldent~a  censetur  praeletum.  . . . 
Ecce, 61  ea quae superius  habontur ad 
mentem ~ovoccs,  quomodo omnls supo- 
rlor~tas  ordlnata,  ex  electiva  coucor- 
dantis spontaneae subject~onls  exor~tur 
et quod populo lllud Divlnum Semlna- 
num, per  communom  ommum  homl- 
num aequalem neress~tatem  et  aeqnnlla 
11115.  mest,  ut  omma  potedtas  qua6 FIFTEENTH  CENTUBY. 
reminded, of  the sweeping phrase  of  the Sachsenspiegel "  a1 
werlik gerichte hevet begin von kore." 
Again,  the principle  of  free  election  does  not  arise  from 
positive law or from the authority of  any one man, but from 
the Natural  and Divine Law.  The Electors, therefore,  who 
were created with the common consent of  all the German and 
other subjects of  the Empire in the time of  Henry 11. have their 
authority fundamentally  (radicalem vim) from the common 
consent of  Jl  those who could by Natural law have created the 
Emperor, and not from the Roman Pontiff, who has no power 
to appoint a King or Emperor over any country without its  - 
con~ent.~ 
In another  place  Nicolas lays  down  the same conclusion, 
but with even greater breadth ; every political order, he says, 
is founded on the law of  Nature, and if  it contradicts this, it 
has no validity.  He admits that the wiser and better men 
should be elected to make laws and to rule according to them, 
for they are naturally the rulers of  other men ; but they have 
no  coercive power  over the unwilling.  For all men  are by 
nature free, and therefore all government  (principatus) arises 
only from agreement and the consent of the subjects (consensu 
subjectiva) ; it  cannot  be  created  cxoept  by  electioll  and 
 ons sent.^ 
pr~nclpallter  a  Deo  est, slcut  et ipse  regem  et Imperatorem,  culus  esse  et 
homo,  tunc  divlna  cen,eatur,  quando  posse  ab  uno  homlne  non  dependlt. 
per  concordantlam  communem a  sub-  Uncle  electores qu~  communl  consensu 
1ec t~s  exorltur."  ommum Alemannorum et allorum qul 
1  CE.  vol. 111  p. 153.  lmperio sub~octl  erant, tempore secundl 
2  Nlcolas of  Cusa.  Id ,  III  4 (p. 360):  Henrlcl constltutl sunt, radlcelom vim 
"  Hoc  est  ~llud  orchnatum  sprltual~s  habent  ab  ~pso  communl  ommum 
colllgantlae  divlnum  matr~monlum,  In  consensu, qul s1b1 nature11 lure Impera- 
racl~ce duratlvae  con~ordant~ae  collo  torem  conqtltuere  poterant  non  ab 
catum, per quod lsta respubllca, opt~me  lpso Romano pontlfice, In cu~us  potes- 
ad  finem  eternae  foel~cltatls  summa  tate non est dare culcunque provlnolae 
paro d~rlg~tur  Et qula hujus radlces  per  mundum regem  vel  lmperatorem, 
divnu  et humam juns supellus haben-  lpsa non consentlente " 
tur,  non  ~epl~co  ~dem  ,  sufficlt  sclre  Id. ~d , 11  14 (p  319) : "  Omnls 
quod electlo hbera, a natural1 st  dlv~no  constltut~o  rad~catur  In  lure  naturall, 
lure  dependens,  non  habet  ortum  a  et sl el  contradlc~t,  constutut~o  vallda 
poqitlvo  lure, aut homlne  quocunquc,  esse  neqult  . . . Unde cum ]us  nat- 
ut In ejus arbltrlo ex~stat,  quoad hoc,  urale,  natu~al~tor  ratlonl  lns~t,  tunc 
vallrlltas electloma, maxlme in ellgendo  cognnta eat omnls lex horn~n~  1x1  rad~re 
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In the Preface to Book 111. Nicolas expressed his preference 
for monarchy,  but he  prefers an  elective monarchy  to 0110 
which had originally been created by election, and was trans- 
mitted by hereditary suc~cssion.~  And he goes on to contend 
that it was right that every human government should corre- 
spond to the type of Christ Himself ;  he was both God and man, 
and every government has both a human and a Ilivino origin. 
All "  malestas " is sacred and spiritual:  it comes  frorn  God, 
but also from man ; Christ was born both God  and Nan of 
the Virgin and with her free consent, and thus all government 
should arise from the Church or Congregation of  men by pure 
consent,  not  by  violence  or  ambition  or  corruption.  For 
Christ was  under  the law,  and came not to destroy but to 
fulfil it.2 
sue.  Ideo saplentlores et  prestant~ores  tunc  qula  In  Vera  reg~m~nls  ordme, 
alns  rectores  el~guntur,  nt ips1  e  sua  1ps1us  rectorls  elect10 fien  debet,  per 
natural1  clara  ratlone  saplentla  et  quam  elsct~onem  constltuatur  rector, 
prudentla praedltl, justas loges ellclant,  judex  el~gentlum  :  tunc  ordlnnta  et 
ct  per  eas  allos  regant,  et  caussas  recta  domrn~a  et pres~dentla  per  elec- 
rllscutlant, ut pax servetur, slcut aunt  t~onem  ronstltuuntur." 
responsa  prudentum,  2  D~ht.  Ex quo  1 Id  ld , In  Preface  (p.  355) : 
oven~t,  quod  ratlone  vlgentes,  sunt  "  Inter autem omnla tempelat] pllnel. 
naturallter allorum dornln~  et rectores :  patus genera, monarchlcus prae omlnet. 
sed non pel  legem coerclvam, aut 1ud1-  Inter autem speclos hujus, prlnc~patus 
clum quad reddltur In lnvltum  Unde  temporal~s,  monarchwus,  qu~  per  elec- 
cum  natura  omnes  sunt  11ber1 tunc  t~onem  const~tu~tur,  absque successon- 
omnls  pllncipatus,  slve  conslatat  In  bus,  praefertur  el  qul  per  electlonem 
lego scrlpla, slve vlva apud pnnolpem,  constltu~tur  cum lpsls successorlbus " 
per  quem  pnnclpatum  coorcentur  a  Id. ~d ,  111  Preface (p 350)  "  Sed 
malls subdlti, et eorum regulatur hber-  haec racl~x  ad omnla cum hls prozn~ss~s 
tas ad bonum  motu  poenarum,  est  a  sufficlt,  quod  quemhbet  prlnclpatum 
sola  concordantla et consonsu  subjcc-  Inter  C11nst1 fideles,  oportet  Chr~sto, 
tlva  Nam sl natura aeque potentos et  cujus  figuram  et successlonem  gestat, 
aeque llberl homlnes sunt, vera et ordl-  in typo conformarl. 
nata  Potostas  unlus  communls aeque  Resplclat  ltaque  ad Chrlstum,  qul 
Potent18 naturallter, non  msl  electlone  est  ipsa  verltas,  et primo  conslderet 
et consensu  allorum  conit~tut  potest,  quonlarn ~pse  ost domlnus et maglster, 
slcut etlam lox ex consensu const~tultur  Ileus et homo  ita omms prlncipatus 
Dlat  1  lex  8,  D~it  quae  cox tiu  ex quodam divlno et humano exurg~t 
(Gratlan Decretum,  D.  VIII  2,  8), ub~ . .  Sacla est omn~s  mapstas  et  sp~ntu 
dlclt  pactum Inter  se gent~s  aut clvi-  all8 et a Dco , cst etlam ab homme, ut 
tatls.  Generale  pactum  socletatls  Chrlstus  verus  vlrglnls  Marllo  films. 
I1umanne est obtemperare reglbus suis.  Unde  ex  lncorrupta  st  lntemerata 
qula  pacto  convenlt  vlrglne,  elus  11beral1 consensu  Inter 
socletas, velle rcglbus obedlre ,  vernento, dum dlceret, fiat m~h~  secun. 172  FIFTEENTH  CENTURY. 
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From  Germany we  turn to England,  and to the work  of 
Sir John Fortescue.  As  we  shall see, his political principles 
are developed with special reference to England, but this does 
not mean that they are not also related to those of  the writers 
whom  we  have  just  been  considering  and  to the  political 
tradition of  writers like St Thomas Aquinas. 
In  what seems to have been his earliest work he takes from 
St Thomas the definition of the Natural Law as "  participatlo 
legis aeternae in rationali creatura," and it is from the natural 
law that all just kingship is derived.l  By this  law alone can 
be determmed the "  ]us regnancli "  in any kingdom.  This law 
is the source of  all human laws, and they cannot properly be 
called laws if they depart from it.2  He repudiates the notion 
that Kingship could be taken as defined in such terms as are 
used by Samuel (1  Sam. viii.) ; this was not a statement of  the 
Jus Eegis  in general but of  the Icing whom  Israel had 
dema~~ded.~ 
So far Fortescue has been dealing with the general principle 
that all political  authority is founded  upon  justice  and the 
Law of  Nature, but he then turns to the distinction between 
the "  dominiurn regale," the " donlinium pohticum,"  and the 
"  dominiurn politicurn et regale." 
We  have  already  dealt  with  this  in  an  earlier  ~hapter,~ 
with reference to the supremacy of the law, made by the whole 
community, and above the King, and we need not go into this 
again.  We may, however, cite a passage from the '  De Laudl- 
bus  Lepm Angliae,'  which  draws  out  very  emphatically 
the  nature  of  the  authority of  the  "  Dorninium  Politicurn 
dum verbam tuum, Chnstus nascltur 
Deus et homo.  Ad  modum hu~us,  ax 
unlca  incorrupta  ecclesla  slve congre- 
gatlone  hominum,  ex  purlsslmo  con 
sensu prod110 debet vorus prin~lpatus  , 
non ox allqua v~olent~a,  lion ex ambl 
tlone,  nut pravltate slmonlaca, sod ex 
purltote  qua  Chrlstus  In  mundum 
propter omorem salutis popul~  d~gnatus 
est venlro  . . . Christus enlm sub lege 
erat, non vomt  solvero  legem,  sed ed 
implere, hum~hs  et  m~tis  corde, medicus 
mansuetisaimus." 
1  Fortescue,  ' De  Natura  Legls 
Natu~ae,'  1  5, 
Id ~d ,  I. 10. "  Et por  eam  (Len 
Naturae) solam discut~  potost omne ]us 
reguandl  m  quocunque  rogno  quod 
bupenorem  noscli.  .  ,  Hao'  lox 
namque  mater  ost  omnlum  legum 
humanarum, a qua sl lpsae degene~ant 
indlgne vocantur Icges." 
8  Id ~d,  I  12, 16. 
a  Lf  pp  141  1'3. 
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et  ~egale," as  it  existed,  in  Fortescue's  judgment,  in 
England. 
This work is in the form of  a dialogue between the Chan- 
cellor  and  the  Prinm  of  Wales.  The  Prince  had  asked 
whether it was  the Civil Law or the Law of  England  which 
he  should  study, and the  Ohancellor rebukes  him  for such 
an  "evagatio " ; for  the  King  of  England  cannot  change 
the law at his pleasure, his authority is not simply "  regale " 
but "  regale et politicum " ; if  it were  simply "  regale " he 
could change the Laws, and could impose talliages and other 
burdens on his people at his pleasure.  This was the meaning 
of  the doctrine  of  the Civil Law,  "  Quod principi  plaeuit," 
but the authority of  the Princc  who governs "  politice " is 
very  different.  The people indeed  approve  the government 
of  the king, so long as he does not become a tyrant, but it was 
to avoid  this  danger  that St Thomas had  desired  that tho 
kingdom should be 80 ordered that the royal power should be 
restrained by the Law. l 
Fortescue was, however, well aware of  the fact that there had 
been  kings oB  England  who had been impatient of  thcse re- 
straints, and he represents the Prince as asking why some of 
his  ancest'ors had  endeavourcd  to bring  in  the  Civil  Law. 
E'ortescae  answers in the person of the Chancellor.  The law 
Id , '  De Laudibus Legum Angl~ae,' 
ix. : "  Dub~tas  nempe,  an  Anglorum 
logum  vel  olv~hum  te conferas.  . . . 
Non  to  conturbot,  Flli  Regis,  haer 
mentls evagat~o Nam non potest Rex 
Angllao ad llbltum suum legom mutaro 
reRnl  sul,  prlncipatu  nedum  rcgal~, 
sed ot pollt~co,  lpse suo populo domin 
atur  SI regall  tantum  ipse  praes,ot 
818,  leges reg111 su~  mularc ille posset , 
tallagla  quoque  et  cetera  onera  91s 
Imponere  psis inconsultls, quale domi- 
nlum  denotant  leges  C~vilos, cum 
dlcant,  '  quod  Pnnclpi  placu~t leges 
habet  v~gorem.'  Sed  longe  ahter 
POt8st  rex  polltlce  lmperans  genti 
suao,  qula  nec  leges  lpse  slne  subdl- 
torum  assensu  mutare  potent,  nee 
sublectum populum ren~tcnf  am onorare 
~mpos~cion~bus  poregrlnis, quia populus 
ejus libere fruetur  bonis  su~s,  loglb~ls 
quas  cuplt  regulatus,  nec  per  regem 
suum,  aut  quemvls  alium  dep~latur  ; 
ronsimihter  tamen  plaudit  populus, 
sub rege regallter  tantum pnnc~pante, 
dummodo  In  tymnmdom  lpso  non 
labatur.  Do  qua11 rogo  dlx~t  Phlloio 
phui 111.  Pollt~coru~n  quod mehub est 
civitatem rug1 viio  optllno  quam lege 
optlma  Sed  qula  non  semper  ron- 
tinglt  presldontem  populo  hujusmo,l~ 
esse  vlrum,  Sanctub Thomas, In  llhro 
quem reg1 Cypri scnp%lt,  de Reglm~ne 
Princ~pum,  optare conbetur regnum  RLC 
~nst~tul,  ut  rex  non  valeat  populum 
suum t~rann~de  gubernare ,  quod solum 
slt,  dum  potestas  regla  lege  pollt~ca 
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of  England  did  not  sanction  the maxim  of  the Civil  Law, 
" Quad principi placuit," for the Iiing of  England was bound 
by  his coronation  oath to observe the Law.  Some English 
kings had been impatient of  this, for they thought that they 
had not that freedom of  government possessed by those who 
ruled according to this maxim, who could at  their pleasure make 
and unmake laws, inflict punishments, impose taxes, and even 
at their pleasure interfere in the Law Courts.  Some English 
kings  had  therefore  endeavoured  to shake  off  the "  iugum 
politicum,"  not  understanding  that the real  power  of  both 
kinds of  kings was the same, and that it was not a "  yoke," but 
"  liberty," to rule the people "  politice," a security to the people 
and a relief  to the 1cing.l  In order to make this clear to the 
Prince, he draws out some of  the eEccts of  a "  regimen tantum 
regale," as they could be seen in France.  He points out how 
the French people were preyed upon by the gens d'armes, werc 
oppressed by ordinary and special taxation, by the burden of 
the Gabelle on salt, which they were  compelled to buy, and 
their  consequent poverty, their miserable food and clothing. 
The  nobles  indeed  were  not  liable  to  taxation,  but  they 
were  liable to be  punished  and even executed  without  any 
proper  trial before  the  ordinary  Judges,  but in the  Icing's 
Camera." Vn  England, on the contrary, no one, not even 
the King, could take a man's  possessions without payment ; 
he  could  not impose talliages,  subsidies or  any other  taxes 
1 Id., '  De  Laudibus,'  xxxiv. : "  Ail-  tum jura  mutant, nova condunt, ponas 
disti  namque  supcrius quomodo inter  infligux~t,  ot  onera  imponunt  subdltis 
leges  civiles  praecipua  scnteutia  est,  suis, propriis  quoque arbitriis conten- 
maxima, sive regula, illa quao sic eanit,  doncium  cum  velint  dirimunt  lites ; 
'Quod pnncipi placuit, legis habet vigor-  quam moliti aunt ipsi progonitorea tui 
em,' qualitor non sanciunt loges Angliae,  lioc jugum  politicum  obiicore, ut con- 
durn  nedum  regditor,  sod  et politico  similiter  et ipsi in subjectum populum 
rex  ejusdem  dominatur  in  populum  rcgaliter  tantum dominari,  sod  pocius 
suurn, quo ipne in coronacione sua ad  dobacchari  queant ;  non  attendentes 
legix  sue  obsorvanciam  astriugitur  quod equalis est utriusque regis poton- 
sacramonto ; quad roges quidam Ang-  cia, ut in prodicto traetatu de Natura 
liao  egre Eerentos, putantes proindo so  Legis  Katurao  docctur,  st quod  nor1 
non  libere  dorninare  in  subditos,  ut  jugurn,  sod I~bortas  ost, politice  rogere 
faciunt  seges  regahtor  tantum princi-  populum,  aecuritas  qnoqua  maxima, 
pantes,  qui  loge  civili,  et  potissirno  nedum plebi,  sod ot ipsi regi ; allevacio 
predicta  legis  illius  maxima,  regulant  etiam lion minima sollecitudinis suae." 
plebom  suam, quo ipsi  ad oorum libi-  Id. id., xxxiv., xxxv. 
CHAP  111.1  POLITICAL  WRITERS.  175 
lvithout  the  consent  of  the  Kingijom  in  Parliament,  nor 
anyone  be  brought  before  any  court, except  that of 
the Ordinary Judge ; and the people  were  well clothed  and 
well fed.l 
The  contrast  which  Fortescue  makes  between  the happy 
condition of England under a monarchy limited and controlled 
by  law and the miserable circumstances of  France is indeed 
very emphatic, but it is important to obscrve that Fortescue 
did not think that this arbitrary and uncontrolled monarchy 
had always existed in France ;  in another treatise he speaks of  it 
as the unhappy result of  the long war with England.  Saint 
Louis, he says, and indeed the other kings of  France, did not 
impose taxes upon the people without the consent of  the three 
Est'ates, which had the same character as the Parliament in 
~ngland.~  We shall see presently that Fortescue's conception 
of  the actual contemporary constitutional condition of France 
was very far from adequate. 
It is interesting to conipare Fortescue's  conception of  the 
nature of  the French Monarchy with that which was expressed 
by  an important and almost contemporary Frenchman, that 
is by Philippe Pot, the Sieur de la Roche, as reported by Jean 
Masselin in his "  Diarium "  of  the States General which met at 
Tours in 1484.  We do not suppose that Masselin's report of 
de la Xoche's speech to the Estates can be accepted as repre- 
senting in precise terms what he said, but it may be properly 
taken as expressing tho general conceptions of  that important 
section  of  the  Estates to which  Masselin  and  de la Roche 
belonged. 
Jean Masselin was  a Canon of  the Cathedral, and a repre- 
sentative of  the "  Bailliage " of  Rouen, and he put together 
' Id. id.,  xxxvi. 
Id., '  Governance of  England,' iii. : 
"And  how  so  bo  it that the French 
kynge  royneth  uppon  his  people, 
'  dominio  regali,'  yet.  Scynt  Lowes 
sometyme kyngo there, nor any of  his 
progenitors  sette never tayles or other 
imporicions  uppon  the  prplc  of  that 
land, without  tho  assent  of  the three 
Estates, wich, when thai be  assomblod, 
be tho like to the Courte of  Parlemont h 
Ingolende.  And this ordre kopte many 
of  his successours into late dayis, that 
Ingelendo  men  made  such  warre  in 
rraraunce  that  the 111.  Estatos  durst 
not  come  togedre." 176  FIFTEENTH  CENTURY. 
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in the form of  a "  Diariuln,"  or Journal, an account  of  tht; 
proceedings of  the Estates.  There was  much  discussion, he 
says, of  the powers of  the Estates, especially with regard  LO 
the 3,nnointment of the Gouncil of  Regency during the minority  --- - --1-  1- 
of  the King (Charles VIII.), and he then gives an account of 
the speech made by the Sieur de la Xoche. 
De la Roche begins by contending that the decision on this 
question belonged not to the Princes of  the Blood, but to the 
I3states.l  The  Kingdom was a " dignitas,"  not  an "  heredi- 
tas," and when tho Commonwealth was left without a ruler, 
the care of  it belonged to the States General, not that they 
should themselves govern, but that they should appoint those 
most worthy to do this.2  This leads him to a discussion of  the 
origin and nature of  kingship.  He had learned, he says, from 
history and from his ancestors, that in the beginning kings were 
created by  tho will of  the people, and that they  appointed 
those who were pro-eminent in virtue and industry.  Princes 
do not rule for  their  own benefit, but, forgetting  their  own 
concerns, they should set forward the good of  the Common- 
wealth ; those who  act otherwise are tyrants.  It is of  the 
greatest importance to the people by what law and by what 
ruler the Commonwealth is to be guided.  The L'  Respublica " 
is the LL res populi "  as they had often read.3 
1 Jehan  Masselin : "  Diarium  Sta- 
tuum Generalium Francine, habitorurn 
Turonibus  anno  1484," ed. ' Collection 
des  Documents  InBdits,'  A.  Bernier, 
Paris, 1835, p. 140. 
2 Id. id., p. 246 : "Ad  quod  accedit 
quod rcgllurrl cllpnitas cst, non heroditas, 
qURe  nequaquam debeat, iustar  haere- 
ditatem, ad naturnles tutores sanguine 
scilicet propinquos, continuo  devenire. 
Quid ergo 1  Num  respublica  absque 
rectore  vacua,  et  omnibus  exposita 
manebit ?  Minime  profecto :  sed  ad 
statuum  generalium  examen  primum 
defcrtur :  non  quod  eam  per  se  ipsi 
pro, urent,  sed  quod  ei  preficiantur 
dignissimi quique statuum judicio." 
a  Id. id., p.  146 :  LL Et ut  res pati- 
ficiamua, historiae  predicant,  et  id  a 
majoribus  meis  accepi,  initio  domini 
rerum  populi  suffragio  reges  fuisse 
creatos,  et  cos  mnxime  prelates,  qui 
virtute et industrla reliquos anteirent. 
Ad utilitatom enim suam sibi quisque 
populus  rectore~  eligebnt.  Siquidem 
principes  rlon  ideo  pransunt  nt  ex 
populo lucrum capiant ac ditentur, sod 
ut, suorum obliti  commodorum, rem- 
publicam ditent et provehant in melills. 
Quod si aliter quandoque faciunt, pro- 
fecto tyranni sunt et nequam pastores. 
. . . Populi ergo maxime interest qua 
lege, quove rectore ducatur respublica, 
cujus si optimus rex, est optima res est, 
si secus, deformis et  inops. Nonne crebro 
legistis rompnblicam rem  populi ease ? 
Quod si res ejus sit, quomodo rem suam 
negliget aut non curabit." 
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A little later he appeals to Roman  History against those 
wished to atrribute all power to the Prince, for in Rome 
the magistrate was created by the election of the people, and 
no law was  promulgated  until it had been submitted to the 
people, and approved by them.  He didnot,  however, here wish 
to discuss the power of  the Prince who lawfully administered 
the Commonwealth, being of  full age.  The case before them 
was that where the King, on account of  his minority, or for 
other reasons, could not take hold of  the g0vernment.l 
He  had  shown  then  that  the  LL Respublica"  was  LL Res 
populi,"  and had been entrusted by the people to the King ; 
those who  hold it by other means and without the consent 
of  the people are  tyrants,  and " alienae rei invasores."  It 
was evident that the Icing (on account of  his minority) could 
not himself rule the Commonwealth, and it was necessary to 
provide for its care by  others.  This responsibility did  not 
pass  to any one prince,  nor  to several, nor  to all of  them. 
It  must  return  to  the  people  who  originally  granted  the 
authority ; the people must resume it, for it was the people 
who  would  suffer from the absence of  government  or from 
its  bad  administration.  He  does  not  suggest  that  the 
"  habitus  regnandi " or lordship  should go  to any  one  but 
the King ; but the guardianship of  the kingdom, for the time 
being, belonged to the people and those elected by them : by 
the people, "  populus,"  he did not mean the "  plebs " alone, 
but all men, of  all conditions, for under the name of  the States 
General were included the princes and all the inhabitants of  the 
kingd~m.~ 
Id., id., pp. 148,9 : "  Quomodo ab 
ashorltittoribuv  tota  principi  tnbuitur 
potestas, a populo ex parte facto.  Nam 
spud  Romanos  quisque  magistratus 
electione populi  fiebat, nec  aliqua  lox 
Promulgatur nisi primum populo relnta 
ab 00 probata fuisset.  Adhuc quoque 
multis  in  terris  veteri  more rex alec- 
tione  queritur.  Sed nolo  nunc  discu- 
tere  de  potestate  principis,  qui  per 
aetatem jure rompublicam administrat. 
Tanturn  in  ~ro~osito  nostro  questio 
VOL.  VI. 
concludatur,  cum  rex  ob minoritatem 
vel  alias  impeditur  a regimine  capes- 
sendo." 
Vd.  id.,  p.  148 :  "Et  imprimis 
vobis  probatum  ease  velim  rempubli- 
cam rem populi esso, et regibuq  ab eo 
traditam, eosque qui, vi vol alias, null0 
populi consensu, earn habuere, tyrannoa 
creditos, st alienao rei invasores.  Con- 
stat  autcm  regem  nostrum  rem- 
publicam  par  se  disponere non  posse. 
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De la Roche continued by urging upon the States General 
that they were the elected procurators of  all the Estates of  the 
realm,  and held the will of  all in  their  ha,nds ; they should 
therefore not be afraid to recognise that they had. been sum- 
moned in order that the Commonwealth should be directed by 
their advice in the nlinority of  the King.  He argues that the 
contention of  those wl~o  sitid that the States General only met 
to grant taxes was in manifost contradiction to the historical 
facts.  The Assembly of  the States General was not something 
new, nor was it unprecedented that they should take hold  OE 
the administration of  the Comnlonwealth during a vacancy, 
and entrust it to upright men ; proferably to Inen of  the royal 
blood, if they were men  of  character ; and he cited varioue 
cases which illustrated this.  It was the States General wl~ieh 
decided between Philip of V'alois and Edward 111. of Zngland. 
It was  the States General who  after two years  granted the 
Regency  of  the Kingdom to Charles  (afterwards the Fifth) 
when  King John had been  talcen  prisoner  by  the English. 
It was the States General by whose advice the kingdom was 
ordered in the time of  Charles VI.  He concluded therefore 
by urging them to set to the work of  ordering and nominating 
the " Council of  Eegency." 
procurari necesse est.  Verum respondi:  excludi qui regnum habitent." 
Nec  ad aliquem unum  principem  nec  1 Id.  id.,  p.  148:  "Cum  autem 
ad  plures,  vcl  omnes  simul,  hoc  in  intolligatis  vos  universor~lm  st~tuurn 
casu,  rcvortitur.  Oportot  proptoren,  regni  legntos  et  procuratores  doctos 
ut  ad  populum  redeat,  hujus  roi  et omnium voluntatem vestris in mani- 
donatorem,  qui eam quidem  renumat,  b1.n  esse,  cur  concludere  timetis  vor 
volut  suam, prilcsortim  cum hujus roi  ad  hgc  maxime  vocatos  negotium, 
aut diuturna vacatio, aut mala rcgcntia  quatenus  respublica  oh  minoritatexu 
in  suom  semper  solius  pernicie~n  regis,  quodammodo  vacans,  vostro 
rodundet.  Non  sum  tamen  ejns  consilio procuretur ?  . . . Haec etiarn 
men ti^,  ut  dicam  habitum  regnandi,  illos  liquid0  refellunt,  qui  duntaxat 
sivo  dominium  ad  quemquam  alium  levandorum  tributorum,  non  alterius 
quam  ad  regis  transire  personnm ;  opcrao  vel  finis  ~ratia  conventioneln 
sod regni tamcn procuratio atque  tutela,  indictam  arbilrantur.  .  . . Verum 
non  jus,  sive propriotas,  pro tomporo  huic  sententiae  manifestissime  con- 
populo vel ab eo electis jure tribuitni.  tradicit  et exporieutia  rcrum,  et pro- 
Populum  ~utem  appello,  non  plebem,  cessus  a  nobis  habitus,  quo  patuit 
nec  alios  tantum rcgni  subditos,  sed  multas alias res a nobis tractatas fnisse. 
omncs  cujusque  status,  adeo  ut  . . . . Non est autem res nova ha00 
otatunm  generalium  nomino  ctir,rn  gor~cralium  stat~lum  conventio.  Non 
complcct~  principos arbitrer, nec aliquoa  est  inusitaturn  eos  vacantem  roi. 
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AS has been already said, we  do not think it probable that 
the Sieur de la Itoche made a speech whose terms corresponded 
with all this, but we  think that what Masselin reports 
represents the political and constitutional ideas of  some not 
unimportant number  of  the inembers of  the States General. 
It will  be  observed  that what  is  said  embodies  three very 
important conceptions.  The first, which belongs to what we 
may call general political theory, that all authority originall1 
comes  from  the community,  and  can  come  from  no  other 
source, and that this authority naturally reverts to the com- 
munity, when by any accident the government it set up fails. 
The second, the general constitutional principle that the States 
General represented  the authority of  the whole  community, 
and that their authority was not in any way lilnitcd  to the 
granting of  financial assistance to the Government.  The third, 
that the appointment of  the Regency  should not be carricd 
out without the advice and conscllt of  the Estates.  We shall 
return to the proceedings of  this meeting of  the States General 
in Chapter VI. 
There is a very interesting treatise of  about 1477  by Wessel of 
Groningen, which sets out some very important conceptions 
of  tlle source and the nature of  political authority. 
The primary subject of  the work is the nature and limitations 
of  the Papal and Ecclesiastical authority, and this belongs to 
puhlicae  adrninistrationem  capeasere,  teneretur, nonne status  politiam regnum 
Proborumque  sui  gremii virorum  eam  et  administrationem  assumpscrunt, 
crcrlore con~ilio  ; omnino tamen  prae-  ordinaverunt, commi~erunt  7  Et quam- 
ferentes regii sanguinis viros, dumrnodo  vis ipsius Johannis filius esset Carolas 
eflsont virt~~tcr  praerliti.  Quintus,  qni  jam  vigessimae  aetatie 
Et no longius huju~  roi  monumenta  annum  complevorat,  non  est  tamen 
repetam,  temporibus  Philippi  Valcsii,  continuo ei regentia credita, sod biennio 
cum intor eunl et Angliae Regcm Edu-  post  primam  conventionom,  rursus 
ardum, pro jure  regnandi  armis decor-  status Parisius congrcgati, memoratus 
tarctur,  tandem  inter  eos  convenit,  Carolus reipublicao regimen cepit, non 
sicut jure debebant, nee veriti sunt rem  alias quam eorurn oonsensu ac decreto. 
tantam  statuum  genernlium  com-  Scd quid paulo vetustiora commemoro 7 
mittere  judisio:  eorumquc  pro  Phi-  ltegnum  quidem,  Caroli  Sexti  tern- 
lippo data sententia, adversum Anglos  poribus,  qui  duodenis  fore  patri  suc- 
defonsiono utimur.  . . . Temporibus  cesnerat statuum consilio ordirialurn nc 
item  Johannis,  Franciae  Rogis,  cum  proouralum fuit." 
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the literature of  the Conciliar lllovement, but in some chapters 
it deals with the general question of  political authority. 
In  one place Wesselius maintains that the true relation of the 
subject  to the ruler  must  be  carefully  considered, for it is 
not  one  of  an unconditional  obligation,  rather it is  of  the 
nature of a contract with the ruler, and if the ruler does not 
observe the law of  the contract, the subject is not bound by 
it.1  This  is  a very sharp statement of  that contractual con- 
ception  of  the nature of  political  authority  which  we  have 
discussed in previous volumes.  Wesselius, however, not only 
states the principle, but goes on to explain its rationale.  All 
subjection should be voluntary, and should only bo  accel7ted 
after due deliberation upon the causes of  it, and of  the results 
which  are to be expected  from such subjection ; and, inas- 
much  as it is these which have  led  Inen  to enter  into  the 
contract with a ruler, the contract is termiuatecl if  the con- 
ditions  are  not  f~lfilled.~  After  praising  the  Franciscan 
custom  of  electing  their  superior  from  year  to year,  and 
urging  that tho relation  between  a  Bishop  and his  diocese 
is termiaablc if  he prove unworthy  of  his charge, he goes on 
to argue that it should be the same with Kings, for in every 
well-ordered commonwealth the chief magistrate should eitlier 
be annually elccted, or his authority should be restrained by 
the votes  of  those  who  have  consented  to it.  What  does 
election mean, he says, but the freedom of  those who  have 
1 Wesselius  Groningensis : '  Do  dig-  ligatur subditus." 
nitate ct potestate ecrlesiastica,' xviii. :  2 Id.  id.  id. :  "  Omnis  enim  illa 
" Consideratu  dignum,  quanto  debet  subjectio voluntaria et spontanoa  esse 
subditus  prnclato  suo, st inferior  suo  clobot,  quare  non  subounda,  nisi  cum 
suporiori.  Hoc enim debitum non  cst  dcliboretione.  Deliberatio autom cau- 
conditionis  ut  sit  debitum  absolute,  sam  considerabit  et  fruclum.  Unde 
sod magis ost pacti cum prelato.  Non  quandocunque causa cum fructu eiusee- 
enim  superior  dominus  est  inferioris,  motli sunt, ut movere possent deliber- 
licet  inferiores dominos eos vocent,  et  antem  ante  contractum,  pari  ratione 
~uperiores  aliquando  justis  caasis per-  solvunt  obligatum,  quando  alter  con- 
ferant.  Nisi  tamen  superiores, juxta  trahentium  deficit in  promisso.  Fcre 
clebitum  pacti,  legi  pactionum  aoqui  enim ox  natura hujus  obligationis BS~ 
sint,  non  tonebit,ur  subditus  integro  ut  subditi  superiorem  sibi  eligant, 
debito,  sed  quantum  ille  legem  supc-  quatenus talem  sibi eligant, in quo et 
rioris implet, catenus dobitor  est suh-  ox  quo suae  dcliberationis fruutum eb 
ditus.  Unde si prorsuslegem ille praela-  causam proximo coniectant." 
torulrl abjecorit, jam tunc null0 debit0 
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deliberated 04 it.  Kings, therefore,  are not to be obeyed in 
evil things, but rather they may lawfully '(  in regno turbari," 
unless this might cause even greater evi1s.l 
These are drastic and far-reaching  principles which Wesselius 
sets out, but when we allow for the sharpness of  the phrases, 
there is nothing new in them.  The contractual conception was 
embodied in Feudalism, and in the whole politica1 system of  the 
Middle Ages  the principle of  election  or  recognition corre- 
sponded with the con~titutional  practice, while the principles 
of limitation and deposition were at least perfectly familiar.3 
This is not, however, all which is important in Wesseli us.  In 
another chapter he points out that the real meaning of  St  Paul's 
words, "  There is no power except from God," requires a careful 
examination.  It is obvious that those who hold temporal or 
spiritual power may greatly err and lead those who obey them 
into mortal error.  We must, therefore, resist the unrighteous 
authorities unless we  wish to be partalrers with  them.  The 
words of  St  Paul (Romans xiii. 1)  must therefore be interpreted 
by those which follow, "  There is no power but for edification." 
The power, so far as it edifies, is from God, but he who "edifies " 
by resistance aIso received the power of  resistance from  GO^.* 
Id. id. id. : "  Deberet etiam  simile  '  Non est potestas nisi a Deo, et quae a 
esse  de  regibus.  Unde  in  omni  ro-  Deo  sunt, ordinata  sunt.  Itaque qui 
publica beno instituta, summus magis-  potestati  resistit,  Dei  ordinatione  re- 
trntus  vel tempore vel auctoritate,  ut  sistit.'  Possunt enim qui in potestate 
vel  annuus tantum  sit, vel  suffragiis  tam corporali quihm spirituali crrare et 
consontientiurn  ab insolentia  compos-  graviter errare, ut in via Dei eoandali-  . 
catur.  Quid  enim electio signat, nisi  zent  subjectos, st obedientes in  mor- 
libertatem  deliberantis.  Oportet enim  talem  errorem  praecipitarent.  . .  . 
Parere meliori, et hunc debit clectio con-  Sceloratis  ergo  potostatibus  oportet 
iectare, a quo quantum electus  deficit,  obviare, nisi velimus occnlta societate 
Pro tanto ei non est obediendum. . . .  participare. 
Ex  hoc fundamento non solum regibus  Verba  igilur  apostoIi  de  potestate, 
non  parendum  in malis, verurn etiam  sicut  alibi  moderantur,  ipse  dicenn, 
iure deberont regno turban, nisi maioro  '  non est potestas nisi in edificetionern,' 
damno timerentur accepts. mala resar-  intelligenda  sunt.  Quatenus  enim 
turn iri."  aedificat  potestas,  a  DCO est,  et 
a  Cf.  vol.  iii.  part  i.  chap.  4;  quatenus non aedificat, qui resistendo 
Part ii. chap.  6.  aedificat,  a  Deo potestatem resistendi 
a  Cf. vol.  v.  art i. chaps. 7 and 8.  habet.  Posse igitur aedificmepotests% 
Id.  id.,  23 :  "  Non  perfunctorie  a  Deo est, et qui plu~  acdificat plus in 
a~t  ~upcrficialiter  legendurn nut intelli-  potestate est." 
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Wesselius was evidently anxious to correct the error of those 
who thought that all authority, good or bad, just  or unjust, 
was  a  divine  autliority.  This  conception had indeed  been 
little regarded in the Middle Ages, but there are some traces 
of  it in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the criticism 
of Wesselius is therefore of some importance. 
It seems to us that it is important to observe at this point 
that the theory that in the last resort the unjust ruler might 
legitimately  be  deposed, had,  at the outset  of  the fifteenth 
century, an important illustration in constitutional action, that 
is,  in the deposition of  the Emperor Wence~llas  in  the year 
1400.  This may  seem a somewhat unimportant  occurrence, 
but, as we  shall see later, it was not forgotten in the sixteenth 
century. 
It is therefore worth while to notice the terms in which the 
electors, that is the Archbishops of  Maintz, Trier, and Cologne, 
and the Count Palatine, expressed their judgment and declared 
Wenceslss deposed.  We do not, it will be understood, pretend 
to deal with the actual circumstances which lay behind their 
action, and its merits.  We arc only concerned with the con- 
stitutional principles which they assumed, and the terms in 
which they justified their action. 
They charge him with neglect to act for the peace of  the 
Church and of  Germany, with his betrayal of the authority of 
the Empire, specially in the case of Milan, and with the reckless 
way in which he had allowed his seal to be affixed to blank 
forms which he sold to his friends, and they accused hirn of 
having murdered many ecclesiastics and 0thers.l 
1 '  Ueutsche  Reichstagsakten,'  vol.  ... 
111.  (Ed.  Julius  Weizsiiclier,  Royal 
Academy  of  Science, Munich, vol.  iii. 
204) (p. 265) : Enumeration of  charges 
against  Wenceslas  "  (I) Nemlich  daz 
or der heiligen  Kirchen ny zu  fridden 
gehulfen hait. . . . (2)  So hait er auch 
dez heilige Romische Rich swerlich und 
achedelichon  entgledet  und  engleden 
lassen, nemelich  Meylan  und daz land 
in Lamparten.  . . . (3) Er hait auch 
vil stede und lande in Deutschen und 
Welschen Landen dem Riclle  zugehor- 
ende, und  der  ein  teyl  verfallen  sint 
dem  heiligen  riclle,  uebergeben,  und 
der nit geachtet, noch an dame heiligen 
Riche  behalden;  (4) So hait er auch 
umbe geldes willen dicke und vil syne 
freunde  gesand  mit  ungeschrieben 
brieven,  dy man  nennet  membranen, 
dy dooh  mit syner majestat ingesjgel 
besiegelt  waren.  . . . (5) So hait cr 
CHAP. 111.1  POLITICAL.  WRITERS.  183 
They say that they had remonstrated with him in vain, and 
had finally invited him to meet them at Ober Lahnstein and 
~aited  for him,  but he had  not  come.  The Archbishop of 
Maintz therefore, in the name of  the electors, and acting as 
in  a  court,  declared  Wenceslas  deposed,l  and  notified  the 
princes, lords and cities of  the Empire that they were free 
from their  oath  of  obedience to Wenceslas, while  they con- 
tinued  to be bound by  their oath to the Empire and to the 
person who should be elected King of  the  roman^.^ 
When we  now endeavour to put together the political prin- 
ciples of  the writers with whom we have dealt in this chapter, 
it  is evident that there is a substantial agreement among them. 
They are clear that all political authority is derived from the 
community, that is, while they conceive of  it as coming from 
God  ultimately, directly  and immediately it comes from the 
whole  body  of  the community.  It is indeed interesting  to 
observe  that Wesselius  thought  it well  to  correct  the mis- 
interpretation  of  St Paul's words, "  The powers that be are 
ordained by God."  It is clear that, whether they were ecclesi- 
astics or laymen, they did not recognise the doctrine of  what 
is called the Divine Right of  Icings ; they were clear whether 
they were Englishmen or Frenchmen that the authority of  the 
auch  ny  keno  achte  gehabt  alle  der 
mishel  und  Iiriege,  dy leider  manche 
zijt  in  Deutschen  und  in  anderen 
Landen  des  heiligen  Richs  swerlich 
und  verterplich  gewesen  und  noch 
werende sint.  . .  . (6) Er hot auch, 
das  erschreglich  und  unmenschlich 
ludet, mit syns selber hand, und  auch 
ubermiez  ander  ubelteden  die  er  by 
yme  hait,  erwirdigo  und  bidderbe 
prelaterr paffen und geistlich lude, und 
vil andere erbar lude ermordet. erdrun- 
kot,  verbrand  mit  fackeln  und  sy 
jemorlichen  und  unmenschlichen  wid- 
der recht getodet, das eym Rcmischen 
Konige  unczemelichen  stehet  und 
ludet." 
Id. id.,  p.  267 : "  Und wir Johann 
Erzbischoff  vorgenant,  Gots  namen 
zu dem ersten angeruffen,  in Gerichtes 
stad  gesessen,  in  nameu  und  wegen 
unsero vorgeschriben Herren und midcle 
Kurfiirsten  des  heiligen  Romischen 
Richs  und  unser  selbes,  umbe  diese 
egenanten  und  andere  vile  grosser 
gebresten  und  sachen  uns  tlarezu 
bewegende, abethun und abeseczen mit 
dissem  unserme  Urteil,  daz  wir  thun 
~md  geben in dieser  sehrifft, den  vor- 
genanten Herren Wcncezlaus als einen 
unniiczen  versiimelichen  unachtbarcn 
entgleder  und unwerdigen  hant liaber 
des heiligen Romischen Riclls, von dem 
selben Romischen Riche  und vor aller 
der  wirde  und  herlichkeit  darcau 
gehoreude." 
Id. id. id. King was a limited authority.  Gerson, d'Ailly, and Turrecre- 
mata  emphatically  prefer  a  mixed  government,  that  is,  a 
government  which  included the aristocratic and  democratic 
elements, as well as the monarchical.  Gerson and d7iGlly  in 
France, and Fortescue  in  England, are  clear  that the legal 
rights of  the subjects are protected,  even  against the King, 
by the Courts of  Law.  Gerson, Zabarella, and Wesselius are 
even clear that in the last resort the violent and unjust ruler 
might be resisted and deposed. 
These writers, then, know nothing  of  absolute monarchy ; 
indeed, it is evident that such a conception would have seemed 
to them irrational and repulsive ; they all, like the Medizeval 
writers in general, conceived of  monartrohy  as the best form of 
government, but it was a monarchy limited  and conditioned 
by  the law,  and  tho good  of  the  community  for  which  it 
existed. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
THE THEORY  OF THE  DIVINE  RIGHT. 
WE have been carefully searching for the appearance of  the 
theory  of  the absolute Divine authority of  the King in  the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as we  have done in other 
volumes with relation to the earlier Middle Ages. 
In o-ur first volume we pointed out that this theory was first 
explicitly stated by Gregory the Great, and in later volumes, 
that, in spite of  his great authority, there is hardly any trace 
of  it, except in a small group of  imperialist writers, of  whom 
the most important was  Gregory of  Catino, during the great 
conflict between the Popes and the Emperors in the eleventh 
and twelfth  centuries.  The  great Medizval writers,  like  St 
Thomas  Aquinas,  ignore  this  theory,  and  even  speak  with 
confidence  of  the  right  to resist  and  even  to  depose  the 
unrighteous ruler.  l 
The only writer of any importance in the fourteenth century 
who seems to us to have maintained the doctrine of  the absolute 
Divine authority of  the King was Wycliffe, and we have dealt 
with this in an earlier chapter.  It seems to us that the con- 
We wish again to express our great 
regret  that,  owing  to  the  troubled 
times  in  which  it  came  out,  our 
attention had  not been  called  to the 
admirable work  of  Professor  F.  Kern, 
'  Gottesgnadenthum und  Widerstancls- 
recht  im  Mittelalter.'  We  greatly 
regret  that we  were unable to consult 
it  in  writing  our  last  volume.  We 
are  glad  to take  this opportunity  to 
draw  the  attention  of  students  of 
medizval politics to this work,  which 
is,  as far  as we  have  seen,  the most 
thorough  study of  the subject, within 
its limits.  We  are glad  to find that, 
as we think, we  are not compelled  to 
alter  the  judgments  which  we  have 
expressed  in  former  volumes,  but 
Professor Kern has handled his subject 
with  a  fulness  and  precision  which 
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ception was wholly alien to the political thought of  the fifteenth 
century, as we have so far considered it, but it  found expression 
in two quarters, in Spain in 1445, and in a work of  Aeneas 
Sylvius (afterwards Pope Pius 11.)  written apparently in 1446. 
We cannot here discuss the circumstances which lay behind 
the appearance  of  this conception in the proceedings  of  the 
Cortes of  Olmedo in 1445, but it  is evident that the country was 
in  a  highly  disturbed  and disorderly  condition,  not  indeed 
uncommon in Spain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
and it was very natural that men should set out in the ~trongest 
terms the urgent need of  political order and obedience. 
However this may be, the principle of  the Divine authority 
of  the King,  and the wickedness of  resistance to him, is ex- 
pressed  in very  strong  terms.  After  referring  to the wars 
and revolts caused by some of the King's subjects in his king- 
dom, the Cortes declared that the Divine Law expressly forbade 
men to touch the King, who was the Lord's Anointed, or to 
speak evil of  him, for he was the Vicar of  God, or to resist him, 
for to resist the King was to resist the ordinance of  God.' 
This statement is rendered more significant when we observe 
that the Cortes went on to say that the revolters affirmed in 
their  justification  that they were  acting in the King's  own 
interest, and  in  accordance with the law of  the kingdom as 
expressed in the ' Siete Partidas ' of  Alfonso X.  The passage 
from this law book, which they quote at  length, certainly seems 
1 '  Cortes of Castile and Leon,' vol.iii. 
18 (Olmedo, 1446).  Present, tho King, 
various prelates, nobles, doctors of  the 
King's Council, and the Procurators of 
the cities and villas of  the kingdom. 
The  Cortes presented  a supplication 
to the King in whioh they first refer to 
the  rovolt  of  some  of  his  subjects, 
p. 4.58  : "  Oluidada la ley natural, por 
estilo  dela  qnd  Ins  abejas  han  un 
principe, o lals  gruas siguen un cabdillo, 
e  aqne  ellos  acatan  e  obedespen;  e 
mi  mesmo  pospuesta  la  ley  devinal, 
lo qua1 espresamente manda e defienda 
que ninguno non sea osado de tocar en 
su rrey e principe, commo a quel que 
0s  ungido  do  Diou,  nin aun do  rretraer 
nin dezir de1  ningunt  ma1  nin  aun 10 
pensar en su espiritu, mas quo aquel sea 
tenido commo vicario de Dios e onrrado 
commo  por  oscelente,  e  quo  ~~ingunt 
non sea osado dole rresistir, por quelos 
que a1  rrey rresisten  son vistos queror 
rresister  ala  ordenanpa  de  Dios,  a10 
qual  asi  fazer  todos  son  obligados e 
tenudos, non  solo temiendo  la  ira  de 
Dios,  e  el  ma1  e  pena  que  dello  10s 
puede venir, mas aun por la guarda de 
sus conspienpias." 
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to suggest that the subjects should guard the King not only 
against themselves  and  foreigners, but also  against himself, 
not only by good counsel, but by preventing him from com- 
mitting any act which  might dishonour him,  and injure his 
kingdom.'  The  Cortes urged  that the revolters  were  mis- 
interpreting the passage ; they cited a number of  other passages 
from the '  Siete Partidas ' on  the nature of  the authority of 
kings, which seemed to them to forbid such actions as those of 
the insurgents, and they co~itendecl  that these should not be 
tolerated.  It  would, they said, be abominable and contrary to 
God, and Divine and Human Law,  that the King should be 
subordinate to his vassals and subjects, and should be judged 
by them ; for the King is the Vicar of God, who holds his hcart 
in his hands ; he is the head and heart and soul of  his people, 
who are his members, and owe him revcrence and obedience ; 
his authority is so great that all laws are subject to him, for he 
holds his power from God and not from men2 
After further citations from the "  Fuero de las leyes,"  the 
Cortos urged  that if  anything  in  the ' Siete  Partidas ' was 
contrary to these principles, the Icing should revoke it "  de su 
cierta qiencia e proprio motu e poderio absolute," so far as it 
1 Id. id. (p. 469).  These are some 
words they quote from the 'Sioto  Ptbr- 
tidas,' ii., 13, 25 : "  E por ende cl pueblo 
dove mucllo punnar en quardar surrey, 
lo uno por quo lo han ganado ospiritual- 
mente por don do Dios, e lo a1 natural. 
mente  por  rrazon  e  por  derecho,  e 
ovta  guarda  quele  han do fazer es en 
tres maneras. La primera, de si mesmo, 
la  segnnda de ellos mismos, lo, terser8 
delos estrannoa.  E la gnarda que han 
de fa7or a el de si rnesmo es que non le 
dexen  Eazor  oosa  a  sabiendns por  que 
se  piorda  el  alma,  ninque  sea  a  ma1 
eatanpa e desonrra de su ouerpo e de su 
ligmage, o a grant dapno de su rregno." 
'  Id. id. (p. 483) : "Lo quarto, por 
que  cosa  seria  muy  abominable  e 
sacrilego  e  absurda  e  non  menos 
eecandalosa e dapnosa e contra Dios e 
ley  divina  e  umana  e  rrepugnante  a 
toda buona ~olipia  e rrazon natural o a 
todo derecho canonico e peuil, e enemiga 
clo  t>du  justipia o lealtat, major monte 
delas leyes  de  nuestros  rregnos,  si  el 
rrey cuyo corapon es  enlas  mnnos  de 
Dios, e lo el guia 0 inclins. a todo lo quel 
plaze, et qua1 es vicario e tiene su logar 
enla tierra, e es cabepa e corapon e alma 
del pueblo, e 0110s  son su mienbros, a1 
qual  ellos  naturalmonte  deuen  toda 
lealtnt e fidelitat e sujeqion e obedionqia 
e rruenerenpia e servipio,  e por el se ha 
do  gniar  e  mandar  el  derecho  del 
poderio el  quel es tan grande, especiol- 
mente  segunt  ]as  leyes  de  nuestros 
rregnos  que  todas  las  leyes  e  10s 
derechos  tienen  so  si,  por  quo  el  su 
poderio non lo ha  delos omes mas  do 
Dios, cuyo logar tiene en todas las cosas 
tornporales--oviese  de  ser  e  fuese 
sugeto  asus  vasallos  e  subditos  o 
naturales, e por 0110s juzgado." 188  FIFTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  11.  CHAP.  IV.]  THE  THEORY  OF  THE  DIVINE  RIGHT.  189 
might be contrary to the aforesaid laws of  the "  Fuero " and 
"  OriXnamiento." l 
It  would be difficult to find a more emphatic assertion of  the 
doctrine of the "  Divine Right " of the King, and of  his absolute 
authority as above the Law.  It is possible that this may be 
related  to the attempt made by  Juan 11.  at the Cortes of 
Palencia  in  1431 to annul  the  provisions  of  the  Cortes  of 
Bribiescs in 1387 and to give his Briefs the authority of  law, 
which  we  have  already  considered;  but  as  we  have  seen, 
Juan 11. had been compclled to withdraw from this p~sition.~ 
We have another example in  the fifteenth  century of  the 
assertion of the "  Divine Eight "  in a treatise of  Aeneas Sylvius : 
'  De Ortu et Auctoritate Imperii ltomani,' written, as we have 
said, apparently in 1446. 
This treatise is indeed primarily an exposition of  the nature 
and authority of  the Empire, and it is only incidentally that 
it touches upon the "Divine  Right,"  and it is perhaps worth 
while to observe its more general principles.  Aeneas Sylvius 
begins by tracing the origin of  monarchy to the conflicts among 
men ; its purpose therefore is to secure peace and justice.  The 
conilicts of  nations compelled men  to accept  some  supreme 
authority ; this was the origin of  the various Empires of  tho 
ancient  world,  and finally  of  Rome.3  In Rome  itself  men 
were driven by similar causes to agree that the Government 
should be placed in the hands of  one man ; the Prince wae 
created  and it  "ratum  esset  quicquid ab eo  constituitur." 
All  peoples  are  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  Empire, 
for the purpose  of  the Empire  is universal  peace.5  These, 
however, are little more  than  commonplaces ; we  are  con- 
corned  to  know  what  in  the  view  of  Aeneas  Sylvius was 
the authority of  the Emperor.  The Emperor has authority 
to  make  law,  to interpret  law  and  to abrogate law  where 
1 Id.  id.  (p.  492) :  "  Las  quiera  Cf. p. 133. 
rrevocar  do su ~ierta  ~iencia  e proprio  Aeneas Sylvius, 'De Ortu et Auc. 
motu e poderio rreal absoluto, asi o en  toritate Imperii Romar~i,'  2-4. 
quanto  sou  e  pueden  aer  contra  laa  Id. id., 6. 
diuhas  leyea  del  Fuero  e  Ordina-  5  Id. id.,  10.13. 
miol~to." 
there  is  reasonable  cause.1  In another  chapter  he  deals 
with the question of  appeals from the Emperor alone to the 
Emperor acting with the Princes ; he flatly deilics that any 
such  appeal  can be made,  and adds that the Emperor has 
just  as great an authority when acting alone as when acting 
with the Princess2  We are not  here discussing the constitu- 
tion of  the Empire, but it is obvious that Aeneas is speaking 
under the terms of  the interpretation of  Roman Law by the 
Civilians rather than under  those  of  the actual constitution 
of  the Empire in the Middle Ages. 
The Emperor has supreme legislative power, but we are also 
concerned to know what Aeneas thought was his relation to the 
actually existing law.  It is right that he should live, and judge, 
according to the law, and he cites the '  Digna vox ' (Cod. i. 14, 
4j,3 but  he  adds  that while it is  honourable to say this, it 
must not be asserted that the Emperor is subjcct to the law, 
for  he  is  "  legibus  solutus."  Aeneas  may  not, however, 
have meant by this much more than to assert the dispensing 
power  of  the Emperor, that he had authority to temper the 
rigour of  the law by Equity. 
It is, however, when we  turn to Aeneas'  discussion of  the 
relation of  the subject to what might be thc unjust actions of 
the Prince that we come to the matter with which we are here 
specially concerned.  We must always, he says, presume that 
there is a rational cause behind the action of  the Prince, and 
therefore, even if he should unjustly annul, or derogate from 
sonic "  privilegium," we must not revile or resist him, for there 
is no one who can judge his temporal actions.  Whatever the 
Id. id.,  19. 
Id.  id.,  22 : "  Nunc  ultimo  loco 
de appellationibus transigamus eosque 
confuternus  qui  a  sontentia  summi 
principis  asserunt appallandurn.  . . . 
Sed  appellant  quidam  rursus  ad 
Caesarem  adjunctis  principibus,  quasi 
maior sit imperat,or cum illis qnam sine 
illis. . . . Sed vans atque inania snnt 
ista  fundamonta.  Tanta est  enim in 
Cne~aro potostas,  sine  principil,us 
qualltarn cum ipsis.  Amat eniln  uni- 
tatem suprema potestas. . . . 
33.  Cumque  in  Caosare  summa 
potestas  sit,  summaque  authoritatis 
plcnitudo,  nil  est quod adjunctis prin- 
cipibus authoritatis acceclat,, quoniam 
noque  summo adiici quicquam  polrst, 
noque plenum potest esse plenius." 
Id. icl.,  20. 
Id. id.,  20 : "  Quod  quamvis pul- 
chrum  est  dicere,  non  tamen  asseron- 
dum est irnperatorem  esse  subjectunl, 
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Prince does must be patiently endured, however unjust it is, 
and we  must look for sonic amendment of  his action by his 
successor, or to its correction by that heavenly judge who does 
not suffer violence  and injury  to be  perpetual.  We  must 
remember  that whatever  the  Prince  does,  is  done  by  the 
permission of God, for the heart of  the King is in the hands of 
God, who turns it whither he wi1ls.l 
Aeneas was setting out in dogmatic phrases the doctrine of 
passive  obeclience, and relating this to the conception, that 
whatever the Prince does is done by the permission of  God. 
He returns to this again in a passage of  which we have already 
quoted a part, in which he deals with the question of  appoals 
from the judgment of  the Emperor.  He admits that sometimes 
unrighteousness and an unjust judgment might proceed from 
the highest authority, but there can be no appeal, for there is 
no judge  who  can  examine the teiliporal actions of  Caesar. 
&!ten must recognise that they are subject to the Prince, a8nd 
must reverence  the Emperor and Lord  of  the world, for he 
rules over temporal things in God's place, and as men must do 
what God commands, they must also accept the commands of 
Caesar, " sine repugnatione." 
It is  clear that Aeness  was  concerned in this  treatise  to 
assert the absolute authorjty of  the Emperor, both as supremo 
1 Id.  id.,  1G :  "  Ver~~rn  quum  in 
omnibus  quae  geruntur  a  princ~po, 
caussa  presumatur  et ratio  facti,  si 
quando  vel  abrogare  privilegia  vel 
ipsis derogare  principom  contingit in- 
juste, quamvis liceat eum per viam sup- 
plicationis  informare,  hunliliterque 
potere  restitutionem, non tamen rscla- 
mrre licet, vituparare vel  impugnare, 
si  perseveret,  cum  nemo  sit  qui  do 
fiuis factis tempordibus possit  cognos- 
cere.  Tolerandum ost patienter,  quod 
princeps  facit,  quamvis  iniquc,  ex- 
pectandaque  est  succevsoris  emenda, 
vel  superni correctio  judicis,  qui  vio- 
lentias  atque  injurias  non  sinit  esse 
perpetuas.  Cogitandurn  insuper  est, 
quod  princeps  agit  Dei  fieri  por- 
missione.  Quia  cor  rcgis  (ut inquit 
scriptura)  in  manu  Dei  ost,  ot  ubi 
voluerit, inclinebit illud. . . . Ex quo 
fit, ut ocoulto  Doi  judicio  apud Dourn 
justa  nonnunquam  reperiantur,  quao 
nobis vidontur injusta." 
Id. id.,  23 : "  Elenim  quamvis  ex 
summo  solio  nonnunquam  procodat 
iniqnitas,  injustunlqne  judicium  pro- 
deat,  non  tamen  idcirco  loc~ls est 
appellationis,  quum  nomo  sit  jo-lex, 
qui  iemporalia  Caesaris  facta  valenl 
examinare.  . . . Cognoscant hominos 
se  principi  esse  subjocton,  imperator- 
emquo  mundi  et  dominum  tanquam 
Dei  vicem  in tempordibus  gercntem 
venerentur,  ot  sicut  quae  Deus  jubct 
implenda sunt, nihilquo contraroplicnn- 
durn est, sic temporalia Caesarin man- 
dala sine repugnationo suscipiant." 
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 egisl la tor,  and as being above the Law,  and his  references 
to  this  unchalIengeable  Divine  authority  are  of  some 
importance. 
It is then, we think, true to say that in the statements of 
the Cortes of  Olmedo  and of  the treatise  of  Aeneas Sylvius 
we have a clear and sharp re-statement of  a poliiical doctrine 
which had little importance in the Middle  Ages,  but  which, 
as we shall see Ixter, was  ilovelopod  by some writers  in the 
sixteenth century. CHAP.  v.]  TAXATION.  193 
CIIAPTER  V. 
TAXATION. 
WE have  in  a  previous  chapter  dealt with  this  subject, as 
related to the fourteenth century, in some detail.  We must 
now examine it in relation to the fiftecnth century, for there 
appears to have been  some confusion  about this:  naturally 
enough, for there are some  statements by important writers 
of  the fifteenth century which if  uncontrolled by a more precise 
examination of  the actual facts, might produce,  and indeed 
have  produced,  a  somewhat incorrect  judgment:  Sir  John 
Fortcscue,  for  instance,  in  his  ' Governance  of  England,' 
attributed the poverty-stricken condition of  the French people 
to the arbitrary power of  taxation of  the King.l 
We must therefore consider carefully the evidence as to tho 
constitutional principles, and the actual practice of  taxation 
in the fifteenth century, and we  begin  with France, for it is 
hero that there seems to have been most uncertainty.  As we 
shall see, therc is evidence that from time to time the French 
Crown endeavoured to impose taxation without  the consent 
of the Estates, Provincial or General, but we  think that it is 
also clear that the legal right to do this was not recognised, and 
that normally, when tho Crown needed more than it received 
from its ordinary fixed revenues, it asked for Aids or Subsidies, 
either from the Provincial Estates or the States General. 
It is unnecessary to enumerate all the occasions on which 
the kings of  France asked for Aids from the States General or 
1 Bortoscue :  ' Governance  of  Eng-  Laud~bus,'  chap. 36. 
land,'  chap.  3.  Cf.  his  worlc  '  De 
provincial Estates ; we  deal with some of  the more importtant 
examples. 
The Treaty of Troyes of  1420, by which the unhappy King 
Charles VI. recognised Henry V.  of  England as his successor, 
contains a cIause providing that Henry was not to impose upon 
l,he Kingdom of  France any taxes without reasonable cause, 
and that thcse were  to be in accordance with the laws and 
customs of  the Kingdom.  According to Juvenal des Ursins the 
Three Estates met in Pari8 later in the same year,  and were 
asked for an Aid, and after deliberation expressed themselves 
as prepared to grant whatever the King and his Council should 
command.  l 
These proceedings were, it may be urged, taken, not under 
the legitimate government  of  France, but under the English 
usurpation, and we tun  to the legitimate government.  In a 
letter of  Charles VII. of  1423 we find him mentioning that the 
Three Estates of the Kingdom had granted him an Aid at  their 
meeting in Bourge~.~  In 1425 the States General meeting at 
Melun granted Charles VII. a Taille, but attached to this the 
condition  that  he  should  inform  them  what  measures  he 
proposed to take to put an end to the disorders caused by the 
soldiers, otherwise they would not make a grant.3  In 1423, 
as we  learn from another letter of  Charles  VII., the Three 
Estates of  Languedoc had met in April and May at Carcassonne, 
and had granted him the sum of 200,000  "livres tournois." 
What is, however, more significant is the account given in 
a letter of  Charles VII. of  December 1427 to his Lieutenant 
in  Languedoc,  of  the  complaints  made  by  the Estates  of 
' Rocueil des Ancionnes Lois Fran- 
~aises,'  vol. viii.  696 (p. 639) : Juvenal 
des  Ursins, '  Histoire  de  Charles  VI.' 
(Ed. 1653, p.  381). 
a  ' Ordonnances,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  14 : 
"  Charles. . . . Anx Commis B imposer 
et asseoir  en notre  pays  de  Poictou, 
l'ayde a nous presentement octroyire par 
leu  gens des Trois Estats do notre roy- 
aume,  iL  I'Assembl6e par eux faiete en 
notre ville de Bourges." 
a  '  Recueil,'  vol.  viii.  28 (p. 731). 
VOL.  VI. 
Cf.  Picot, '  Histoire des  tats GirnBr. 
aux,'  "  Ordonnances,'  vol. i. p. 299.  vol.  xiii.  p.  34 : 
"  Charles  . . . Comma ez mois de Mai 
et d'Avril derridrement  passez,  a l'As- 
semblire dcs Trois Bstats de notre pays 
de  Languedoc,  que  lors  par  notro 
Ordonnance  furent aasemblez en notro 
ville de Carcassonne,  nous fut ootroy6 
par 10s gens du Commun Estat du pays 
la  somme  de deux  cent  millea  livres 
tournois." 
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Languedoc.  At their meeting in that year they had protested 
that it had always been part of  their liberty that no Aid or 
Taille, &c., should be imposed upon them by the King, until he 
had c~llcil  together the Couilcil or the Deputies of  the Three 
Estates, and they complained that, in spite of  this, the Lieu- 
tenant of the King, in virtue of  a sinlple "  letter patent,"  had 
imposed upon them a new  Aid  of  22,000  livres tournois," 
over  and above the Aid  of  150,000 francs which  had been 
imposed with the consent of  the Three Estates.  The King 
accordingly ordered the levy of  the new Aid to be suspended 
until the meeting of  the Three Estates which had been sum, 
moned for the following January.l 
In  a letter of Charles VII. of October 1428 there is a reference 
to a meeting of  the States General at Chinon which had granted 
him an Aid of  500,000 francs, part for the Langue d'Oc, part 
for the Langue d'Oil.2  According to Vaissette's '  History of 
Languedoc,'  the King laid  down,  at this  time,  the general 
principle, at least for Languedoc, that for the future no one 
should impose any Aid  or Subsidy without his express com- 
1 '  Ordonnances,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  133 : 
"  Nons avons ouii In  dolente et gricfvo 
complainte  B  nous  faitee  de  par  les 
gens des Trois Estats de notre dit pays 
de  Languedoc,  exposes  par  leurs 
notables  ambassadeurs  et  mossagors 
pour ce envoyee par devers nous, difions 
que  japoit  ce  que  de  tout temps  ils 
soient en telle libert6 et franchise, que 
aucun aide ou taille ne doit de pnr nous 
estre  sur  eus impos6,  quelque  cas 
que ce soit, sans promiAremont appeler 
B ce ot faire assembler le Conseil ou les 
Deputez  des  trois  Estaz  d'icelui  pais, 
et que en ladite libart6 et franchise les 
ayons  jusques-cy  maintenus ; n6ant 
moins  par  vertu  d'une  simple  lettre 
patente  command6e  st  faite  seelee 
sous  notre s6c1,  au  mois  d'Aout  der- 
r~iercinent  pa~s6,  B  la relation  de vous 
notre  Cousin  ot  Lieutenant, sans que 
ladicte lettre sit 6t6 par nous passee, ni 
sans y  avoir aucunement appell6 ledit 
Conaeil  clcv  Trois  Estats,  vous  avee 
impose et mis sus audit pays un  aide 
nouvel de 22 m. livres tournols,  outre 
et par dessus la derniore aide de 150 m. 
francs,  qui  par  lo  consentement  des- 
dits trois  Etats y  avait  6t6  paravant 
impos6s. 
Pour ce est il  que  nous, . . . VOU- 
lons toujours nos loyaus suLjccts estre 
favorablement tra.it6s,  et attendu m6me- 
ment que ledit aide et impost do  22 m. 
livres a 6t6 fait sans notre sfi et sans 
ce  que nous ayons est6 advertis qu'il en 
feut neccssaire . . . par  ces  pr6sentes 
octroyons de  nostre  grace special@,  se 
mestier ost, quo  d'icelui  aide de 22 m. 
livres  et  de  tout  autre  nouvd  nido 
dont en les voudreit charger, ils soiont 
tenus  en  souffranco  et  suspens,  sans 
plus avant y proc6der  par maniere de 
contrainte, no autrement, jusques B ce 
que  Q,  la  prochaine  assembl6e  dea 
trois  Estats de nostre  ob6issance . . . 
en soit par nous aulrement ordcnn6." 
2  '  Recueil,' vol. viii.  39 (p. 749). 
mand and without calling together the three Estates, as had 
been the cust0m.l 
We have again references to pants of  money by the Estates 
of Languedoc in 1431,1434, and 1435,2  and to the imposition by 
the King with the consent of  the Three Estates of  his "  obedi- 
ence " (presumably the whole kingdom) of  a variety of  Aids 
which  had been  levied for  the War but had been abolished 
when the King left Paris. 
It is then evident that during the first part of  the century 
it was in virtue of  a grant by the States General, or the Pro- 
vincial Estates, that Aids and Subsidies were normally levied 
by the King.  We have, however, found a few cases in which 
there is no indication that the Estates  had  been  cons~lted.~ 
This  does  not,  however,  amount  to  much  more  than  the 
possibility that in the disturbed conditions of  the early years 
of  the fifteenth century the government of  France may have 
occasionally  levied  taxes  without  taking  account  of  the 
normal constitutional custom. 
We  must now consider how  far the constitutional practice 
of  the earlier part of  the century gave place to another system 
in its later part, and we must first examine the significance of 
the important ordinance issued after the Meeting of  the States 
General at Orleans in 1439.  We have already referred to this 
Ordinance in an earlier chapter,  but must now  examine its 
relation to taxation. 
Its main purpose was, as we have already seen, the establish- 
ment of  a body of  royal "  Gens d'Armes " and the prohibition 
of the levy of  all private forces.  It was in order to carry this 
out that, as we  should infer, the King, with the consent of the 
Three Estates, imposed a  Taille, which  was  presumably in- 
tended to be continuous, at least for the period of the War. 
1.  Ordonnances,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  140.  Troia  Etats du  pays  ainsi  qu'il  Qtait 
(' Vaissette  Histoire  de  Languedoc,'  accountum6 de faire." 
iv.  p.  471) :  "  Avec  defense  a  2  '  Vaisetto Histoire  de  Languodoc,' 
toUte  sorte de personnes de mettre ou  vol. iv. pp. 478-482. 
desormais  aucune  ayde  ou  a  '  Ordonnances,' vol. xiii. p. 211. 
subside en Languedoc, sans son expras  '  Ordonnances,' vol.  ix.  p. 5 ; vol. 
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The most important clauses of  this "  0rd.onnancc: " are, for 
our present purpose, two : the first says that, in spite of the 
imposition of  a Taille by  the King with the consent of  the 
Estates, some of  the Lords, Barons, and others hindered the 
raising of  the Taillo or other Aids on their lands, and sometimes 
appropriated them on the pretext that the Icing was in debt to 
them.  The  Ordonnance  commands  that this  must  cease.l 
The  second forbids men  of  any condition or estate to raise 
any "  Taille " or "  Aid " or tribute from their subjects uniier 
any pretext whatever, without the authority of  the King given 
in his "  letters patent,"  and declares that for the future any 
place  or  lordship  where  such "  Tailles " or  Aids  had  been 
imposed without his permission, was to be confiscated to the 
King2 
It is not within  the scope  of  this  work  to deal with  the 
complex question of  the various forms of  taxation in France. 
It  has been held by some historical writers that the provisions 
of  this  Ordinance represented  a  far-reaching change in  the 
royal power of  taxation, by giving the King the power of  Icvy- 
ing "  Tailles " on his own authority ; others do not go  so far.3 
1 'Ordonnn.nces,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  312 
(41)  : "Et pour co quosouvontefo~~  t~pr&s 
que du consentement des trois Etats, le 
roi  n fnit mctt,re sus au(:uno tiiillo sur 
son peuple pour  le fniet  de sa guerre, 
et lui subvenir et aider 8, ses n6cessitaez, 
les seigneurs, barons, et autres empech- 
ent  et  font  empeclier  les  deniers  de 
ladite taille et  aussi  des  aidos  du roi 
on  leur  terres  et  seigneuries,  ot  les 
aucuns lea prennent soubz couleur qu'ils 
ont  est6  assignez,  on  dient  aucune 
somme leur  dtre deiies, ou  aussi est6 
promises par le  Roi, et aucuns autres 
croisseut et mettent avec et pardessus 
la  taillo  du  Roi,  sur  leurs  sujets,  et 
autres,  grandes  sommcs  do  deniers 
qu'ils font lever avec et soubz couleur 
do la taillo du Roi, It  leur profit ; par- 
quoy  le  Iioi  cst empesch6 et nr  peut 
estre pay6 les deniers  de la  t)aille par 
son peuple ; le roi  ordonne, mande, et 
commnnde que toutes telles voies dore- 
nnvant ce~sent." 
ic!.  id., p.  313 (44) : "Et pour  ee 
que plusieurs mettent tailles sus en leurs 
tarres, sans l'auctorit6 et congfi du roi, 
pour leur volont6, ou autremenl, dont 
lo  pruple  est  moult  opprim6, le  Roy 
prohibe et defend P tous, snr lesdictes 
pines  de  confiscation  de  biens,  quo 
nu1  de  quelque estat, qualit6  on  con- 
dition  quil  soit,  me  motte  ou  impose 
toille  ou  autre aide  ou  tribut sur scs 
sujets  ou  aut,res, pour  quelque  cause 
ou  couleur  que  ce  soit,  sinon  quo  ce 
soit de I'auctorit6 at cong6 du Roi, et 
par  ses  lettres  patentes ;  et  declare 
lo  Roi  d4s-It-pr6sont, le  lieu  ou  seig- 
neurio ou  telles loillus ou aides soront 
mis  sus  sans  son  auctorit6  ot  cong6, 
commis et confisquez envers lui." 
3  Ci.  Picot :  ' Histoirc  do8  l?i,ats 
OBnBraux,'  vol. i. pp. 322 ff. ;  ' lZecueil 
des Anciennes Lois,' vol. ix. pp. 57, &c. 
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We  think  that  however  important  the  provisions  of  the 
Ordinance  may  have  been  with  regard  to  certain  forms  of 
taxation, it would  be  a  very  serious error to think  that it 
estabIished the principle that taxes in general could  be im- 
posed by the King without the consent of  the Community. 
There is an interesting account by Monstrelet of  the demands 
put forward  by  an Assembly  of  the Princes and Nobles at 
Nevers in 1441, and the answer  of  the King.  They  urged 
that  the  Lords  and  the  Estates  of  the  Kingdom  should 
be called together to impose "  Tailles " and "  Impositions " 
on the Kingdom.  The King replied that the Aids had been 
imposed upon the Lords with their consent, but that the King  - 
could impose the Tailles by his royal authority, in view of  the 
circumstances of  the Kingdom.  There was no need to call 
together the Three Estates for this purpose ; that was  only 
a burden upon the poor people who had to pay the expenses 
of  those who attended.l 
In the Ordonnances, however, from 1439 to the time of  the 
meeting of  the States General in 1451, we  find frequent refer- 
ences to formal grants of  money by the Zstates of  the several 
provinces,  while  we  also  find  frequent  complaints  about 
taxation  without  their  consent.  In February  1443(4) we 
find  Charles  VII.  referring  to  a  statement  of  the  Three 
Estates  of  Languedoc that they had voluntarily  and freelv 
granted him large sums of  money by way of  Aid for the War ; 
and  so  again  in  144tL2  In 1456  Charles  asked  the same 
Monstrelet : '  Chronique' (ed. 1862), 
vol. vi. p.  26 : "  Ont remonstr6 au roy 
comme telles  tailles  et impositions  so 
doivent mettre sus et imposcr, ct appcler 
les seigneurs et les Estats du royaume. 
Reponse.  Les  aydes  ont estb mises 
sus par les seigneurs et de leur consente- 
ment.  Et, quant  aux  taillos,  le  roy, 
quand il a est6 en lieu, les a appelcr ou 
leur fait savoir.  Combien de son autor- 
it0  roial,  veu  les  grandes  affaires  de 
sonroyaume, si urgents, comme chascun 
sait,  et  mesmement  ses  ennemis  en 
occupent une  grande partie, st d6trui- 
sent le  sourplus,  les  peut  mettre sus, 
le que auetre que luy ne puct fnire sanR 
cong6.  Et n'est ja  nu1 besoin d'assem- 
blcr  les  trois  Etats, pour  mettre  sus 
lesdites tailles, car ce n'est  quo charge 
ct despence au pauvre commun peuple, 
qui a It  payer  les frais do oeux  qui y 
viennent.  Et  ont  requis  plusieurs 
notables seigneurs des d~z  pays,  qu'on 
cessit  de  telle  convocation faire.  Et 
pour  cette cause  soit  convonus, qu'on 
envoic la commission aux eslues, selon 
le ban plaisir du roy.  (Cited in '  Re- 
cueil,' vol. ix. p. 99.) 
2  ' Ordonnances,'  vol.  xiii.  p.  392 ; 
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Estates  for  an  Aid  of  130,000  "limes  tournois " ;  they 
replied that their province was greatly impoverished, but they 
made a grant of  116,000 limes for one  year.l  In 1458 the 
people  of  Normandy  complained  of  the  violation  of  their 
laws  and liberties,  and  Charlcs  replied  by  confir~ng  their 
Charter, and promised that no Tailles, subventions or exactions 
should be imposed on the people  of  the Duchy  beyond  the 
customary "  redditus, census, et servitia nobis debita " except 
for some clear and urgent need, and then only by a meeting 
of the Three Estates of  the Duchy, as had been  c~stomary.~ 
It should be  observed  that "  Talliae " are  included  in  the 
taxes which  are not to be levied without  the Estates.  In 
March 1462(3),  we find Louis XI. referring to the fact that the 
Three Estates of  Normandy had granted him 400,000 "  livres 
tournois"  as  representing  all  Aids,  Taillages,  &c., for  the 
previous year.3  In an  Ordinance which as the Editors think 
belongs probably to 1463, we find that the Estates of  Languedoc 
had  granted  an Aid,  but  complained that the Receiver  of 
Taxes had taken more than the  Estates  had  granted.4  In 
1476(7) we have a letter of  Louis XI., relating to the Govern- 
ment  of  the Duchy  of  Burgundy,  which  had fallen  to the 
French  Crown on  the death of  Charles the Bold,  and Louis 
declares  that no  Aids  or  Subsidies should be  levied in the 
Duchy unless  they had been granted and authorised  by the 
Three Estates of  the D~chy.~ 
We have found direct evidence in a few cases of  an attempt 
by Louis XI. to over-ride the Estates, and to levy taxes, if 
necessary, without their consent.  The most  important is a 
1 '  Ordonnances,' vol. xiv. p. 388 (1). 
2  Id., vol. xiv.  p.  465 : "  Quod  de 
cetero per  nos  aut nostros  successores 
in dicto Duoatu  in personis aut bonis 
ibidem commorantibus, ultra redditus, 
census et servitia nobis debita, tallias, 
subventiones,  impositiones,  aut  exac- 
tiones quascunque facero non possimus, 
nee  debeamus, nisi evidens utilitas vel 
urgnns  nocessitas id  exposcat,  et per 
convontionem et congregationem gcn- 
tium  trium  statuum  clicti  Ducstus, 
sicut fnctum fuit et consueturn tornpore 
retro lapso." 
3  Id., vol. xv. p. 627 ; 
J  Id., vol. xvi. p. 26. 
6  Id., vol. xviii. p.  247  (17) : "Quo 
l'on ne pourra lever ni cueillir sur iceulx 
nos pays et clurh6, aydes no subsides iL 
notre prouiiit  ou  d'autres,  se non  quo 
losdites  aydes  ayent  est6  octroy6es, 
accord6es et consenties par lesditz gens 
cles trois Estats." 
letter of  1469 to the royal officers in Dauphin6 : Louis instructs 
them to request the Three Estates to make a grant of  money for 
the gear, bnt if the Estates refuse or delay to do this, they are 
to impose the tax and to levy it  by the methods uscd in cases 
of  debts  to  the  Crown,  notwithstanding  any  privileges  or 
exemptions granted by himself  or his predecessors.  It  must, 
however, be observed that Louis adds, that this was to be done 
without  prejudice  to such  privileges  or exemptions  for  the 
future.l 
In 1478 we  find  a  declaration  of  Louis XI. that he  had 
ordered the imposition of  a tax throughout the Kingdom, and 
he  demanded  1300  "  livres  tournois"  from  the  people  of 
Perigord,  but, it  should again  be  noticed,  that he did  thia 
without prejudice to their privileges for the f~ture.~ 
What conclusion then are we to draw ?  It seems to us clear 
that, whatever may have been the significance of  the provision8 
of  the Ordinance of  1439 with regard  to the "  Taille," it was 
still recognised as a general principle that Subsidies knd Aids 
could  not  be  imposed without  the consent  of  the Estates, 
Provincial or General. 
We turn to the proceedings of  the great States General held 
at Tours in 1484 at the accession of  Charles VIII.  When the 
Id. id., vol.  xvii.  p.  288 : "  Vous 
mandons  . . . que  vous  assembli6s 
lesdictes  gens  des  dicts  trois  estats 
dudict pays de Dauphin6 . . .  (et)  leur 
requerrez trds-instamment de par nous 
qu'ils  nous  veuillent  octroyer  et 
accorder  . . . la somme de quarante- 
cinq mille florins pour l'ayde  accoutu- 
m6e,  avec  la somme  da  vingt-quntre 
mille livres tournois forte monnaie . . . 
et en cas qu'icoux  gens  docdicts Trois 
Estats  scroient  reffusans  ou  delayans 
de nous octroyer pour ceste dicte ann6e 
les dictcs doux sommes dessus d0clar6s, 
nous  voulons et vous  mandons  qu'en 
leur  refus  ou  delay  vous  leu  mectiez 
aus et imposi6s par la manidre devant 
diote  . . . et non obstant oppositions 
et appellations  quelconques . . . (et). 
Contraigniez  ou  faictes  contraindre 
tous ceux sur lesquels lesdictes sommes 
auront eat6 impos6es, par toutes voies 
et manidres accountum6es do faire pour 
nos  propres  debtes  et  affeires,  non 
obstant  comme dessus et quelconques 
privilleges et exemptions qui pourroient 
avoir eat6 donn6es et octroy6es le temps 
pass6, par nos  pr6decesseurs, ou  nous, 
B  aucuns  desdicts  habitants,  et  sans 
prejudice  diceux  privildges  et exemp- 
tions pour le temps B venir." 
2  Id., vol.  xviii.  p.  403 : "A ceste 
cause  advons  advis6,  conclud  et  or- 
donn6, faire mestre sus, asseoir et im- 
poser  latlicte somme, en et par toutes 
les elections de notre royaumo, pour la 
porcion de laquollo avons ordonn6 estre 
mis sus et impose en votreditte election 
(Perigord)  la  somme  de  treize  cens 
livres tournois.  . . .  Et san.; prcj~idire 
do  lours  privilciges  pour  le  temps 
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Estates came to deal wit,h the financial business, the officers of 
the Crown attended and laid before them the actual condition 
of  the finances of  the country and the demands of  the Crown. 
The Estates as Masselin  reports in his '  Diarium ' were  not 
satisfied that the statement of  the revenue was correct, and 
it was proposed to grant the King the same amount as had 
been given to Charles VII., but only for two years, when the 
Estates were to meet again.l  The Chancellor, as representing 
the Crown, was not saLisfied, and while offering to reduce the 
amount  of  taxation, demanded  1,500,000  Masselin 
reports that a number of  the Princes and Lords attempted to 
persuade them to submit to the demands of  the Crown, and 
asserted dogmatically and in threatening terms that the Icing 
had the right to take his subjects' goods to meet the dangers 
and necessities of the Commonwoalth, and that many thought 
that the  amount  demanded  should be  imposed  and  levied 
even if  they were ~nwilling.~ 
The Estates finally decided to offer 1,200,000 livres for two 
years, and 300,000 for one year, for the expenses of  the coro- 
nation14  but accompanied this with the following statement. 
They grant the King the same amount as had been levied in 
the time  of  Charles VII.,  but they  do  thie  as  a  gift, and 
LL obtroyrf' not to be called "  tailles,"  and they  do this for 
two years only.  They also grant the sum of 300,000 "  livres " 
for  one  year,  on  his  accession  to  the  Cro~n.~  They  also 
1 Masselin,  '  Diarium,'  pp.  350-  5  Id. id., p.  449 : "  Et pour subvenir 
360.  aux  grandes  affairs  dudit  seigneur 
2  Id. id., p.  390.  (Charles VIII.), tenir  son royaume  en 
3  Id.  id.,  p.  420:  "Videmini  pro-  seuret6,  payer  et  soudoyer  ses  gens 
fecto oonari,  ut populum  etiam invi-  d'armes st  subvenir 8, scs autres affairs, 
tum,  faciatis  tenacem  et  avarum  et  les  troys  Estatz  luy  obtroyent,  par 
inofficiosum  principi.  Quod  si  etiam  manidre de don et octroy et non autre- 
contra rationem  dissentiret, certe  non  ment, et sans ce quon l'appelle dorese- 
ambigimus  regem  posse  subditorum  navant tailles, ains don  st obtroy, telle 
bona  capere,  quatenus  reipublicae  et sernblable somme  que  du temps du 
periculis et necessitatibus provideat,. .  .  .  feu  Roi  Charles Soptieme estait lev60 
Postremo sciatis plerosque in ea fuisse  et cueillie en son royaume,  st ce  pour 
sententia, ut petitus denariorum nume-  deux ans, prochainement  venans, tant 
rus  quindecies centorum millium vobis  seulement et non plus.  . . . Item, et 
etiam  statuatur  invitis,  atque  colli-  par-dessus ce, les ditz Estaz  . . .  laj 
pat rir.''  accordent la somme de trois cent mille 
4  Id. ~d.,  p. 428.  livres  tournois  pour  une  fois  tant 
petition  the King  that  he  should  call  together  the  States 
General within two years, for they do not contemplate (n'en- 
tendent point) that for the future any money should be raised 
without  their  being  summoned and  without  their  will  and 
consent.  They beg him to maintain the liberties and privileges 
of  the Kingdom and to abolish the novelties and grievances 
which had been introduced.1 
It  is clear that while  some persons, representing the Court, 
made large statements about tho power of  the King to raise 
taxes at  his pleasure, the States General were quite determined 
and firm in maintaining the principle that this was contrary 
to the tradition and custom of  the Constitution, and it would 
appear from Masselin that the King promised to call together 
the States General within two years.2 
We have then examined the evidence as to the constitutional 
usage of  France with  regard to taxation in the fifteenth cen- 
tury, but we must also take account of  some very important 
statements of Comines in his '  Memoires.' 
In one place he sets out the general principle that if  any 
king or lord were to impose any tax upon his subjects outside 
of  his  domain  without  their  consent,  his  action  would  be 
seullement et sans cons&quence,  et par 
manibre  do  don  et  obtroy,  pour  son 
nouvcl  et  joyeux  advenement  8,  la 
couronne do France." 
(This, and what follows in the next 
note, arc given  by the  Editor  in  the 
original  French  which  Masselin trans- 
lated into Latin.) 
Id. id., p.  451 : "Item et ensuivant 
certain  article,  contenu  ou  cayer  qui 
par les ditz Estatz a est6 leu et monstr6 
au  roi  et  h,  Messeigneurs  du  Conseil, 
suplient  et requidrent  les dits Estatz, 
clue  le bon  plaisir du dit seigneur eoit 
faire tenir  et assembler  lesditz  Estaz 
dedens deux ans prochainement venans, 
en lieu et temps qu'il lui plaira et que, 
de  ceste heure, lesditz lieux  et temps 
mien$ nommez, assignee et d6clairez ; 
car  les  ditz Estate  n'entendent  point 
que doresnavant on mette sus  aucune 
somme de deniors, sans les appeler, et 
que ce  soit  de leur  vouloir et consen- 
tement,  en  gardant  et  observant  les 
libertez  et privileges  do  ce  royaume; 
et que  les nouvelletez, griefs et mau- 
vaises introductions qui, par c'y devant, 
puis cortain tomps en Fa, ont est6 faictes 
soieut  repaireez ; et  cle  ce  supplient 
trbs humblement le roi nostre souverain 
seigneur." 
(The article of  the Cahier referred to 
will  be  found  on  page  678  of  the 
'  niarium.') 
Id. id., p.  712 : "  Le  roy est  con- 
tent que les Estatz se tienneut cledens 
deux ans prochainement  venant et lea 
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mere tyranny.l  ID.  another place he says that neither the King 
of  France nor any other Prince had the right to impose taxes 
on his subjects at his pleasure.  Those who say that he could 
do this, do the Icing no honour, but rather make him to be 
feared and hated by his neighbours, who would not on any 
account  become  his  subjects.  If the Icing would recognise 
how loyal his subjects are, and how willing to give him what 
he  asks, instead  of  saying that he would  take whatever  he 
wished, it would be greatly to his praise.  Charles V. never said 
this  and Comines had not heard  any king  say  it ; he  had 
heard  their  servants say it, but they  only  did  this  out  of 
servility, and did not know what they were talking abouL2 
We  shall return to Comines  when  we  deal  in  the  next 
chapter in more general terms with the position of  represen- 
tative institutions in the fifteenth century.  In  the meanwhile 
it is obvious that his evidence about the principles of  taxation 
is of great importmce, especially in correcting the impression 
which such statements as those of  Sir John Fortescue might 
produce. 
Comines  does  not  indeed  say  that  there  had  been  no 
arbitrary taxation in France, but he confirms the judgment 
1  Philippe  de  Comines, 'Memoires,'  si  tres  bons  et  si  tres  loyaux,  qu'ils 
v.  19, p.  141 : "Donc  pour continuer  ne  me  refusent  chose  que  je  leur 
propos, y a il  roy ne seigneur sur terre  saiche demander,  et suis  plus  craiuct, 
qui  ait povoir, oultre son domaine, de  obey et servy,  de  mes subicts que nu1 
mettre  un  denier  sur  ses  subjectz;  autre  prince  qui vive  sur  la terre, et 
sans ootroy et consentement  do  ceulx  qui  plus  patiemment  endurent  tous 
qui le doibvent payer, sinon par tyran-  maux et toutes rudesses, et a qui moins 
nie ou viollence 1 "  ils  souviengne  de  leur  dommages 
a  Id. id., v. 19, p.  142 : "  Notre  roy  passez ;  ' il  me  semble  que  cela  lui 
est le seigneur du monde qui lo moins  seroit  grand  10s  (st  dis  la  verit6) ; 
a cause de user de ce mot : '  J'ay pri-  non  pas  dire,  '  Je prends  ce  que  je 
vilege cle lever sur mes subjectz ce que  veulx, st  en ay privilege ; il le me fault 
me plaist,'  car ne luy ne autre ne 1& :  bien garder.' 
et ne luy font honneur ceux qui ainsi  Le  feu  roi  Charles  Quint  ne  le 
le  dient,  pour  le  faire  estim6s  plus  disoit  pas  ainsi,  ne  l'ay-je  point  ouy 
grand, mais le font hair et craindre aux  dire aux roys, mais l'ay  bient ouy dire 
voisins,  qui  pour  rien  ne  voudroiont  8.  de  leurs  servitcurs,  a qu'il  semblait 
&re  soubz sa seigneurie ; et mesmes  qu'ilz faisoient bien  la bcsogue.  Mais, 
aucuns  du  royaueme  s'en  passeroient  selon mon advis, ils mesprenoient envers 
bien,  qui  en  tiennent.  Mais  si  notre  leur seigneur, et ne le disoient que pour 
roy,  ou  ceux  qui  le  venlent  louer et  faire les bons varletz, et aussi qu'ilz ne 
agrandir,  disaient  '  J'ey  des  subjectz  soavoieut cc qu'ils disoient." 
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(which we  should  derive  from  the  study  of  the  "  Ordon- 
na~nees  ")  that it is impossible to maintain that the King of 
France had any recognised and constitutional right to impose 
taxation at his discretion.  That he frequenhly did so is clear, 
and the right to do so was froni time to time asserted by some 
persons,  but it is also clear that the right was emphatically 
and constantly denied, and that the King from time to time 
and in quite unequivocal terms recognised that taxation should 
not be imposed without the consent of  the Provincial or General 
Estates. 
The evidence we have found in the proceedings of  the Cortes 
of  Castile with regard to the constitut;ional method of  taxation 
during the fifteenth century, is curiously enough scanty, but 
what there is, is important.  In  the year 1411  we find a request 
made to the Cortes by the Guardians of  the young King for 
the grant of  a sum of money for the war against the Moors. 
The Cortes authorised the levy of  the amount askei for, but 
they attached to the grant the condition that the Guardians 
should take an oath in the presence of  the Cortes that the 
amount  granted  should be  strictly  appropriated  to the ex- 
penses of  the war, and to no other purp0se.l 
In 1420 the Cortes of  Valladolid represented  to the King 
that they were much disturbed by the fact that he was raising 
money without consulting the Cortes, and without their eon- 
sent.  The King replied that he would not levy such taxation 
till it had been authorised by the Corte~.~ 
'  Cortes of  Castile  and  Leon,' vol. 
iii. 2 (p. 6) (Valladolid, 1411): "Per lo 
qua1  nos  demandastes  quo  vos  otor- 
parnos, 10s trcs ostados del rregno, para 
cunplir e continuar, e sostener la dicha 
Guerra  delos mcros  . . . quarenta e 
~inco  cuentos desta moneda usal  . . . 
(P. 6).  A nos otros plaze todos de una 
concordia do  vos otorgar, e otorgamos 
V0"esdo  agora todo  quo  nos copiere 
a Pagar delos dichos quarenta  e ocho 
Cuent~s  desta moneda usal en Casticlla. 
. . Los quales dichos quarenta e ocho 
Cuentos vos  otorgarnos, sennores, para 
quolos pague el rregno este  anno pre- 
sente en  que  estamos,  para  cunplir  o 
continuar la dichn gucrra  . . . (p. 7). 
Et  este  otorgamiento  destos  dichos 
quarenta e ocho cuentos, sennores, vos 
fnzemos  con  condipion  que  fagades 
juramenta,  en presenqia  do  nos  otros, 
quo este dincro que vos otorgamos que 
non  lo  tomareclos  nin  destribuyrcdes 
en otras costas nin  otras cosm algunas, 
saluo enlo clicha gucrra delos moros." 
Id., vol. iii. 4,  2 (Valladolid, 1420) : 
"E otrosy  a10  que  me  pidieron  por 
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There is also a very important and carefully drawn-out state- 
ment by the Cortes of  Ocaiia in 1469.  The Cortes expressed 
themselves as willing  to contribute to the necessities  of  the 
Icing by a grant of  money, but, as it appears, they were not 
satisfied with the financial admirlistration, and they therefore 
proposed that the amount raised should be placed under the 
control of  persons to be appointed by the Cortes, who should 
hold it for the King and should only expend it for the restora- 
tion  of  the royal patrimony  and the Crown, and other pur- 
poses authorised by the Cortes.  They also proposed that no 
payment should be made except under a writ signed by the 
King himself  and at least two members of  his Council, and 
certain persons to be  aqpointed by  the Cortes.  They  also 
proposed that the King should swear to maintain these pro- 
visions, and should request the Pope to cxcommunicote him 
i.f he did not do so.  The King assented, except to the clause 
about the P0pe.l 
vos  otros,  en  quo  fuese  especifioado 
todo  el  caso,  quo  por  mi  mandado  e 
en  mi presenqia el dicho Arqobispo de 
Toledo 10s  avia  dicho, e lo  que  c;erca 
dello  conduyoron,  e  pertifioando  los, 
que  por  caso  alguno  que  acaespiese, 
non  mandario  coger  10s tales  pechos, 
sin primer0 ser otorgados : que de aqui 
sdelante  quando  algunos  men6steros 
me  viniosen,  ami  plaaie  de  vos  lo 
fazer  saber  primeramente  antes  que 
mandase  echar  nin  derramar  tales 
pechos." 
1 Id., vol. iii.  25,  10 (Ocaca, 1469) : 
" Quales  per  nos  otros  fueren  non- 
brados,  para  que  rrespiban  delos 
arrendadores  e  rrecaudadores  e rrepe- 
tores, todas las contias quo montaren en 
10s  dichos  pedidos  e  monedas,  e  lo 
tengen  donde por  vuestra  alteza  con 
acuerdo  de  nos  otros fuero mandado, 
e  les  dipute  salario  rrazonable  para 
ello, e que non acudan con cosa  dello 
a  persona  alguna  ni  lo  gasten, saluo 
enlo que fuere menester para la8 cosas 
conqernientes ala rrestituqion  de  vues- 
tro patrimonio e rreformapion de vues- 
tra corona rroal, e enlas cosas conthe- 
nidas  enel  otorgamionto  quo  pcr  nos 
otros se hiziere delos dicl~os  pedidos e 
monedas, e esto quo se haga solamente 
por v~est~ras  cart-  o alualaos firmado 
de  vuestro  nonbre  e  firmado  en  las 
espaldas delos nonbres delov de vuestro 
consejo,  que  sean  fulano  y  fulano  y 
fulano  y fulano,  o alos  monos 10s dos 
dellos,  si  10s  otros  no  ostouieren  en 
vuestra corte, e de algullos de nos otro~l 
quales nos otros deputaremos,  e delos 
vuestros contadores  mayores,  que  de 
otra guisa 10s  dichos rrecaudadores,  e 
errencladores  e  rrepetores  non  sean 
thenudos  de  aoudir  ni  acudan  con 
dinero dclos dichos pedidos e monedas, 
e quo vuostra  alteza jure  dolo guardar 
e manthcncr asy e qno non yrb nl vegnB 
contra  ello,  e  que  supliquo a  nuestro 
muy sencto Padre, que ponga sentonpia 
de  excommunion  sobro  vuestra  rreal 
persona si lo contrario hiziere o man- 
dare  e  que  desto  nos  mande  lnego 
dar  sus  cartas  para  quclos  klagamoe 
pubhcar." 
CHAP.  v.]  TAXATION. 
It  would appear that, whatever may be the exact significance 
of  some of  these complicated provisions, the Cortes not only 
was  the body which  authorised the imposition of  taxes,  but 
that  they  considered  themselves  entitled  to  see  that  the 
amounts raised should be appropriated strictly to the purposes 
for  which  they  granted them.  We  see no  reason to doubt 
that the constitutional principles of  the fourteenth century, 
which we have discussed in Part I. of  this volume, were main- 
tained in the fifteenth.1 
It is  obviously  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  question  of 
taxation with regard to England in the fifteenth century, for 
there cannot be any doubt that it was recognised that Parlia- 
ment aIone had in normal cases the right to levy taxatiol~.~ 
Cf.  Part I. p. 92.  (cd.  1896).  par.  370 and  I~ldex--~~xa- 
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CHAPTER  VI. 
REPRESENTATIVE  INSTITUTIONS. 
WE have in previous chapters dealt with the history of  law, 
its source and authority, and with the theories of  the nature 
and limitations of  the authority of  the Buler : we must now 
consider the development of  the authority of  the community 
as  embodied  in  and  finding  expression  in  representative 
institutions. 
We venture to say that this is the proper method  of  ap- 
proaching tlle development of  Parliamentary  or quasi-Parlia- 
mentary forms.  The phrasos which are sometimes used, such 
as that of  the "  Sovereignty of  the People," may be well meant, 
but  are in  our judgment  somewhat misleading.  The  term 
"  Sovereignty " itself  has  often been  used  so  carelessly  that 
it is  better  to avoid it, and the term "  People " is  almost 
equally  ambiguous.  It would  be  better  to  speak  of  the 
authority of  the "  Cominunity," the "  Respublica " or "  Uni- 
versitas,"  for these are more strictly the Medi~val  terms, and 
whatever ambiguity may belong to them, they have at least 
not become the catch-words of  sometimes ill-considered con- 
troversy. 
We have seen that it  is true to say that the normal Mediaval 
conception, which was only reinforced by the revived study of 
the Roman Jurisprudence, was that the community was the 
source of  all political  authority,  which  was  indeed  derived 
ultimately from God, but immcdiately from the commullity. 
The community was the source of  law, and of  the authority of 
the Ruler, Emperor or Iiing ; and it is also clear that, while 
the Prince  was  conceived  of  as having,  subject to the law, 
a large discretion in the exercise of  his authority, in fact the 
Medizval Prince normally acted with the counsel and advice 
of some body of councillors, the chief men of  the Community, 
who were conceived of, however vaguely, as having some kind 
of representative character. 
There is nothing therefore to surprise the historian in the 
fact that this vaguely representative institution should halve 
assumed a more precise and definite character in Spain in the 
twelfth century, in England and France and other countries 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
We  endeavoured to trace very briely the development ot 
representative institutions in the twelfth  and thirteenth cell- 
turies in our last volume, and in the first, part of  this volume 
we  have  set  out  solliething  of  their  developmellt  in  the 
fourteenth century.  TVe  must now consider this in the fifteenth, 
and especially in Spain and France. 
It  is important to observe that while the Cortes of  Castile 
and Leon did not meet every year, they met very frequently. 
It  is not going too far to say that the Cortes in the fifteenth 
century  continued  to  be,  as  in  the fourteenth  century,  a 
normal part of  the system of  government. 
It is  also  evident  that the Cortes were  clearly  conscious 
of  their  representative  character,  and  greatly  concerned 
to maintain this.  We find them repeatedly throughout  the 
century  protosting  against  any  interference  by  the  King 
with the election of  representatives.  In 1441  they demanded 
that the King, when he issued his summons to the cities and 
estates  to send  their  Procurators  to the  Cortes, should not 
nominate any partrticular persons ; for the cities should elect 
freely according to use and custom.  The King replied that he 
would  not nominate any persons to be sent as p~ocurators.~ 
'  ' Cortcs of Castile and Loon,' vd.  iii.  nonbrar  que  enbien  perbonas  piertas, 
9,  9  (l'olencia,  1431) :  " Obrosi  supli-  saluo  aquollas  quelas  dichas ~ibdades 
carnos  ala  vuestra  alteea  que cada  e  e villas entendieran que cunple auestro 
quando le plonguiero mandnr avuostras  soruicio e bien  publico  delos  pueblos ; 
~ibdades  e  villas que nnbion  sus pro-  por que libre monte 10s puedan escoger 
curadores  ante vuestra morpod,  quela  crltre  si,  segund  lo han  de  uso  e  de 
vuo8ti-a  sennoria  non  quiera  mandar  coutumbre ; pero  que non  bean  dulov E'IFTEENTH  CENTURY. 
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Tn  1442 the Cortes of  Valladolid renewed  this  demand even 
mire emphatically, and added the very important claim that 
in the case of a disputed election the Cortes itself should con- 
sider and decide the question, and not the Ring or any other 
.'  justicia."  The King again assented to their demand that he 
ahonld not nominate any person for election, but his answer 
to the second point was, as we understand it, that in case of 
a  disputed  election  they  should  asli  his  permission  before 
determining upon  it.l  In 1447  the Cortes  again  protested 
against  the interference  of  the King,  but on this occasion, 
though accepting tho general principle, the King reserved his 
right to take such action on his own initiative, if  he thought 
it d~sirable.~  In 1462 again the Cortes at Toledo demanded 
labradores nin sesmoros nin do:  estado  curador ; por  quelas  dichas  cibdades 
delos  pecheros,  por  quo  mejor  sea  enbien  libre  monte  sus  procuredores, 
guardado el estado e onrra delos quelos  e sy caso sera que algunos procuradores 
enbian,  e so  puedan  mejor  conformar  vengan  en  discordia,  que  el  conospi- 
con  10s  otros  procuradores  quando  miento della, sea delo~  procuradores  e 
ovieren  de  tractar  en sus  ayuntami  non  de  vuestra  sennoria  nin  de  otra 
entos. 
A  esto  vos  rrespondo  que  yo  non 
vos envie mandar gue enbiasedes per- 
sonas piertas por procuradores." 
1 Id.,  "01.  iii.  16,  12  (Valladolid, 
1442) : "  Otrosi muy esclarepido rrey 
e sennor, por quanto la osperienpia ha 
mostrado 10s grondes dannos e incon- 
venientes que vienen enlos pibdades  e 
villas  quando  vuestra  sennoria  enbia 
llamar  procuradores,  sobre la elepeion 
dellos, lo qual viene por vuestra aenoria 
'  se entrcmeter  a rrogar  e mandar que 
enbien  personas  sennaladas,  e  asy 
mesmo  la  sonnora  Reyna  vuestra 
Muger e el  Prinpipe vuestro fijo e otros 
sennores ;  supplicamos auestra aennoria 
que non se quiera entremoter enlos tales 
rruegos e mandamientos,  nin  d6  logar 
que  por  la  dicha  sennora  Reyna  o 
Principe,  nin  por  otros  sennores scan 
ferhos;  0  ordenar  e  mandar  que  sy 
algunos llevaren  tales cartas,  que por 
el mosmo fecho pierdan 10s ofipios que 
touieren enlas dichas cibdades et villas, 
o sea  privado para  sienpre de ser pro- 
jusligia. 
A esto vos respondo qne dezidee bien, 
e  mando  que  se  filga  e  guarda  auy; 
pero  que  el  conospimiento  del  tal 
quando  la procurapion viniere en dis- 
cordis, que  quede  ami  mercet para lo 
mandar ver e determimr." 
Cf. iii. 21, 9. 
2  Id..  iii.  19,  60 (Valladolid,  1447) : 
"  Otrosi muy poderoso sennor, algunos 
con  importunidad  ganan  cartas  do 
vuestra  sennoria  delos  que  estan 
cerca  dello  pama  que  quando  vuestra 
sonnoria llama a Cortes e manda quele 
enbien procuradores, qua enbien a ellas, 
lo qual no as vuostro servisio e dello se 
podrian seguir algunos inconvenientes ; 
supplicamos  a  vuestra  sennoria  que 
prouea en ello, mandando quelas cartas 
non  se  den,  e  sy se  dieren  quo  sea11 
obedecidas, mas non complidas. 
A  esto vos  respondo  que  asi  lo  110 
guardado  e  entiendo mandar  guardar 
segund quo melo suplicastes e pedistcs 
por  merped,  saluo  quando  yo,  non  a 
peticion do porsones alguna mas de mi 
that thc King, Henry IT., should not interfere in the e1ection.s. 
-  - - - - -  - 
and that any person who produced royal Briefs for his elec- 
tion in any city, should be perpetually disqualified for holding 
any office or "  procuragion "  in that city.  The Ring replied 
that this was already provided for by the laws, specially those 
of  Juan 11. 
This jealous insistence on the freedom of  the elections by the 
Cortes is  of  great significance, as we  have said, in  showing 
that they were much concerned to vindicate their representative 
character, and the fact that the Crown was evidently from 
time to time attempting to control the elections, is significant 
of  the continuing importance of  the Cortes. 
We have in an earlier chapter considered the functions and 
authority of  the Cortes with reference to legislation, and in 
the last chapter we have dealt with their authority in taxation, 
but it must be carefully observed that the Cortes did not con- 
ceive  of  their  function and  authority  as limited  to finance 
and  legislation, but claimed  that they  should be  consulted 
on all the more important affairs of  the Commonwealth. 
There is an excellent illustration of  this in  the early part 
of  the century.  The Cortes in 1419 represented to the King, 
Juan II., that when his predecessors ordained anything new 
or of  geneyal importance for the kingdom, they were accustomed 
to call together the Cortes and to act with their advice, and 
not otherwise ; they complained that this had not been done 
since his accession, and that this was contrary to custom and 
law and reason ; and they therefore petitioned  him  that he 
should do this in the future.  The King replied that hc had 
always done this in important matters, and that he intended 
to do it in the fut~re.~ 
In 1469 we  have a statement by the Cortes as emphatic as 
that of 1419.  They protested to Henry IV. against an alliance 
with England instead of  with France, and represented them- 
"lvos  as aggrieved for several reasons,  of  which the first is 
important from our present point of  view.  They maintained 
Proprio  motu,  entendiondo  ser  asy 
1 Id., iii. 23, 37 (Toledo, 1462). 
complidero a  mi serviyio, otra cosa me 
8  Id., iii. 3,  19 (Madrid, 1419). 
 gluere re cle mandar e disponer." 
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that according to the laws of  the kingdom, when the kings had 
to deal with any matter of  great importance, they ought not 
to do  this without  the counsel  of  the principal  cities  and 
"  villas " of the kingdom, and they complained that the King 
had not observed this, but had acted without the knowledge 
of  the greater part  of  the grandees,  and  of  the cities  and 
"   villa,^."  It is  true that the answer  of  the Kiog  was,  as 
it seems to us, evasive ; he only promised to consider their 
petition with his Council, and to take such action upon it as 
might seem best ; but this dogmatic statement of  the Cortes 
of  their claim to be consulted on all important matters, and 
their  assertion  that this was  in  accordance with  the laws, 
remains very important.  l 
We turn to the character of  the representative system in 
France in the fifteenth century, but we must again notice that 
in considering this  we  must  remember  not  only  the  States 
General, but also the Estates of  the great Provinces.  If  we 
could take account of  them we should recognise more clearly 
the importance  of  the representative system in France,  for 
though  the meetings  of  the States General in the fifteenth 
century  were  important,  the  meetings  of  the  Provincial 
Estates were, as we should judge, much more frequent. 
What were the matters with which they were concerned? 
We have already dealt with some of  these, especially legislation 
and taxation, but we  must observe that, besides these, they 
were concerned with all the important affairs of  the kingdom. 
In the first part of  this volume we  have pointed  out that 
the attitude of  France to the great Schism in the Papacy was 
determined  in some kind  of  great  council of  the kingdom. 
1 Id., iii. 25, 29 (Ocafia, 1469) : "  La 
primera, porque segundleyes di vuestros 
rregnos, quando 10s rreyes hen de hazer 
alguna cosa de gran importanqia, no 10 
deuen  hazer  sin  consejo  e  sabiduria 
delos qibdades e  villas  principales  de 
vuestros rreynos ; lo quai en esto no 
guard6  vuestra  alteza,  hablando  nos 
nt,vnn con humill reverencia, ca nunca  ----- 
cosa desto aupieron la mayor parte dolos 
grandes  de  vuestros  rregnos,  ni  la8 
prinpipdes pibdades e villas dellos. . . . 
A esto vos rrespondo  que yo entiendo 
deliberar  sobre lo contenido en uestra 
petipion e platicar esto enel mi consejo e 
hazer  fiobrello lo quo se hallare que 0s 
mas complidero a servizio de Dios 8 a1 
pro  e  bien  commun  de mis rrognos e 
sennorios." 
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~t does not seem that we  can call the Assembly, at which in 
1408 it was  determined  that Prance  should  be  neutral  as 
between the rival claimants to the Papacy, a meeting of  the 
States General, but it had at least something of  the character 
of a National Assembly.  The King speaks of  the decision as 
being  made  after  great  and  mature  deliberation  with  the 
Princes  of  the  Blood,  the  great  Council  and  others,  both 
clerical and lay. 
We are on clearer ground when we observe that the Assembly 
summoned to meet in Paris in 1413 in the name of  Charles VI., 
was composed of  the Princes, Prelates, representatives of  the 
University, and those of the good towns.  The business of  this 
Assembly was to deliberate on the great affairs of  the kingdom, 
and especially on the reform of  the Royal officials.2 
In the Treaty of Troyes by which in 1420 Charles VI. gave  t 
the actual administration,  and the future succession to the 
French Crown to Henry V.  of  England, it was specially pro- 
vided that the Treaty was to be confirmed by the oaths not 
only  of  the great Lords, but also by those of  the Estates of 
the  kingdom,  spiritual  and  temporal,  and  the  cities  and 
communities of the kingd~m.~  In  another clause of the Treaty 
it was provided that Henry was to endeavour to secure that, 
by the advice and consent of the three Estates of the two king- 
doms, the union of  the crowns of  England and Prance in one 
person should be perpetual.%  It was no doubt in accordance 
with these provisions of  the Treaty that the Three Estates were 
called together in Paris in December of  the same year.  We 
have unfortunately  only  an incomplete  account  of  the pro- 
'  ' Ordonnances,' vol. ix. p. 342. 
'  Recueil,'  vol.  vii.  5,  39.  Cf. 
Ifonstrelet, '  Chronique,' vol. ii. p.  307. 
a  '  Recueil,' vol. viii. 695,  13, p. 636. 
"  11 est accord6 que les grands seigneurs, 
barons  et nobles, et  les  Estats  dudit 
'Oyaume,  tant spirituel que temporelz, 
et  aussi les citez ot notables communitez, 
citoyens et bourgeois du dit royaume, 
A nous ob6issans pour le tornps, feront 
lea seremens qui s'ensuivent." 
'  Id.,  vol.  viii.  695,  24,  p.  360: 
"I1  est  accord6  que  notre  dit  filz 
labourera par effect de son pouvoir, quo 
de  l'adviz  et consentement  des  Trois 
Estas  desdiz  royaumes,  ostez  les 
obstacles en ceste partie,  soit ordonne 
et pourveu que du temps que notre dit 
filz sera vonu h la couronne de France, 
ou aucun de sos hoirs, les deuxcouronnes 
de  France  et dlAngleterre  A  toujours 
mais  porpetuelment,  demoumont  on- 
sernble,  et seront en  une  mesme  por. 
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ceedings in  Juvenal des Ursins'  '  Histoire  de Charles VI,' 
but if  we  could trust a  document printed  by Ryrner in the 
' Foedera,' whose source is unknown, we  have an important 
statement of  the composition and proceedings of  the Estates. 
They are described as composed  of  the Bishops and Clergy, 
the '(  Proceres,"  nobles,  citizens,  and  burgesses.  After  the 
Chancellor had read the Treaty to them, and the King had 
declared that he had sworn to observe it, the Estates were 
adjourned  for  a  few  days,  and on their  reassembling they 
reported  that they  approved,  accepted  and  authorised  the 
Treaty and all its  provision^.^ 
To return to the legitimate government of  France, we  have 
a reference to a meeting of  the States General at Chinon, in a 
letter of  1426.3  We have already dealt with the very impor- 
tant meeting of  the States General at Orleans in November 
1439, and we need only point out again that it was with the 
advice  of  the  Estates  that  Charles  VII.  created  the  new 
military organisation of  Fran~e.~ 
In  April 1468, Louis XI. called together the States General 
to deal with a great constitutional question ; that was-the 
demand of his brother Charles that the Duchy of  Normandy 
should be separated from the Crown of  France, and held by 
himself.  The Three Estates agreed that it could not be thus 
separated,  but must  remain  inseparably  united  and joined 
to the Cro~n.~  It is  also  significant of  the  constitutional 
authority of the States General that on the same occasion, in 
view of  the attacks made by the Duke of Brittany in Normandy, 
1 Juvenal  des  Ursin~, '  Histoire  de  trusted  is  uncertain.  It is  possible 
Charles VI.,'  ed. Paris, 1653, p. 384.  that  it  represents  an  attempt  in 
Rymer, '  Foedera,'  vol.  x.  p.  30 :  England  to give the Treaty of  Troyes 
"  Rosponderunt  quod,  quantum  ad  a legal and constitutional character.) 
Pacem predictam, Ipei eandem Pacem  ' Ordonnances,' vol. xiii. p.  140. 
censentes  et  reputantes  laudabilem,  Cf. pp.  138, 194. 
neeessariam et utilem utrisque Regnis et  '  Reeueil,' vol. x.  114 (3), p.  653 : 
subditis eorundem, ymo et toti christi-  "  Que en tent qu'il touche ladicte duch6 
anitati,  ipsam  Pacem  ac  omnia  st  di Normandie, elle ne doit st ne  pout 
8inguIa  in  eadem  contents,  quantum  6tre separe4 do la couronne en quelque 
in eis erat et velud ipsi tres St,atus dicti  manidre que ce  soit, mais y est et doit 
Regni, approbarunt, laudarunt, mcep-  Btre et demeurer unie, annex6e et con- 
tarunt et auctorisamnt."  jointe ins4pmabloment." 
(How  far  this  document  call  be 
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they gave the King authority to take such action as should be 
necessary  to maintain  the  statutes and  ordinances  of  the 
kingdom without waiting to call together the Estates.l 
It  is, we  think, evident that the States General in France 
were conceived of, not merely as a body which should sanction 
taxation, importa,nt though this was, but as, in some sense and 
degree, representing the whole community of  the nation, whose 
approval and support it was desirable that the King should 
obtain in matters of  great political importance.  It is only 
with this in our mind that we can understand the constitutional 
attitude of  the great States General of  Tours which met in 
January 1484, on the accession of  Charles VIII. 
We have already dealt with some important questions which 
arose in the course of  their meetings, and here, therefore, we 
only deal with some other of  the most important of  these.  When 
the States General met, they conceived their function as being 
primarily to consider the abuses which had grown up during 
the last reigns, and secondly to consider and provide for the 
government of the country during the minority of  the King. 
The  &st  they proceeded  to deal  with  by  arranging  the 
Estates in six divisions, representing the six groups of  provinces ; 
each of  these divisions was to prepare a statement of  grievances 
and  remedies.  They  then  created  a  commission  of  six 
members of  each division to prepare a general statement on 
this basis.  We are not here concerned with the details of  these 
statements, but it is important to observe that they covered 
almost the whole range of the government of  the country, not 
only in matters of  finance, but also of  the administration of 
justice.2 
The question of  the Council of  Regency was the subject  of 
protracted discussion.  It is evident from Masselin's account 
that there was much dflerence of  opinion among the members 
Id. id.  id.  (9), p.  558: "  Et dds  pourreque  ais4ment ils  ne  se  peuvent 
maintenant pour lors, et dds-lore pour  pas  assembler,  y  puisse  proceder 
maintenant,  toutes  les  fois  que  les-  faire tout ce que ordre de  droit  et de 
dits cas Bcherroient, iceux des Etatz ont  justice, et les statuts et ordonnances du 
accord6 et consenti, aceordent  et con-  royaume le portent." 
sentent  que le roi, sans attendre autre  Masselin,  '  Diarium,'  pp.  66,  74, 
assembl6e  ne  congregation  des  Etats,  76. FIFTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  11. 
of the States General, some maintaining that it was for them 
to appoint the Council, for the care of  the State had now (in 
the King's minority) come to them, while others maintained 
that the appointment of  the Council belonged to the Princes 
of the Blood.1  The  final result seems to have been that the 
Estates did not maintain the right to appoint the Council of 
Regency, but they requested the Kin;  and his Council to add 
to it twelve persons, to be chosen from the six divisions of  the 
 estate^.^ 
It is no  doubt probably true that behind the controversy 
in the Estates about the composition of  the Council of  Regency, 
we can see the influence of  different factions among the Princes 
and great nobles, but we are not attempting to write the history 
of  the times. 
We turn  again  to Cornmines  and  to his  attitude to the 
States General.  His opinions have a special value, not only 
because  he  was  a  man  of  great experience in political and 
diplomatic affairs, but because he was  a great servant of the 
French Crown, and cannot be suspected of  any desire to de- 
preciate its authority.  We have in the last chapter cited his 
important  statements  about  taxation,  but  these  are  only 
incidental to his treatment  of  the importance  of  reasonable 
relations between the King and his subjects.  It is not only 
with reference to taxation that he thinks that the King should 
act with the consent of  his subjects.  After the general con- 
demnation of the attempts of  kings to impose taxes upon their 
subjects  without  their  consent,  as  being  mere  tyranny, 
which we  have cited, he continues, that even in the case of 
war it was  much wiser for kings to act  aiter consulting the 
assemblies of  their people, and with their consent, and that this 
would  greatly  increase  the  King's  power.3  Comrnines  is 
1 Id. id., p.  138.  l'entrepreudre.  No  se  fault  point 
Id. id., p. 702, 3.  haster, et on a assez temps : et si vous 
8  Commines,  '  MBmoires,'  v.  19,  p.  dis que 10s Roys et Princes en sont trop 
141 : "  On pourroit respondre qu'il y a  plus fors,  quend ilz entreprenneut du 
de  saisons qu'il  ne  faut pas  attendre  conseil de leurs sujectz, et en sont plus 
l'asaemblee, et que la chose seroit trop  crainctz de leurs cnnemis." 
longue,  8.  commencer  la  guerre  et  8. 
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obviously  referring  to  the  Estates  when  he  speaks  of  the 
assembly,  and  a  little  later  on  he  speaks  of  them  wfth 
special reference to the States General of  Tours in 1484.  He 
describes contemptuously certain persons who  spoke of  this 
assembly  as  dangerous, and  denounced it as being  treason 
(leze majest6) to speak of  calling together  the Estates, and 
argued that this would  diminish the authority of  the King ; 
such persons,  he says, were  really guilty of  a crime against 
God and the King ; they were men who held some undeserved 
authority, and talked thus foolishly, because they were afraid 
of the great assemblies, and feared that they would be known 
for what they were, and be censured.l  It is clear that Com- 
mines looked upon the States General, that is, the meeting of 
the representatives of the community, and its consultation by 
the King, as being a useful and normal  part of  the organi- 
sation  of  a  political  society,  necessary  for  taxation,  and 
desirable for the effectiveness of  public action. 
We do not need  to discuss in  detail the character  of  the 
representative Assembly of  the Empire, for it is clear that the 
Emperor was the head of  a political body which was  tending 
to become a federal system rather than a unified monarchy, 
and that the final authority in this system belonged rather to 
the Diet than to the Emperor. 
It is, however, important to observe the terms in which the 
Diet is  described  by  Nicolas  of  Cusa.  Tho Council  of  the 
Empire, he says, consists of  the Emperor, the principal Rulers 
Id. id., p.  143 : "  Et pour  parler 
do I'experience de la bont6 des Branpsis, 
ne  faut alleguer pour nostre temps que 
19s  Trois Estats tenus 8. Tours, apres le 
decez  de  notre  bon  maistre  le  Roy 
Louis XI. (& qui Dieu fasse pardon) qui 
fut l'an  mil, quatre cents, quatrovingts 
et troia. 
L'on  povait  estimer  lors  que  ceste 
msemblee estoit dangereux, et disoient 
cluelques ungz de petite condition et de 
Petite  vertu,  et ont dit  plusieurs fois 
depuis, que c'est crime do LBze Majestd, 
qul  de  parler  d'assembler  I':statz,  et 
que c'est pour  diminuer 11auctorit6 du 
roi:  et sont ceulx  qui commottent  ce 
crime envers Dieu et le Roy, et la chose 
publique ;  mais aervoient ces paroles, et 
servent  8,  ceulx  qui  sont en  auctorit6 
et credit, sans en riens l'avoir merit6, et 
qui no  sont points propicos d'y 6tr0, et 
n'ont  accoustum6 que  do  fleureter  en 
I'oreille, et parler  de chose8 de  peu  de 
valleur;  et  craigneut  les  grandes 
assemblees,  de paour  qu'ils  ne soieut 
congnenz, Ou  que leur~  muvres ne soient 
blasm6es." FIFTEENTH CENTURY. 
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of  the varioue provinces as representing these, and the heads 
of  the great communities (Universitates) ; and, he adds signifi- 
cantlv. when these  are met in one representative body,  the  ", 
whole Empire is gathered t0gether.l 
We may put beside this the terms in which at the Diet of 
Worms in 1495, a  new  Court  of  the Empire,  the  LL Reichs 
Kammergericht,"  was established.  Its creation was a part of 
the attempt made in the last years of  the fifteenth  century 
to reorganise the constitution of  the Empire.  The creation of 
this new Court is represented as being related to an attempt 
to establish a "  Common Peace " for the whole Empire, and 
it, was  with  the  consent  of  the Electors,  Princes,  Counts,  - -  .  . -- . 
Nobles,  and  Estates  that the Peace  and  the  Court  were 
e~tablished.~  And it was with the counsel and will of  the Diet 
that the Emperor was to appoint the judges of  the Court.8 
We  do  not  discuss the development of  the representative 
system in the fifteenth century in England, for this has been 
done by the great historians, but it is worth while to put beside 
1 Nicolas of Cu~a,  '  De Concordantia 
Catholics,'  iii.  26 :  "  Scimus  impera- 
torem caput st primum omnium, apud 
quem est imperialis iussio,  de congre- 
.gandis subditis, regibus et principihus, 
si vero qui ut membra ad ipsun caput 
concurrere  habent ; in  hoc  universali 
concilio  sunt  principdes  praesides 
provinciarum,  suas  provincias  repre- 
sentantes,  ac  etiam  universitatum 
magnarum rmtores et magistri,  et illi 
qui e senatorio gradu, qui sacer conven- 
tus appelatur, eristunt.  . . . Et  durn 
simul  conveniunt  in  uno  eompendio 
representative, totum imperium collec- 
tum est." 
2  "  Neue  Sammlung,"  '  Senckenburg 
und  Schmaus,'  vol. ii. p.  21 ; Reichs- 
abschiecl,  Worms,  1496 :  "  Darumb 
mit  cynmutigen,  zeytigen  Rate  der 
heylig Reich und Teutsche Nacion eyn 
gemainen  Fried furgenommen,  aufger- 
ichtet und gemacht."  (p. 6) "  Ordnung 
des  kayserlichen  Cammergerichts  zu 
Worms.  . . . Wir  haben  aus beweg- 
lichen Ursachen, einen gemeinen Landt- 
Frieden,  durch  den  heylig  Romisch 
Reich und teutsche Nacion, aufgericht,, 
und  zuhalten  gepoten,  und  nachdem 
dcr sclb on redlich, erber und furderlich 
Recht  schwerlich  in  Wesen  besteen 
mocht, darumb auch Germanien  Nutz 
zu  Ftirderung  und  Nothurfften  euer 
aller,  unser und des  Heyligen  Reychs 
Cammergerichts  mit  zeitigom  Rat11 
Encr  der  Churftirsten  Fursten  und 
Gemainen  Besammlung,  auff  unserem 
und des Reychs  Tage,  hie  zu Worms, 
aufzurichton und zu  halten, furgenom- 
men in Form und Massen  als hernach 
Erwerdigen und Hochge~orenen . . .  volget." 
Curfiirsten  und  Fursten,  Geysstlichen 
8  Id. id. : "  Die Richter undurthejler 
und Weltligen  auch  Prelaten, Grafen,  die  all  wir  mit  Rath und Willen  der 
Herren  und Stende, haben Wir  rnlr~h  Sammllung yet.  hie kicaen werden." 
Nicolas of Cnsa and Cornmines, some of  those passages which 
we  have already cited in which Sir John Fortescue describes 
this,  and also  some  observations on  what  he understood  to 
have been its history in France. 
He deals with it &st  in his treatise on the Law of  Nature, 
where he treats the English constitutional system as embodying 
the " dominium politicum et regale," for no laws can be made. 
nor taxes imposed without the consent of  the Three Estates 
of the Kingdom, while on the other hand the subjects could 
not make laws without the authority of  the King.l  He deals 
with  it again  in  the treatise,  '  De Laudibus Legis  dngliae,' 
where he points out that the laws of  England do not proceed 
from the mere will of the King, for laws which are made by the 
Prince alone might often be directed to his private advantage 
and turn to the injury of his subjects, while the laws of  Englmd 
are made by  the wisdom  and prudence  of  more than three 
hundred  elected  men,  that is  by  the  assent  of  the  whole 
kingdom, and for the good of  the neonh2  -  L-  L---' 
In his '  Government of  England'  Portescus contrasts  the 
unhappy condition of  the French people under a "  Dominium 
Regale "  with that of  the English under a "  Dominium Politi- 
cum et Regale,"  as he had done in his '  De Laudibus Legis 
0  Angliae,' but he also says that though the French King now 
reihgned "  Dominio Regali,"  this had not always been so,  for 
neither St Louis nor his ancestors imposed taxes on the people 
without the assent of  the Three Estates, which were like the 
Parliament in England, and this had continued till the time 
of  the warB of England against Pran~e.~ 
We have, we think, said enough to justify our own conclusion 
that  that  representative  system  whose  beginnings  in  the 
'  Fortescue,  '  De  Natura  Legis  id est plurium dispensatione regulatum 
Naturae,'  i.  16 : "  Sed et tertium  esse  dici  possit,  verum  etiam  ct  regale 
dominium, non minus his  dignitate et  dominium nominari mereatur, cum nee 
laude,  quod politicum et regale  nomi-  ipsi subditi, sine regia auctoritate loges 
natur. . . . In regno namque Angliae  condere valeant." 
reges  sine  trium  statuum regni  illius  Id., '  De Laudibus Legum Angliae,' 
consensu  leges non condunt, nec  sub-  xviii. 
sidia  imponunt  subditis  suis.  . . .  a  Id., '  Governance  of  England,'  iii, 
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twelfth and thirteenth  centuries we  have traced in  the last 
volume,  and whose  contdd  importance in  the fourteenth 
century we  have illustrated in the first part of  this volume, 
continued to be a normal part of  the political civilisation of 
Western Europe in the fifteenth century.  As we have often 
 aid, we are not writing a constitutional history of  Europe, and 
we  are only concerned with the representative system as illus- 
trating'the conception that political authority was understood 
to  be  the  authority  of  the  community,  primarily  indeed 
through  the law which was  the expression and the form of 
its life, but secondarily and in these later centuries especially, 
as embodied in the Assemblies, Estates, or Parliaments which 
were accepted as representing the whole community. 
We have examined the political and legal literature of  the 
fifteenth century, and we have compared it with the constitu- 
tional practice especialy of  Spain and France, and we  think 
that it is clear that there is little trace of the development of 
any political conceptions which were merent from those of 
the fourteenth century, or of  the Middle Ages.  It seems to 
us  evident  that the political  thought  of  the time  was  still 
dominated  by the conception of  the supremacy  of  law  and 
custom, that is, if we  use the rather unhappy terms of  some 
moderns, it was not the Prince, but the Law, which was con- 
ceived of  as sovereign. 
The Prince was indeed thought of  as august, and was treated 
with profound deference and respect, but he was not absolute, 
and  his  authority  was  derived  from  the community.  His 
authority was limited and even terminable if  he violated the 
laws and liberties of  the community. 
It  is true  that when  we  turn from  the general political 
literature to the Civilians we  find that they generally repre- 
sented  another mode  of  thought, and we  have come across 
a few  statements of  the theory  of  Divine  Right,"  in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth  centuries,  but  there  is  very  little 
evidence that these absolutist  theories  had  any  appreciable 
influence on the general character of  the political ideas of  the 
fifteenth century. 
PART 111, 
THE  EARLIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY, 
CHAPTEX  I. 
THE  THEORY  OF  A  LIMITED  MONARCHY. 
WE  have  so  far considered  tho  character  of  the  political 
theory  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  and  its 
relation  to the  actual constitutional  conditions  of  some  of 
the greater European  countries.  We  have now  to examine 
the  question  how  far,  and  in  what  respects,  we  can  trace 
the appearance and development of  any new and important 
political  conceptions  in  the  sixteenth  century.  We  have 
to consider how far the great political and religious movements 
of  the  century,  or  that  great  but  indefinable  movement 
which we  call the Renaissance, may have brought with them 
new  conceptions  of  the  nature  and  principles  of  political 
society and authority.  If,  however,  we  are to approach the 
subject  seriously, we  must  begin  by  putting  aside  all  pre- 
conceptions and must not allow our judgment  to be swayed 
by any traditional notions, or assume that those great move- 
ments  were  or  were  not  important  in  the  development  of 
political  ideas  or  principles. 
We have a work of the early years of  the sixteenth century 
which  is  of  the  highest  importance  both  as  representing 
the experience of  the past and as anticipating future develop- 
ments.  This is  the work  entitled  ' La  Grant  Monarchie  de TEE  EAFZIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTmY.  [PART  111. 
Prance.'  which was written in the first quarter of  the century 
by Claude de Seyssel, the Archbishop of  Turin, who, though 
- 
a  noble  of  Savoy, had been  for many  years,  from 1497 to 
1517, in the service of  the French Crown, under Louis XII. 
It is the work, therefore, of  a man who had a large practical 
political experience, and though it may be described as a work 
of political theory, it is rather of  the nature of  the recorded 
observations of  a practical statesman on what he had seen. 
This is indeed a remarkable work, both for its shrewd and 
penetrating observation of  tho actual character of  the political 
system,  and for the sharp  contrast it presents  to the work 
of  another important French writer, of  the latter part of  the 
century, that is the ' De la RBpublique ' of  Jean Bodin, first 
published in 1576.  We  shall have much to say  about this 
in  a  later  chapter,  but  we  may  at once  contrast  Bodin's 
dogmatic and abstract conception of  the nature of  the political 
authority, which he calls "  Majestas,"  which we  should call 
Sovereignty, with the cautious  and tentative  conception  of 
de  Seyssel,  that in  the  actual  fact  of  human  experience, 
political authority is conditioned and limited by forces, some- 
times intangible, but none the less real. 
At the outset of  the work de Seyssel says that the French 
monarchy  was  the best  of  all  monarchies,  because  it  was 
neither completely absolute, nor too much restrained ; it was 
regulated  and restrained by good lams, ordinances, and cus- 
toms which were so firmly established that they could scarcely 
be broken.  The absolute power of  the kings of  France was 
regulated  by  three restraints  (freins), Religion,  Justice,  and 
what  de  Seyssel calls "  la  police."  In a later passage he 
says that it is by these "  freins " that the absolute  power  of 
the monarch, which is called tyrannical when  it is  exercised 
1 ne Seyssel,  ' Grant  Monarchie  de  adnichiler,  iacoit  que,  en  quelque 
France,'  i.  8 :  "  Et  neantmoings  temps  et  en  quelque  enclroict,  il  Y 
demeure toujours la dignit6 et authorit6  adviegne quelque infraction et violence. 
royale  en son  entier,  non  pas  totale-  Et pour  parlor  desdicts  freins  par 
ment  absolue,  ne  aussy  restraincte  lesquels la  puissance absolue  des rois 
par tropt : mais reglee et refrenee par  de France est reglee, jen  trouve trois 
bonnes lois, ordonnances et coustumes,  principaulx.  Le premier est la religion, 
lesquelles sont establies  de telle  sorte  le second la justice, et le tiers, la 
que  a  peine  se  peuvent  rornpre  et 
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against reason, is reduced to "  civilitt!,"  and if he sets aside 
these Limits, and follows his uncontrolled will, he is held to be 
an evil  tyrant,  cruel  and intolerable,  and earns the hatred 
of  God  and  of  his  subjects.1 
We  must  consider  these  "  freins " a  little  more  closely. 
About Religion he does not say much which is of  importance 
for our present subject except that the people would hate the 
king if  he were notoriously irreligious, and would hardly obey 
him.2  Of the second, "la justice,"  he has much to say which 
is of the greatest importance.  This, he says, was more highly 
developed  in  France  than in any other  part of  the world, 
under the form of  the "  Parlemens " which had been created 
chiefly  for the  purpose  of  restraining  the  absolute  power 
which  the king might  desire to exercise.  In respect  of  dis- 
tributive justice  the kings had always been  subject to this, 
so that in civil matters every man could obtain justice against 
them, just as much as against other subjects, and the king's 
'  letters  and  rescripts  are  subject  to  the  judgment  of  the 
"Parlemens."  In  regard  to  criminal  matters  the  kings' 
"  graces et  remissions " are subject to such discussion in these 
courts, that few would venture to do evil in hope of  them.3 
Id.,  ii.  R : "  Et  premidrement  dont vouldroyent  user  1es rois.  Et si 
touchant  les  troys  freins  dont  jay  furent  des  le  commencement  establis 
parIee dessus par lesquels la puissance  de  si  grans  personages en  tel  nombre 
absolue du prince et monarque, laquelle  et avec telle puissance et pouvoir quo 
est  appelee  tyrannique,  quant  I'on  les rois y ont, quant a la justice  dis- 
en  use  cont,re raison,  est  refrenee  et  tributive, toujours este subjectz : telle- 
reduite  a  civilit6.  . . . Et  par  le  ment  que  lon  a  justice  et  raison  ii 
contraire,  des qu'il se desnoye desdits  l'encontre  deulx,  ausai  bien  que  ii 
troys  limites et veult user  do  volont6  I'encontre  des  subjects  es  matieres 
desordonnee,  il  eat  tenu  et  repute  civiles.  Et entre  les  parties  privees 
mauvais tyrant et cruel et intollerable,  leur  auctorite  ne  peut  prejudicier  au 
dont  il  acquiert  la  hayne  de  nieu et  droit daultruy.  Ains sont leum lettres 
de ses subjects."  et  rescriptes  subjects  au  jugement 
a  Id., i.  9.  desdits parlemons en tel cas : non pas 
Id.,  i.  10 : "  Le  second frein  est  touchant obreption et subreption seulle. 
Is justice,  laquelle sans point  de diffi-  ment,  comme  ceulx  des  aultres  pro- 
cult6 est plus  autorisee  on  France quo  vinces solon  les  lois  Romaines,  mais 
en  nu1  autre  part du monde que  lon  touchant  la  civilit6  et  incivilit6.  Et  sache, mesmemeut  a cause  dee  parlc-  quant  aulx  matieres  criminelles leurs 
mens  qui  ont  este  instituez  princi-  graces et remissions y  sont  tellement 
Pallemont  pour  ceste cause et a  ceste  debattnes  et ceulx  qui  les  obtiegneut 
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And then, lest it should  be imagined that judges are after 
all under the king's control, he adds that their office was not 
temporary but perpetual, and that the king could not remove 
them  "sinon  par  forfaiture,"  and  that  judgment  upon 
them  belonged  to the  courts  themselves.  And  thus,  the 
judges,  knowing  that  they  could  not  be  removed,  except 
for a definite fault, can give themselves with more confidence 
to the administration  of  justice,  or  are inexcusable if  they 
do not do s0.l  The significance of  this will be obvious to all 
who remember the importance of  the principle of  the mediznval 
constitutional system of  the supremacy of  the law and the 
courts over the prin~e.~ 
We must turn to do Seyesel's treatment of  the third "  frein " 
upon  the royal  authority in  France,  that is,  "la  police." 
It is  difficult to deiine in  precise terms  what he  means by 
this, but it would appear that he uses it to describe the system 
and order of  the State (probably as equivalent to "  Politia "). 
He describes, as belonging to it, first the laws and ordinances 
which had been made by the kings themselves, and confirmed 
from time to time, and which tend to the preservation of  the 
kingdom.  These had been  observed for so long a time that 
the princes  do  not attempt to "  derogate " from them ; if 
they did, they would not be obeyed3  He returns to the subject 
trouvent de gens  qui soubs  esperancc 
ne confance de cela,  ouent faire chose 
ma1 faicte et sur tous cas ex6crable." 
1 Id.  id. :  "  Et dautant  est  icelle 
justice  plus  autorisee  que  les  officiers 
doputes  pour  la  fairo et administrer, 
sont perpotuels, et nost en la puissance 
des  roys  les  deposer,  sinon  par 
forfaiture,  dont  la  cognoissance  est 
reservee  quant  aux suppos  des  cours 
souveraines A  icelles commis en premidre 
instance, et quant aulx autres inf6rieurs 
par appel. Et  si par volunt6 desordonnee 
aucun  a  estee  quelque  foys  prive  et 
deboute  sans  garder  le  dit  ordre, 
ceulx  qui  en ont este  cause,  ou  ont 
prins et occupe leur lieu, en ont apres 
rendu  compte  et  reliqua.  Dont  il 
advient  que  iceula  jugcs  et  officiers 
sachant  non  pouvoir  estre  deposoes 
sils  ne  mefiont,  plus  asseurement 
saquittent  a  I'exercice  de la  justice ; 
ou  sils  ne  le  font  sont  inexcusables. 
Et  veritablement  cestuy  frein  et 
retenail  et moult  grant  et louable  en 
France  plus  que  en  nu1  autre  pays, 
comme dict est." 
Cf. esp, vol. iii., part i., chap. 4. 
8  Id.,  i.  6 :  "  Le  tiers  frein  est 
cnlui  de la  police.  C'est  B scavoir  de 
plusieurs  ordonnances  qui  ont  este 
faictes  par  1es  rois  mesmes,  et apres 
confermees  et aprouvees  de temps en 
tromps,  lesquelles  tendent  B  la  con- 
servation  du royaume  en universe1 et 
particuller.  Et si  ont  este  gard6es 
pour  tel  et  si  long  temps,  que  lea 
prince8  nentrepreignent  point  dy 
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in a later chapter,  when  he  says that the king knows that 
it is  by  means  of  the laws,  ordinances,  and laudable  cus- 
toms  of  France concerning the  "police,"  that  the kingdom 
has  come  to  its  greatness,  and  the  king  must  keep  them 
and  cause them  to be  kept,  to  the  utmost  of  his  power, 
remembering that he is bound to do so by the oath which he 
swore at his coronation.  If he were not to do so, he would 
offend  God  and  his  own  conscience,  and  would  incur  the 
hatred and ill-will of  his people.1 
This, however,  is not  all  that de  Seyssel treats of  under 
"  la police."  There are, ho says, three estates in the kingdom 
besides  that of  the  Church-the  nobles,  the middle  classes 
(le peuple gras), and the lower classes (Is peuple menu), and 
each of  these has its own "  preheminences " according to its 
quality, and these must be carefully pre~erved.~ 
In the  second book  of  the  treatise  he  goes  on  to  say 
that the king should take counsel, and he describes the Great 
Council,  which  he  distinguishes from  the  ordinary  Council. 
The Great Council is composed of  the good and notable men 
deroguer :  et  quant  le  vouldroyent  ce, affoiblist la force et par consequence 
faire  lon  nobeist  point  a  leur  com-  diminue sa gloire et sa renommee." 
mandemens.  Mesmemcnt  quant  au  *  Id.,  i.  13 :  "  11  va  outre  a 
faict  de  leur  demaine  et patrimoyne  ung  aultre ordre et une  aultre formo 
royal  qoil's  ne  peuvent  alicner  sans  de  vivre  en  ce  royaume  tendant  8. 
necessite."  cette  mesme  fin,  que  moult  faiot  B 
Id.,  ii.  17 :  "  Quant  au  tiers  louor  et entretonir  pour  l'union  et 
poinct  do  la  police,  portant  que  tout  accord  de  tous  les  Estais  dicelluy. 
ce  qne  je  diray,  cy  apres  depend  Car ilz  ont este si bien  introduicts et 
dicele, ncn  diray sur ce propos aultre  continue2  que  a  grant  peine  peult 
chose  que  le  roy  et monarque  cog-  venir le royaulme en grande decadence 
noissant  que  par  le  moien  dcs  101s  tant quils seront bien entretcnus, pour 
ordonnances  et louables coustumes de  autant  que  ung  che~cun  des  dictee 
France concernant la police, lo royaulme  Estats a  ses  droits  et preheminellces 
est pervonu  B  telle gloire, grandeur et  selon sa qualitb, et & pelne  peult l'ung 
Puissance qlle I'on  voit ; et se conserve  opprimer l'autre, ne tous troiv ensemble 
et  entretient  en  paix  prosperit6  et  conspirer contre le  chief  et monarque. 
reputation ; les  doibt  garder  et falre  Et en ces trois Eytats ie ne comprends 
Observer  le  plus  qu'il  peult,  attendu  point  celui  de  I'Eglise  dont je  parlera 
mesmement  qu'il  cst  astrainct  par  le  aprAs.  Ains  les  prens  ainsy  que  Ion 
Serment qu'il faict & son couronnement  faict  en  aucuns  aultres  pays.  C'est 
de  ce  faire.  Pourquoy  faisant  le  a scavoir la noblesse, le  peuple  moyen 
contraire  offense  Dieu  et  bless0  sa  que  Ion  peult  appeler  le  peuple  gras, 
Conscience et si acquiert  la  hayne  et  et lo pauplo menu." 
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of  the  various  estates,  both  secular  and  ecclesiastical, the 
Princes  of  the Blood,  the  Bishops,  the chief  officers,  and, 
if the business is important, the Presidents of  the Sovereign 
Courts (Parlemens), the principal counsellors of  those courts, 
and other wise and experienced parsons.  This is not a body 
which  should be  called together  frequently, but only when 
there  are  some  grave  and  important  matters  to  consider, 
such as the declaration of  war, the making of  laws and ordin- 
ances  for  the whole kingdom,  and  other like  matters.  He 
adds,  a  little  grudgingly  apparently,  that it  is  somatimcs 
expedient  to summon to the Council some small number of 
men from the most important cities of  the kingd0m.l 
It will be  observed that this  can  hardly  be  described as 
the "  States General," it is more of  the nature of  an Assembly 
of  Notables,  and it is evident that de Seyssel had no  great 
intercst  in  strictly representative institutions, but he is clear 
that tho king should be advised by a body of  men who repre- 
sented the political intelligence of  the community. 
We have said enough to indicate why it is that this treatise 
is of  great importance, for it expresses the judgment  of  an 
experienced officer of  the French Crown on the nature of  what 
we  should  call  the constitutional  system  of  France.  It  is 
1 Id.,  ii.  5 :  "Tout  ainsi  je  dis  voquer  tels  personnages absens ne  se 
quo  le roy doit  les grans et communs  faiet  ne  doibt  faire  guierea  souvent 
nfairos  du  royaume  communiquer  8,  pour  eviter  confusion  et  despense. 
ung grant consoil assomblee do  bons et  Ains tant seulement  quant il  occourt 
notables  personnagos de  divers  estats  quelque chose qui nadvient pas souvent 
tant d'eglise  quo  s6culiers, et tant  de  et est  de grande  consequence a  toute 
robbe  longue  que  de  robbe  courte.  le royaume, oomme d'entreprendre une 
C'est  a  savoir coulx  qui sont qualifies  guerre  et  conqueste  nouvelle.  De 
a cause de lour  degro, estat, ou office,  faire  loix  at  ordonnances  generallee 
comme sont  en  France les Princes du  concernant  la  justice  ou  la  police 
sang, les evosquos, 10s chefs d'office, les  univorselle du  royaume, at aultres cas 
chambellans, les maitres  des requestes  semblrtbles, aux quels cas il  eat quelque 
et maitres  d'hotel  qui  se  trouvent  en  foys  expedient  d'eppellor  quelque 
Court.  Et encore  selon  l'importance  potite nombre de gens dos cites et villes 
des  affaircs  y  doibt  lon  appeler  des  capltales du royaume.  Et en ceci n'est 
presidens  des  courts  souvoraines  et  pas  appelle  conseil  ordinaire.  Ains 
principaux  conseillers  dicelles,  des  est  une  assembl6e  casuelle.  Laquelle 
prelatz  absens,  at  autres  notables  comme dicte est ne se doibt faire sinon 
personnagos  que  lon  sait  estre  sagos  quant les oas le requierent." 
et experimentes.  Mais  cola  de  con- 
CHAP.  I.]  THE TmOfLY  OF  A  LlXG!CEb  MONARCHY. 
evident  that  its  emphasis  lies  just  on  those  principles  of 
political  order  which  had  been  most  characteristic  of  the 
 fiddle Ages,  that the king was controlled by the Law,  and 
that in all mathrs concerning the rights  of  his  subjects he 
could only act by process of  law and in the courts.  If  de 
Seyssel does not express the first principle in the precise terms 
of  Bracton or Fortescue, his meaning is clear, and the second 
pinciple is stated by him in terms which are not far removed 
from those of Magna Carta and the great Feudal Lawyers.  It, 
is indeed the confidence with which he affirms the  complete 
independence of  the courts from the authority of  the king, 
which is moat remarkable. 
It is interesting and important to observe that the most 
famous  political  writer  of  the  sixteenth  century,  that  is, 
Machiavelli,  made  some  observations  on  the  government 
of  Franoo,  which  correspond  in  important  points  with  the 
opinion  of  de  Seyssel.  In one  place  in  his  Discourses 
on  Livy,  he  contends  that when  a  people  knows  that the 
prince will not on any account violate the law, they will live 
secure and contented, and he gives as an example tho kingdom 
of France which lives in security because the kings were bound 
by many laws which formed the security of  all their people.1 
In another place he points out the good effects in France of 
this ;  that kingdom lived  more  complctely under law  than 
any other, for their laws were maintained  by the Parlements, 
and especially by that of  Paris, which would deliver judgment 
even against the king.2 
'  Macchiave'li,  '  Discorsi  Super  la  loggi  di  quelli  verso  il  suo  principio. 
prima  Decade  di  Tito  Livjo,'  I.  16:  E  si  vedi  qurtnto  buono  effetto  fa 
"  E  quando un principe faocia questo,  questa  parte  nel  legno  di  Francia,  il 
e che 11  popllo vegga che per accidente  quale regno viva sotto le  leggi e sotto 
nossuno ei non rompe tali leggi, oomin-  gli  ordini piu  cho  alcun  altro  regno. 
cera in breve tempo a  vivere sicuro e  Delle  quali  leggi  e  ordini  ne  sono 
contento.  In esempio  ci  e  il  Regno  mantenitori i  Parliamenti,  e  massime 
di Francia, il quale non vive sicuro per  quel  di  Parigi ; le  quali  sono  dn  lui 
altro che per essersi quelli Re obligati  rinnovate  qualunque volta,  e  fa una 
ad  infinite  leggi  nolle  queli  si  corn-  esecuzione contra  ad  un  prl~lcipe di 
Prende la sicurtn di tutti i suoi populi."  quel  regno, e  che  ei  condanna  il  Re 
Id., iii. 1 : "  Eanno ancora i regni  nelle sue sentenze.'* 
bisogno  di  rinnovarsi  e  ridurre  le 
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These conceptions of  the nature of  the French monarchy 
may seem at first sight rat he^ strange ;  they do not correspond 
with the impressions of  Sir John Fortescue, as we  have seen, 
but after all de Seyssel was in a better position to judge the 
real nature of  that government than an observer in England, 
however intelligent he might be. 
It is clear that in the judgment  of  de Seyssol the French 
monarchy was a monarchy limited by law and custom.  Wc 
shall have to consider the development of  the theory  of  an 
unlimited monarchy, so far as it is to be found in the sixteenth 
century, but it is clear that it was unknown to de Seyssel. 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF LAW. 
WE have,  in  the last chapter, drawn attention to the work 
of  de Seyssel, because it seems to us important as representing 
the judgment  of  a man  of  affairs, an experienced official of 
the  French  Crown,  on  the real  nature  of  the  government 
of  France.  Our  task is, however, to examine  the political 
theory which lay behind the actual institutions of  European 
society, and we  must therefore turn to a more detailed exam- 
ination of  the various aspects of  this. 
We  must begin  with an examination of  tho theory of  the 
nature,  the source, and the authority of  law.  As  wo  1i;~ve 
often said, and we  are convinced that it is a right judgment, 
the  supreme  authority in the Medizval State was  the Law, 
not  the prince,  and as we  have seen in  the earlier parts  of 
this  volume,  this continued  to be  the normal judgment  of 
the  fourteenth and  fifteenth  centuries;  we  must  now  con- 
sider  whether  this  continued  in  the  sixteenth  century,  or 
how  far it gave  place  to that theory of  the  supremacy of 
the monarch  which  became  common  in  continental Europe 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
We  have not found, in the literature of  the earlier part of 
the  century,  very  much  discussion  of  the nature  of  law in 
general, but there is enough to indicate its general character, 
and to illustrate the continuance of  the tradition of St Thomas 
Aquinas.  We find examplcs of  this in the work of an eminent 
Engli,sh Jurist, St Germans, writing about 1539, in  that  of 
the Jlominican Professor  of  Salamanca, Soto, who had been 
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St Germans' work is in the form of  a dialogue between a 
Doctor  of  Civil  Law  and  a  Student  of  Engllsh  Law,  and 
he begins with a brief  statement by the Doctor on the first 
and general principles of  all law.  The Eternal Law, he says, 
is nothing else but the supreme reason of  the Divine Wisdom, 
bv  which  God  wills  that all  things  should  be  moved  and 
directed to their good and proper end. 
God  reveals the Eternal Law  to the rational  creature in 
three ways : first, by the light of  the natural understanding ; 
secondly, by Divine Revelation ; and thirdly, by the reason 
in  the  prince  or  other ruler, who  has  power  to impose law 
upon his subjects.  The "  Lex Natarae "  is that which belongs 
to the  rational  human  being;  the "  Lex  Divine " directs 
men  to eternal felicity ; while the "  Lex  Rationis " directs 
men  to felicity in this life.  The "  Lex Humana,"  in order 
to be just, requires two things in the legislator : "  prudence," 
that he may direct the community in accordance with right 
practical reason ; and authority, for he must have authority 
to make law.  The Lex Humana will be called just, "  ex fine," 
when it is directed to the common good, "  ex authore " when 
it does  not go  beyond  the  authority of  him who  made  it, 
"ex forma" when it imposes burdens  on the subjects in due 
proportion  to  the  end  of  the  common  good,  for  if  these 
burdens are unequally imposed upon the multitude, the law, 
even if it is directed to the common good, will not be binding 
upon  men's  conscienws.  He  adds finally, that, as Aristotle 
had  said,  it is  better  that  all  men  should  be  ruled  by  a 
certain and positive law, than that the judgment  should be 
left to man's wi1l.l 
1 Christopher St Germans, ' D~nlogus  elernnm et notam fmit oam creaturae 
de Fundemento legum Anghae,' cap. I.  rationall.  Primo  modo,  per  lumen 
(folio  ii ) .  "  Doctor.  Lex  eterna  naturalis  intellectus ,  secundo  per 
nih~l  aliud  est,  quam  ipsa  summa  revelatlonem  d~vlnam  ,  tertio  per 
ratio  gubernatlonis  rerum  in  Deo,  ratlonem  in  principe  sive  in  all0 
sive illa summa  ratio Divlnae Sapient~ae,  rjuocunque secundario gubernante, qul 
qua  vult  Deus  omnla  a  se  condita  l~abet potestatem  legem  Imponere 
mover] et dlng~  ad bonum  et deb~tum  subd~t~s  smfi " 
hnem."  Id  id, cap.  11  (fol  iv ) .  "  Lex 
Id.  d ,  fol.  111..  "  Tribus  igltur  vero  naturae  speclallter  considerats 
modis  revelat  Deus  hanc  lcgcm  resplc~t  solum ad creatursm rationalem 
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It is not necessary to illustrate at length the relation of the 
general theory of law in Soto to that of  St Thomas Aquinas, 
as it is obvious that in his treatise, '  De Justitia et Jure,' he 
was illustrating and expounding the principles of  St Thomas ; 
as, however, the question of  the continuity of  these  concep- 
tions is highly important in the history of  political theory, we 
may take note of a few passages. 
The Eternal Law of  God is, he says, nothing else than the 
eternal reason  by which  he  governs  the whole  world ; and 
the Eternal Law governs man by the Natural Law, which is 
a ~articipation  of  it.  The Natural Law is written in  man's 
mind,  without  any process  of  argument ; the Jus Gentium 
is derived from it by a process of  reasoning, but without any 
assembly of  men ; while the Civil Law is derived from the judg- 
ment of  men assembled in Council, that is, from the Common- 
wealth or from him who is its Vicar, and has its auth0rity.l 
humanam  ad  imginem Del  creatam, 
quae  a  quibusdam  etlam  dicitur  Jus 
Gentium." 
Id  ~d , fol.  vi. :  "  Lex  dlv~na  de 
propinquo et de so ordlnat ad fel~cltatem 
eternam,  lex  rationis  vero,  ad  fehoi- 
tatem hujus vitae." 
Id.,  chap.  iv.  fol.  xi. :  "  Et  ut 
]ex  humana  sit  lusta  requlruntur  in 
leg~slatore  duo,  scllicet  prudentla  et 
auctoritas.  Prudentla,  ut  secundum 
rectam  rationem  practicam  dlctet 
quid faciendum  sit pro communitate .  . . 
Auctorrtas, ut  sc~licet  habeat  aucton- 
tatem  leg18  condendae  qula  d~c~tur 
]ex a hgando " 
Id  id.,  fol.  XI]. :  "  Dlcltur  enim 
]ex humana  lusts, ex fine, ex authore 
"1  ex forma.  Ex  fine quando ordmatur 
ad  bonum  commune.  Ex  aulhore 
quando  non  excedlt  authontatem 
ferentls.  Ex forrna quando secundum 
Proportionem  lmponuntur  subditis 
Onera  In ordlnem ad bonum commune : 
etsl  onera inequal~ter  lmponuntur multl- 
tudlnl, licet  ordlnetur ad bonum com- 
mune. in foro conscientiae non Ilgat." 
Id  id , fol  ml. :  "  Dlcit  ltaque 
phllosophus  In  secundo  Ethico~um  ; 
quod  mellus  est  omnes  ordinari  leg0 
certa  et  posit~va quam  dimitteie 
judltium arbltrlo, propter tria." 
Soto, '  De Justitia et Jure.'  1.  3, a : 
"  Fit ut lex eterne, in Deo nih~l  rtliud slt 
quam sempiterna ratlo suae sapientiae, 
qua  mundi unlversltatem  reg~t." 
Id. ~d ,  1.  4,  1 . "  Ad  primum lgitur 
argumentum  respondetur,  quod  etsl 
eterna  lege  gubernemur  zd  tamen  fit 
per  naturalem, quae part~cipatio  1111~s 
est.  . . . Quin,  vero  . . . lnde  lox 
naturalis  In  nobis,  prae  brutorum 
lnstinctu,  legls  rat~onem  habet,  quod 
ratlone  nos  lpsl  ducimur,  illa  vero 
per lmpetum forinsecus aguntur." 
Id. id, 1.  5,  3 (p 40) : "Itaque  ]us 
naturale  absque  ulla  ratiocinatione 
scriptum  est  in  ment~bus nostr~s: 
]us  autem  gentium natural1 ratlocina- 
tione,  absque  hommum  conventu  et 
longo  cons1110 inde elic~tur,   us autem 
civlle  arbitratu  homlnum  In  unum 
coeuntium conclhum constituitur." 
Cf  ni, I, 3. 
Id.  id, 1, 1,  3: "  Leges  condere 
non  cu]usque,  tied  roipublicno  est, The general correspondence of  these principles of  St Germans 
and of Soto with these of St Thomas Aquinas is obvious.l 
The terms in which  Calvin states his  general  conception 
of law are not formally the same, but it appears to us that they 
are not substantially  very different.  The Moral Law which 
is the true and eternal rule of  justice is binding upon men in 
all places and times, who  desire to order their lives by the 
will of  God.  Subject to this, every nation is at liberty to 
establish laws for itself, as it finds best ; they may vary in 
form, but they must have the same principle  (rati~).~  This, 
he says, will be done if  we  will distinguish between law and 
equity (aequitas) upon which law depends.  Equity, because 
it is natural, is the same among all men ; constitutions  (i.e., 
positive laws), because  they are determined at least  in part 
by particular circumstances, may well differ, so long as they 
are directed to the same end, of  equity.  The Moral Law of 
God is nothing else than the testimony of  Natural Law, and 
the whole principle of  equity is contained in it.3 
ejusque  vicem  gerentis,  seu  curam  est et immutabilis  ejus voluntas, ut a 
habentis. . . . Lex est regula dirigens  nobis  ipse  quidem  omnibus  colatur ; 
in  commune  bonum : dirigere  autem  nos vero mutuo inter nos diligamus. . .  . 
in  commune  bonum  proprium  est  Quodsi  verum  est,  libertas  certe 
reipublicae,  cujus  ejusmodi  bonum  singulis gentibus relicta  est condendi, 
proximus finis est ; ergo penes ipsam  quas sibi  conducere providerint  leges, 
tantum, ac penes illum qui ejus habet  quae  tamen  ad  perpetuam  illam 
curam,  potestas  eat  ferendarum  charitatis regulam exigantur, ut forma 
legum.  . . . Subnectitur  autem  et  quidem  varient,  rationem  habent 
secunda  ratio:  lox  enim  vim  habet  eandem." 
coercivam  . . . vis  autem  haec  et  Id. id. id. : "  Id quod dixi planum 
vigor  in  sola  republics  et  principe  fiet,  si  in  legibus  omnibus  duo  haec, 
existit sicuti totius animalis virtus est  ut decet, intuemur, legis constitutiones 
membra movere."  et  aequitatem,  cujus  ratione  con- 
1 Cf. vol. v. pp.  36-44.  stitutio  ipsa  fundata  est  ac  nititur. 
a  Calvin,  '  Institutio,'  iv.  20,  15  Aequitas,  quia  naturalis est,  non  nisi 
(p.  665)  :  "  Lex  itaque  moralis  (ut  una  omnium  esse  potest,  ideo  ut 
inde  primum  incipiam) quum duobus  legibus  omnibus,  pro  negotii  genere, 
capitibus contineatur, quorum alterum  eadem proposita esse debct. 
pura  Deum  fide  et  pietate  colere,  Constitutiones,  quia  circumstantias 
alterum  syncere  hominos  dilectione  aliquas  habent,  a  quibus  pro  parte 
complecti simpliciter  jul,ot  : Vera  est  pendeant,  mod0  in eundem  aequitatis 
justiciae  regula,  gentium  omnium  ac  scopum  omnes  pariter  intendant. 
temporum  hominibus  prescripta,  qui  diversas esse nihil obest.  Jam,  quum 
ad Dei  voluntatem  vitam  suam com-  Dei  legem,  quam  moralem  vocamus, 
ponere volunt.  Siquidem haec eterns  constet  non  aliud esse quam naturalis 
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We must turn to the consideration of  the Positive Law of 
the State or Commonwealth, and we begin by discussing the 
conception of the nature of  this, as it  appears in the proceedings 
of  the Cortes of  Castile and Leon, in the last years  of  the 
fifteenth century and the first part of  the sixteenth.  The 
~ntroduction,  or Preface,  to the proceedings of  the Cortes, 
oalled  by Ferdinand and Isabella  at Toledo in 1480, seems 
to us to set out very clearly the recognised principles of  the 
method  of  legislation.  The Sovereigns, it says, have found 
it necessary  to provide  for the circumstances  of  the time, 
by  making new  laws, as well  as by  securing the execution 
of  the  old  ones,  and  they  have  therefore  summoned  the 
"  procuratores " of  the cities and "  villas " of  their kingdoms, 
not only to take the oath to their eldest son, but to provide 
by  legislation  for the  good  government  of  the  kingdoms. 
The "  procuratores " have presented various petitions, and in 
aceordailce  with  these  petitions  Ferdinand  and  Isabella, 
with the consent of their Council, order and establish the laws 
which fol10w.~ 
This  seems  to us  to be  a  very  clear  recognition  of  the 
legis testimonium, et ejus conscientiae,  todos nuestros reynos, que enbiasen 10s 
quae  hominum  animis  a  Deo  in-  dichos procuradores de Cortes asi para 
sculpta est, tota hujus,  de  qua  haec  jurar  a1  principe  nuestro  fijo  primo- 
loquimur,  aequitatis  ratio  in  ipsa  genito  heredero  destos  reynos,  como 
praescripta  est.  Proinde  sola  ipsa  para  intender  con  ellos  e  platicar  e 
legum omnium et scopus et roguia et  proveer  en  las  otras cosas  que  saran 
terminus sit oportet.  Ad eam regulam  nescessarias  de  se  proveer  por  lcyes 
quaecunqueformatae sunt loges. quae in  para  la  buena  goueruacion  destos 
eum scopum directae, quae eo termino  dichos reynos. 
limitatae,  non  est  cur  a  nobis  im-  Los  quales dichos procuradores . . . 
probcntur,  utcunque  a  lege  Judaica,  nos  frequentaran  e  dieron  certas 
vel inter se ipsae alias difforant."  peticiones,  e  nos  supplicaran  que 
'  Cortes of  Castile and Leon,' vol. iv.  sobrellas  mandassemos  proveer  e 
Toledo, 1480.  Preface : "  E nos cono-  remediar  como  viesemos  que  complia 
sciendo  que estos  casos  occorrian alo  a servicio de Dios e nuestro e bien  de 
presente  en  que  esce  necessario  y  la  republica  e  pacific0  ostado  dcstos 
provechoso provear de remedio por leyes  dichos reynos,  sobre las  quales dichas 
nuevamento fechos, ansi para executar  petitiones  y  sobre las otras cosas que 
las  pnssadas,  como  para  proveer  et  nos  entendimos  sor  complideras,  con 
reniodiar 10s nuevos casos, accordamos  acuerdo  delos perlados e  caualleros e 
de enbiar mandar a las cibdades e villas  doctores  del  nue~tro  Consejo,  proue- 
nuestros  reynos  que  suelen enbiar  imos  e  ordinarnos  e  statuimos  la@ 
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necessity  of  consulting  the Cortes  before legislation  and  a 
statement of the normal method of such legislation. 
In the proceedings of  the Cortes, which met at Valladolid 
in 1506, under Queen Juana, we  have an explicit statement 
of  the same principle.  The Cortes maintained that the former 
kings had laid it down that when new laws had to be made, 
the Cortes should be summoned, and it was then established 
by law that no laws could be made or revoked except in Cortes, 
and they  therefore  petition  that from  henceforth  this  rule 
should be kept.  They  complain that many  "Pragmatics " 
had been issued without this process, by which the kingdoms 
felt themselves aggrieved, and ask that these should be revised 
and  the  grievance  removed.  The  Queen  assented  to the 
petition.1  This statement of  the proper method of  legislation 
is  not  only  important  in itself,  but  as  affirming  that  this 
was traditional and legal. 
With this we  may compare a clause in the proceedings of 
the Cortes of  Valladolid in 1523, in the reign of  the Emperor 
Charles  V.  This  provides  that  the  answers  made  by  the 
King (Oharles V.)  to the petitions  of  the Cortes were  to be 
registered (yncorparados) and observed and executed as laws 
made and promulgated in Corte~.~  And again we  may com- 
pare a petition made by the Cortes of  Madrid in 1534, and 
1 Id., vol. iv.  Valladolid,  1606, 6: 
"  Y  par  esto  10s  rreys  establecieron 
que,  quando  diesen  de  hazer  leys, 
para  que  fuesen  probechosas  a  sus 
rreynos  a  cada  provinpio  fuese  bien 
probeyda,  se  llamasen  Cortes e  Pro- 
curadores y entendiesen enelloa, y por 
esto se establepio ley, que no se fipiesen, 
ni  rrevoeasen,  leys  sy  no  in  Cortes: 
suplican a vuestras  Altezas que agora 
e  de  qui  adelante  se  guarda  e  fag8 
asy, e quando leys se obiesen de hazer. 
mandan  llamar  sus  rreynos  e  pro- 
curadores dellos, porque para las tales 
feys  saran dellos muy mas ynfamados, 
y vuestros rreynos juste e derechamente 
proveydas:  e  porque  fuera  desta 
horden, se an fecho muchas prematicas, 
de  que  estos  vuestros  rreynos,  se 
syenten  por  agrabiados,  mande  que 
aquellas  ssean  rrebistas  e  probean  e 
rremedian  10s  agrabios  quelas  tales 
prematicas  tienen.  R.  (reply)  Que 
quando fuere necessario, su alteza lo 
mandara proveer de manera  que se de 
accuerdo dello." 
2  Id. id.,  Valladolid,  1623 (p. 402): 
"  Porque  vos  mandamos  a  todoa  e  u 
cada uno de vos, segund dicho es, que 
veays  las respuestas  que por  nos alas 
dichas  petipiones  e  capitulos  fueron 
dedas, que de suso van yncorporad~. 
y las guardeys e cunpleys y executeye, 
e hajays guardar e cunplir e executar 
en todo e por todo, segund e como 10 
suso  se  contiene,  como nuestras ley@ 
e prematicas sanpiones par nos hechas. 
y promulgadas en Cortes." 
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accepted by Charles V., that the "  Capitula " made in former 
Cartes, and in the present one, were to be held as laws, and 
together in one volume with the laws of  the  Ordinami- 
ento,"  and that a copy of  this was to be kept in every city 
and  Ldvilla."  It seems  to  be  clear that in Castile, in the 
early sixteenth century at least, it was assumed as a normal 
constitutional  principle  that legislation was  a  function  not 
of  the king alone, but of  the king in, and with, the Cortes, 
as the representative body of  the kingdom. 
It  is equally clear that the King of  Castile had no authority 
to ignore or set aside the laws.  We find repeated examples 
of  the  tenacity with  whioh  this  principle was  held, in the 
repeated  protests  made  by  the Cortes in  the sixteenth,  as 
in  earlier  centuries,  against  the issue  of  royal  briefs  which 
interfered with the ordinary course of justice.  At Valladolid 
in 1518 and 1523 the Cortes petitioned King Charles V.  to 
revoke all "Cartas e cedulas de suspenzyon" whether granted 
by himself or by the Catholic Kings (Ferdinand and Isabella), 
and not to issue them in the future.  The King complicd with 
their request, and this was repeated in the Cortes of  Madrid 
in 1534.* 
Id. id., Madrid, 1634 : " 1. Primera-  non se de, por  el  prejuyzio que dellos 
mente supplicamos a vuestra majestad  siguen alas partes." 
que  de  todos 10s  capitulos  proveydos  Id.  id..  Valladolid,  1623  (p.  373) 
en las Cortes pasados,  y delos que en  (62) : "  Otrosy : supplicamos a vuestra 
estas  se  proueyeren,  se  hayen  leyes,  alteza  mande  revocar  qualesquier 
juntandolas  en  un  volumen,  con  la8  cartas  e  cedulas  de  suspenciones  de 
leyes  del  Ordinamiento  emendado  y  pleytos  que  estan  dadas  ansy  por 
corregido . . . y  que  cada  ciudad  e  vuestra  alteza  como  por  10s  Reyes 
villa  tenga  un  libro,  y  el  regimiento  Catholicos,  pues  es  denegar  justipia 
tenga  especial  cuydado  de  hazer  y  abdienpia  alas  partes  on  prejuyzio 
guardar las leyes dB1.  . . .  do su derecho. 
R.  A  esto  voa  repondemos  que  ya  R. A  esto  vos  rrespondemos  que 
auemos proeydo  y  nombrado  persona  nose densuspensyones de aqui adelanto, 
qua1  conviene  para  effectuar  lo  en  y mandamos que las dadas Sean en sy 
vuestra supplicazion contenido."  ningunas, e de ningund efecto."  '  Id.  id.,  Valladolid,  1618 :  "  (23)  Id.,  Madrid,  1634  (42) :  " Otrosi, 
Otrosy,  supplican  a  vuestra  Alteza  porque  acaesce  dar  cedulas  para  que 
mande  rrevocar  e  rrevoque  quales  10s  oydores  enbien  relacion  de  algun 
(Pier  cartas  e  cedulas  de  suspensyon  pleyto  quo  ante ellos pende,  diciendo 
esten  dadas,  ansy  por  vuestra  que  la  parte  se  quiesca  que  no 
altola.  ansy  por  10s  reyes  Catholicos  10s  pertinesce  il  conosciemento,  y 
Vueatr~s  aluelos,  y  de  nqui  adelante  entretanto  se  10s  manda  sobreseer,  e When  we  turn  from  Castile  to  England  it is  obviously 
unnecessary  to  illustrate in  detail  the normal  methods  of 
legislat,ion.  We have, however, a very important discussion 
of  the subject  in  that most  interesting treatise  on  English 
Law by Christopher St Germans, to which we  have already 
referred  in dealing with the theory of  the nature  of  law in 
general. 
This  treatise  is  in  the form  of  a  dialogue between  the 
r'Doctor.v  that  is,  the  Civilian,  and  the  LL Student,"  or  . - 
representative  of  English Law, who gives  an account of  the 
nature of  this.  He enumerates the six foundations of  Znglish 
Law-the  Law of  Reason, the General Customs of  the Country, 
certain  Principia " which  are  called  LL Maxima,"  certain 
particular  Customs, and, finally, the Statutes made  by  the 
Common Council of  the Kingdom, that is, the Par1iament.l 
One of  the most important aspects of  St Germans' work is 
his treatment of  law  as custom, for he includes under this 
not only the general customs of  the country and the particular 
customs of  different localities, but also the "Maxims"  of the 
courts, for he says of these that they might be reckoned among 
the  general  customs  of  the kingdom-their  sole  authority 
was ancient usage.2 
He defines the general customs as being those which from 
ancient times had been used by the king and his councillors, 
and  had  been  accepted  and  approved  by  their  subjects. 
These are neither contrary to the Divine Law, nor to Reason, 
and as they are considered to be necessary for the common 
good  of  the kingdom, they have the force of  law, and it is 
these which are properly called the common law (Lex Com- 
qua1  es  daiio conoscldo,  supplicamos  Cf.  Id.,  Madrigal,  1476,  2 ; Toledo, 
vuestra  majcstad,  que no se den con  1480-84. 
ananension  a  unque  sea  temporal,  y  1  St  Germans,  'Dialogue,'  cap.  - --  r------ 
se  si  dieren,  sean  obedescidas  y  no 
complidas. 
A esto v09 respondemos que nuestra 
mercod  y  voluntad  es  de  no  dar  las 
talcs  schedulas  de  suspen~ion, y 
declarando  vosotras  en  qu6  casos 
iv.-x.  ... 
a  Id.  id.,  cap.  VIII.  (fol.  27): 
"  Et licet  omnia  illa  maxima  inter 
predictas consuetudines generalev regni 
convenienter  enumcrnri  possint,  clllla 
antiqua consuetudo est hlls ot lllla sola 
ynegocios  se an dado, mandarernos  lo  auctoritas." 
que convenga." 
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munis).  It is the judges who decide what are general customs, 
and it is  these,  together  with  t,he "  Maxims,"  which  form 
the  greater  part  of  the  law  of  England,  and  the  king, 
therefore,  at his  coronation,  swears  that he  will  faithfully 
obey them.l 
The  fifth foundation  of  the law  of  England  St Germans 
finds in the local customs of  different parts of  the country, 
and  these  have  the force  of  law  even  against  the general 
customs and maxims, inasmuch as they are not  contrary to 
Reason and the Divine Law.  They are determined not  by 
the judges  but  by  the "  Patria,"  and he  citcs as examples 
the customs of  Gavelkind and Borough English.2 
It is deserving  of  notice that St Germans maintains that 
it is from custJom  that the great Courts, the Chancellor's, the 
King's  Bench, the Common  Pleas,  the Exchequer, and also 
certain  lesser  Courts  such  as  those  of  the manor  and  the 
county,  have their origin  and authority ; there is,  he says, 
no written law concerning their institution,  but they bclong 
to the ancient custom of  the country and could not be changed 
Id.  id.,  cap.  vii.  (fol.  21) :  quodomneseonsuetudinos regni fideliter 
"  Tertium fundamentum legis  Angliae  observet." 
habetur  ex  diversis  consuetudinibus  a  Id.  id.,  cap.  ix.  (fol.  32) : 
generalibus  per totum regnum Angliae  "  Quintum fundamentum legis Angliae 
ex antiquo tempore usitatis, per dom-  stat  diversis  consuetudinibus  par- 
inum  regem  et progenitores  suos,  et  ticularibus  in  diversis  patriis,  villis, 
eorum subditis, acceptis et approbatis.  dominils  et civitatibus  regni ueitatis ; 
Et quia consuetudines  illae  nec contra  quae quidem consuetudines particulares, 
legem  divinam,  nec  contra  rationem  quia non sunt contra rationem, neque 
in aliquo existunt, et  pro bono communi  contra  legem  divinam,  licet  predictis 
totius  regni,  ex  earum  diuturnitate  generalibus consuetudinibus  sive max- 
censentur fore necessaria,  vim legis re-  imis  legis  contrarientur,  tamen  vim 
tinent.  Et hae sint illae consuetudines  legis  retinent.  Sed  si  dubium  in- 
quae  proprie  dicuntur  lex  communis.  surgat;  inter  partos  in  Curia  Regis, 
Et  semper  determinari  oportet  per  utrum tall9 sit consuetudo particularis, 
judices  utrum  sit  talis  lox  sive  con-  vel non, non debct semper detcrminari 
suetudo  gencralis,  ut  pretend~tur  vel  per judices  utrurn sit talis consuetudo 
"0%  et non  per  patriam.  Et ex istis  vel non, ut do predictis convuetudinibux 
consuetudinibus  gencralibus  et  alils  gonerallbus  sive  maximls  superius 
Principiis  sive  maximis  legis  Angliae  dictis  fieri  debet,  nisi  In  paucis  con- 
ch  quibus  inferius  dicetur,  dependit  suetudinlbus particulrtribus sufficienter 
maxlma  pars  legis  Angliae.  Et ideo  ex  record0  in  Curia  Regis  conditis 
Domlnus rex in coronatione  sua, inter  et  approbatis,  aet  debet  trluri  per 
all%  Hacramenturn  praestat  speciale  patriam." except  by  Par1iament.l  And  it  is  equally  important  to 
notice  that he maintains that it was  by  the custom  of  the 
kingdom that no one could be judged except according to the 
"lex  terrae."  This  custom  was  confirmed  (not made)  by 
Magna Carta.2 
Finally, St Germans states the sixth foundation of  English 
law as consisting of  various statutes made by the king and his 
ministers, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the "  Com- 
munitas"  of  the  whole  kingdom  in  Parliament,  when  the 
Law  of  Reason  and the Law  of  Customs and Maxims  are 
not sacient  .s 
St  Germans'  treatment  of  English  law  is  then  highly 
important for several reasons.  He has the same conception 
as Bracton  that law  is  not  primarily  an enactment,  but  a 
custom ; and while he is clear, with Bracton and Fortescue, 
that the deliberate judgment and will of  the whole community, 
the king  and nobles, with the representatives of  the people 
in  Parliament,  can  make  laws,  and  can  change  ancient 
customs,  it is  only  the  whole  community  which  can  do 
this ; the king  has  indeed his part, but he  cannot legislate 
a10ne.~ 
When we turn to France, the evidence is more complicated, 
1 Id.  id.,  cap.  vii.  (fol.  xxiii.) :  parium suorum, et per legem terrae." 
"  De earum institution8 ut scilicet tales  Id.  id.,  cap.  x.  (fol.  xxxiv.) : 
Curiae fiant, nulla lex scripta in legibus  "  Sextum fundamentum  legis  Angliao 
Angliae habetur, nam earum institutio  stat in diversis Statutis per  dominum 
solum ex  antiqua consuetudine  Regni  Regem  et  progenitores  suos,  et  per 
dependit,  quae  etiam  consuetudo  dominos  spirituales  et temporales,  et 
tantae auctoritatis  habetur,  quod non  per  communitatem  totius  regni,  in 
possunt  Curiae  illae,  nec  earum  parliamentis editis, ubi lex rationis, lex 
auctoritates alterari, nec earum nomina  divina,  consuetudines,  maxima,  sive 
mutari absque Parliamento."  alia  fundamenta  legis  Angliae  prius 
2  Id.  id.  id.  (fol.  xxiii.) :  "  Item  sufficere minime videbantur.  Et ultra 
ex antiqua conauetudine Regni habetur  haec  fundamenta  legis  Angliae  alia 
quod nullus mittetur ad respondendurn,  me legisse non meminor." 
nec  judicetur  nisi  secundum  legem  There  are  a  few  but  important 
terrae.  Et haec  consuetudo  firmatur  references  to  the  principle  of  $118 
per  Magnam  Cartam,  cap.  xxvi.,  ubi  supremacy of  law in Thomas Starkey's 
sic  habetur.  Nullus  liber  homo  '  Dialogue between  Cardinal  Pole  and 
capietur,  aut  imprisonetur,  aut  dis-  Thomas  Lupset,'  but  it will  be  more 
saifiiotur,  aut  alio  modo  destruetur,  convenient to deal with these in a later 
nec  super  eum ibimus  nec  super  eum  chapter, when  we  consider the nature 
mittemus,  nisi  per  legale  judicium  and source of  the authority of  the Ruler. 
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for the reason that in Prance we  must always take 
account  of  the Provincial Estates as  well  as of  the States 
General. 
We may at once notice some references to the customs and 
constitutions of  the great provinces.  In the Letters Patent, 
issued in 1498 by Louis XII. on the occasion of  his marriage 
with  Anne of  Brittany,  he confirms  the rights and liberties 
of the Duchy, and assures them that if  there were good reason 
for making some change in their customs  and constitutions, 
it should be done by the "  Parlements " and assemblies of  its 
Estates as had always been the custom.1 
In the  Ordinances issued by  Louis  XII. in  1499  for  the 
reorganisation  of  the Exchequer  Court  of  Normandy,  it is 
said  that for this  purpose  he had summoned  an  Assembly 
of  prelates, barons, lords, the greater part of  the "  Baillifs " 
of  the province, and the men of the three   estate^.^  In 1501 
Louis XII. issued an ordinance about "  Weights and Measures " 
in  Languedoc,  after  deliberation  with  him  Council,  by  his 
full power  and  royal  authority,  but  it should  be  observed 
that  he  does  this  on  the  petition  of  the  three Estates of 
I~anguedoc.~ 
'  Ordonnancea,'  vol.  xxi.  Jan.  7, 
1498 (9)  (p. 151) : "  C'est B savoir que 
en  tant  que  touche  de  garder  et 
conduire  le  pays  de  Bretagne  et  les 
subjets d'iceux en leurs droits, libertez, 
franchises, usaige~,  coustumes et tailles, 
tant aux fraia de l'Eglise,  de la Justice, 
comme Chancellerie,  Conseil, Parlement, 
Chambre de Comptes, Trbsorcrie g6n6r- 
alle, st autres de la noblesse et comun 
peuple, en manidre que aucune nouvelle 
loi  ou  constitution n'y  soit faite, fors 
en  la  manidre  accoustum6e  par  les 
rois,  et  ducs  pr6decesseurs  de  notre 
dite  cousine, la Duchesse de Bretagne 
. . . (7.)  Item, et  en  tant  que  peut 
toucher  s'il  advenist  que  de  bonno 
Paison, il  y eut quelque cause de faire 
mutations,  particulidrement  en  aug- 
mentant,  diminuant,  ou  interpretant 
lesdits droits, coustumes, constitutions 
Ou  etablissemens, que  ce  soit  par  les 
perlement~  et  assembl6es  des  Eatate 
dudit  pays,  ainsi  que  de  tout  terns 
est  accoustum6, et que autrement  ne 
soit  fait ; nous  voulons et entendons 
que  ainai  se  fasse,  appelez  toutes 
voyes  lea  gens  des  trois  estats  de 
Bretagne." 
Id.  id.,  April  1499  (p.  215) : 
"Pour  pourveoir  B  laquelle  chose 
ayona mand6, assemble plusieurs prelats 
barons,  seigneurs,  et  la  plus  grande 
partie des baillifs dudit pays, avee les 
gens des trois Estats d'iceluy." 
Id.  id.,  July  1601  (p.  279): 
" Nous avons receu l'humble supplica. 
tion  de  chiera  et bien  amez  gens de8 
Trois  Estats  de  Languedoc. . . . par 
la  tenure  de  CBB  prbsentes, de  notre 
grace  especial,  plein  pouvoir  et  auc. 
torit6  royal,  statuons  et  ordonnona 
par  edict, statut, et  ordonnance  per. 
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Pcrha,ps,  however,  the  most  significant  reference  to the 
nature and source of  law in France is contained in the Ordin- 
ances  of  Charlcs  VIII.  and  Louis  XII.,  providing  for  the 
collection  and publication  of  tho  customs  of  thc  different 
parts  of  the kingdom.  Charles  VIII. in 1197 appointed  a 
commission  to  collect,  correct,  and  adapt  these  customs, 
but they were to be collected with the advice of  the men of 
all classes in each district, and to be published with tho con- 
sent of  the three Estates of  each  district or the larger and 
wiser  part of  them.l  In 1505 Louis  XII. again  appointed 
a  Commission to carry this out, for it apparently had never 
been completed.  The three Estates were to  be called together 
in each Bailliage, and the king declared by his full power and 
royal  authority that the customs, as agreed  upon  by these 
Estates, should be perpetually kept and observed as laws.2 
This  treatment  of  the  customs  of  different  parts  of 
France, as determined by the representatives of  thedifferent 
en  tous  et cllncune  des  villes,  lieux 
et placos do notrodit pays do Languodoc, 
soit us6 desdits poix de balance, &c." 
1 Id.,  vol.  xxi.,  September  1497 
(p.  7) :  "  Eussions  despiegh,,  mand6 
aux  bailiffz,  seneschaux  et  autres 
juges  de  notre  royaume,  appelez 
avec  eux  chacun  en  sa  jurisdiction 
les  gens  d'Eglise,  nobles, nos  officiers, 
praticiens et aultres gens de bien en ee 
du conscntomcnt toutes voyes  desclitz, 
trois  Etats de chaques baillage,  sene- 
schauss6e  et jurisdiction,  ou do la plus 
grante et saine partie d'iceulx." 
Id.,  vol.  xxi.,  March  4,  1.506 
(p.  332):  "  Et  neantmoins  voulons 
tous et chascuns les articles qui seront 
accordez  par lea-dits des Etats assem- 
blez, comme dit est, ou la plus grande 
et saine partie d'iceux,  et ceux d'entre 
cognoissans,  ils  vissent  et visitassent  vous qui serez commis 8. la publication 
lesdites  coutumes ;  et  icelles,  en-  desdits coustumes estre publiez,  et dBs 
semble  lour  advis,  de  ce  quil  leur  maintenant  pour lors, et dBs  lors pour 
semblera  y  dehvoir  estre  corrig6,  maintenant  les coustumes contenus en 
edjut6, diminu6,  nous envoyassent,  ce  iceux  articles  accordez en  la  manidre 
quo est ot6 fait. . . . Et asvomblable-  dossusdito,  de  nostre  science,  propre 
ment  en a  est6  donne conclusion  sur 
votre  dit  advis,  et  no  reste  qua  les 
faire  publier  en  chascun  desdits 
haillages,  senecha11ss6es  et  jurisdic- 
tions. . . . Et n6aninoins  s'en  faisant 
ladicte publication y survenant aucune 
difficultez,  nous,  desirous  ycelle  estro 
vuydbes, vous avons clonnB et donnons, 
et Q ceux  ainsi  quo  vous  esleuz  pour 
faire  ladicte  publicatlion,  pouvoir, 
puissance  et auctorit6  de les accorder, 
mouvement,  pleine  puissance  et  auc- 
torit6  royale,  nous  avons  decretez 
et auctoris6,  decreton~  et auctorisons 
par  ces  pr6sents,  et  icelles  voulons 
inviolabloment  estre gard6es  et obser- 
v6es,  sans  enfraindre,  comme  loi 
perpotuelle, sans qu'aucun doresnavant 
soit recu Q poser ni prouver coustumes 
contraires,  ne  desrogant  h,  icolles 
constumes ainsi  publi6es." 
localities and acknowledged  as laws by t,he king, would seem 
to  show  that  in  France,  even  in  the  sixtcenth  century, 
t,he source  of  legislation  must  not be  thought  of  as  being 
simply  the royal authority. 
R 1013s  We  must,  however,  notice  that we  find some inciic  t' 
of  another conception of  the relat,ion of  the King of  France 
to the law.  There is a well-known declaration of  the Prcsi- 
dent of  the Parlement of  Paris made in thc year  1527 at a 
I'  Lit de Justice " held by Francis I.  The  occasion  of  this 
was a complaint made by the Parlement about the evocation 
of cases, which had been brought before it, to the Great Council 
of  the  king.  The  President  maintained  that  this  was  an 
innovation of  the reign  of  Louis  XI., which  had been  con- 
demned by the Statcs General of  Tours in 1484 ; but, he went 
on to say, the Parlement did not intend to throw any doubt 
upon the royal authority ; this would be a kind of  sacrilege, 
for they knew  well  that the king was  above the laws,  and 
that  laws  and ordinances  could  not  constrain  him.  They 
did, however,  intend to say that the king  ought not to do 
anything  that  he  had  the power to do, but only that which 
was  reasonable, good, and equitable-that  is, Justice.l  The 
king commanded the Parlement not to meddle with anything 
except matters of  justice, and not to impose any modifications 
upon royal ordinances, edicts, or briefs. 
We  find,  however,  another  example  of  the  relation  of 
the  King  of  France  to the law,  in  a  letter  of  Louis  XII. 
of  December  1499,  which  expressly forbade  the Parlements 
of  Paris,  Toulouse,  and other Courts  to pay  attention  to 
any  dispensation  which  he  might  grant  from  the  terms 
of  the  Ordonnance  for the administration  of  justice,  which 
he  had  issued  in  March  1499.  They  were  to ignore  such 
dispensations, and in virtue of  the authority of  this Declaration, 
' '  Recueil  des  Lois Anciennes,'  vol.  contraindre. et n'y  Btro contrainct par 
12, No.  145 (July  1627) :  " Nous  no  puissance  co-active;  mais  entendons 
voulous  revoques  en  doute  ou  en  dire quo vous ne devez, ne voulez pas 
dispute  de  votre  puissance,  ce  sorait  devoir, tout ce  que vous pouvez,  ains 
espBce  de  sacrilege,  et  savonv  bien  eeulement, ce qui est en raison, bon et 
que vous Btes  pos6 sur les lois, ct que  equitable  qui  n'est  autre  chose  que 
lea lois et ordonnances ne vous peuvent  justice." WE  EARLIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY. 
[PART III. 
to annul them, as he himself now declared them mulled and 
rev0ked.l  This  is  clearly  parallel  to similar  provisions  in 
Spain. 
1  Ordonnances,' vol. xxi., December 
1499  (P.  217) :  "  Nous  voulons  at 
ordonnons que i3  telles lettres on n'ait 
aucun  regard,  et  dtifendons  expr0ss6- 
ment  B  nos  am&  et  foaux  les  gens 
tenons  nos  cours  do  Parloment  B 
Paris,  Toulouse,  Bordeaux,  Dijon, 
eschiquier  de  Normandie,  et  sem- 
blablement  B  tous  nos  justiciers  at 
oficiers, que, par vertu ou sous couleur 
do  telles nos lettres de dispense, ils ne 
en  quelque  meniere  que  ce  soit,, Bur 
peino  d'entre  eux-mesmes  reputes  b 
nous disobeissans et infracteurs d'icelles 
ordonnances ; mais nos dites lettres do 
dispense ot  derogoantes, en  usant  de 
notre presente declaration et intention, 
cassent  annullent et declarent  nulles, 
et de  nu1 effet  et valeur ; lesquelles 31, 
cotto f ois pour q~lelconque  cause qu'olles 
soyont expedi6s, nous, dds  maintenant 
ot pour lors, avons cassQos  revoquees et 
contrarient ou contreviennent,  faosent,  adnull66s." 
souffrent, ni permettent contrarier,  ou  Cf. '  Ordonnances,'  vol.  xxi.,  March 
oontrevenir  &  noa  dites  ordonnances,  1499, 40. 
CHAPTER  111. 
TEE SOURCE  AND  NATURE  Or  THE  AUTHORITY 
OF  THE  RULER. 
WITH  the principles of the nature and supremacy of  the Law, 
which  we  have considered in the last chapter, in our minds, 
we  can now turn to the conception of  the source and nature 
of  the  authority of  the  Ruler  or  Rulers,  as we  find  it in 
the earlier part of  the sixteenth century in France, in Italy, 
in Spain, and in England. 
One  of  the most  interesting  writers,  for  our  purpose,  is 
James Almain of Sens, whose work  seems to us to have been 
somewhat  overlooked.  Little  seems  to  be  known  of  him, 
except  that he  was  a  teacher in the College of  Navarre  in 
the  University  of  Paris,  and that he  received the Doctor's 
degree in 1511 and died in 1515.l 
In various  treatises he  dealt not only  with  the particular 
question with which we are now concerned but with the whole 
nature of  political society and authority, and in order to do 
justice  to his principles we  must take  some  account  of  his 
political theory  as a  whole. 
He  distinguishes  between  that  "  Dominium  Naturale " 
which  was  given to men  by  God  over  all  things,  and  the 
"Dominium  Civile " which  was  added  after  sin  came into 
the world, by  which  man has "  civil " property and "  juris- 
diction,"  that is, the  authority to use  the material  sword.2 
' "  Biographie  Univermlle,"  from  'Opera,'  ed.  1606.  Prima  Pars) : 
'  Dupin,  Bibliothdque  des  Auteurs  '  De  Domini0  Neturali  Civili  et  Ec- 
E~cleaiasti~ues.'  clesiastic~  ' (col. 687). 
a  Jacobus  Almain  (in  J.  Gerson,  "  Dominium  naturale,  quod  llomini 
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~t is interesting to observe that Almain  represents  the Stoic 
md  Patristic conception of the orlglns of  political society, for 
he thinks of  political authority and property as consequences 
of  sin. 
This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  Almain  denied  that 
polilical  society  and  authority  were  of  Divine  institution. 
On  the contrary, he insists  dogmatically in another treatise 
that the lay power  was  just  as truly derived  from  God  as 
the ecclesiasti~al.~  The  sacred  character  of  political  insti- 
tulions  was  not confined to Christian  communities, and he 
repudiates  contemptuously  and  as  savouring  of  heresy  the 
theory, which he  attributes to Innomnt, that there was  no 
legitimate political authority outside of the Church.'  Political 
society and authority were then in the view  of  Almain con- 
sequences of  sin, but also,  as the Patristic tradition held,  a 
Divine remedy for sin, 
ALmain  had, however,  no  belief  in  the absolute King,  or 
in the "  Divine  Right " of  the monarch.  On the contrary, 
he  develops the conoeption  of  the  constitutional  authority 
of  the community very dogmatically.  In  the treatise which 
we  cited  first  he  maintains  that  a  Community  of  men, 
united  with  each  other to form  one body,  has  by  natural 
law the power of  removing, even by death, any person who 
disturbs the Community ; and no Community  can abdicate 
this  power  any more than the individual can renounce his 
right  of  self-preservation ; the prinoe  cannot  slay any man 
conven~t  ex dono  Del,  slmphclter est 
~nabchcab~le  quantum  ad  cuncta, 
s~mll~ter  et  quantum  ad  cortam 
speclorn CI~I  et potus in omnl eventu ' 
CUI domln~o  post poccatum  convenlens 
fult superaddere domlnlum clvlle  pro- 
prletat~s, simihter  et  jur~sd~ct~onls  . 
quo  fungentes,  executlonem  glad11 
mater~alis  habent." 
1 Id ,  '  Do potestate Eccles~ast~ca  et 
La~ca,'  Q i  1 (col  752)  "  Hac occaslone 
quaeritur,  utrum  tahs  potestas  lalca 
slt  a  Deo,  et v~detur  quod  slt, ad 
Rom  XIII  '  Omn~s  anlma  subllm 
loribus  potevtat~bus subjects  slt,'  et 
sequltur  In  textu, ' Non  est  potestas 
i~rsi  a Deo,' idco talis potestas lalca e6t 
aeaue  hone  a  Deo,  slcut  potestas 
spirituahs " 
2 Id. ad, Q. 11  12 (col  8415) : "  Et 
ad  verba  Innocent~l,  SI  intelllgantur 
quod  extla  ecclesiam  nullus  habet 
leg~tlrnam  potcstatem  qua  utatur 
glad10 motenall, illa saplurrt haereslm  9 
nam et apud fideles  st apud ~nfideles~ 
est  Vera  potestas  lalca,  Idem  parum 
ourandum est de auctor~tate  Innocentll 
m propos~to." 
(Innocent  IV  In  h13  '  Apparatus ' 
says the oppo91te  Cf  vol. v. p.  34.1 
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by 111s  own authority; as William of  Paris had said :  the "  clom- 
inium jurisdictionis"  of  the prince in  relation to the Com- 
munity  is  a  ministerial  authority,  as  the authority  of  the 
priest is in relation to God.  The Community cannot renounce 
the  authority  which  it possesses  over  the  prince  whom  it 
has established, and by this authority it can depose him if  his 
rule is not for edification, but for destruction, and he  cites 
a gloss on  the "  Decretum " of  Gratian.  He concludes that 
the  Community  Cannot  in  any  case  bestow  a  monarchy, 
"pure  regalis,"  that  is,  a  monarchy  in  which  one  alone 
rules, and is subject to none.1 
The same conception of  political authority,  as not merely 
derived from,  but  inherent  in  the  Community, is  repeated 
by Almain, in the first chapter  of  his work, '  De Auctoritate 
Id., '  De  Domlnlo  Natural1  Clv111 
et Ecclesiast~co  ' (col  689)  " Tertia 
pars  concIusioil~s  est, quod convemens 
fu~t  tam domlnlum ctvlle  proprletat~~ 
quam jur~sd~ct~on~s  superadd1 domlnlo 
naturah.  Pro  cujus  probatlone, 
quaohbet  commun~tas ad  invicem 
ronversantlum  est velut unum corpuq 
cujus singull alter alterlus sunt  membra, 
juxta illud dlctum Paul1 ad Rom . XI] 
Socundo  supponendum est,  quod In 
illa  con~mlln~tate  jure  natural1  ost 
potestas  quaedam  qua  lic~te lllos, 
quorum  vita  est  in  perturbatlonem 
elus,  potest  a  corpore  praosclndore, 
etlam per  moltem, et lstud dcduc~tur 
13  prlor1  ex  ratlone  Sanct~  Thomae, 
"  2  Q.  64  . . . Secundum  rorol- 
larlurn  nulla  commun~tas perfccta 
hnnc potestatem  a  se abdlraro potest, 
sl~~t  ilec  s~ngular~s  homo  potostatem 
quam  habet,  ad  se  conservandum  In 
esse 
SlOnls  peccatorum,  ost  solum  mlnls- 
tellale ln ordlne ad Deum. 
Quarturn  corollarlum,  non  potoat 
rsnunclare commun~tas  potestat~  quam 
habet  super  suum  Prlnclpem,  ah  ea 
constltutum, qua sclhoet potestate eum 
(~1  non  In  acdlficat~onem  sed  de- 
structlonem  regat)  deponere  potest, 
Cum  tall3  potestas  s~t  naturalis  et 
lstius sententla8 est glossa  XXIII  Q  111. 
Can  ostendet  (Gratlan,  Decretum, 
C  xxlll  Q  111.  11) ub~  dlclt, "  populus 
habet  junsdlctlonem,  Ilcot,  dlcat  lox, 
qu0d eam transtullt In lmperatorem " 
Nam, 81 c1vltas vel popul~s  non haberet 
~unsdlct~onem,  quare pun~retur  propter 
dellctum  judlcls,  xxnl  n  2  Can : 
Dom~nus (Grat~an,  Dec  C  xx~n. 
Q.  11  2),  ubi  dlc~tur  sic,  " Cons  ot 
clv~tas  petenda  est  bello,  qua0  vel 
vlncll~are negloxer~t  quod  a  su~s 
lmprobe factum ost,  non  enlm  puni- 
endus foret  clvltas n131 ~ur~sd~ctionem 
Tortiurn  corollanum,  Princeps  non  haberet  ad  compellendurn 
Et Item  ~c~ldlt  auctoritatr  proprIa,  nec  lllarn  sequ~tur, quod  non  est  dahrl~s, In 
~otestalem ~otoyt  el  conferre  ros  quocunque casu natural~te~,  monarchla 
publln  Hmc  dic~t  Gulielmus  Paris  puro  regalls.  prout  vism  est  capere 
lenals,  quod  dommmm  jur~sdirt~on~s  qmdam  ~stls  dlebus,  quando  umcus 
prlnclpum  at  solum  ministennle  ln  pmoest,  et null18  subest  nani  spud 
0rd1nc  ad commun~tatem,  sicut  dom  ph~losophum non  ita  cap~tur  polltla 
lnium  acero reapctu  remls-  trmocmt~ca  szrut ips0 capishat." TIIE  EARLIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  111. 
Ecclesiae,' where he adds a more developed statement of  the 
principle  that the prince  has  no  authority  of  himself,  nor 
from  God  immediately,  but  only  from  the  Community.l 
In the first chapter of  his work, '  De Potestate Ecclesiaatica 
et Laica,' he affirms in more general terms that the secular 
power is derived from the people, whether it passes by heredi- 
tary  succession or  by  election ; in  some  exceptional  cases 
God  may have bestowed it upon  some man, but, regularly, 
God  does  not  do  this.2  In another  place  in  this  work  he 
asserts,  incidentally,  that the legitimate kingdom in  France 
was established by the agreement of  the pe~ple.~ 
These conceptions of  Alrnain are obviously very significant ; 
he does not merely repudiate the theory of  what we  call the 
"  Divine  Right,"  but  he  looks  upon  political  authority  as 
properly  inherent  in  the Community, in  such  a  sense that 
it is really inalienable, and that an absolute monarchy cannot 
properly  be  created  by  the Community.  The  Community 
always has such authority over the prince whom it has created 
that it can depose him if his rule is for destruction, otherwise 
it would not have power  adequate for  its self-preservation. 
It  was  this  authority  which  the Community  of  the  Gauls 
1 Id., '  De Auctoritate Ecclesiaa,' I.  2  Id., '  De Potestate Ecclesiastica et 
(col.  707) :  "  Communitas  confert  Laica,'  Q.  i.  cap.  1 (col. 752) : " Sed 
principi  auctoritatem  oocidendi  eos,  potestas laica sive secularis est potestas 
quorum vita  in perniciem reipublicae  a  populo,  ex  successione  hereditaria, 
cedit ;  ergo  ill8  auctoritas  est  per  vel  ox  electione  alicui  vel  aliquibus 
prius  in  communitate,  cum  nemo  tradita  regulariter,  ad  aedificationom 
alteri  det  quod  non  habet  et  ante-  communitatis,  quantum ad res civiles 
cedens notum  est, cum princeps  a ee  secundum  leges  civiles,  pro  consequ- 
auctoritetem  illam  non  habeat,  nec  tione  habitationis  pacificae.  Prim0 
habet  eam  immediate  a  DBO,  saltem  tangitur causa efficiens et origo hujus, 
utinpluribus.  N~m,utdicuntd~~t~res,  scilicet  'a  populo  regulariter'  et 
praesertim  Durandus  in Tractat.  De  licet aliquando Deus specialiter dederit 
Jwisdictione  Ecclesiastica,  non  est  aliquibus  hanc  potestatem  laicam,  ut 
intellipndum  quod  auctoritas  regis  Sauli . . .  et Davidi . . . et aliquibus 
secularis  sit  a  Deo  sic,  quod  eam  qui  utebantur  ista  potestate  super 
immediate alicui commiserit regulariter,  Israel,  ut  patet  Judicum  I., tamen 
sed  quia  secundum  rectam  rationem  regulariter neminem Deus instituit." 
quam  Deus  hominibus  indidit,  est  8  Id.  id.,  Q.  4  (col.  871) :  ‘‘Dice 
alicui  commissn.  Et  non  videtur  quod  incoepit  esse  legitimus  rex  in 
(cum non  sit  a  Deo  immediate com-  Gallia, ex  consensu populi,  quia  Con- 
missa)  a  quo sit  principi  collata  nisi  sensit populas in aliquenl ut regeret." 
ab ipsa communitate." 
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used  when  they  deposed  the king  (Chilperic), not  so  much 
for any crime as because he was incapable.  And it was the 
same authority which the Israelites  used against Rehoboam, 
for even when Qod had given authority immediately, as seems 
to have  been  the case  with  Saul and David,  such  princes 
remained subject to the whole Community if  they used their 
authority to the destruction of  the Community.l 
This does not mean that Almain was an enemy of  monarchy. 
In another treatise he cites the usual definition of  the various 
forms of  government, but adds that of  these the best is the 
monarchy,  the  worst  what  he  calls  the  "  Censupotestas." 
And again he adds that there is no form of  government which 
may not be changed into another, for the form of  government 
belongs to the "  Jus Positivum."  A Iittle further on, he goes 
some  way  towards  dehing  what  he  understood  by  the 
monarchy.  A monarchy is that form of  government in which 
normally one man  rules, but this does not mean that there 
is no assembly which is over him,  and can depose him, but 
while in the "  Communitates ,' the as8embly is constantly in 
being, and ruling, that is not so in the monarchy.3 
Id., '  De  Auctoritate Ecclesiae,' I. 
(col.  708) :  "  Secundum  corollarium 
est,  nulla  communitas  perfects  hanc 
potestatem  a  se  abdicare  potest. . . . 
Tertium Corollarium, tote communitas 
potestatem  habet super  principem  ab 
ea  constitutum,  qua  eum  (si  non 
in aedificationem sed in destructionem 
politiae  regat)  deponere  potest,  alias 
non  esset  in  ea  sufficiens  potestas  se 
conservandi :  et ista potestate Gallorum 
communitas  quondam  usa,  regem 
mum deposuit, non tam pro criminibus, 
quam  pro  eo  quod  tantae  regimini 
inutilis esset, ut habet glossa Can. alius 
15 Q. 6 (Gratian Decretum, C.  16 Q. 6), 
ubi  dicitur  quod  Zacharias  Regem 
Francarum  doposuit,  habet  glossa,  id 
0%  dsponentibus  consensit.  Hac 
sadem  potestate  usi,  filii  Israel  re- 
cemrunt  a  Rehoboam.  . . .  Et 
quamvis super aliquem populum a Deo 
acceperint  aliquam  jurisdictionem 
civilem immediate, ut videtur probabile 
de Saule et Davide, nihilominus semper 
toti  communitate  fuerunt  subjecti, 
casu  quo  in  destructionem  com- 
munitatis regerent." 
Id., ' De Potestate Ecclesiastica et 
Laica,'  Q.  i.  5  (col.  766) : "  Et inter 
has,  summa  et  ultima  est  regnum, 
infima  autem  censupotestas.  . . . 
Ultra  supponitur  quod  nulla  est 
politia  pure  civilis,  et  nulla  regalis, 
quin  posset  mutari in  aliam  speciem, 
puta  timocratiam  vel  aristocratiam, 
quia  quaelibet  talis  est  instituta jure 
pure positivo, ergo quaelibet potest  in 
aliam mutari." 
Cf. Id., Q. iii. 7 (col. 867). 
a  Id. id., Q. i. 16 (col. 824) : "  Sed illa 
(politia) dicitur  regalis,  quando  unus 
solus  dominatur,  et  non  plures ; 
verum est regulariter,  nam in civilibus 
non  dicitur politia  regalis ex  eo  quod 
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In a later passage he sums up some of  the functions  and 
limitations of  the best prince.  He is to render to every man 
what belongs to him, that is, to administer justice, to establish 
law, to appoint the inferior judges and officers, but especially 
to correct  and punish  the transgressors.  The prince  must 
rule for the common good, he must remember that he reigns 
over free men and not slaves ; it is inconsistent with the best 
princely  authority  that  he  should  have  absolute  power 
(plenitude potestatis), that is, that he should have authority 
to  transfer  one  man's  property  to  another,  without  fault 
or cause, or to do whatever he pleases, so far as it does not 
conflict with the laws of  nature and of  G0d.l 
It is perhaps worth while to notice that Almain in the same 
chapter  represents  the person whom  he  cites  as "  Doctor " 
as  saying  that  it  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  best 
"  principatus " that  there  should  exist  in  the  Community 
a juridical  (legal) authority, which in no way depends upon, 
or is created by, the Supreme Prince ; and he mentions,  as 
an illustration  of  this,  that, in  some countries,  in  Aragon, 
as it is said, there are jurisdictions  which the king does not 
create  but  which  descend  by  hereditary  succession;  the 
nam  congregatio  nobilium  politiae  quarumcunque  virtutum  praecipere ; 
civilis,  immediate  est  super  regcrn,  et quilitet  princeps  ex  officio  ad  lita 
et  pro  idonietate  possunt  deponi  tenetur :  sed  tamen  ad  hoc  videtur 
reges,  ut patet  in Childerico et Zach.  esse  principalissime  constitutus  nt 
aria.  Non  vocatur  ergo  regalis,  eo  corrigat  et  puniat  delinquentes. . . . 
quod  nulla  congregatio  sit  super  Ex his  patet  quae sunt  optimo  prin- 
illum  qui  gubernat.  Sed  in  com-  cipatui  necessario  annexa,  et  qu:~o 
munitatibus  est  congregatio  super  incompossibilia et quae  impertinentia, 
regem, et semper  manet  in  esse  con-  et dictum est quod ad optimum prin- 
gregatio.  Sed  in  politia  regali  non  cipatum necesse est quod sit ad bonurn 
sic est, quia non est semper congregatio  commune,  et  quod  principans  princi- 
nobilium  congregate,  quae  sit  super  petur  liberis,  et  non  servis,  et  quod 
regem."  sit  unus  principans  et  non  plures. 
1 Id.  id.,  Q.  iii.  6  (col.  865):  Item  repugnat  optimo  principatui 
"  Consequonter  restat  inquirere  quae  habere  plenitudinem  potestatis,  puta 
possunt  adesse  et  abesse  optimo  quod  possit  ad plaoitum  suum trans- 
principatui;  et breviter  dicitur  quod  ferre  rem  meam  in  altorum,  sine 
ad  optimum principatum spectat uni-  quocunque  meo  peccato,  vel  cause, 
cuique  quod  suum  est  reddere,  hoe  et faccre  quidquid  non  repugnat  juri 
est justitiam ministrare, leges condere,  naturae  et divino ; et visum est otiam 
judices  inferiores  et  alios  officiales,  quo mod0 praecipuus actus principalis 
delegere  et  constituere,  operetiones  est malorum punitione intendere." 
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sons succeed the fathers as judges and the king cannot deprive 
them  of  their  authority ; rather, they are over the king, in 
respect of  this jurisdiction.1 
The  whole  position  of  Ahain is  exceedingly interesting. 
He has the same preference for  the monarchy as that which 
we  normally find in the medieval world, but he is also quite 
clear  not  only  that the source  of  political  authority is  the 
~ommunity,  but that the ultimate authority always remains 
in it and must in the nature of  things do so, and though the 
monarchy  is  the  best  form  of  government,  it  is  strictly 
limited by the purpose  for which  it  exists, the  furtherance 
of  the common  good  and  the maintenance  of  justice ;  an 
absolute monarch is to him impossible. 
The  character  of  the  political  theory  of  John  Major  ie 
very  close  to that  of  Almain;  indeed, it would  seem  that 
he was either directly influenced by Almain or that they were 
both  under  the influence  of  some common tradition.  John 
Major  was  a  Scotsman, but  taught  for  many  years  in  tho 
University  of  Paris,  and the work  with  which we  are now 
dealing  was  apparently  published  in  1518.  It is primarily 
concerned,  like those of Almain, with the ecclesiastical  questions 
of  the relation  between the Pope and the General Council, 
but we are here only concerned with its political principles. 
The  king  has  no  authority except  that which is  derived 
from the kingdom, for he himself or his first predecessor was 
elected  by  the people ; the  king  is  over  every  individual 
person in the kingdom, but he is not over all the kingdom, 
"  regulariter  et  casualiter,"  he  is  "  regulariter " over  the 
Id.  id.  id.  (col.  865) :  "Jam 
Doctor infert aliqua  corollaria-Primo 
non  repugnet  optimo  principatui  su- 
premo, optimo  ordinato, aliquem  esse 
potestatem  juridicam  alicujus,  vel 
aliquorum  de  eommunitate  illa,  quae 
nullo  modo  ab ipso  supremo  princi- 
pante  dependeat,  et  quae  non  sit 
ab  ipso  instituto,  hoc  est,  quae  non 
dependeat  ab ipso,  nec  quoad  insti- 
tutioncm  nec  ad destitutionom  saltem 
regulariter.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . 
Hinc  eat  quod  in  aliquibus  regnis, 
ut fertur in regno Arragoniae, rex non 
habet  institupre  jurisdictiones,  imo 
est  aliqua  potestas  juridica,  quae 
habetur  ex  successione  parentum. 
Ita quod post  patres,  filii sunt judices 
. . . nec  illos  rex  potest  dest~tuere, 
imo  illam sunt  jurisdictionem."  supra  regem  quantum  ad whole kingdom, while the kingdom is over him "  casualiter." 
This is sharply stated, but the principle is even more com- 
pletely expressed in another passage.  The  King  of  France 
is  over  all Francs,  but  the "  praecipua  pars"  from which 
he derives his authority is over him, and can depose him for 
reasonable  cause.  The  people  is  " virtualiter "  over  the 
king, and in difficult matters the three Estates of  the Realm 
are called  together  and  direct  him,  and  a  free  people  has 
the  power,  for reasonable  cause,  to alter the form  of  the 
~onstitution.~ 
He expresses the  same  principle  again  in  another  place. 
In France  and  Scotland it  may  be  said  that the  supreme 
power is in the king, but it would be better to say that there 
are two powers of  which one is supreme and more unlimited 
than the other.  In the kingdom and in the whole free people 
1 John  Dlajor,  '  Do  Auctoritate  sine rationabili et arduissima causa. .  .  . 
Concilii  super  Pontificem  maximum.'  Si  contradicat,  in  hoc  solum  eat 
(In J. arson, Opera, vol. i., ed.  1606)  discrimen,  pontificatus  est  de  jure 
(col. 881) : "  Rex utilitatem reipublicae  divino  et  ex  institutione  Christi,  et 
dissipens  et  evertens  incorrigibiliter,  rex habet regnum  a toto populo . . . 
eat  deponendus  a  cornmunitate  cui  respondeo, sed auctoritas communicata 
praeest.  . . . Rex  non  habst  robur  eat  ecclesiae  a  Christo, sicut  summus 
et auctoritatem nisi a regno, cui libere  pontificatus,  et  auctoritas  ills  non 
praeest."  dependet ab auctoritete summi ponti- 
(Col.  888) :  "  Rex  tamen  non  est  ficatus,  sed  immediate  a  Deo,  et sic 
super  omnes  in  regno  regulariter  et  aliquomodoconvenitpotestasecclesiae, 
casualiter,  quia  vel  electus  est,  vel  cum  potestate  populi  unius  regni  et 
enim  primus  predecessor erat  electus  aliquo  mod0  differt ;  nam  quoad 
a populo, pro communi populi utilitate,  superioritatem  convenit,  ita  quod 
et non pro auo. . . .  Ad  politism vero  sicut  populus  virtualiter  est  super 
regalem,  non  requiritur  quod  rex  sit  regem,  et in casu,  ut in rebus  arduis 
super omnes sui regni tam regulariter  in  quibus  convocantur  tres  status 
quam casueliter,  ut ex  dictis  liquet :  regni, qui regem in casibus ancipitibu~ 
sed sat est, quod rex sit super unum-  habeant  dirigere ;  sic,  in  casibus 
quemlibet ;  et  super  totum  regnum  arduis  Concilium  rite  congregatum, 
regulariter ; et regnum  sit super eum  habet  leges  obligatorias  pontifici  im- 
casualitor, et in aliquo eventu."  ponere, quoad  ejus personam,  et non 
2 Id, id.  (rol.  886)  : "  Exemplum  quoad  dignitatem  ipsum.  Hoc  pro 
in simili, Franciscus dicitur communiter  tanto dico, quod  corpus ecclesiae non 
rex totius Franciae,  et non  mod0  est  poteetmutare politiamregalem ecclesiae 
super  unam  provinciam  Galliae,  sed  in  aristocraticam  vel  timocratioe.m, 
super  totam categorematice,  non  ob-  quia  tunc  contravenlret  institutioui 
stante quod  precipua  pars  est  super  Christi :  populus  autem  liber,  pro 
ipsum, a qua auctoritatem habet, qua8  rationabili  causa  potest  politiam 
non potefit to lere ab eo regnum suum,  mutare." 
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there is a supreme power which is the ultimate source of all 
authority,  and  which  cannot  be  abrogated,  while  the king 
holds a power, honourable, indeed, but ministerial.1 
It is interesting to compare  the position  of  AImain  and 
~ohn  Major  with that of  Machiavelli in Italy.  We  are not 
here discussing the character and significance of  his discussion 
of  statecraft in  the  administration  of  government  as  it is 
set  out in  ' The  Prince.'  Indeed,  we  venture to say  that 
there is but little relation between this and the history of  the 
development of political civilisation as embodied in the laws 
and institutions of the countries of  Western Euro~e. 
A  It  must  not  be  thought  that  we  are  undervaluing  the 
importance of Machiavelli in history, or attempting to estimate 
the  significance  of  his  penetrating  analysis  of  the  forces 
which,  rightly  or  wrongly,  consciously  or  unconsciouslv. 
d 7  have determined in so great a measure the relations  of  the 
-- 
autonomous Communities of Europe ; but the history of these 
relations does not come within the scope of  this work, and it 
would  be  absurd to discuss them  merely incidentally.  We 
deal, therefore,  with  certain  aspects  of  his  political theory 
which  are to be found mainly in the 'Discourses  on  Liw.' 
--  . 
.J  7  and  these  are  for  our  purposes  very  interesting  and 
significant. 
Machiavelli sets out the traditional definition of  the three 
good  forms  of  State,  Monarchy,  Aristocracy,  and  popular 
government, and their three corrupt counterparts, the Tyranny, 
the  Oligarchy,  and the corrupt Democracy.  He  adds that 
the good forms of  government had a fatal tendency to turn 
into the corrupt ones, and points out that the wise founders 
of  States had therefore endeavoured to establish a constitution 
l  Id.  id.  (col.  889)  : "  Similitor  in 
regno  Francorum  vel  Scotorum  est 
suprema  potestas  etiam  in  eorum 
reglbus ;  melius dicantur duae potestatos 
realiter,  quarum  una  est  superior  et 
iuimitatior  quam  alia,  ad  quam  alia 
subordinatur,  et sic  est  quodammodo 
una. .  . . 
(Col.  890) : "  Similiter  in  regno  et 
in toto populo  libero, est suprema  et 
foutalis  potestas  inabrogalis ; in  rego 
vero,  p0testaS  ministerialis  honesto 
ministerio :  et  sic  aliquo  modo  aunt 
duae  potestates,  sed  quia  una  ordin- 
atur  propter  aliam,  poteat  vocari 
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It  seems  to us  to be  clear  that Machiavelli  held  that the 
prince should be subject to the Law, and that he related this 
to the conception of  liberty. 
We  find also  in Machiavelli a  very  interesting  discussion 
of  the ultimate  foundations  of  a  healthy  political  system. 
He contrasts the success of  Rome, in establishing and main- 
taining liberty after the expulsion of the Tarq~s,  with its 
inability to restore it  when  the opportunity  was  given  by 
the deaths of  Caesar,  or  Caligula, or  Nero, and he  contends 
that the reason of  this was that in the time of  the Tarquins 
the Roman  people  was  not yet corrupt, while in the later 
times it was most corrupt.  And he adds that the same thing 
could be said of  his own time.  Nothing, he says, could ever 
restore liberty in Naples or Milan, the corruption of  the people 
had gone to;  far, and this could be seen in the fact that, on 
the  death  of  Filippo  Visconti, Milan  wished  to  recover  its 
liberty, but could not maintain it.l 
We  must  not, indeed,  interpret  Machiavelli's  conception 
of  the corruption  of  the Community as related to what we 
ahould call private morals ; it  has  reference rather to what 
we  might call public spirit and honour.  The importance  of 
Machiavelli's conception, from the point of  view of  our subjoct, 
is that he is clear that the prosperity of  a State and the char- 
acter  of  its  government  depends  in  the  long-run  on  the 
qualities, not  merely of  the Ruler  but  of  all  the members 
of  the Community. 
menti,  e  massime  quel  di  Parigi ; le 
quali sono da lui rinnovate qualunque 
volta e' fa una esecuzione contro ad un 
Principe  di  quel regno, e  che  ci  con- 
danna il Re nelle sue sentenze." 
1  Id.,  i.  17 : "  Ma  non  si  vede  il 
piu forte esempio che quello di Roma, 
la  quale  cacciati  i  Tarquinii  potette 
subito  prendere  e  mantenere  quella 
liberta ;  ma  morto  Csasare,  morto 
Caligula, rnorto  Nerone, spenta  tutta 
la  stirpe  Caesarea,  non  potette  mai, 
non  solamente  mantenere  ma  pure 
dare  principio  alla  liberta ; ne  tanta 
diversita  di  evento  in  una  medesima 
citta  nacque  da altro, se  non  da non 
esaere dei tempi de Tarquinii ii  populo 
Romano  ancora  corrotto,  e  in  quosti 
ultimi tempi  essere corrottissimo. . . . 
E  benche  questo  esempio  di  Roma 
sia  da  proporre  a  qualunque  altro 
esempio, non di meno voglio a  questo 
proposito addurre inanzi popoli conos- ' 
ciuti  ne  nostri  tempi.  Pertanto  dico 
che  nessuno  accidente,  benche  grave 
e  violento,  potrebbe  ridurre  mai 
Milano  o  Napoli  libere,  per  essere 
quelle  membra  tutte  corrotte.  I1 
che  se  vide  dopo  la  morte  di Filippo 
Visconti, che volendosi ridurre Milano 
alla  liberta non  potette e  non  seppe 
rnantenerla." 
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The truth is, that though he asserted the principle that the 
mixed or tempered constitution was the best, he held that the 
people  as a whole, if they accepted the control of  the Laws, 
were wiser and more prudent and less variable than a prince. 
In one  chapter  he  discusses at some length  the opinion  of 
Livy  and other historians  that the multitude is inconstant, 
and declares that this might be said equally of  princes, when 
they are not restrained by the Laws.  A people which is well 
ordered will be constant, prudent, and grateful  as much  as, 
or more than, a prince, even a wise prince ; while  a prince, 
who  is  not  subject  to the  Laws,  will  be  more  ungrateful, 
more variable, and more imprudent than the people.  There 
is some ground for the comparison of  the voice of  the people 
to the voice of  G0d.l 
The people  is much wiser  than the prince in the appoint- 
'  Id.,  i.  58 : "  Nessuna  cosa  esser 
piu  vana  e  piu  inconstante  che  la 
multitudine,  cosi  T.  Livio  nostro 
come tutti li altri Istorici affermano. .  .  . 
Dico adunque como di quello difetto 
di  che  accuaano li  serittori  la  multi- 
tudine,  se  ne  possono  accusare  tutti 
gli  uomini, particolarmente,  e massime 
i principi . . . e de' buoni e de savi no 
sono  stati pochi ;  io  dico  de'  principi 
che  hanno  potuto  rompere quel freno 
che  li  puo  corregere ; tra  i  quali 
non  sono  quelli Re che  nascevano  in 
Egitto  quando  in  quells  antichissima 
antichit&  si governava quella provincia 
con  le  leggi,  ne  quelli che  nascevano 
in Isparta, ni quelli che a nostri tempi 
nascono  in  Francia,  il  qual  regno  6 
moderato  piu  delle  leggi  che  alcun 
altro regno  di che ne'  nostri tempi  si 
sbbi notizib.  E que~ti  Re che nascono 
sotto  tali  costituzioni,  non  sono  da 
mettere in quel numero donde si abbia 
a  considerare  la  natura  di  ciascuno 
uomo  per  sb, e vedere se egli  B  simile 
ella  multitudine ; perche  all' incontro 
lor0  si  debbe  porre  una  multitudine 
medasimamente  regolata  dalle  leggi 
come  sono  essi,  e  ~i troverh  in  lei 
essere  quella medesima  bontQ che noi 
veggiamo essere in quelli. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Conchiudo  adunque  contra  alla 
commune opinione, la qual dice come i 
Popoli,  quando  sono  principi,  sono 
vari,  mutabili, ingrati,  affermando che 
in  loro  non  sono  altriment6  questi 
peccati  che  si  sieno  ne  Principi  par- 
ticolari.  Ed  accusando  alcuno  i 
Popoli  e  i  Principi  insieme, potrebbe 
dire il vero ; ma traendone  i Principi, 
s'inganna:  perch&  un  Populo  che 
commands  e  sia  bene  ordinato,  Sara 
stabile,  prudente,  o  grato,  non  altri- 
mente  che  un  Principe, o meglio  che 
un  Principe,  eziandio  stimato  savio ; 
E dal  altra parte, un  Principe  sciolto 
dalle  leggi  sarb  ingrato,  vario,  e  im- 
prudent~  piu  che un  Populo . . . Ma 
quanto alla  prudenza  e  alla  stabilita, 
dico  come un  Populo  6 piu prudente, 
piu  stabile,  e  di  miglior  giudizio che 
un  Principe.  E  non  senza cagione si 
assomiglia  la  voce  d'un  populo  a 
quella  di  Dio ;  perche  si  vede  una 
opinione univorsale  fare  effetti  mara- 
vigliosi  ne'  pronostici  suoi,  talche 
pare che per  occulta virtb e'  preveggu 
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ment of  the magistrates, and is more constant in its opinions. 
The truth is that the government by the people is better than 
that of the prince ; if  we compare the government of a prince 
bound  by  the  Laws  with  that of  a  people equally  bound, 
there  is  more  excellence  (virtu) in  the  pmple than  in  the 
prince ; while, if  we  compare the errors of  the prince with 
those  of  the people, the errors of  the people  are fewer and 
less  serious,  and  more  easily  remedied.  The  truth  is, 
35achiavelli adds, that the common depreciation of  the people 
arises from  the  fact  that everyone  speaks evil  freely,  and 
without fear, of  them, even when they govern, while of  princes, 
men only speak with fear and deferenm1 
It  is  clear  that  Machiavelli's  political  conceptions,  as 
represented  in  the  'Discorsi,'  are  related  primarily  to  the 
tradition of  the Italian City States, but it is significant that he 
represents the same position as other medizval writers, that 
the foundation of  a  civilised  political life  is  the supremacy 
of  Law. 
We  turn to Spain, where we  find  in  Soto  a,  wriber  whose 
work  was  not indeed published  till after the midrllc  of  the 
century, but who  seems to us to belong in character to its 
clarlier part ; for he does not seem to be affected by the great 
political movements of  the latter part of  the century.  Indeed, 
the work of  Soto is in the main a careful restatement of  some 
of  the  principles  of  St  Thomas  Aquinas,  with  occasional 
modifications, no doubt. 
1 Id.  id.  id. : "  Vedesi  ancora  nelle 
sue elezioni a i Magistrati fare di lungo 
migliore  elezione  che  un  Principo,  ne 
mai  si  perauaderk  ad un  populo  cho 
sia  bone  tirare  alla  dignit& un  uomo 
infame  e  di  oorrotti  costumi,  il  cho 
facilmente e  per  mille  vie si  persuado 
ad  un  Principe ;  vedesi  un  populo 
cominciare  ad  avere  in  orrore  uua 
cosa,  e  molti  secoli  stare  in  quolla 
opinion0 ;  il  clle  non  si  vede  in  un 
principe.  . . . I1  ohe  non  puo nascere 
da  altro  so  non  che  sono  migliori 
govorili  quolli  de'  popoli  che  quelli 
dn'  Principi.  . . . Se  adunque  si 
ragionorb  d'un  Principo  obligato  alle 
leggi,  e  d'un  populo  incatenato  da 
quolle,  si  vedra  piu  virtu  nel  populo 
che  nel  Principe ; se si  ragionor& do1 
uno e del  altro sciolto, si vedra mono 
errori  do1  populo  che  nel  Principe, e 
quelli  minori  e  arrano  maggiori 
remedi.  . . .  Ma  I'opinione  contra si 
populi  nasce perch& de'  popoli ciascun 
dice  male  senza paura,  e  liberamente 
ancora  montre  che  regnano ;  de 
Principi  si  parla  sempre  con  mille 
paure o mille rispetti." 
We  have  already  noticed  Soto's  conception  of  Law  in 
general;  we  are  now  concerned  with  his  conception  of 
tho  prince.  Kings,  he  says,  do  not  derive  their  authority 
immediately  or  directly  from  God,  except  in  some  special 
cases, such as those of  Saul and David ; they are normally 
created by the people, and their authority is derived from the 
people.  Such words as those of  the Proverbs, "  By me kings 
reign,"  only mean that God, as the source of  Natural  Law, 
has granted  to mortal men  that every Commonwealth  has 
the right  to govern itself,  and if  reason,  which is itself  an 
inspiration (spiramen) of  the Divine, demands it, to transfer 
its authority to another.] 
The authority of  the king is, however, conceived by  Soto 
as being very great.  In a passage dealing with tJhe  practice 
of  selling public  offices, he is met  with the contention  that 
the king cannot do this, for he is merely "  dispensator  offi- 
ciorum" ; he emphatically  disputes this, and says that the 
king is not merely a "  dispensator,"  but he is the Respublica, 
not a mere vicar of  the Respublica, like the Doge of  Venice. 
The people, in Ulpian's phrase, has conveyed to him  all its 
authority and force, and neither he nor his heirs can be de- 
prived of  this, except for manifest tyranny.  Therefore, the 
kingdom is his, as the house of  a private citizen belongs to 
the citizen, and every power and right (Jus)  of  the Respublica 
belongs to him.  Only, the Respublica was not made for him, 
but  he for the Respublica, and he  must  therefore  consider 
everything from the point of  view of  its good.2  In another 
Soto, 'Do Justitia  et Juro,'  i.  1, 3 
(p. 9) : "  Haud onim a Deo proxime, ot 
quod  aiunt  immediate  crcati  sunt, 
praetor Saulum et Dnvidem oorumque 
prosapiam, cui sceptrum ips8 commisit, 
sed, ut ljabetur  1.  quod placuit  ff.  do 
Consti.  prim (' Digest,' i.  4, 1),  reges ac 
principes a populo creati sunt, in quas 
suum  transtulit  imperiom  ac  potos- 
tatem. . . . Unde  verbum  illud  apud 
sapientem  ex  Proverb:  vi!i.  supra 
citatum,  '  Per  me  reecs  regullt,  etc.' 
non  aliter  intelligendum  e~t  quam 
quad ab ipso,  tanquam naturalis juris 
auctorom, donatuq mort,alibus  eat, ut 
unoqueque respublica  se ipsam regondi 
habcat  arbitrium ;  ac  subindo,  ubi 
ralio,  quod spiramen otiarn est divini 
numinis,  postulaverit,  in  alium  suam 
transmittat  potestatem,  cujus legibus 
providentius gubernetur." 
Id., iii.  6, 4  (p. 273) : "  Attamen 
objectio  haeo  nisi  fallor  nullat,enus 
conclusionem n0stra.m expugnat  Rex 
enim  non  tanquam  diapensator,  sed 
tanquam ipso  oadem  respublica  rep" 
tandus.  Enim vero non out estimandus 
tanquam  reipublicae  vicarius,  siouti 256  THE  EARLIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  III. 
passage  Soto speaks of  the power  of  the prince  in  making 
laws ;  and  says emphatically  that he is  superior,  not  only 
to all individuals, but to the whole 8tate.l 
It  should be  observed that with  a11  his emphasis on  the 
authority of the king, he is equally clear that he must use it 
for the good  of  the  State, and if he uses it tyrannically he 
may be deposed.  This is not merely an incidental judgment, 
but is carefully developed, with due qualifications, in another 
passage, where he discusses the question of  tyrannicide.  He 
makes a distinction, with which we  are by this time familiar, 
between the tyrant by usurpation and the tyrant by practice. 
As to the first there is no doubt ; he may be slain by anyone, 
for he is making war on the Commonwealth.  The case of  the 
second is more difficult, as he has a lawfulright to the kingdom; 
he can therefore only be deprived of  this by public judgment, 
but when this has been pronounced, anyone may be appointed 
to carry it out.  If  the Commonwealth hart a superior, he should 
be requested  to provide a remedy, but if there is none, the 
Commonwealth may  take  arms  against  the  tyrant.  It  is 
noteworthy that he interprets the Decree of  the Council  of 
Constance concerning tyrannicide as referring to the action of 
a private person.2  It is clear that, with all his reverence for 
Venetorum  dux,  qu~  eqt  a  repubhca  lpsum est . licet non respublica propter 
pendens,  sed  tanquam  plenlss~mam  lpsum,  sed  lpse  propter  rempubhcam 
habens potestatem reipublicae, oandem  s~t  ~nstitutus  . et ideo omnla debet ln 
eclllcet  quam lpsa  habebat.  Sm  emm  pubhcum oommodum referre." 
expresse habet lex  ~lla,  quod prlnclpl,  1 Id ,  iv 4, I (p 309)  "  At hinc sit, 
ff. . de  Const~t pnm  ('Dig ' 1  4,  1)  ut 11b. I.  Quest. VI  dlcebamus,  prmcl- 
Quod  prlnclpl  placult,  leg18  habet  pem potestate fung~  ferendarum legum , 
vlgorem,  utpote  cum  lege  regia  quae  qu~bus  rempubhcam coerceet.  Fltque 
de lmperlo  lata est, populus  el  et In  praeterea ut non solum slnguhs reipub- 
eum  omne  suum lmperlum  et potes  hcae  membris  supertor  slt,  verum  et 
tatem  contulerlt.  Hac  enlm  lege  totlus collectim corporla, caput, totlque 
atque hac  de  cause  non  potest  lllum  adeo sic eminens, ut totam stlam elmu1 
ullo  pacto  &movere, neque  fil~os  lure  punlre  valeat  Quare nequo  per  rem- 
hered~tar~o  regnand1 expollare,  si lllud  publicam  rex  potcst  regnl  expollarl, 
semel  1111  contulorlt,  nisl  ub~  aperta  nisi fuer~t  In tyrann~dem  corruptus " 
tyrann~de regnum  pessundaret.  Et  a  Id ~d ,  v  1, 3 (p 400). "  Pr~mum 
tunc  solo  beneficlo  naturahs  ]urls,  de tyranno, an cuivls civlum hcet eum 
quo  vlm  VI  repellere  llcet.  Itaque  privatim  interficere  Apparet  enlm 
regnum est suum, slcut cujusque  clvls  ~d esse,  nature  maglstra,  legltlmum 
eua est domus ,  atque adeo quaecunque  Nam  unlcu~que concehtur  ]us  de- 
faculLas  st  ]us  re~pubhcae  penes  fendendl sose  De  hoc  D.  Thorn  ll 
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the  authority  of  the  king,  Soto  holds  that,  as  it  is 
derived  from  the  Communlty,  he  may  justly  be  deprlved 
of  it  by  the  Communlty  if  he  uses  it  unjustly  and 
tyrannically. 
Soto's treatment of  the relation  of  the king to the Law is 
rather  different.  He  discusses  this  in  detail  in  a  chapter 
in whlch he asks whether all are subject to the Law, and points 
out the difficulty raised  by the words of  St Paul, "  Law is 
not made for the righteous man " (1 Tim. i. 9),  and by those 
of  Ulpian, "  Princeps  legibus  solutus  est " (Dig. I. iii. 31). 
We  cannot here enter into his discussion of  the first passage, 
but  his  observations  on  the second  are  important  for  our 
purpose.  The  prince  is  subject  to the directing  force  (vis 
directive) of  the Law, but 1s not subject to its coercive force ; 
this, he says, is obvious, for he cannot apply force to himself ; 
the prince should not, however, think of  this as a privilege, 
but rather as an unhappy circumstance, for subjects are both 
illurnmated by the  light of  the Law and driven by its penalties ; 
the prince lacks the second, for there is no one who can compel 
hlm or even dare to reprove him.  And, therefore,  the king 
should be the more careful to listen to reason and the Divine 
voice, and to hearken to the laws which he has made for others, 
and Soto cites the words of  the Imperial Constitution, ''  Digna 
Sent  Dlst .  64  Q  11  Art  11,  et 
opus xx Do  Reg~mlne  Prlnc~p~s  C.  VI. 
optime  dlsser~t  Summa  autem  dls- 
putat~onls secundum  qrrosdam  ejus 
~nterpretes,  atque ahos doctores, haec 
@st,  b~farlum quemplam  conting~t 
esse tyrannum, vldellcet, aut potestatls 
acq~nllqlt~one,  aut  sola  adm~mstrat~one 
quem  juste  adeptus  fult  Atque  In 
hoc secuiido C~SU,  communls consensus 
est,  nemlnl  llcere  lpsum  privatim 
Intenmere  Et rat10 est, quod  quum 
]us habeat ad regnum, non eat 1110 n1s1 
per  publ~cum  judlclum  expol~andum, 
Ut  s  audlatur  Lata  vero  In  eum 
sententla, qulsque potest inshtui execu 
tlonls m~nister 
Pr?eterea  dum  part~cular~ter  clvem 
quemp~am aggiedltur,  ut  vel  lpsum 
VOL.  VI. 
truc~det,  vel  sua  wplat,  potest  CIVIS 
ille, vim vi repellendo, eum mntenmere, 
dum  tamen  constant~ss~mum  s~t,  esse 
tyrannurn  . . .  Quare  SI  respubl~cn 
superlorem  habet,  ille  adeundus  est, 
ut remed~o  succurreat  sin  vero,  illa 
poteut  In  cum  coarmari.  . .  Atque 
In  hoc  casu  intelllgenda  est  sanctio 
Concllu  Constant~ens~s,  Sess  16, 
ub~  tanquam  haercsls  conrlenmatur 
eorum  error  qui  ali~rmabant  cuil~bet 
l~ce~e  tyraunum  occldere  SI  voro 
tyraunride  znvasam,  rempubll~am  ob. 
tlnult,  neque  unquam  lpsa  consenslt, 
tuno  qulsque  jus  habet  lpsum  extln- 
guendl , nam vlm vi repellere hcot ;  et 
quamdlu  ~lle  rempubll~am  SIC  obt~net, 
pcrpetuum gent in ipsam brllum." vox eat ma,jcst,atis  regnantis,  legibus alligatum  se principem 
grofitcri"  (Cod. I. xiv. 4).' 
Soto then, on the one hand, ascribes to the prince a <peat 
authority ; he looks upon him as normally the source of  Iiaw, 
and  as,  technically,  above  it, though  he  is  conscious  of 
the danger  of  this conception ; but, on the other hand, he 
maintains very emphatically that it is from the Clommunity 
that his  authority  is  derived,  and  th&L if  he  abuses  this 
authority he may be deposed. 
St  is  ha8rdly necessary  to point  out  that in  England  St 
4 ortescue,  Germans represents the tradition of  Eracton and of  r 
that tho authority of  the king was limited by the Law, and 
that the Law was not made by him alone.  It is obvious, from 
what we have said in an earlier chapter, that in the opinion of 
St Germans it was from the custom of  the Community that 
the Law was  originally derived, and that the only authority 
which  could change these  customs was  that of  Parliament, 
including, no doubt, the Icing, but also representing the whole 
community.  The sixth foundation, as he says, of  the law of 
England was to be found in the Stattnttes made by the king or 
his ancestors, by tho Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and by 
the comruunity of  thc whole kingdom.  He knows no  source 
1 Id. id., 1, 6, 7  (p. 66) : "Sit  ergo  verum  etiam  ejus  penis  stimulantur, 
prima  conclrrsio,  uuivorsi  qui  subditi  duobus subsidiis ad virtutem utuntur ; 
sunt poteatati, legibus subinde ipsius ;  princeps  autem  alter0  destitutus est, 
quia vero et princeps quantum ad vim  dum nullus est qui illum cogere poaset, 
diroctivum subiicitur. .  .  .  Huio autem  aut reprehendere  audeat ; immo  vix 
subiicimus  similem  ei  tertiam:  prin-  uslus qui veritatem doceat. . . . 
ceps  quantum ad vim  coercivam  non  Quapropter  sex  quo  enm  Deus 
subditur  logi.  Conclusio  eat  aperta,  libcriorem  fecit,  legumque  coactioni 
quoniam coactio ejusdem  ad so  ipsum  longius  exemptum,  eo  debet  esse 
esse non potzest : non enim est intcllectu  ipse  rationi  vigilantius,  divinoquo 
possibilo,  ut  vim  quispiam  sibi  ips0  nutui  audiens osse, ac subinde legibus 
inferat  atque adeo se sua lege cogat. .  .  .  quas aliis ponit, ipso auscultarc : no in 
Quod  autem  sua  principem  Sex  non  illum  Christi  improperium  impingat, 
cogat,  non  inde venit  quod  ipse  non  ' qui  dicunt  et non  faciunt ' . . . 
egeat, sod quod lex natura sua nequeat.  C.  De  Leg :  et  Constit.  4.  Aiunt 
At  vero  hanc  principes exemptionem  imperatores  ipsi  '  digna  vox  086 
non  inter  privilegia  ducere  debent,  majestatis regnontis,  legibus  u!Ilgi~:um 
immo est illis inique, conditio.  Subditi  so  principem  profiteri.' "  (Cod  1. 
enim qui non solum logis luce ducuntur,  xiv.  4.) 
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of English law except the Divine Law, the Law of  Reason, 
the general and particular customs of  the country, and the 
Statutes of  Par1iament.l  To  the observance of  these laws 
the king is bound by the oath which he takes at his corona- 
ti~n,~  and it is by  tho  customs  embodied in  Magna  Carta 
that the person  and  property  of  the Englishman is legally 
pr~tected.~ 
Tliero is, however, another Englisil work of  this time which 
deserves some notice.  This is the ' Dialogue between Cardinal 
Pole and Thomas Lupset,'  written  by  Thomas Starkey, not 
later than 1538, for he died in that yeare4  The greater part 
of  this work  is indeed  occupied with a  description and dia- 
cussion  of  the social and  economic  conditions  of  England 
with which we  cannot deal here, but from time to time them 
. 
are important  observatiolls on  the authority of  law and of 
the Euler. 
Pole is represented as saying that originally "  man wandered 
abroad in the wild fields and woods, none otherwise than you 
see now the brute beasts  to do"  (page 52).  At last certain 
wise men persuaded them to forsake this rude life and to build 
cities iu which  they might  live.  "  Thereafter  they devised 
certain ordinances and laws whereby they might be somewhat 
induced to follow a life convenient to their nature and dignity " 
(page 52). 
The forzns of  government, Pole defines in the Aristotelian 
tradition, as that of  one, a king or prince, or a few wise men, 
or that of  the whole body and multitude of  people, "  and thus 
it was  determined,  judged,  and appointed  by  wisdom  and 
policy, that ever, according to the nature of  the people, so, 
'  St Germans,  '  Dialogus,'  cap.  x. 
(fol.  34) :  "  Sextum  Fundamenturn 
legis  Angliae  stat in divcrsis  statutis 
Per  dominum  Regem  et progenitores 
sues,  et  dominos  spirituales  et 
temporales,  st  per  communitatem 
totius  regni  in  parliament0  editis, 
Ubi  lox  rationis,  lox  diviua,  consuetu- 
dines,  maxima,  sive  alia  fundament8 
legis  Angliae  ~rius  sufficere  minime 
videbantur.  Et  ultra  hacc  funda- 
menta legis Angliae ulin me legisse non 
meminor." 
Id. id., cap. vii. (fol. 22). 
Id. id. id. (fol. 23). 
We  lefer  our  readers  for detail8 
about  Thomas  Starkey and  his  work 
to the edition publislled  for the Early 
English  Text  Society  in  1878.  Tho 
work  was  never  published  before. 
We  havo  modernised  the  spelling  in 
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by  one  of  these politic  manners,  they  sho~ld  be  governed, 
ordered, and ruled fl (page 53).  He also repeats the Aristot- 
elian principle  of  the difference betwecn  a bad  and a  good 
government ; the good government is that which is directed 
to the  wellbeing  of  the whole  Community,  while  the evil 
government is that which is directed to the advantage of  the 
Ruler (pages 53, 54). 
So far there is nothing of  much importance, but in the last 
paragraph of  Lhe third chapter Pole turns from the discussion 
of  tho economic  and social evils of  England  to the "  mis- 
orderings and ill-governance which we  shall find in the order 
and rule of  thc state of  our country " (page 99).  And in the 
next chapter he begins the consideration of  this subject  by 
saying "  that our country has been governed and ruled these 
many years under the state of  Princes which by their myal 
power  and  princely  authority  have  judged  all things  per- 
taining to the State of  our  Realm to hang only upon their 
will and fantasy, insomuch  that whatsoever they ever have 
conceived in their  minds, they thought  by-and-by to  have 
it put in effect,  without resistance to be made by any private 
man  and  subject ; or  else  by-and-by they  have  said  that 
men should diminish their princely authority.  For what is a 
Prince (as it is commonly said) buL  he may do what he will. 
It is thought that all wholly hangn  on his only arbitrament. 
This hath been thought, yea, and this is yet thought, to per- 
tain to the Majesty  of  a  Prince-to  moderato  and rule  all 
things according to his will and pleasure ; which is, without 
doubt, and ever hath been, the greatest  destruction  to this 
Realm,  yea,  and  to  a11  others,  that  ever  hath  come 
t l~creto.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
For  Master Lupset  this  is  sure, and  a  Gospel  word, that 
country  cannot  be long well governed nor  n~aintained  with 
good policy where all is ruled by the nil1 of  one, not chosen 
hv election.  but  co~rleth  to  it by  natural  succession ; for 
'-J  --  --  , 
scldom  seen  it is, that they  which  by  succession come  to 
killadoms and realms,  are  worthy  of  such high  authority "  - 
(pages 100 and 101). 
Lupset  is  greatly  alarmed,  and  warns  Pole  that  many 
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people will think that this sounds very like treason, for ('  it 
is  commonly  said  (and, I think, truly) a king  is  above his 
laws, no law binds him "  (page 101). 
The  words attributed to Pole clearly  express the opinion 
that  thc  royal  authority  had  tended  to  become  absolute, 
and that a government of  this kind was a great evil in England 
or  any  other  country.  It  must  be  noticed,  however,  that 
Polels words here suggest that this might be different if the 
prince  werc  elected  instead  of  hereditary,  and  he  develops 
the  criticism  of  succession  by  inheritance.  Lupset  replies 
that experience had  shown  that hereditary  succession  was 
neccssary to prevent  civil war, and Pole admits that it was 
better to have it in England (pages 104-108). 
Pole returns to the subject in the Second Part, and a,gain 
expresses  his  preferonce  for  an  elective  monarchy,  but  he 
now  adds  that  even  the prince  thus  elected  "  should  not 
rule  and govern according to his  own  pleasure  and liberty, 
but ever be subject to the order of  his laws " (page 168). 
He  turns,  however,  immediately  to  the  question  of  the 
method of  government if  the prince  succeeds by inheritance, 
"if  we  will that the heirs of  the Prince  shall ever succeed, 
whatsoever he be, then to him must be joined  a Council by 
common authority ; not  such as he wills, but such as by the 
most part of  the Parliament  shall be judged  to be wise  and 
meet thereunto " (page 169). 
He  assumes the existence of  the  l'  Great  Parliament,"  as 
he calls it (page 169). It is not to meet continually, but to be 
called  together for the election of  the prince  and for  other 
matters  "  concerning  the  common  state  and  policyll' and 
is to appoint a Council which slrould sit continually in London 
and represent  the authority of  Parliament, and  "should  be 
ready to remedy  all such causes, and repress seditions, and 
defend the liberty of  the whole  body  of  the people,  at all 
such  times  as  the king  or  his  Council  tended  to  anything 
hurtful and prejudicial to the same " (page 169).  This Council 
is to be wholly distinct from the ordinary Council of  the king, 
and it is to be composed  of  four nobles, two bishops, four 
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the  authority  of  the whole  Parliament  when  it was  not 
meeting.  The end and purpose  of  this Council is, "  to see 
that the king and his proper Council should do nothing against 
the ordinance of  his Laws and good Policy, and should also 
have power to call the Great Parliament whensoever to them 
it should  seem  necessary  for the reformation  of  the whole 
State of  the '  Commynalty.'  By this  Council, also, should 
pass  all acts  of  Leagues,  Confederations, Peace,  and  War. 
All  the  rest  should  be  administered  by  the Iring  and  his 
Council " (pages 169,170). 
In another  place  Pole  is represented  as  dogmatically re- 
pudiating the conception that the authority of  Government, 
whether it is evil or  good, is derived from God.  "  Even ee 
every particular man, when he followeth reason, is governed 
by  God,  and contrary, blinded  with ignorance by his  own 
vain  opinion ;  so  whole  nations,  when  they  live  together 
in civil order, instituted and governed by reasonable policy, 
are then governed by the Providence  of  God  and be under 
His tuition.  As, contrary, when they are without good order 
and politic rule, they are ruled by the violence of  tyranny ; 
they are not governed by His Providence, nor celestial ordin- 
ance, but  as  a  mass  governed by '  affectis,' so they be tor- 
mented infinite ways, by the reason of  auch tyrannical powers ; 
so that of this you may see that it is not God that provideth 
tyrannies  to rule  over  cities and towns, no more than it is 
He that ordaineth ill  affectys ' to overcome right reason " 
(page 166). 
He again insists that the law must be supreme even over 
the prince,  'l seeing  also  that Princes  are  commonly  ruled 
by  '  affectys' rather than by  reason  and order  of  justice, 
the laws which be sincere and pure reason must have chief 
authority.  They  must rule  and govern the State, and not 
the Prince, after his own liberty and will " (page 181).  And 
he contends that,  For this cause the most wise  men, con- 
sidering the nature of  Princes, yea, and the nature of  man, 
as it is indeed, affirm a mixed state to be of  a11 other the best 
and most convenient to conserve the whole out of tyranny " 
(page 181). 
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It would no doubt be impossible to attach very much im- 
portance to a  work  which was  not published till three  cen- 
turies after it was writt'on, if  it were not that its  judgment,^ 
coincide, in  a large  measure, with those of  other important 
writers of  the time.  It  is clear that Pole, as represented by 
Starkey, absolutely  refuses to acknowledge  that the  prince 
has any absolute authority derived from God;  he maintains 
emphatically that the prince is not above the Law but under 
it,  and  he  conceives  of  the  best  government  as  beinq 
mixed  or  constitutional,  and  as  representing  the  a~thorit~y 
of  the whole community. 
We  must  finally  consider,  and  carefully,  what  was  the 
position of that great Frenchman, John Calvin, who exercised 
so immense an influence not only in France but throughout 
Europe.  It appears to us that there has been some misunder- 
standing about this, and we  must therefore examine it with 
some care.  I 
Calvin has not, eithed in the '  Institutio ' or elsewhere, set 
out  any complete systeb of  political thought, but he states 
with care some important principles both of  a general and a 
particular kind.  His treatment of  politics in the ' Institutio ' 
was, at least in part, intended as a defence of  the Reformers 
against the charge that they held  doctrines which were sub- 
versive of  all political and civil order.  Indeed, he says this 
explicitly  in  the  Preface  to  the '  Institutio ' addressed  to 
Francis I. in 1536,l and it seems  to us  that his treatment of 
political  authority  was  largely  determined  by  the need  to 
repudiate those who  did hold such subversive views, that is, 
especially,  some Anabapti~ts.~  This  is  why  Calvin  so  em- 
'  Calvin,  ' Institutio  Christianm 
Religionis,'  Preface :  "  No  quis  haec 
injuria  nos  queri  existimet:  ipse 
nobis testis esse  potos rex nobilissime, 
quum  mendacibus  c~lumniis  quotidie 
apud to traducatur, quod non aliorsum 
Veotet  nisi  ut regibus  sua  scoptrn  e 
manibus  extorqueat, trubunalia,  judi- 
ciaque  omnia  precipitet,  subvertat 
ordines  omnes et poIiiias,  ot  quietem 
populi perturbet,  leges omnes ahrogot, 
dominia et possossio~~es  dissipet, amnia 
denique sursum deorsum volvat." 
Id. id.,  iv.  20,  1  (p. 549) : "  Illi 
enim,  quum  in  evangelio  promitti 
libertatem audiunt, quae nullum inter 
homines  regem,  nullumque  mngis- 
tratum  agnoscat,  sed  in  Cllristum 
unum  intueatur :  nullum  libertatis 
suao frurtum capere  se posse  puiant, phatically  and  repeatedly  lays  down  the  principle  of  the 
Divine  source  and  nalure  of  political  a~ithority,  and  the 
religious obligation of  obedience to it.  In one passage of  the 
'  Institutio ' he  shows  that the function  of  the  magistrate 
is not only approved by  God, but that tho Scriptures speak 
of  this  mthority  in the strongest  terms.  The  magistrates 
are  even  called ''  and this  not  without  sigmficance, 
for they  have received their  authority  from  God, they are 
endowed with the authority of  God, they bear the person of 
God, for they act in His place.  This is what St Paul meant 
when  he  called the Power the Ordinance  of  God, and said 
that there was no Power which was not ordained by God.' 
We may compare this with a passage in one of  his homilies 
on the First Book of  Samuel, in which, like Gregory the Great, 
he treats the conduct  of  David in refusing to lift hie  hand 
against the Lord's Anointed as an example to Christian men, 
and argues, like Gregory, that we  must obey the rulers, even 
when  they  abuse their authority, and that we  must render 
honour to the king or prince, even when he unjustly imposes 
tributes  and taxes  upon  his  subjects,  or  otherwise  gravely 
oppresses them.2  - - 
quamdln  nllquam  supra  se  em~uere 
potestatem  v~dent. Itaque nlhll  fore 
salvum  exlstimant,  nlsl  totus  in 
novam  faclem orb~s  refolmotur  ubi 
nec  judlcia  ant, nec leges, nec  mags 
tratus,  et  81  quld  slmile  est,  quod 
officere suae  llbertati  oplnantur  At 
vero qui Inter corpus  et anImam, Inter 
presentem  hanc  fluxamque  v~tam,  et 
futuram lllam  aetenamque  d~scernere 
novent,  neque  d~fficlle  lntelllget 
~p~ntuale  Chrlst~  regnum  at  clvllom 
orrhnatlonem  re8  esse  plurlmum 
gerunt, nec  In  ea appellat~one  leve In- 
esse  monumentum  quls  putet  Ea 
enlm  slgnlficatur  mandatum  a  Doo 
habero,  lvlna  auctorltate  praedltos 
esse, ac omnlno Del personam sustmnere, 
CUIUS  VIC~S,  quodammodo agunt. .  . 
Quod  et  Paulus  aperte  docot,  dum 
prefecturas Inter Dei dona enumerat .  .  . 
Nam et potestatem  Dei  ordlnat~onem 
esse tradlt:  nec potestatos esse ullaq, 
nlsl  a  Deo  ordinatas.  Ipsos  autem 
prlnc~pes mlnistros  esse  DOI,  bene 
agentibus  in  laudem,  malls  ad iram 
seposltas " 
1 Id ~cl  , lv  20 4 (p 650)  " Magis 
tratuum  functloilem  non  mod0  s1b1 
probar,  acceptaque  esse  testatus  est 
Dominus,  sed  honor~ficeutlssimis 1" 
super  eloglls  elus  d~gnltatem  prose 
quutus,  mlrlfice  nobls  commendat 
Ut  pauca  oommemorem  Quod  Dn 
nnn~upantur,  qulcunque  magstratum 
ultores " 
Id, '  Hom~lles on  1  Samuol.' 
XXIV.  7,8  (p 483).  'I Nos ~gitur  debltos 
honores  tr~buere  dlscsmus  ns  qulbus 
Deus  poc 111arem  quandam  notam 
delt, quum 00s ad rerum gubornaruln 
sedere volult, at ]ustitlam ndm~ulstrare 
qulsquls emm, ut alt Paulus, dlgnltatl 
superlorl  reslstlt,  Deo  lpsl  reslstlt 
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This  is  not,  however,  all  that  Calvin  said.  In another 
place In  the ' Institutio ' he warns  sub~ects  that they must 
not meddle in public matters ; but then he adds that whllr 
they must not interfere with the function  of  the magistrate, 
nor  tumultuously raise  their hands  aqainst  hlm,  if  there  is 
something  in  the public  order  which  should  be  corrected, 
they  should bring this to the  knowledge  of  the magutrate 
whose  hands  are free to deal  with  the  matter.'  Here,  it 
is  evident, is  another  mode  of  conceiving  the  position  of 
the king  or prince;  private persons, indeed, may not resist, 
may  not  interfere in  public  matters, but  there  are  others, 
public  persons  or  officers,  to  whom  this  does  not  apply. 
The truth is that Calvin makes  a sharp distinction  between 
the position of  private persons  and that of  those who  held 
a public and constitutional office in the State.  In an earlier 
passage  in  the  'Institutio ' he  had  said  that it  would  be 
idle  for private  persons to dispute  about the best form  of 
the  State, for  they have  no  right even to deliberate  about 
any  public  matterY2  but  it should  be  observed  that it is 
''  private "  persons of  whom he  speaks.  We  must therefore 
bear this in mind  when  we  turn to the well-known passage 
in which Calvin speaks of  the possibility  6f  a constitutional 
. .  (p  487 )  Quo exemplo  (z e ,  that 
of  Dal  ld) docemur,  maglstratlbus  et 
prlmarlae  dlgnltatis vins  et ad rerum 
gubernaeula  sedentlbus suum  offic~um 
non  faclentibus, sed  nuctoxltate  abu- 
tentibus,  n~hllominus  obtemporan- 
dum  . . . Exempl~  gratla,  si  quls 
rex  aut prlnceps  subdltos  trlbut~s  et 
vectlgallbus  injuste  premat,  et  alus 
gravlor~bus  crrorlbus  grav~ter  laedat, 
dlgnltas tamen at potestas llla semper 
est  honore  afficlenda  Quamohrem 
ad Deum rc.;plc~oudum  norlmus, quum 
tanta  Inter  homlnes  vlolentla  passlm 
regnet,  tonioque od~o  nos otlam ultro 
Persequatur,  ut patientla  nostra  lsesa, 
nos  ad ordlnem,  a  Deo  prencr~ptum, 
turbandurn ~mpellat 
'  Jd , ' Inst~tut~o,'  ~v  20,  23  (p 
658)  Sod  hsc praoterea  obedlentia, 
moderat~onem  comprehendo, quam s1b1 
In  publlco  lmperare  debont  prlvatl 
homines,  ne  se  ultra  admlsceant 
publlcxs negoclls, aut temere lrrumpant 
In  partes  maglstratus,  ac  ne  quld 
omrnno publlco  mollantur  SI quld in 
pubhca  ord~nat~one  corrlgl  ~ntororlt, 
non tumultuentur IPS], nec  admoveant 
operl manus, quas 1111s  ommbus hgatas 
esse  in  hac  parte  docet,  sed 
ad  maglstratus  cogmtlonem  deferant, 
CUIUR U~IUS  hlc solutu est mnnus." 
Id  ~d ,  IV.  20 8  (p  551)  "  Et 
sane valde  otlosum esset, qu~s  potiqsl. 
mus sit pohtlae, In eo quo vlvunt looo, 
futurus  .;tatus,  a  pnvatls  hommibus 
dlsputarl .  qulbus  de  constltuenda re 
allqun publica dellberare non hcet " 
Cf  'Hom  on  1 Samuel,'  xxlv  and 
'  Comm  on Romans,'  xnl. method by which the unjust ruler might be restrained.  Hc 
had, in this passage, been  saying that  ~f  men  are cruelly 
treated, plundered, or  neglected by their prince, they must 
consider that God is no doubt visiting their sins with punish- 
ment, and that they can  only  look to God, in whose  hand 
are the hearts of  kings ; while God has sometimes raised up 
deliverers for the oppressed, they must not imagine that they 
are entrusted with God's  vengeance, they can but suffer and 
obey.1  There is  then, however, a  sudden  turn ; in  saying 
this, he is speaking always of  private persons.  If  there are 
magistrates of  the people who have been created to restrain 
the arbitrary will of  kings, such as were formerly the Ephors 
in  Sparta, or  the Tribunes  of  the People  in Rome,  or  the 
Demarchs in Athens, or in modern times  perhaps the three 
Estates in their Assemblies, these, he asserts, may legitimately 
intervene to restrain the license of  kings ;  indeed, he maintains 
that if  they should connive at the violence of  the kings, they 
are guilty of treachery, for they betray the liberty of  the people 
of  whom they are, by God's ordinance, the  guardian^.^ 
It  is  quite  evident  that  while  Calvin  repudiates  in  the 
strongest terms all revolutionary  and unconstitutional move- 
ments against the existing political authority, his words have 
no reference to the propriety  of  constitutional restraints  on 
the  ruler.  We  can, therefore,  now  take  account  of  some 
observations which  he  makes upon  the proper  functions  of 
government and its various forms. 
He refuses to determine which is the absolutely best form 
1 Id. ld ,  lv. 20, 61 (p. 561)  "  Neque  Senatul,  Demarchl :  et  qua  et~am 
enlm  81  ult~o  domln~  eat  effrenatae  forte  potestate,  ut  nunc  re8  habent, 
domlnatlo~s  correct~o,  ldeo  protlnua  funguntur  In  s1ngul.s  regnls  tres 
demandatam nobis arbltromur  qu~bus  ordlnee  (quum  pnmarlos  convontus 
nullum ahud quam parendl et pat~en&,  peragunt), adeo 1110s  fcroclent~  Regum 
datum est mandatum "  hcentlae,  pro  offielo,  ~ntorcedere  non 
a  Id ~d ,  IV.  20,  61  (p  60  1) . "  Do  veto,utsl Reg~bus  impotenter grassant] 
prlvatls homintbus semper loquol  Nam  bus, et humill plebeculae msultant~bus 
61  qul nunc slnt populares mafpstratus  conniveant,  eorum  d~ss~mulationem 
ad  moderandum  Rcgum  hb~dmem  nefarla  perfidla  non  carere  affirmem, 
constitut~ (quales  ohm  erant,  qu~  quia  popull  l~bcrtatem  (cu~us  se.  De1 
Lacedemonus  reebus  opposlt~ erant,  ordlnat~one tutores  posltos  norunt) 
Ephorl ,  aut  Romama  Consuhbus,  fraudulcnter produnt." 
Trlbun~ pleb~s  ,  aut  Athenlenslum 
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of !government ; the monarchy is liable to turn into a tyranny, 
the  aristocracy  into  a  faction,  the  clemocracy  to  beco~nc 
seditious, but he admits that he would himselP prefer either an 
aristocracy or a government combining the elcmmts of aristoc- 
racy with those of the constitutional commonwealth (politia). 
~xperience  had shown that this was the best, and it was also 
the  government  which  God  Himself  had  instituted  among 
the Israelites.  That seemed to Calvin the happiest  form of 
government, where liberty was moderated, and which tended 
to continuance.  The magistrates of  such a State ought to be 
diligent to see that its liberty was not violated or diminish0d.l 
From the discussion of  the best form of  Government hc turns 
to the nature of  the law of  the State.  He begins by laying 
down  the general principle  that without laws there can  be 
no  magistrates,  as  without  magistrates  there  are no  laws. 
He repudiates with great energy the notion that the polltical 
laws of  Moses were binding upon the State ; the moral law, 
however, which is the true and eternal law of  justice, is binding 
upon men of  all  places and times who desire to order their 
life by the will  of  God, for it is His eternal and immutable 
will  that  men  should  worship  Him  and  love  each  other. 
Subject to this, every nation is at liberty to establish laws 
for itself, as it finds best ; they may vary in form, but thoy 
must have the same principle (rati~).~ 
Id  1c1 ,  lv.  20, 8 (p. 662) . "  Equ-  et  beat~ssimos censeo,  quibus  hac 
dem  81  In  se  conslderantur  tres ~llae,  cond~tlonc  frul  llcot,  ets~  In  ea  con. 
quas ponunt  ph~loeophl  reg~mnis  for-  servanda,  retlnondaque  strenue  ac 
mae,  mlnlme  negaverlm  vel  arlsto  constanter  laborant,  80s  n~hll ab 
cratlam,  vel  temperatam  ex  lpsa  et  offic~o  allenum  faccre concedo.  Quln 
pohtla  statum  alns  omnlbus  longo  etlam  huc  summa  dll~gentla Intent] 
excellere.  Id cum  experiment0  lpso  maglstratus  esse  debont,  no  qua  In 
sempor fult  comprobatum  tum  8U0  parto l~bertatom,  cujus praes~deq  sunt 
quoque  auctorltate  Domlnus  con  constitut~,  minu1  ncdum  v~olsrl 
firmav~t,  quum  arnstocrat~arn  polit~ae  pat~antur. SI in 80  aunt segnlores et 
vlclnam apud Isracl~tas  lnstitult, quum  parum  sollic~t~,  perEd1  sunt In  ofic~o, 
optlma conat~tut~one  eos habero vcllet,  at pstriae suae prod~tores." 
donec  ~maglnem Christ1  produceret  2  Id id ,  IV.  20,  14 (p 655)  "  Prox~ 
in Dav~de  Atquc  ut libenter  fateor,  mae aunt maglstratul in polltug  logos, 
nullum  esse  gubornatlonls  genus  lsto  validlsslml rerum publicarum nervl  . 
beat~us,  ub~  libertss ad dam quam decet  sine  qu~bus  consistore  neqult  magls- 
moderat~onem eat  oompoa~ta, et  ad  tratus,  quomadmodum nec ipsao luisum 
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This, Calvin says, will be clear, if  we will distinguish between 
law and equity (aequitas),  upoil which law depends.  Equity, 
because it is natural, must be the same among a11  men ; the 
constitutions  (i.e., posilive laws), because they depend upon 
circumstances,  may  well differ, as long  as they look to the 
same end of  equity.  The moral law of  God is nothing else 
than the testimony of  natural law, and the whole principle 
of  equity, which is the rule and end of  all law, is contained 
in it.  Laws which  are directed  to this  end  are not to be 
condemned by us, even  though they differ from the Jewish 
Law, and from each 0ther.l 
It  is  clear  that  substantially  Calvin  was  restating  the 
principles of  St Thomas Aquinas,  and other great medizval 
political writers, both with regard to the nature of  positive 
law,  and  its  relation  to  reason,  the  moral  law,  and  the 
natural law, and also with regard to the nature and limitations 
of  the authority  of  the prince.  It is evident  that, like St 
habent.  Prolnde  n~hil dlcl  verlus  1 ld. ld ,  iv.  20,  16  (p.  555) : ''  Id 
poterat,  quam  mutum  esse  magls-  quocl  &XI planum  fiet,  81  In  leglbus 
tratum  legem,  maglstmtum,  legem  ommbus duo haec (ut decet) lntuemur, 
eqse  vlvam. . . .  Sunt enlm  qm rectc  leg19 const~tutlonem,  et  oqultatem, cu~us 
compositam esae rempubhcam negant,  ratlone  comtltut~o lpsa  fundata  est 
quae  noglect~s  Moyse  poht~cls, com  ac nltitur.  Equ~tas  quia natural16 est, 
mumbus gentmm leg~bus  reg~tur.  Quae  non nlsl una omnlum esse potest, ~deo 
sententla  quem  per~culosa  s~t  et tur-  et leg~bua  ommbus, pro negocn genere, 
bulenta, vlderlnt at11 ;  mlhi falsam esse  eadem  propos~ta esse  debet ,  Con- 
ac stohdam demonstratam sat16 erit . .  .  stltutlones, qula circumstant~ss  ellquns 
15 Lex ltaque moral~s  (ut ~nde  prlmum  habent, a  qu~bus  pro  parte pendeant, 
lnc~p~am),  quum  duobus  capitlbus  mod0  In  eundem  equitatls  scopum, 
contmneatur quorum alterum pura Deum  omnes parlter  intendant, d~versas  esse 
fide  et pietate  colere,  alterum  slncere  n1h11  obest  Jam,  cum  Do1  legem, 
homines  dllectlone  complectl,  s~m- quam  moralem  vocamus,  constet non 
pllc~ter jubet,  Vera  est  eternaque  ahud  osse  quam  naturahs  leg13 testl- 
lust~tlae  reyla  gentium  omnlum  ac  monmm,  et  elus  consclentlae,  quae 
temporum  hom~mbus  praescr~pta,  qul  homlnum anlmis a  Deo lnsculpta est 
ad Do1  voluntatem  v~tam  suam com-  tots  hujus,  de  qua  nunc  loqu~mur, 
ponere volunt.  S~quldem  heec asterna  equltstls ratlo In  lpsa praescr~pta  est 
est  et ~mmutablhs  eius voluntas, ut a  Prolnde,  sols,  quoque  lpsa  legum 
nob~s  lpse  quldem  omnibus  colatur,  omnlum et scopus et  regula et tcrmlnus 
nos vero mutuo Inter nos dll~~amus.  . .  .  s~t  o~ortet. Ad  eam  regulrtm  quae- 
Quod 31 vemm est l~bertas  certe slnguhs  cunque  formatae  sunt  leges,  qune  In 
gent~bus  rel~cta  est condendl quas s~b~  eum scopum hrectae, quae eo termlno 
conducere  prov~dermt leges:  quae  llmltatae.  non  est  cur  a,  nobls  Im- 
tamen  ad  porpetunm  ~llam  char~tatls  probentur, utcunque vel a leec Judnlca 
replam ex~gantur,  ut  forma  qu~dem  vel Inter se lpRae allas d~fferant  " 
vanent, rat~onem  habent eandem." 
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Thomas, his own preference was for a mixed or constitutional 
government.l 
We may finally ask whether C:tlvin's  opinions or advice on 
the actual events of  his  tirue  throw any further light  upon 
his  conception  of  government.  It  would  seem  that so  far 
as they go, they correspond very closely with the principles 
which we have just  set out.  Calvin lived through the period 
when the Protestant Princes of  Germany, reluctantly in some 
cases, took  up arms against  the authority  of  the Emperor, 
Charles V.,  and his letters show that he found no reason to 
eriticise their  action ; indeed, in  a letter to Fare1 of  1539, 
he seems for~nally  to appr~ve.~ 
This contrasts with the tone of some letters of  1560, which 
seem to refer to the conspiracy  of  Amboise, in France.  To 
Bullinger  he  says  that he had acted rightly  in repudiating 
the charge  of  responsibility  for the tumults in France.  He 
(Calvin) had  known  of  the deliberations  about  this  matter 
eight  months  before,  and had  interposed  his  authority  to 
prevent  them  going  any  f~rther.~  And  to  another  corre- 
spondent he says that he had from the beginning anticipated 
what would happen, but he had been unable to restrain them 
(the conspirators).  Formerly,  they had  allowed themselves 
to be  governed by his  advice, but when they saw that their 
design  was  displeasing  to him they had  deceived him.  He 
never  approved  of  the enterprise, for in his  jndglnent  they 
were attempting more than God permitt~d.~ 
Cf. vol  v  pp  94 97 
Calvln,  '  Eplbtolae '  (ed  1675, 
p  18).  (April  1530).  "Foedus 
Cle~manl~um  mh11  habet  quod  debeat 
p~oium  pectus  offendere  Cur  emm, 
quaeso, quas dedlt els Domlnus  vires, 
non  conjungant  ad communem Evan- 
gel~~  defens~onem." 
Cf  ~d,  page  6 
a  Id ld. ,  p  229 (May 1560). "  Quod 
Gall~u  tumultus a nobls  depellere  non 
dubltnstl, tute ~d potoras.  Quum ante 
octo  menses  ag~tar~  consllla  haec 
Inc~perent,  meam  auctontatem  Inter 
pocin ne longlu.; progred~  tentarent." 
Id.  ~d ,  p. 230 (June 1660) . ' Gallls 
lnfellciter ceclsse ~nco~ls~derntum  suum 
ardorem,  ad  vos  perlatum  esse  non 
dub~to.  Ab  lnltio  vatlclnatus  sum 
quod  acciht,  sed  nesclo  quo  fasc~n~ 
genere  SIC  captae  erant  multorum 
mentes,  ut  frustra  lmpotum  ~llorum 
sedere conatus elm.  Antea mels  con- 
~1111s  se leg1 paam fuerant  sed quum In- 
telhgerent totam  hanc  actlonem  mlhl 
non placere, nullurn piltarunt esse mcl~us 
cornpend~um  quam si me fallerent  .  . 
Slcut autem earum expedltlo nunquam 
mih~  probata fuit, qula plus meo 1ud1c10 
tentabant quam Deus  permltteret, ~ta 
cons1110  deutltutl,  rem  non  leg~tlrnam 
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The difference between this and Calvin's  judgment  on the 
action of  the German Princes serves to illustrate his theory. 
And our judgment  is confirmed by that important letter to 
Coligny, of 1861, which Professor Allen has cited in hi8 learned 
work, for, while Calvin condemns forcible resistance to per- 
secution by  the reformed party in France, ho  admits  that 
such action would be lawful if  it were taken by the Princes 
of the Blood and the Par1ement.l 
We  have  then, we  hope,  said  enough in  this chapter  to 
make it clear that by some of  the most important writers of 
the earlier part of  the sixteenth century, not in one country 
only, but in  all the great countries of  Western Europe, the 
mediaeval principle of  the limitation of  the authority of  the 
ruler, Emperor, King, or Pnnce, was firmly and intelligently 
maintained. 
We  have  also  pointed  out  that this  coincidrs both with 
the general evidence of  constitut~onal  practice and principles. 
In the  last  section  of  this  chapter, however,  in  discussing 
the position  of  Calvin, we  have referred to the question of 
the Divine  authority  of  the ruler,  and while  we  are  clear 
that  Calvin's  own  interpretation  of  this  was  not  in  any 
way  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  the  constitutional 
limitation of  that authority, w0  must now turn to the con- 
sideration  of  the reappearance  in  the sixteenth  century  of 
the theory  that the  Divine  authority of  the ruler  was  un- 
qua;lified and unlimited. 
1 Cnlr In,  '  Lettres  F1anca1ses.'  ed  valo~t m~eux que  nous  periss~ons 
Jules  Ijoimet,  vol.  11.  p.  382.  "  C'ost  tous cent  iols,  quo  d'estre  chuse  que 
que  sept  ou  hu~t  mois  auparavent  le  nom  de  Chrestlentb  et  I'Evan@le 
(e e ,  before  the attempt at Ambo~se),  fust expos6  a  tel  opprobre.  Blen  lul 
quelqu'un  ayant  charge  de  quelque  arcorday ]e  que 81  les prlnces  du sang 
nombre  de gens,  me  demanda  eonsell  requorroyent cl'estre mnlillc~lus  en leur 
8'11  ne  sero~t  pas hclte cle  reslster  n la  dro~t  pour  le blen commun, et que 1~s 
tyrannle  dont  les  enfans  de  D~eu  cours  de  Parlement  se  jo~gn~ssent 
estoyont  pour  lors  opp11m6z, et quels  leur  qusrelle,  qu'll  serolt ho~te  a 
moyens 11  y aurolt. . . .  Je  respond1  bons sub~ects  de leur p16ter rnalnforte " 
slmplement  B.  tellea  ob~eot~ons,  que  Cf  J  W. Allen, 'II~story  01  I'olltl~al 
8'11  s'espandolt  une  seule  goutte  de  Thought  In  the  S~xteentll  century,' 
-an&  lcs  rlvioles  en  decoulleroyent  p.  69. 
par  touto  1'Europe.  Ainsl  qu'll 
CHAPTER  1V. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE DIVINE  RIGHT. 
WE  have in  the first volume of  this  work  endeavoured  to 
trace  the appearance in Western thought of  the conception 
that  the Ruler  was  in  such  a  sense representative of  God 
that he could in no circumstances be resisted, however oppres- 
sive and tyrannical he might  be.  We have pointed out that 
while there  may  be  some  tendency  towards  this in  earller 
Christian  writers,  it  was  St Gregory  the  Great  who  first 
definitely  formulated  and  enunciated  this  doctrine.  We 
have ventured to suggest, and we  still think it is true, that 
this conception was  substantially  alien to Western  thought, 
and  that it was  an orientalism  which  was  derived from an 
interpretation  of  some  parts  of  the  Old  T~stament.~  We 
have also  pointed  out that this  must  be  quite clearly  dis- 
tinguished  from  the  conception  of  St Pad, that  political 
authority is derived from God, because it exists for the main- 
tenance of  ~ustice.~ 
We  have also polnted  out that while the conception of  St 
Paul became the normal doctrine of  rnediiuval civilisation, the 
doctrine  of  St Gregory  the Great  had no  real place  in  the 
political ideas of  the Middle Ages,  not only  because, as the 
cynic might  say, the recurrent conflicts between the ecclesi- 
astical and secular powers made such a doctrine inconvenient, 
but much more because it was  completely incompatible with 
the fundamental principle  of  the Middle Ages,  that human 
society was  governed  by  law,  which  was  the expression  of 
 oati ice,  and not by  the arbitrary  will  of  any ruler.  There 
1  Cf  vol. I  chap. 1.3. 
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were  indeed  a  few writers,  such  as  especially  Gregory  of 
Catino  in the twelfth century, who  reaffirmed  the view  of 
St Gregory the Great, but they were insignificant in number 
and in authority.  In the first and second parts of  this volume 
we  have  cited  the interesting  but isolated  restatements  of 
St Gregory the Great, by Wycliffe in the fourteenth century 
and by the Cortes  of  Olmedo and by ~Encas  Sylvius  (Pope 
Pius PI.) in the fifteenth cent~zry. 
It was not till the sixteenth century that, as far as we can 
see,  this  conception  came  to have  any  importance.  How 
far, indeed, it had  any real importance even then we  shall 
have to consider, but we have first to endeavour to trace the 
appearance and development of  the conception, and to discuss 
so far as possible what we are to understand by it. 
As far as we have been able to discover, the first writer of 
the sixteellth century of  whom wc can say that he, at one time, 
held and affirmed the conception that the temporal ruler was 
in  such  a  sense  representative  of  God  that under  no  cir- 
cumstances  he  could  be  resisted,  was  Luther.  For  there 
can be no doubt Lhat this was his conviction till about 1530. 
We have, in spite of  our best  efforts,  been  quite unable  to 
discover  how  Luther  came  to  entertain  so  eccentric 
an opinion, whether  directly Prom  the  tradition  of  Gregory 
the Great  or  from  some  other  unknown  influence.  It is 
no  doubt  obvious  that  he  endeavoured  to  find  sufficient 
authority for it in the well-known words of  St  Paul in Romans 
xiii. and of  St Peter in his first Epistle (iii. 13, 14),  and like 
St Gregory  the Great  he was  also  clearly influenced  by the 
conception  of  the king, the Lord's  Anointed, as represented 
especially  in the stories of  the relation  of  David to Saul in 
1  Samuel. 
It is, however,  difficult to imagine that these alone would 
have  induced  him  to  adopt  an attitude  so  extreme,  and 
which  was  so  contrary,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  general 
tendency  of  thought  in  Germany  and in  Western  Europe, 
not only in the Middle Ages, but in the fifteenth century. 
We would  begin  by pointing  out that it  appears  evident 
that  Luther  was  not  a  systematic  political  thinker,  that 
indeed he can hardly be described as a political thinker at  all. 
There are,  however,  some general  conceptions  expressed  in 
his  writings  which  it may be  well  to notice,  for they may 
serve at least to indicate some  of  the presuppositions  with 
which he approached political questions. 
In his treatise, '  Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit,' after citing  St 
Paul's  words, "  The powers  that be  are ordained of  God" 
and the parallel words in the first Epistle of  Peter, he discusses 
the apparent conflict  between  the  Old  Testament  and the 
Sermon  on  the Mount,  with regard  to  the use  of  force  to 
maintain justice.  He contends that the coercive authority of 
society is required  because  men are not all true Christians ; 
if  they were, there would be no need of  kings and princes, of 
law or of  the 8word.l  If it is then asked why the Christian 
man should be obedient to the coercive authokity, the answer 
is, that while the true Christian does not need this for himself, 
he must obey it  for the sake of his neighbo~rs.~ 
The  same  conception  is  expressed  in  different  terms  in 
Luther's tract, written in July 1525, in defence of  the harsh 
and violent  terms which  he had used  against the peasants, 
in May of  the same year.  There are, he says, two kingdoms : 
the one is the kingdom of God ;  the other, the kingdom of  the 
world.  The kingdom of  God is a kingdom of  grace and mercy, 
the kingdom of the world is a kingdom of  wrath, of  punishment, 
and of  judgment,  to coerce  the wicked  and to defend  the 
godly, and therefore it has the sword ; the prince represents 
the wrath and the rod of  God.3 
1 Luther:  Works,  vol.  xi.,  '  Von  sondern  seynen  nehisten  lebt  und 
TVeltlicher  Obrigkeit,'  p.  247 : "  Und  diemt,  sso  thut  or  von  art  seyns 
wenn alle welt rechte Christen, das ist  geystes such das, des er nicht bedarff, 
rectgleubigen  weren,  so  were  keyn  sondern das seynen nehisten nutz und 
Fcret,  Kunig,  I-Ierr,  Schwerd,  noch  noth ist." 
Recht noth odor nutze."  a  Id.  id.,  vol.  xviii. : "  Ein  send- 
2  Id.  id.,  p.  263 :  "Anttwortt ;  brief  von  der  harten  Buchlein w~dder 
itzt hab ichs  gesagt,  das die Chrlsten  die Beuorn," p. 389. 
unter  einander  und  bey sioh  und  fur  "  ER sind  zwe~erley  Reich.  Eyns 
sich selbs keyns Rechten und Schwerds  ist  Gottls  Reioh,  das  ander  ist  der 
durrffen, denn  es  ist  yhn  keyn  noth  wellt Reich . . . Gottls  Ro~ch  ist  eyn 
noch  nutz,  aber  were  eyn  rechter  Reich der gnaden und Barmhertziclccit, 
Uhr~sten  auff  Erden, nicht yhm  selhst  und  nicht eyn Relch  des  Zorris odder 
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The same principles are again set out by Luther in a Treatise 
written in 1526, on the position of  soldiers and their relation 
to the Christian  religion.  This, he says, is the conclusion of 
the whole matter:  the office  of  the sword is lawful and a 
godly  and useful ordinance.  For  God  has  established  two 
governments in the world, the one is spiritual, the other is the 
worldly government of  the sword, which has been set up, that 
those who will not live religiously and justly, and in obedience 
to the word of  God, may be compelled to be religious and just 
in this world.  God is the Founder and Lord of  both forms 
of  righteousness, both of  the Spiritual and of  the Temporal ; 
they are not merely human ordinances, nor are they founded 
merely upon human power, but they are Divine.l 
It is the same conception of  the two kingdoms which  is 
expressed in the Tract  which  Luther  wrote,  apparently  in 
April 1525, in answer to the demands of  the Suabian peasants, 
when he deals with the question of  serfdom.  They wished, 
he says, to make all men equal, but this would be to try to 
convert  the spiritual kingdom  of  Christ  into a  visible  and 
earthly  kingdom,  which  was  impossible.  For  the  earthly 
kingdom  could  not  exist  without  inequality ;  some  must 
be free, others in bondage, some, lords and some, ~ubjects.~ 
Strnffe. . . .  Aber  das welltlich  Reich 
ist  eyn  Relch  des  zorns  und  ernsts, 
denn  daselbst 1st eytel straffen, weren, 
rlchten  und  urteylen,  au  zmngen 
dle bbsen und zu schntzen die fromen, 
darumb  hat  es  auch,  und  furet  das 
Schwerd,  und  ein  Furst  odder  Herr 
heyst  aotts  zorn  odder  Gott's  rute 
ynn d~e  Schr~ft." 
1 Id., Works, vol. xix. : ''  Ob Kr~egs 
Leute  auch  m  sellgem  Stande  scln 
konnen,"  p. 29. 
"  Denn  dam  ist  summa  sumrnarum 
davon:  Das  amt  des  Schwerds  1st 
an yhm selber recht, und elne Gottllche 
nutzhche  ordnunge. . . . Denn  er hat 
zwelerley Repment unter den menschen 
auffgencht.  Elns  gelstllch . . .  das 
ander 1st eln weltllch Reglment durch's 
Scliwerd,  auff  das  dle~~lllgen  00 
durch's  wort,  mcht  wollen  frum  und 
gerecht  werden  zum  ewlgen  Leben, 
dennoch duroh solch weltlloh Reglment 
gedrungen  werden,  frum  und  gerecht 
zu aelnfur der Welt. . . . Also 1st Cott 
selber,  aller  beyden  gerecht~cke~t, 
beide gelsthcher und lelbhcher, Stlffter, 
Herr, Me~ster,  Fddderer und Belohner. 
Und  1st  kelne  menschllche  ordnung 
odder  gewalt  dnnnen,  sonder  eytel 
Cbttllch ding." 
2  Id , Works,  vol.  xvm. : "  Erman- 
nung  sum  Fr~eden, auf  he zwolf 
Artlkel der Bauerschaft In Schwaben," 
p.  328. 
"  Ps  wlll &sser art~ckel  rtlle menschen 
gle~ch  machen, und aus dem gelstllchen 
Relch  Chrlsts  eyn  weltl~ch  eusserhch 
Re~ch  mechen, wllchs unmugllch 1st. 
Denn  wellthch  Roloh  kann  n~cht 
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~t seems  to  us  clear  that  while  Luther's  words  have  a 
character  of  their  own, he  was,  in principle,  so  far simply 
restating  the Stoic and Patristic doctrine,  that the coercive 
authority of  the Political Society is a consequence of  sin, that 
it is  made  necessary by  the moral  infirmity  and defect  of 
human nature.  It  is a consequence of sin, but also, as in the 
patristic tradition, a Divine remedy for sin, created by God, 
and deriving its authority from  Him.  And we  should con- 
jecture that Luther's development of  this, into the conception 
of  the two kingdoms, is probably derived, ultimately, from St 
Augustine, and especially from the  De Civitate Dei,' although 
we  have not actually observed any direct reference to this. 
The Political Order, then, is the result of  human sin, and is 
appropriate to the sinful nature of  man, but it is a Divine 
institution, and its authority is a Divine Authority. 
So  far,  we  have  nothing,  or  little  more,  than  the 
traditional  conceptions  of  the Middle  Ages.  We  can  now 
approach  Luther's  interpretation  of  the  conception of  the 
Divine  origin  of  political  authority  as  meaning  that  the 
Temporal Ruler must  always be  obeyed, except in spiritual 
matters, as holding the authority of  God. 
The first reference  we  have  found to the subject  of  the 
necessity of  implicit obedience to the Supreme Ruler, is in a 
letter written  by  Luther to the Elector Frederic  of  Saxony 
in  1522, after the decision  of  the Diet  of  Worms.  Luther 
proposes  to return  to Wittenberg,  but  he  urges  upon  the 
Elector that he must not resist any action taken by the Em- 
peror, or attempt to defend Luther ;  the only thing he suggests 
that the Elector might  do was  to "leave  the gates  open," 
so  that Luther might, if  necessary, escap0.l  The impression 
stehon, wo  nlcht  ungleychhelt 1st ynn 
Personen,  dass  etthche  frey,  ettllche 
gefangen,  etthche  Herron,  ettllcho 
Unterthan " 
'  Luther,  '  Bliefo,'  &r.  Ed.  De 
Wette, vol  11  p  140 
We  deslre to acknowledge our  very 
great  obhgatlons  to  the  adm~rable 
Essay of  Professor K. Muller, ent~tled 
' Luther's Ausserungen uber das Rccht 
des  W~derstands," published  In  the 
Transact~ons  of  the Bavar~an  Academy 
for 1915. 
Without th~s  most careful collection 
and comment upon the many references 
to the subject whlch  are to be  found 
In Luther's  works and correspondence, 
we  should have had the greatest  d~ffi- 
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which this leaves is confirmed  by the more formal  Bedenken " 
or opinion, written by Luther in 1523, in which he very clearly 
condemns all forcible resistance to the Emper0r.l 
It is the same principle which is expressed in a letter of 
1525 to  the  Count  of  Mansfeld,  in  answer  to  a  question, 
whether it would be lawful for the Reformed princes to form 
a league and defend themselves against the Emperor.  Luther 
answers unequivocally that this would be absolutely wrong, for 
God requires men to honour the supreme authority, whether 
it is good or bad.2 
For  the  full  development  of  this  conception  we  must, 
however, turn to his pamphlets or tracts.  We have already 
cited some important passages from the tract, 'Ton Weltlicher 
Obrigkeit,'  and we  should observe that this tract not only 
asserts the Divine origin of  the Temporal Power, but also says 
very emphatically that no prince may fight  against his king 
or  emperor  or  his  feudal lord, for the Supreme Lord  must 
not  be  resisted  by  force  but  only  by  confession  of  the 
truth.3 
Pt  was, however, in the tracts dealing with the Rising of  the 
l'cssants  that Luther developed this theory most completely. 
In  the first of  these, written in April 1525, Luther said that the 
peasants in Suabia claimed to be defending their religion and 
to be  Christian  men,  but he replied that they were  taking 
God's name in vain.  St Paul had bidden every man  to be 
subject  to  the  authority  (Oberkeit), the  man  who  resists 
God's  Ordinance will be  damned.  They  may  say  that the 
authority was  wicked  and intolerable,  that  it endeavoured 
to take the Gospel from  them  and oppressed them in body 
1 Luther,  ' Brief  - wechsel,'  Ld. 
Enders,  vol.  IV.  No.  76. 
2  Luther,  '  Briefe,'  &c.  Ed.  De 
Wette,  vol.  111.  p.  73 .  "  Das  andor, 
ob  man  slch  verbinden  moge  unter, 
hinter,  odor  wlder  &e  Oberke~t,  oder 
me ~hm  zu thun sey, daas man solchen 
Tyrannen  wideretche.  Aufs  erste 
WelSS  er wohl, daas mder d~e  Oberholt, 
Loin  Verbindung  gllt  Derin  Gott 
will  dio  Oberhcrren,  ie  seyn  bo,e 
oder  gut, geehret habon, Rom  xiii.  1, 
1 Peter v " 
a  Id.,  Works,  vol.  XI, '  Von  Welt- 
hcher  Obrigke~t,' p.  276  "  Das kein 
Furst, wlder  sein  Oberherrn,  als  den 
Konlg  und  Kaiser  oder  sonst  seynen 
Lehenherrn kriegen soll, sondern lassen 
nehmen,  was  da  nympt.  Denn  dm 
Oberkeyt  soll  man  nlcht  widerstehen 
mlt gewalt, sondern nur mlt bekenntnlss 
der wahrheit." 
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and soul, but this was no excuse, for to punish the wicked was 
not the right of any man but only of  the Temporal Authority.1 
If every man took the law into his own hands, there would 
be no law or order in the world, but only slaughter and blood- 
shed,2 and  Luther  bids  them  remember that Christ taught 
men not to resist evil but to submit to injuries ;  the only right 
of  the Christian is suffering and the Cr~ss.~  Luther does nof, 
indeed,  deny that the Lords had behaved like tyrants, and 
would be judged  by God, but the peasants had transgressed 
against God by their insurrection.4 
So far, Luther's theory was extreme, but his language was 
moderate ; in two later tracts of  the same year he seems to 
lose  all sense of  proportion  and restraint  and  decency.  In 
one of  these, written in May 1525, he says that the peasants 
had broken their oath of  obedience to the authorities ; they 
had robbed and plundered, they had made the Gospel a cloke 
for their sin, and he calls upon the princes and lords to take 
the most violent and ruthless measures  against  them.5  And 
Id.,  Works,  vol.  xviii.,  'Ermah-  aufruhr, denn  die  boshe~t  zu  straffen, 
nung  zum  Brleden,  auf  die  zwolf  das geburt nicht eym iglichen, sondern 
Art~kel  der Bauernschaft In Schwaben,'  der weltichen oberkeyt, die das Schwerd 
p.  303.  "  Sondern,  me  S.  Panlus  furet.' " 
eagt,  Ein igliche  Seele solle der  Ober-  8  Id. id., p.  306. 
kelt  untertan  sein,  mit  furcht  und  Id. ~d.,  p.  301 : "  Leyden, Leyden, 
ehren.  Kreutz, Kreutz is  dm Chriuten Recht, 
Wle  k~ndet  yhr  doch  fur  diesen  das, und keyn andcrs." 
Gottes  spruchen  und  Rechten  uber,  Id. ld ,  p  329. 
dle yhr euch rhumet, Gbtthchen Recht  6 Id.  id.,  vol.  xvlii.  ' Wlder  die 
nochzufahren,  und  nehmet  doch  daa  Rauberlschen uud Mbrdenschen Rotten 
Schwerd selbst,  und  lehnet  euch  auff  dor Bauern,'  p  358.  "  Drumb sol h~e 
w~ddor  d~e  Oberke~t  von  Gotta  recht  zuschrneyssen,  wurgen  und  stechen 
geordnet l  Meynet  yhr  mcht,  das  heymlich oder offentlich, wer  da kann. 
urthell  S.  Paul]  werde  euch  treffen.  und  gedencken,  das  n~cht  g~fftigers, 
'  Wer  Gott's  ordnung  w~dderstrebt,  schedlmhers,  tsuffelischers  seyn  kan, 
den  wlrd  das  verdamnis  ubsr-  denn eyn auffrurlscher  mensch, glelrh 
kommen  .  . . Znm  dritteni  Ja,  als  wenn  man  eynen  tollen  hund 
~prechot  ihr, dle  Oberkeit 1st zu  bose  todschlahen  mus,  schlegstu  n~cht,  so 
und  unleidlich  Denn  sie  das  Evan-  schlegt  er  &oh  und  em  gantz  land 
gehon  uns  nlcht  lessen  wollen,  und  mit dyr." 
drucken uns  allzu  hart  ynn ze~tlicher  Td.  ~d.,  p.  361 :  "  Drumb,  llebe 
guter Boschwerung, und verderhen uns  Herren, loset hie, rettet hle, helfft h~e, 
also an Leyh und Seele  Autworte ich ,  erbarmt ench der armen Leute, steche 
Dass  &e  Oberkeit  bdse  und  unrecht  schlahe  hie,  wer  du  kann,  bleybstu 
 st,  ontschuld~gt keyn  rotterey  noch  druber  tod,  wol  dyr ' THE EARLIER  SIXTEENTH  CENTmY.  [PART  111. 
in another tract, written probably in July 1525, he attempted 
to defend  the language  and attltude of  the first,  especially 
by  means  of  that distinction  between  the two  kingdoms- 
God's  kingdom of  mercy and the earthly kingdom of  wrath 
and punishment, which we  have already discussed.l 
We come back to a more restrained tone of  discussion  in 
in the little work, '  Ob  Kriegsleute  auch im Seligen Stande 
sein  konnen,'  written  in  1526, to  which  we  have  already 
referred.  Here he discusses the principle8 of  political obedience 
with  greater  fulness, but  with  equal  decision.  He  admits 
that in the  ancient world  men  had not hesitated to depose 
and even to kill useless or wicked rulers.  The Greeks set up 
monuments to the Tyrannicides, the Romans murdered many 
of  their  emperors ;  but these, he says, were heathen who did 
not  know  God, and that the temporal authority was  God's 
Ordinance.=  This was incompatible with the Christian Faith ; 
even if  the rulers do what is unjust it is not lawful to be dis- 
obedient  to them,  and  to  destroy  the Ordinance  of  God; 
men  must  endure  inj~stice.~  Luther  was  aware  of  the 
fact that the Swiss had  emancipated  themselves, and that, 
not long beforo, the Danes had deposed their king, but, he 
says, he is not speaking of  what had been done, but of  what 
ought to be done.4  Men must submit to the tyrant, they must 
not resist him, they must leave him to God's judgment, and 
he cites the example of  David's conduct to Saul.5 
This  is  sufficiently  clear,  but it is  not  all.  Luther  was 
aware, even then, of  what we may call constitutional tradition, 
but he sets this aside.  It  may be contended, he says, that a 
king or lord had sworn to his subjects to reign according to 
definite conditions, and that, if he violated these, he forfeited 
his authority, as it is said that the King of  France must reign 
in accordance with the judgment  of  his Parlement, and that 
1 Cf. p. 273,  note  3  unrecht  zu  thun,  das 1st ungehorsam 
2  Id. ~d ,  vol  xlx ,  '  Ob Kriegsleute,'  seln und zerstoren Gotta Ordnung, dm 
&c., p  633.  n~cht  umer   st,  sondorn  man  solle 
8  Id ~d ~d ,  p  634  "  Aber lch hab  das unrecht lclden " 
solchs  verantwortet, daqs  obglelch  dle  "d  1;1 ~d ,  pp  636  to 037. 
Herrn  unrecht  daran  theten,  were  6  Id  ~d.  ld., p. 640. 
drumb  nicht  b~ll~g  noch  recht,  such 
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the King of  Denmark  had sworn to observe certain consti- 
tutional articles.  Luther answers that it  is good and reasonable 
that the Supreme Ruler  should reign according to law, and 
not merely according to his capricious mll, and should swear 
to  do  this.  But, if  he  dld  not  do  so,  are  hio  subjects to 
attack him and sit in judgment on him ?  Who, he says, has 
commanded this ?  This could only be done by some superior 
power who could hear both parties and condemn the gui1ty.l 
He adds, in reply to those who might say that he was flattering 
the  princes,  that this  was  not  true,  for  what  he  had  sald 
applied to all alike, peasants, burghers, nobles, lords, counts, 
and princes, for they all have a superior lord to whom they 
are ~ubordinate.~ 
Luther's  conception is thus far perfectly  clear and unam- 
biguous.  '  Die Obrigkeit '  has an absolute authority, and God 
requires  of  men  an unconditional  obedience  to it, for  it is 
God Who has set it up.  It would no doubt bo well that the 
ruler  should govern justly  and according to law, but  if  he 
does not do so, his subjects must still submit and leave it to 
God to punish  him.  The principle  is clear and unqualified, 
but  we  have  made  no  progress  in  tracing  the  sources  of 
Luther's opinion.  It  may be suggested that it  was in the main 
111  ~d ~d ,  p  640. "  Ja sprlchatu, 
wle  aber, wenn  eln  Kon~g  oder  Herr 
wch  m~t  Eyden  seliien  unterthanen 
verpfl~cht, nach  furgestelltsn  art~kel 
zu  reglrn,  und  helt  sle  n~cht,  und 
dam16  schuld~g  seln  wll,  auoh  das 
Repment  zu  lassen,  wle  man 
sagt,  dass  der  Kon~g  zu  Frankrelch 
nach  den  Parlamenten  selnes  re1chs 
regleren  musse  Und  der  Kon~g  zu 
Denema~k  auch  schweren musse,  auff 
sonderhch art~kcl 
HIE,  antworte  ~ch.  Es 1st feln  und 
blll~g,  das d~e  Oberke~t  nach  Gesetzen 
repre und dle selb~gen  handhabe und 
nlcht nach eygenem mutw~llen.  Aber 
thu  das  noch  h~nzu,  das  eln  Konlg 
nlcht  allelne  seln  Landrecht  odder 
Artlkel gelobt zu halten, sondern Gott 
~elber  gebeut yhm  auch, er solle frum 
seln,  und  er  gelobets  auch  zu  thnn 
Wohlan,  wenn  nu  solcher  Komg  dor 
lrelns hdt, w~dder  Gotts Recht,  noch 
seln Lendrecht 4  Soltestu yhn drumb 
angre~ffen,  solchs rtchten  und  rochen  ? 
Wer  hat  dlrs  befohlen ?  Es  musste 
ja hle zwtschen euch eln ander Oberkelt 
komen,  der  euch  be~de  verhorte  und 
den schuld~gen  verurtellt.  Sonst wlrstu 
dem  urthell  Gotts  n~cht  entlauffcn, 
da er sagt, '  Dle Ruche 1st mom,' Item, 
'  R~chtet  n~cht,'  Matt  vn " 
a  Id. id  ~d ,  p  643  "  Nlcht  also. 
sondern was lch von  der unter person 
sage,  das  sol1  treffen  boyde,  Bauer, 
Burger,  Eddel,  Horrn,  Graven  und 
Fursten  Denn  d~ese  alle haben  auch 
Oborhsrrn, und slnd Unterpcrson crues 
andorn." a violent reaction against the danger of  anarchy, as represented 
by  the revolt  of  the Peasants,  but  this  is  not  really  con- 
sistent with the facts, for the statements of  Luther, which we 
have  cited from the years 1522, 1523, show clearly that he 
held the same opinions before the Peasants'  Revolt. 
We  must now  turn to the development  of  Luther's  later 
views, for it is quite clear that these were not the same as his 
earlier views.  As  late as May  and November 1529, we  find 
him  solemnly  warning  the  Elector  of  Saxony  against  the 
formation of  a  League for the protection  of  the Reformers, 
and  against  any  attempt  to resist  the  Emperor  if  he  en- 
deavoured to seize Luther.l  But, as Professor Muller thinks, 
even  in  December  1529  there  are  some  indications  of  a 
change,2 and  in  March  1530 Luther  and  some  others in  a 
letter to the Elector of  Saxony gave a formal opinion which 
has  a  very  different  character from  Luther's  earlier  views. 
This  letter was  written  in reply  to  one  from  the Elector, 
and Luther said that it might perhaps be true, that, according 
to the Imperial and Secular Law, it was in some cases lawful 
to  defend  oneself  against  the  Emperor,  especially  as  the 
Emperor had sworn to maintain his subjects in thei;  ancient 
liberty.  Scripture, however,  Luther  says,  does  not  permit 
Christian men to set themselves against the Supreme Authority, 
but requires them to submit to injustice and violence from him. 
Secular and Papal Laws  do  not consider that the Supreme 
Authority is an Ordinance of  God ; but the Emperor remains 
Emperor,  and the Prince remains Prince, even if  he  trans- 
gresses all God's commands-yes,  even if  he were a heathen. 
Then, however, Luther come8 to  the  rather  surprising  con- 
clusion that there is only one  remedy, and that is that the 
Empire and the Electors should agree to depose him.3 
1 Luther,  '  Brrefe,'  Ed.  de  Wette,  dass  vlelleicht  nach  Kalberhchen  und 
vol  ~n pp. 454 and 526.  weltlrchen  Rechten,  etllche  mochten 
2  Cf.  K.  Muller, '  Luther's  Ausser-  schliessen,  dass  man  In  solchom  Fall 
ungen uber das Recht des Widerstands  mochte  wlder  Kalserli~he malestat 
gegen dem Ka~ser,'  pp  26 29.  s~ch  zur Gegenwehr stollen, sonclerhch 
8  Luther,  ' Br~cfe,'  Ed  de  Wette,  well  Kaiserhche  malestat  slch  ver- 
vol.  m.  p.  660:  "  Und  befinden,  pfiohtet  und  vereidet,  nlemand  m~t 
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It  is  clear  that in  this  formal  statement  of  opinion  we 
have something which is very different from Luther's  earlier 
judgments.  In the first place,  we  have  an indication  that 
Luther was  beginning to take  some account  of  the Consti- 
tutional  Law  of  the  Empire,  and  that he  recognised  that 
some jurists at least maintained that if  the Emperor violated 
the  obligations  of  the  oath  which  he  had  sworn  at his 
election, it was  lawful to resist  him.  In the second place, 
he still maintained that the Holy Scriptures did not permit any 
such resistance, however unjust the Emperor's  conduct might 
be.  But in the third place, we come upon the surprising view 
that although, while the Emperor continued to be Emperor, 
he could not be resisted, it might be lawful for the Empire and 
the  Electors  to  depose  him.  We  have  already  observed 
a  conception  analogous to this in several  earlier  writers.1 
In  October of  the same year, 1530, the question of  resistance 
to the Emperor was formally put before Luther and others of 
the Reformers at Torgau, and there was laid before them a 
statement on the subject drawn up by some jurists,  showing 
in what circumstances it would be lawful to resist the Supreme 
Authority  (Obrigkeit), and declaring that such circumstances 
were now present.  Luther and his colleagues answered that 
they had not known that the Law itself  recognised the right 
gewalt  anzugrelfen,  sondern  be1  aller 
vorlgen  Freyheit  zu  lassen,  wle  denn 
he Jur~sten  handeln  von  den  Repre- 
sahen und Dlffidatlon.  Aber nach der 
Schr~ft  wlll slchs In kelnem weg ziemen, 
dass sich jemand,  wor  em Christ  sein 
wlll,  wlder  sein  Oberke~t  setze,  Gott 
gebe  818  thun  recht  oder  unrecht ; 
sondern  eln  Christ  soll  gewalt  und 
unrecht  leiden,  sonderllch  von  seiner 
Oberkeit.  Denn  obgleich  Ka~serliche 
majestat unrecht thut und ~hr  Pflicht 
und  Eid  uebe~trlfft,  1st  dam~t  seln 
Kaiserlich  Obrigke~t  und  se~ner  un. 
torthanen  gehorsam  nicht  aulgehebt, 
well das Roich uud dle Kurfur~ten  ihn 
fur Ka~ser  halten und nlcht absotzen .  . . 
Welthche  oder  Papsthche  Recht 
sehen hlerlnnen  mcht an, dass Oberkeit 
em  gottllche ordnung sey,  darum  ale 
vielle~cht  d~e  pflicht  und e~d  so  hoch 
achten dass sle dle Obngke~t  In solchem 
Fall  sollton  anfhalten  und  wehren. 
Aber  well  Kalser  Kaiser,  und  Furst, 
Furst ble~bt,  wenn  or  glo~ch  all  gebot 
Gottes  uebertlat, ]a  ob er  glelch  eln 
held8  ware:  so  soll  or's  auch  myn, 
ob or glelch sein Elde und Pflicht nicht 
halt, bis dass or abgesetzt, oder nlmmer 
Kalser  he1  . . . und,  summa,  sunde 
hebt Oberke~t  und gehorsarnkelt  nicht 
auf ; aber dle straffe hebt sle auf, das 
186, wenn das Reich und dle Kurfursten 
eintracht~ghch den  Kalsor  absetzen, 
dass or nimmer ~iiser  Ware " 
Cf. '  Sachsonflp~egel,'  vol  111.  p  61, 
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of  resistance in certain cases ; they had always thought that 
the Law must be obeyed, and that the Gospel does not con- 
tradict the Secular Law ; they could not therefore maintain 
that men  might  not defend themselves  against the Emperor 
himself,  or  his  representative ; it  was, therefore,  also  right 
that men  should  arm themselves, and thus be  prepared  to 
resist a sudden sttack.l 
The judgments expressed in this letter represent a different 
position from the letter of  Maroh 1530.  Luther was even then 
aware that some jurists admitted the lawfulness of  resiutance ; 
1 K  Mdller, '  Luther's Ausserungen,' 
Bellage  3  "  Uns 1st eln Zetel furget- 
ragen,  daraus  mr  befinden,  was  die 
Doktores der Rechte schliessen auff  &e 
Frage,  In  welchen  fellen  man  muge 
der  Oberkeit  widderstehen.  Wo  nu 
das ala bey den selbigen Rechtsdokto~en 
odder Verstendigen  gegrundet let, und 
wu gewlslich ynn solohen fellen stehen, 
ynn  welchen  (wle  010  anze~gen)  man 
muge  &e  Oberkeit  wldderstehen, und 
wlr  allzeit  gelert  haben  dass  man 
welttlich  Recht  solle  lessen  gehen, 
gelten  und  halton, was sle vermugen, 
und  das  Evangel~on  nicht  widder  die 
welttl~che  Recht leret, so konnen wlr's 
mit der Schrltt nicht anfechten, woman 
sioh  des  falls  wehren  musste,  es  sey 
gleich  der  Ke~ser  ynn elgener Person, 
oder wer es thut unter selnen namen  .  .  . 
So  w11  slchs  gle~chwol zimen,  dam 
man  sich  ruste  und  als  auff  eine 
gewalt,  so  plotzlich  slch  erheben 
mochte, bere~t  sey, wo slchs denn nach 
gestallt  und leuffte  der sachen  lemht- 
lich begeben kann 
Denn das mr bisher geleret, etracks 
nicht  w~dder  zu  stehen  der  Oberkeit, 
haben  wir  mcht  gewust,  das  solch's 
der  Oberkeit  rechte  selbs  goben, 
welchen  wir  dooh  allenthalben  zu 
gehorchen vle~ssig  geleret haben " 
Cf  the formal  statement signed by 
Luther.  Justus  Jonas,  Bugenhagen 
and  Melanchthon In  1536 
Melanchthon,  " Opera  Omnia "  in 
'  Corpus Reformatorum.' vol 111  Epletle, 
1468,  p.  129  (1630  AD  )  "Nu  1st 
ersthch  klar,  dass jede  Oberkeit  uber 
andere glelche Oberkeit, oder '  privatos,' 
schuldlg  1st  ihre  Chnsten  und  le 
Lehre  mu  schutzen.  HI~  1st  welter 
die  Frage,  was  einem  Fursten  mder 
seinen  Herrn,  als  den  Kaiser,  in sol 
chem  Fall  zu  thun gebhhro  Darauf 
1st  auch  glelche  antworz  Erstllch, 
d~ewohl das  Evangehum  bestatigt 
weltliche  leibhche  Repment,  so  sol1 
sich  ein  idhcher  Chnatlicher  Furst 
gegen selnen Herrn oder Kaiser halten 
vermoge  darselblgen  naturlmhen  und 
weltlmhen Regment und Ordnung. 
Wenn  der  Ka~aer  nicht  Rlchter ]st, 
und  will  gleichwohl  Straf  uben,  als 
'  pendente  appellatione,'  so  heisst 
solch sein thatllch Vornehmen, '  notoria 
injur~a.'  Nu  1st  leses  uaturl~che 
Ordnung der Reement, dass man slch 
schutzen  mdge,  und  die  gegenwehr 
gebrauchen  wieder  solche  '  notonam 
injunam '  Darum, so  der  Kaiser et- 
was thatlig vormmrnt vor dern Concilio 
'  pendente  appellatione,'  in  sachen 
welche die Religon betreffen, und den 
zugesagten Fr~eden  wahrhaft~gllch  und 
ohne  sophisterei  belangen  (so)  1st 
er  zu  halten  als  eine  Privat-person, 
und  1st  aolche  '  mjuna,'  w~der die 
Appellation  und  zugesagten  Fneden 
nngenommen, eine offentliohe  ' notoiia 
injuria.' " 
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but he still maintained  that Holy  Scripture did not permit 
this.  Now,  Luther  admitted  that  if,  as  the  jurists  said, 
the law of  the Empire admitted the right of  resistance, they 
could have nothing to say  against  it, for  they had  always 
taught that the law must be obeyed. 
There are some letters written in the spring of  1531 which 
justified  or explained this apparent change of  position, but 
they  do  not  add  very  much.  In a  letter  addressed  to 
Lazarus  Spengler of  Nuremberg, he  says that he had heard 
that it was  reported that he  and the other  Reformers had 
withdrawn their previous advice that tho Emperor must not 
be resisted.  The real truth was as follows : they were now 
informed that the Imperial Law permitted resistance in the 
case  of  obvious  injustice.  He  himself  had  no  opinion  of 
his own on the law, but must leave that to the jurists to decide. 
If  this was the Law of  the Empire, they were no doubt bound 
to obey it.  The other letters are in much the same terms.I 
That this change in Luther's  position was permanent seems 
to be clear : in 1531 he wrote a pamphlet entitled, '  Warnung 
an seine lieben Deutschen.'  We are not concerned here with 
its general subject-matter, but with some passages in it which 
deal with the relations of  those who accepted the Reformed 
opinions to the Emperor and the Roman Party.  If, he says 
in  one  passage, it should  come  to war, he would not  suffer 
those who  defended themselves  against the "  murderous and 
blood-thirsty  Papists " to be  called  rebels, but would refer 
them to the Law and the jurists ; and in another place he 
says that his advice was that if the Emperor should summon 
them  to fight against the  Reforming Party  no  one  should 
obey him.2 
Luther, ' Brief  wechsel,' Ed  Enders, 
vol  Vlll  pp  343,  344. 
Luther, ' Werke,' vol  xxx  part 111 
"  Warnung an seine lieben Deutschen." 
p  282  "  Welter,  wo  es  zum Kr~ege 
kompt, da Gott  fur sei, so wil ich das 
tell  so sich w~dder  die morlsche und 
blutgyrige  Papisten  zur  were  setzt, 
rncht  auffrurisch  gescholten  haben, 
noch  schelten  lassen,  nonclcrn  w~lls 
lassen  gehen  und  geschehen,  dass  se 
es  eine  not  were  heisseu,  und  wil  ale 
damit Ins Recht  und  zu  den  Juristen 
WelSeI3. 
...... 
Page  291  Das  1st  aber  mein 
trewer  Rat, das wo  der  Ka~eer  wurde 
auffbieten,  und  w~dder unser  Tell, 
umb  der  Bapst's  Sachen  odder  unser 
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We  have  dealt  with  Luther's  position,  not  exhaustively, 
as has  been  done  by  Muller  in his  admirable  monograph, 
but we hope, sufficiently to bring out his original opinions and 
the change after 1530.  It  seems clear that at first  Luther 
maintained dogmatically that the king, whether he was good 
or bad, just or unjust, held his authority from God and could 
not be resisted,  but must  in all secular matters receive an 
unqualified submission.  His judgment is clear, but we  have 
not  been  able  to  find  in  his  work  any  real  light  upon 
the source of  his opinions, for his citations from St Paul and 
St Peter cannot be described as furnishing  this  adequately. 
No  doubt his opinions were ultimately derived from those of 
St Gregory the Great, for these opinions had not completely 
disappeared in the P&iddle Ages, though they had been ignored 
or  dismissed by all serious theological or  political thinkers. 
We  can  only  suggest  conjecturally,  that Luther  may have 
come under the special influence of  some abnormal teacher. 
It  is  also  clear  that from  about  1530 his  opinions  were 
completely altered, at  least with regard to  the  Empire.  Whether 
Luther fully understood the significance of  the change in his 
conceptions may be doubted, but in fact the change was funda- 
mental, for he was no longer maintaining the absolute authority 
of  the Ruler, but the supreme authority of  the Law ; it is not 
necessary to explain the importance of  this change. 
It would  seem  that Melanchthon followed Luther, both in 
his earlier and later opinions.  In  a letter of  1530 to the Elector 
of  Saxony, he speaks of  resistance to the Emperor as being 
contrary to God's command,l but in 1536  he  joined  Luther 
in signing the Declaration which we have just cited.2 
In a letter of  1539 he says plainly that the principle that 
subjects must not resist their superiors does not apply when 
the  superior  commits  atrocious  and  notorious  injuries.? 
ym  solchen  Fall  kein  mensch  9ich  Melanrhthon, '  Opera  Omn~a,'  vol 
dazu  gebrauchen  lasse,  noch  dem  111.  Ep~st.  1767 (p 630)  "Itom quod 
Kalser gehorsam sel "  dic~tur  , subdltis  non  hcere  ut  re- 
Melanchthon, ' Opela  Omma '  (In  sistant superior~hus  ,  hoc d~rtum  habet 
'Corpus Reformatorum'), vol  11  Epist.  locum  sicut  in  a111s  causls  civ~libus, 
666 (p 20 )  quando  superior  non  lnfert  lnjurlas 
Cf  p  282, note  5  atroces et notorlas." 
In 1546  Melanchthon,  along  with  Bugenhagen  and  others, 
signed a declaration that, in their opinion, it was Iawful for 
the "  Stande"  to  defend  themselves  against  the  Emperor, 
if  he attacked them on account of  their re1igion.l  In a letter 
of  the same year  Melanchthon briefly, but clearly, criticised 
the  argument  for non-resistance,  as-drawn from  St Paul's 
words  in  the  Epistle  to  Romans  xiii.  1.  The  Power,  he 
says, is indeed an Ordinance of  God, but only a just Power ; 
unjust violence is not God's  Ordinance ;  and he adds an im- 
portant appeal to the principle that the relations of  inferior 
authorities  to the superior were  determined  by  certain con- 
ditions and agreements, and refers to the mutual obligations 
of  lord  and vassal  in  Feudal  Law.2  Thirteen  years  later 
Melanchthon set out the same judgment in terse and significant 
Id. id, vol.  vi.  Epist , 3454 (p. 
123)  . "  Denn wenn es gew~ss   st, dass 
der Kalser dlese Stande von wegen der 
Relig~on  uberziehen  wlll,  alsdann  1st 
keln Zwe~fel,  dlese Stande thun Recht, 
so sie sich und  die ihren ernstlich mit 
Gottes  hulf  schutzen,  wle  S.  Paulus 
spncht :  dle  Obrigkeit  fuhrt  das 
Schwert  n~cht  vergebhch, sondern  018 
1st  Gottes  Dienenn,  und  sol1  strafen 
dlelenlgen, so arges thun, als morder, 
und  1st  eino  ool~lle  gegenwehr  n~cht 
anders,  denn  so  man  elnen  haufen 
morder  wehren  musste,  es  werde 
gefuhret  vom  Ka~ser  oder  anderen 
Denn  es 1st  eine bffenthche  Tlranney 
und '  notorla  violentla ' " 
Id  ~d , vol  vi.  Eplst , J477 
(p  152)  . "  Aliud  dmtum  lEom  XIII. 
qu~  potestati  reslstit,  Dei  ordi- 
nat~onem reslatit,  et  jud~cium s~bi 
acqu~r~t.  Haec  sententia  prec~pue 
videtur  proh~bere  defensionem contra 
maglstratum  sed  ~psa  sese  declarat. 
Votat  enim  reslstere  in  casu  lustae 
jur~sdiction~s,  quia  manifeste  Inquit 
ordlnation~ Del  resistlt.  V~olentla 
autem  lnjusta,  non  est  ordmat~o  De], 
ut  the ban^,  cum  escusserunt  Lam- 
demonios,  qui  raplebant  civium  con 
luges  et  liberos,  non  resistebant 
ordmation~  Del,  sed  manifestls furon- 
bus Dlaboll et manifesto latrocln~o .  . 
(P.  153)  :  Postea  etiam,  et  do 
imperils  dlci  potest,  quee  etiams~ 
allis  subjects  sunt  Certa  conhtlone, 
tamen  habent  suam jur~sdictionem  et 
adm~nwtrat~onom  glah, ut  principes 
certa condhone subject1 sunt reglbus. 
Cum  autem  politicas  ordinationes 
congruentes  ratloni  approbat  Deuu, 
mnnlfestum eat, his quoque dofenslonem 
concodi,  Iuxta  ~psonun  pacta  Ideo 
m  iuro  multa  do  mutuw  obligationi 
bus,  domlni  et  vassah,  ut  vocant, 
trachta  sunt quae  Vera  sunt, sed llla, 
quae  supra  dlximus,  ex  lege  naturae 
sumpta, ~llustnora  et lndubitata sunt 
Addo  tamen,  et  hanc  manlfeelam 
regulam,  ut judex  mfer~or,  juste  uti 
]wisdictione  sue  debet  (ho  contrasts 
this with the conduct of the judges  In 
the Story of Naboth)  . . . Et Trajani 
vox  recte lntellecta  congrult  cum hac 
regula,  qui  tradens  gladium  maglstro 
equitum inqmt, 81 ]usta imperabo, pro 
me  utarls  gladio,  si  injusta,  contra 
me  utalls"  (p  155,  he  explalns 
David's  refusal to  slay Saul  as  bang 
due to his  not  wishing  to set  an ex- 
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words.  Resistance and necessary defence against the unjust 
and notorious violence of  the superior is right, for the Gospel 
does  not  annul  the  political  order,  which  is  in  accord 
with Law.l 
It is here that we  may appropriately notice an important 
statement  of  the year  1550, made by  the parish  Clergy  of 
Magdeburg, which sets out dogmatically the principle that the 
inferior public authorities might rightly defend their subjects 
against  the unjust  attacks of  the  Supreme Authority  upon 
their religion ; this  means  that in such  cases the Imperial 
cities  and  the  Princes  could  lawfully resist  the  Emperor.2 
They refer  to the doctrine  that it was  always unlawful  to 
resist the Higher Powers, but they contemptuously reject it. 
It is admitted, they say, that the superior and the subjects 
are bound  to  each  other  by  oaths,  but princes  and  lords, 
some say, may deal as they like with their subjects, may forget 
their oaths and may do what they please, while the subjects 
may not protect or maintain their rights and liberties.3 
The ' Obrigkeit 'is an Ordinance of  God, whose function it is 
to honour  the good  and to punish  the  evil, and therefore, 
when  it persecutes the good  and sets forward the evil, it is 
no longer an Ordinance of  God, but of  the Devil, and to resist 
it is to resist, not the Ordinance of  God, but of  the DeviL4 
1 Id  ~d , vol.  ix.,  6886  (p.  987): 
"  Aber  von  wahrhaftlger  nbthiger 
Gegenwehr  zu reden ohne Sophlsterel, 
1st wahr das Gegenwehr und '  necessarla 
defenslo ' wlcler  ~inrechte  '  violent~am,' 
auch  w~der offentllche  '  notoriam 
vlolentiam  superlorls  potrstatis,'  recht 
]st,  denn  das  Evangelium  vertilgt 
nlcht weltllche Ordnung,  den Rechten 
gemafis." 
* '  Bekenntmss,  Unterricht  und 
Vermanung  der  Pfarrherrn  und  Pre- 
d~ger der  Chr~stllchen Kirchen  zu 
Magdeburg,'  ed  1550,  part  11.  (The 
pages are not numbered, but thls is on 
the fourth page) : "  Wn  wollen  aber 
uns furnehmen zu  bewelsen  daqs elne 
Christl~che  Oberkeit mag und sol ~hre 
Unterthanon  verteldigen  auch  wldder 
eine  hbhere  Oberkeit,  so  d~e  Leute 
m~t  gcwalt  zmlngcn,  und  Gottes wort 
und rechte Gottes d~enst  zu~  orleugne~,, 
und Abgdtterey anzunehmen." 
Cf  p  15. 
a  Id.  id, p  5 :  "Item:  Oberkelt 
und unterthanen haben sich zusammen 
hart  vorpfllcht,  und  mit  Eyden  ver- 
bunden.  Aber die Fursten und Herren 
m6gen  dennoch  ihron  muthwillen  m:t 
den  untersassen  uben,  ~hres  Eydts 
vergessen  und  thuen  was  sie  wollen. 
Dagegen  haben  dle  Untersassen  n~cht 
macht dawridder  zu reden, ~hre  Recht 
und  Freyhelten  handtzuhaben  Der 
Furst mag krlegen  w~dder  d~e  Itechte 
und  seinen  Eydt,  aber  d~e  Unter 
thanen durffen ~hm  n~cht  wlddorstehen 
nach den Rechten." 
Id ~d.,  p.  16. Die Oberkelt 1st ein 
Ordnung  Gottes.  das  gute  zu  ehren, 
und zu straffen das Bdse (Romans x~il.) 
Deshalben wen11 d~o  Obilgke~t  anhebt, 
If the superior authority  attempts to suppress the lower 
authority, which will not follow it in evil, its action is null 
and void before God, and the lower authority is still bound 
to carry out its duty.l  If  the authority, prince, or  emperor 
endeavours, against his oath, to destroy  the lawful Liberties 
of  the lower authority, the latter may lawfully resist, though 
it  may  be  wiser  to  submit ; but  if  the higher  authority 
endeavours  to  stamp  out  the  true  religion,  the  inferior 
authority  must  resist,  and  those  who  do  this  are  not  to 
be  called  rebels.2 
The first English writer of  the sixteenth century, as far as 
we  have  seen,  who  sets  out  the conception  of  the Divine 
Right  and  Non  - Resistance  was  William  Tyndale.  It 
is  carefully  and  clearly  set  out  in  his  work  called  '  Tho 
Obedience  of  Christian  Men,'  published  in 1528, and  it  is 
reaffirmed  in his  'Exposition  of  Matthew v.,  vi.,  and vii.,, 
published in 1532. 
We have already pointed out that the Reformers in France 
and Germany were anxious to show that they were in no way 
related to any movement of  revolt  or  revolution,  and that 
they had, still less, any sympathy with the Anabaptist move- 
ment.  Tyndale7s work, '  The Obedience of  Christian  Men,' 
shows the same concern.  In the Prologue to this work  he 
says that the occasion of  the Treatise was the charge that the 
doctrine of  the Reformers, and especially the preaching of  the 
Word of  God, tended to make men disobey and revolt against 
their rulers, and to set up a system of  community of  goods.3 
das  gute  zuverfolgen  und  das  B6se 
zu fodern, so 1st sie nioht mehr (indem 
das  sie  also  handelt  und  thut), e~n 
Ordnung Gottes,  sondern eln  Ordnung 
des  Teuffels.  Und  wer  solohem  Bdse 
furhaben w~ddorstehet,  der widerstehet 
nlcht  der  Ordnung  Gottes,  sondern 
der Ordnung des Teuffols." 
1 Id., p. 17. 
Id., pp. 19, 20, 21. 
W.  Tyndale,  'The  Obedience  of 
Chr~st~an  Men '  (Ed~tion,  London, 1673) 
Prologue  (p.  104):  "Forasmuch  as 
our  holy  Prelates  and  our  gnostly 
Religous, which ought to defend God's 
Word, speak evil of  it, and do all tho 
shame they can to it, and rayle on it, 
and  bear  their  captives  In  hand, 
that  ~t  causeth  ~nsurrect~on  and 
teacheth  the people  to  dlsohey  thelr 
hoades  and  governours,  and  moveth 
them  to  nse  against  them  pr~nces, 
and to make all common, and to make 
havoke of  other men's goods, therefore 
have I  made  the l~ttle  treat~se  that 
followeth contemyng all obedlenco that 
IS ot  God." A11  this he indignantly repudiates, and suggests that it was 
rather  the Pope  and his followers who  had taught men  to 
resist their ru1ers.l 
In setting out his own  view,  Tyndale begins by  citing St 
Paul's  words in Romans xiii.,  and concludes that it is God 
who has given laws to all nations, and who rules the world 
by  means of  the Kings and Rulers whom he has appointed, 
and that no  subject  may  resist  his  superior for  any  cause 
whatsoever, for  if  he  does this, he takes upon  himself the 
authority which  belongs  to  God  only.2  Again,  rulers  are 
ordained  of  God,  whether  they  are good  or evil, and what 
they do, whether good or bad, is done by God, for if  they are 
evil, they are the ministers of  God%  punishment upon the sins 
of  tho people.3  A Christian man is in respcct of God, but as a 
''  passive thing, a thing that suffereth  only and doth nought.'," 
This is sufficiently explicit, but he also says that the king in 
secular matters is outside of  the Law, and whether he does 
right or wrong gives account to God only.5  How far this is a 
reminiscence of  the "  legibus solutus  of  the Roman Law, and 
how far it may be derived from other sources, we cannot say. 
1 ld.  id.,  p.  106:  "  To  disobey 
even  father,  mother,  master,  lord, 
king and emperor : yea, and to invade 
whatsoever  land  or  nation  that will 
not receaue  and admit his God-head. 
Where tho peaceable doctrine of  Christ 
teacbeth us to obey,  and to suffer for 
the Word of  God." 
2 Id.  id.,  p.  109 : " God  therefore 
hath geven lawes unto all nations and 
in all landes hath put kinges, governors 
and rulerb, in  hys  oun  stede,  to rule 
the  world  through  them.  . . . (p. 
110) :  Neither  may  the  inferior 
person  avenge  himself  upon  the 
buperior,  or  violently  resist  hym,  for 
whatsoever wrong it be.  If ho doe, he 
is  condemned  in  the  deede  doing; 
inasmuch as he talieth upon hym that 
which  belongeth  to God  only,  which 
sayth '  Vengeance  is mine, and I will 
rewarde.' " 
Id.  id.,  p.  11  9 :  "  I-Ieados  and 
governors  are  ordeined  of  God,  and 
are even the gift of  God, whether they 
be good  or  bad.  And,  whatsoever  is 
done  unto  us  by  them,  that  doth 
God,  be  it  good  or  bad.  If  they be 
evill,  why  are they  evill,  verily,  for 
our wiekednesse  sake. . . .  Therefore 
doth God make his scorge of  them, and 
turn them  unto wild  beastes . . . to 
avenge  himself  of  our unnatural1  and 
blind unkindnesse, and of  our rebellions 
disobedience." 
4  Id.  id.,  p.  119 :  "A  Christian 
man in respect of  God, is but a passive 
thing, a thing that suffereth only and 
doth nought, as the sick in respect  of 
the  surgeon  or  physitian  doth  but 
suffer only ." 
6  Id.  id.,  p.  111 :  "  Hereby  seest 
thou that the kyng is  in this worlde 
without  law,  and  may  at his  lust  do 
right  or  wrong,  and  shall  give  ac- 
eomplcs  but  to God  only." 
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It may be urged, indeed, that these are somewhat abstract 
phrases,  and must  not  be  pressed, but in  a later work, an 
exposition of  the Sermon on the Mount, he discusses the re- 
lation of  the subject; to the Ruler in more concrete terms. 
In commenting on the words of  our Lord (Matt. v. 38, 42), 
Tyndale  contends  that these  words  do  not  mean  that the 
Christian man is forbidden to go to law, but that, even if  the 
law is  administered  by  wicked  and corrupt rulers, he must 
not take the law into his own hands, for to rail against  his 
rulers is to rail against God, and to revolt against them is to 
revolt against God.  This is sufficiently emphatic, but Tyndale 
was not satisfied till he had repudiated, what we may call, the 
traditional  constitutional contention,  that  the king  had  on 
his  accession  sworn  to  maintain  the  laws,  privileges,  and 
liberties of  his subjects, and that it was  only upon this con- 
dition  that  his  subjects  had  submitted  to  him,  and  that, 
therefore, if he misgoverned them, they were not bound  to 
obey,  but  could  resist  and  depose him.  Tyndale  answers 
contemptuously  that this  argument is  of  no  force;  a  wife 
cannot compel her husband if  he violates his oath to her, or 
a servant his master; this can only be done by some higher 
authority.  Again, it may be contended that the subjects had 
chosen their ruler, and "  Cujus est ligare, ejus est solvare " ; 
but Tyndale answers that even though the people elect their 
ruler, it is God who  has  elected him through them, he is the 
Lord's  anointed,  and  cannot  be  deposed  without  a  special 
commandment  from God ; and  he  then  cites  the story of 
David  and Saul, as Gregory the Great had done.  He adds 
on ingenious parallel, that the citizens of  London elected their 
Mayor, but could not depose him without the consent of the 
king, from whom they had received the power to elect, and 
concludes that if the highest authority does wrong, subjects 
can only complain to G0d.l 
Id.,  '  Exposition  on  Matthew  ever as much more, whatsoever unright 
v., vi.,  vii ' (p. 213) : "  Wherefore the  be  dorm  thee,  rather  than  of  im- 
text  moaneth  this,  that  where  the  patienco t11ou shouldost avenge thyself 
law  is  unjustly  ministered  and  the  on thy neighbour,  or  rayle  or  make 
governors  and  judges  corrupt . . .  insurrection  agaynst  the  superiors 
there  be  patient  and ready  to suffer  which  God  hath set over  thee.  For 
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It seems clear that Tyndale intended to repudiate all con- 
stitutional arguments for the restraint of  the royal authority, 
and it is interesting to observe that in this same work he sug- 
gested that the  evils which had befallen England in the fifteenth 
century were really the result of  their action in slaying their 
rightful king, Richard II., whom God had set over them.l 
to  rise against them, is to  robell against  them, as so must he be the chief putter 
God, and against thy father when  he  down of  them agayne, so that without 
scourgeth  thee for thyne  offence, and  his  special  Commandment  they  may 
a  thousand  times  more  sinne  than  not  be  put down  agayne.  Now  hath 
to  avonge  thee  on  thy  neighbour.  God  geven  no  Commandment  to 
And  to rayle  on thom is  to rayle  on  put  them  down  agayne,  but  con- 
God,  as  though  thou  wouldest  blas-  trariwise,  when  we  have  anoynted  n 
pheme  Him,  if  He made  thoc  siclce,  lryng at his Commandment, he sayth : 
poore,  or  of  low  degree,  or  otherwise  touch not mine anointed.  And  what 
than thou wouldest be made thyself.  jeopardy  it  is  to  rise  agaynst  thy 
Thou  wilt  happily  say:  the  Prince  that  is  anointed  over  thee, 
subjects  ever  choose  the  Ruler  and  how evil1 soever he be, see in tho story 
make  hym  swear  to keep  their  law  of  King  David,  and  throughout  all 
and  to maintain  their  privileges  and  the Bookes of  the Kings.  The authority 
liberties, and upon  that submit their-  of  the King is the authority of  God ; 
selves  unto  him.  Ergo,  if  he  rule  and all  the subjects compared  to the 
amiss,  they  are  not  bound  to  obey,  King are but subjects still (though the 
but. may resist him and put him down  King be never so evil). . . .  And unto 
again.  your argument, '  Cujus est lignre  ejus 
I  answere,  your  argument  is  est solvere,' I answere :  he that bindeth 
naught.  For  the  husband  swoareth  wyth  absoluto  power,  and  without 
to his  wife,  yet  though  he  forswear  any higher authoritie, his is the might 
himself,  she hath no power  to compel  to loose agayne.  But he that bindeth 
him.  Also though a maister keep not  at other  men's  commandment,  may 
covenant  with  his  servaunt,  or  one  not  loose  againe  until  the command- 
neighbour  with  another :  yet  hath  ment of  the same.  As they of  London 
neither scrvaunt nor neighbour (though  choose  them a  Mayor : but may not 
he be  under none obedience) power to  put him down  again, how  evil soever 
avengc : but the vengeance pertayneth  he  be,  without  the  authority  of  him 
ever to an higher office, to whom thou  with  whose  licence  they  chose  him. 
must complayne.  As long as the power of  officers be  one 
Yea,  but  you  will  say,  it  is  not  under  another,  if  the inferior  do thee 
like.  For the whole body of  the subjects  wrong,  complayne to the higher.  But 
choose  the  Ruler.  Now,  'Cujus  est  if  the hyghest  of  all  do  tllce  wrong, 
ligare, ejus eat solvere,' ergo, if  he rule  thou must complayne unto God  only. 
amiss  they  may  put  him  down  Wherefore  the  onely  remedy  against 
agayne.  . . . God  (and  not  the  evil  rulers  is,  that thou  turne  thine 
common  people)  chuseth  the  Prince,  eyes to thyself, and lhyno owne sinne, 
though  he  chuse  by  them.  For,  and then loolre up unto God." 
Deut. xvi., God comrnandeth to chuse  1 Id. id.,  p.  207 :  'I Let  England 
and  fiet  up  officers,  and  therefore  is  looke  about  them,  and  msrko  what 
God the chief  rhuser  and setter-up of  hath  chaunced  them since  they  slew 
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~t would  be  difficult  to find  any stronger  declaration  of 
the conception that the king holds by Divine Right an absolute 
and unqualified authority, that he is above law and not under 
it, that all appeal to constitutional  tradition is  empty  and 
void, that all resistance to his authority, however reasonable 
the cause for this might be, is an offence against God, and the 
authority which he has given to the king. 
It is obvious, of  course, that this is a restatement of  the 
conceptions  of  St Gregory  the Great, but  we  are strongly 
inclined to think that it is from Luther's  earlier statements 
that Tyndale's  opinions are derived, and especially from the 
6L Ermahnung zum Frieden '' of  1525, and possibly from the 
tract '  Ob Kriegsleute auch im seligen Stande sein kijnnen '  of 
1526.  He does  not,  indeed,  refer to  them  explicitly,  but 
a  comparison  of  Tyndale's  arguments  with  those  con- 
tained  in  Luther's  tracts seems  to us  to make  this  highly 
probable. 
There is not much to be said about R. Barnes, another of 
the English Reformers, who seems to us clearly to be on this 
subject a disciple of  Tyndale.  In  the tract entitled '  A suppli- 
cation  to Henry VIII.'  he  is  evidently  concerned  to  show 
that, while the Reformers taught men that God commanded 
obedience  to  princes,  it was  the Pope  who  taught  men  to 
revolt.  In another tract he sets out, in terms as strong as 
those of Tyndale, the duty of absolute submission to the king, 
however unjust and contrary to the law his action might be.l 
their  right  kyng, whom God  had  an- 
ointed  over  them,  King  Richard  11. 
Their  people,  townes and villages  are 
minished by the tllirde parte." 
Cf.  Tyndale's  '  Answer  to  More,' 
Book  iv.  chap. xiii.,  where he  speaks 
of  Henry  V.  as holding  the kingdom 
against  all  right. 
'  R.  Barnes'  Works.  Edition, 
London, 1673 (with Tyndale and Frith, 
Paged  with  Frith's  Works),  p.  292 : 
''In  this  article  we  must  note  that 
there  be  two manner  of  ministers  or 
:  one  is  a  temporal  power, 
the  other is  called  a  spiritual  power : 
the Temporal  Power  is  committed  of 
God  to  Kings,  Dukes . . . Mayors, 
Sherriffs, and all otller ministers under 
them.  . . . In  thys  power  is  the 
Kynge chief  and full Ruler ; all others 
be  ministers  and servaunts,  as  Paul 
doth declare,  saying : '  Let every soul 
be subject unto the Higher Power,'  &c. 
Also  St Peter:  '  Be  subject unto the 
Kynge  as  unto  tho  chief  head . . .' 
unto this power  must  we  be  obedient 
in  all  thynges  that  pertain  to  the 
ministration  of  the  present  life,  and 
of  the  Commonwealth. . . . So  that, 
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The only thing that he will allow is, that the oppressed man 
may fly (he  is evidently thinking primarily of  a man persecuted 
for his religion). 
We have thus endeavoured to set out the first development 
in Germany  and in England in the sixteenth century of  the 
theory of  the absolute Divine Right of  the monarch, and of 
the principle of  non-resistance, but we  shall return to this in 
another chapter, with regard to its development in the later 
part of  the century. 
tyranny  against  tho  Right  and  Law  Faythe) our charitie must needs suffer 
(always provided  that  ii  repugn  not  it, for, ni;  l'aule  sa>th  Charitie suffereth 
against  the  Gospel1 nor  destroye  our  all Thyng." 
CHAPTER  V. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  CIVILIANS  IN 
THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY. 
WE have dealt with the conception of  the source and nature 
of  the  authority  of  Law,  as  illustrated  in  the writers  on 
Political Theory in the earlier part of  the sixteenth  century. 
In previous volumes and in the earlier parts of  this volume 
we have found it necessary to distinguish sharply between the 
character of  political theories in general and the conceptions 
of  the Civilians, and it is necessary to continue this distinction, 
for, as we  have  said, the political conceptions which  these 
jurists  derived from their study of  the Roman Law differed 
in  many  and important  respects  from  the traditional  con- 
ceptions and practice of  mediaval Europe. 
We  cannot,  indeed,  pretend  that we  have  been  able  to 
examine the political theory of  the sixteenth century Civilians 
in as much detail as we have done those of  the earlier periods : 
we  have no longer the invaluable guidance of  Savigny's great 
work, which terminates at  the end of  the fifteenth century. 
We  begin  with  the  famous  French  humanist  and jurist, 
Guillaume Budd, whose work  belongs to the earliest part of 
the sixteenth century.  It is, indeed, not very easy to bring 
Budd's conceptions into complete harmony with  each other ; 
when  dealing with general principles, he seems to assert the 
absolute power of  monarchy, and especially in France ; whiie 
in  other places he  attributes to the "Parlemcnt " of  Paris 
a very large authority, even in relation to the king. 
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the meaning of  the phrase, "  Princeps legibus solutus "  ; the 
second, in a passage in which he compares the Roman Senate 
with  '6  Curia no~tra  suprema " (meaning clearly, the "  Parle- 
ment "  of  Paris). 
He  begins  the  treatment  of  the  meaning  of  "legibue 
solutus "  by appealing to a famous passage of  the '  Polities,' 
in which Aristotle speaks of  the natural monarchy of  a man 
who  is  incomparably  superior  to  all  other  men  in  the 
state.  Such  s  man, Bud6  maintains, cannot be treated  as 
the  equal  of  others,  but  must  rather  be  regarded  as  a 
god  among  men; it would  be  absurd  to impose law  upon 
such  a  man,  as he is  a  law  to  himse1f.l  He  goes  on  to 
assert  that the Roman  Emperors,  at least  at the time  of 
TJlpian, and the Kings of  France, had a pre-eminence of  this 
kind ; the Emperor ordered a11  things according to his will, 
and the Kings of  France have all things in their power.  They 
are like the Jove of  Homer,  and all things tremble at their 
nod : they are human Joves, but that, like other men, they 
die." 
1 Budaeus,  '  Annotationes  in  Pan- 
dectas '(Dig. i. 3, 31), p.  67 : '' l'rinceps 
legibus  solutus  est.  Aristoteles,  Lib. 
Tertio,  Politic.  Hujus dicti rationem 
memorabilem afferre mihi videtur.  . . . 
Is  igitur in eo libro in hanc propemorlum 
sententiam  inquit,  si  tamen  recte 
vertimus ; in republics  autem optime 
constituta  is  demum  iuris  esse  dici 
debet, qui et  regere et  regi, st  voluntate 
et  aptitudine  ad  vitam  paratus  est 
secuudum virtutem agendum.  Agedum 
sit aliquis unus, aut uno etiam plurcs 
(pauciores  tamen  quam  ut  civitatis 
numerum implere possint), tanto celeris 
virtutis  exuperantia  praestantes,  si 
plures  sint,  aut praestans si unus sit, 
reliquorum ut universorum virtus cum 
illius aut illorum non sit comparabilis ; 
dico,  inquit,  hujuhmodi  viros  non 
jam civitatis partem existimandos essc, 
quippe injuriam illls haud duble factum 
iri  credendum  est,  si  aequas  ferre 
partes  d~gnl  ipsi  videbuntur,  tanto 
ceteris  inaequales  virtute  civilique 
facultate.  Hujusmodi  enim  quasi 
Deum quendam censeri  inter homines 
par  est.  Proinde  legum  quoque 
lationem  inter  aequales  necesse  est 
esse  et genere  et facultate civili.  In 
illos  autem  hujuscemodi  nulla  est 
prorsus  legislatio,  quippe  qui  ipsis 
lex  sunt,  quia  enim  ridiculum  fore 
putemus eum qui legem de huiusmodi 
ferre aggrediatur." 
Id. id.,  p.  68 : "  Age cum quinque 
aunt  genera  regni,  quintum  genus 
est  quod  rra~jjaulhr~cr  dicitur,  quasi 
dicas rcgnum numeris omnibus domina- 
tionis  absolutum :  cujusmodi  erant 
Reges,  Principes  Romani,  Ulpiani 
tempore,  nihil  jam  priscae  civilitatis 
rotinentes,  omnia  arbitrio  suo 
statuentes : ut nuno Reges nostri sunt, 
qui omnia in potestate  habent, quique 
(ut  Homerlcus  ille  Jupiter)  quoquo 
sese  verterint,  omnia  circumagunt, 
nutu  etiam  solo  omnia  quat~entes  : 
~udd  is,  indeed,  not  satisfied  that  the  words  "legibus 
solutus " are  adequate to express the relation  of  the prince 
to the Law ; he prefers the phrase "  Principem . . . etiam 
legibus non tene~i." Laws, he says, are made for men  who 
are  equal  in  every  political  ''  fa~ultas,'~  but  they  cannot 
constrain  those  who  are  greatly  superior;  kings  have  no 
equals in the antiquity and dignity of  their birth, in excellence 
of  soul and body, and in the majesty of  their bearing ; they 
are, or should be  held  to be, equal to thc heroes ; and laws 
which are made for the people cannot control such sacrosanct 
beings.' 
He suggests that there is  no  more  reason  why  the laws 
should stand between the prince and the people than between 
a father and his ~hildren.~  He carries, however, his conception 
of  the supreme place of  the prince still further.  The prince 
is the minister of God for the welfare of  men, and it is for him 
to disti<ibute  the good things which are given by God to the 
human lace ; and he cites a saying that justice is the end of 
the low, and this is the function  of  the prince, for the prince 
is the image of God, who orders all things aright.  This, Bud4 
sicps, agrees with the words of  the apostle, "  Let every soul 
be subject to the Higher Powers."  Plutarch had, indeed, said 
denique  humani  Joves,  ut  inquit 
Plautus  in  Casina,  sed  qui  tamen 
hom~num  more  emoriantur.  Hoc 
autem regni genus est, inquit Aristoteles, 
cum  unus  omnium  potestatem  habet, 
tum  commun~um tum  publicarum 
rerum,  non  allter  atque  civitas  una, 
aut populus  unus habent." 
Id.  id.,  p.  68 : "  Ex  supradictis 
igiti~r  demonstrari potest  ut arbitror, 
princlpem  non  mod0  legibus  esse 
solutum,  id  quod  Ulpianus  d~xit,  bed 
etiam legibus non teneri.  Jam primum 
cum  leges  ferri  dcbeant  in  homines, 
gonere  facultateque  omni  politica 
Cqualcs,  nec  legibus  teneantur  qui 
multo  ceteros  rebus  his  praestare 
viclentur ;  reges  autem  generositate, 
id  est  opulentia,  antiquitate,  et 
claritate  natalium  ncmo  o~unium 
aequare  possit  aut contendat,  virtute 
pono  et animi  et  corporis,  omnique 
mcrum  majestate  lmmanum  captum 
modurnque excedere, heroasque aequare 
aut debeant, aut credantur.  3fanifes- 
tum  est  legibus  in  cives,  id  est  m 
populum  latis,  sacrosanctos  hox~~inrrs 
non  teueri,  augueta  iIla,  designatione 
eximios." 
Id.  id.  id. :  "Ad  haec  cum 
nullum  jus  civile  inter  patrem  et 
liberos  et inter dominum et familinm 
intcrcodat, ut Aribtotoles  docet &ib. V. 
Ethicorum,  et  nos  alibi  diximus,  sit 
autem eadem ratio inter Principem  et 
pop~~lum  ; satin ut arhitror effectus est, 
quod efficere meditabamur, .  . .  et p,ln- 
cipem non mod0  legibus solutum cshe, 
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that the Law is the prince of  princes, but he explained what 
he meant by the Law when he said that it is not that law 
which is written in books or on tables, but that living "  reason " 
which is within the prince.' 
It is obvious that Bud6 was anxious, at least as a general 
principle, to maintain the view that the king stood outside of, 
and above, the legal order of society. 
It is, however, also clear that in another place Bud6 repre- 
sents  the  actual  constitutional  practice  of  France  in  very 
different terms.  In discussing the position  of  the Senate in 
Rome  he  compares  it  with  LL curia  nostra  ~uprema,~'  and 
maintains that this Court had all the powers which had been 
in the Senate.  The "  Maiestas  77 and powers of  the Roman 
people  had  been  transferred  to  the  prince  by  the  Lex 
Regis," while the Senatorial Power had been granted to the 
Curia-i.e.,  the  LL Parl~rnent.~~  It was this LL Parlement 77 which 
declared the princes' a  acta,"  rata irritave7l7  by it he willed 
that his  Constitutions  should be  promulgated ;  and it was 
to the judgment  of  this Court alone that the princes, though 
legibus ~oluti,~,  submitted themselves  (LL a qua sibi jus  dici, 
principes leges soluti civili animo f erant  ,). 
1 Id. id.  id. :  "  Verius  autem  quis  Quae  verba  esse  consentanca  cum 
dixerit  magistratus  summos  et  prin-  lege,  '  Digna  Vox ' (Cod.  i.  14,  4). 
cipes Dei ministros esse in procuratione  Sed  quam  legem  Plutarchus  principi 
hominum  et  salute,  ut  quae  bona  imperitantem  dixerit,  ex  iis  quae 
generi humano  divix~itus  donantur, ea  sequuntur  intelligemus.  . . .  Lex 
ipsi partim distribuant  inter  homines,  inquit  principi  imperatrix  erit:  non 
partim asservent  . . . tantorum  porro  illa  quidem  aut  in  libris  oxtrinsecus 
bonorum  divinorum  taliumque  nullus  soripta,  aut  in  tabulis,  sed  animata 
esset hominibus fructus ususque  com-  intus  in  ipso  ratio,  semper  cum  eo 
modus et rectus, sine lege, sine justitia,  conversans,  ejusdomque  observatrix, 
sine  principe.  . . . Deinde haec  sub-  quaeque  eius  animam  nunquam  sinit 
dit ; Justitia  igitur  finis  est legis, lex  tutela sui esse vacuum." 
autem  officium  est  principis.  At  Id. id., Dig. i.  9,  12  (p. 96) : "  In 
princeps ips0 imago est Dei, qui omnia  ea  igitur  curia  in  qua  summa  juris- 
recte  ordineque  constituit.  Convenit  dictionis Gallicae  atque etiam juridic- 
hoc  cum  precept0  apostoli  '  Ad  tialis  imperii  sits  est,  omnia  inesse 
Romanos ' Decimo  Tertio  (Rom. xiii.  mihi videutur, quae et in sonatu, et in 
1).  Plutarchus  tamen,  alibi  in  ccntumviratu,  et  in  areopago  erant, 
eodem  tractatu  ita inquit.  . . . Quis  dumtaxat  quod  ad  jurisdictionem 
igitur  principi  princeps  erit P  Nempe  imperiumque jurisdictiale attinet. . . . 
lex quao omniunl regina est mortalium  Majestas  vero  populi  apud  Romanos 
atque immortalium, ut inquit Pindarus.  dicebatur,  et  auctoritas  Senatus. 
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This is, indeed, a very different conception of  the relation 
of  the prince to the Law from that expressed in the passages 
already  cited ; it is  possible  that  Bud6  looked  upon  this 
relation  of  king  and Parlement  as arising from and depend- 
ing  upon  the king's  will  and  pleasure, but the discrepancy 
remains, and we shall find something very like it in Bodin. 
We may put beside the opinions of  Bud6 some statements 
of  Jean Ferrault, in a work on the laws and privileges of  the 
kingdom of  France, published in 1515.  He contends that the 
Kings  of  France have the same power  of  legislation as the 
Roman  Emperor,  and he  seems,  curiously  enough, to hold 
that the Salic Law was strictly analogous to the Lex Regia 
of  Rome, and that by it all power had been transferred to the 
King of France, who possessed all the rights of  the Emperor.1 
And, in another place, as we  understand him, he seems to 
assert that the King of France can impose  novum ~ectigal,~' 
while other kings and lords can only exact the Regalia.2 
Populus  sciscere  solebat  et  jubere,  solo  rege,  ille  solus  potest  statuere, 
Senatus censere  et  auctor  esse.  Illa  condere et instituere.  Constitutio  vel 
igitur  popularia  ad  principem  lege  edictum  est,  quod  tantum  rex  vel 
regia  delata  sunt,  haec  senatoria  ad  imperator  constituit,  11.  Dist.  c. 
curiam  translata  esse  creduntur. . . .  Constitutio.  Nam salutem reipublicae 
In  hujus acta referri diplomata regiaque  tuori  nulli  magis  credidit,  divus 
beneficia  solent,  ut  perpetua  esse  Augusti  (nus) convenire, nec  aliquem 
possint,  ac  nunquam  antiquabilia.  sufficere  ei  rei . . . quia  antiqua lege 
Hujus autoritateratairritave  principum  regia quae salica nuncupatur omno jus 
acta,  ne  ipsis  quidem  recusantibus,  omnisque potestas in regiam translata 
fiunt.  Una  haec  curia est, a qua sibi  est :  et  sicuti  imperatori  soli  hoc 
jus  dici, principes  legibus soluti civili  convcneret  in  subditis . . . ita regi; 
animo  ferant :  quam  auctorem  fieri  cum rex Franciae  omnia jura  impera- 
sscrandis  promulgandisque  sanctioni-  toris  habeat,  quia  (ut  dictum  est) 
bus  suis  velint :  cujus  cousilii  cen-  non  recognoscit  in  temporalibus 
SUrae, constitutiones suas eximi ; edict-  superiorem." 
aque  sua  nolint,  imo  cujus  decretis  Id. id., 41 : "  Decimum septimum 
hujusmodi sua acta conservari eternitati  jus  regium  est,  quod  ipse  solus  et 
velint."  nullus  alius  potest  imponere  novum 
Jean  Ferrault,  '  Tractatus  de  vectigal . . . alii  autem  reges,  et 
Juribus et Privilegiis Regni Francorum,'  domini temporales possunt exigere ; in 
xxxv. :  ''  Duodecim  lilium  jus  ali-  Tit.  quae  sunt  regalia  X  Coll.  Sed 
qualiter  respiciens  eat  quod  Rex  nec  imponere  nec  quocunque  colore 
iste solus Eacit  constitutiones seu leges  aliam  exactionem  facere  etiam  pro 
in  Regno  Franciae.  . . .  Est  enim  utilitate patriae."  (Weconfess that we 
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We may  also put beside Ferrault the opinions  of  Charles 
de Grassaille, in a work published ln 1538.l 
When,  however,  we  turn  to  other  and  more  important 
Civilians  of  the sixteenth century, we  find judgments  of  a 
very  different kind.  We  begin  with Alciatus  of  &Iilan and 
Bourges, whose  earlier years  were  spent in Milan, but who 
later migrated  to France and taught  in  the Law  School of 
Bourges in the earlier part of  the century. 
Alciatus, as  was  natural, held  that  the authority  of  the 
Emperor was  derived from  the Roman  people,  but  he  de- 
veloped  this into the doctrine  that  all  political  authority 
was  and could only be derived from the people.  The '' JUS 
imperii Romani "  belonged to the people until they transferred 
it  by  law  to Augustus.  God  gave  men  lordship  over  all 
animals, but not over other men ; kings were created, not by 
the Divine  command,  but  by  the  consent  of  the  people. 
Charles the Great was elected by the Roman people, and this 
authority is  now  exercised  by  the seven  German  Electors. 
Thus, also in France, Chilperic was deposed and Pipin elected 
king,  and  so  with  Hugh  Capet ; and  thus  also,  in  lesser 
kingdoms.  Alciatus concludes that "  he is a just  prince who 
reigns with the consent of  the people, and he is a tyrant who 
reigns over unwilling subjects."  St  Augustine rightly described 
kingdoms  created  by  violence,  wlthout  the  consent  of  the 
subjects, as  magna latrocinia." 
1 Cf  J.  W  Allen,  '  A  Hlstory  of 
Political  Thought  In  the  s~xteenth 
century,' p  284. 
8  Alc~atus,  Opera, vol  11.  001.  1047, 
' Comm  on  D~gcst,'  L.  16,  15: 
"  Jus  Imperil  Roman]  ad  populum 
pertmebat, donec per legem Rhernn~am 
populus  In  Augustum  Caosarem 
]US  omne  transtul~t. .  Nam 
cum  homlnem  creavit  Deny,  1111 
In  cetera  quldem  an~mant~a  jus  et 
domlnmm  concess~t,  hom~nem  autem 
ut  alter1  alter  serviret  non  ~ncbxlt 
Unde  princlplo  rerum  non  divlna 
jusslone,  sed ex populi  consemu reges 
assumptl sunt ; qucd et, post Romani 
lillpell~  occasum, servatum  fu~t,  cum 
Carolus  Magnus  a  populo  Romano 
Augustus  electus  est,  et  a  pontifice 
Leone sacro oleo in~unctus  , quod  ]us 
popul~  hod10 Gregor~ana  lege in septem 
Germamae  prlnupes  translatum  est. 
Sic  et  Franc],  Chilperico  ejecto  qul 
regno  ~doneus  non  essct,  P~plnum 
aau~eh~c~$  cons1110 subst~tuerunt. Et 
cum Pip~m  prolo9 a major~bus  degener- 
asset, rursus Odonem, mox eius fratrom 
Robertum  et demdc Robert1 nepotem 
Hugonem  ad  summum  fastlgium 
eveserunt. . . . Et quod  do  lnssimle 
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This  is  an  interesting  expansion  of  the  tradition  of  the 
Roman  Law, that all authority in  Rome was  derived from 
the ~eople,  for Alciatus enlarges this into the general principle, 
that without the consent of  the community there is no legiti- 
mate authority. 
He is  almost  equally  definite  in  his  repudiation  of  the 
conception that the authority which the peoplc had granted 
to the prince was absolutely unlimited.  He refers contemptu- 
ously in one place to the "  hallucinations " of  the theologians 
and the "  adulation " of  the jurists  who maintained that the 
power of  the prince was supreme and free, and that he could 
do whatever he pleased.  This, he says, is certainly not true 
in Italy ;  it is absurd to say that bishops, dukes, or marquises 
have an authority over Italians which  the Emperor himself 
does not possess.l 
In another work  he insists again upon the limited  nature 
of  the authority of  princes.  He has, he says, dealt at some 
length  with  this,  in  order  that  princes,  whether  they  had 
reached the highest rank (he means the Empire) or are kings, 
dukes, or counts, might learn that they had not so great an 
authority as their flatterers tell them ; and also in order that 
the doctrine of  Martin  (i.e.,  that there was nothing that the 
Emperor could not do) should once again be refuted.2 
hlsce  reglbus,  nlmirum  Romano  et 
Franco, dlctum est, idem in infer~oribus 
observatum fulsse, qui histor~cos  legorit, 
deprehendet , ut mer~to  censeam D~vlna 
lcge  eum justum  prlnclpem  03.50, qui 
ex  popul~  consensu  regnet,  quod  et 
Anstot.  tradlt ,  qua  vero  lnvitis 
dominctur, eum tyrannum esse, ot~amsl 
Caesar  slt,  a  Septernvlris  elcctuu,  vel 
quaqua aha  ratlone clvlll ju~e  potentlam 
suam  tueatur.  Unde  cum  magna 
Icgna  non  ex  subditorum  consensu, 
sed  per  v~olent~am  pnmo  constituta 
sunt,  merito  Augustinus  libro  de 
Civltate  Del  1111  magna  latrocln~a 
esse diclt " 
Id ld ,  vol. n  col. 1162, '  Comm  on 
Dlgest,'  L  16, 11  1  "  Hallucinant~bus 
th~olo~ls,  adulantlbus  jur~sconsultis, 
persuadentibusque o~nnla  prmcipl licere, 
summamque et  liberam esse potestatem. 
Quod corte ln Italia verum non est  . . 
ut rid~culum  sit affi~mare  pont~fic~bus, 
duc~bus,  et quo8 Germanlca voce maroh- 
lones  vocant,  absolutam  In  subd~t~s 
potestatem  competere,  quae  nec  ips1 
imp era tor^ in Italos compot~t  " 
Id, 'De  Fo~mula  Romaru  Im- 
per11 ' (ed  Basle 1654) p  43. "  Et  haec 
a nobls d~ffuslus  dlcta sunt, turn ut lnde 
aclmoncrentur  prlncipc5,  sive  ips1  ad 
summum lmperll gradum  pervenellnt, 
blve  ab  tmpcrator~bus, reges,  ducoa, 
com~tes  appellati  slnt .  non  tantum 
1111s In  populos  Ilcere quantum adula 
tores  eorum  aunbus  mellc  dlluto 
vcnorlo  ~nfundunt, tum  cham  ut 
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Alciatus did not, we  think, doubt  that the prince had the 
legislative  power, which  he  had received  from  the people, 
but in one passage he indicates that he was  of  opinion that 
the prince should not make laws without the advice of  the 
"  Periti," the men of  experience.  It appears very possible that 
this is a reminiscence of  the provisions of  '  Code,'i. 14, 8, though 
he is not here commenting on that passage.l  He is also clear 
that the prince  is  bound  by  his contracts, that he has no 
power to revoke or annul them.  We have already observed 
the importance  of  this  conception in  the  Civihans  of  the 
fourteenth and fifteenth  centuries ; indeed, he refers directly 
to some of  them, and he also refers to the important parallel 
principle of  the Feudal Law, that the lord could not deprive 
the vLssal of  his fief  without just cause.2 
He also discusses the question whether the prince can insert, 
in his briefs, clauses which derogate from the law ; he says in 
one place that no one can do this except the prince, and such 
persons as have received  authority from  him.3  That is, he 
would seem to maintain the dispensing power of  the prince.  It 
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus 
allows this only under important reservations.  The prince, 
he  says,  has  power  to remit  all  punishments  for  offences 
againit himself, but he cannot deal in this way wth "  our " 
rights anymore than the peopledid who gave him this authority; 
fitebatur,  n~hil  non  Imperatori  con 
cedentls, sententlam confutaretur " 
For  the  story  about  Martln,  cf 
Sav~gny,  '  Gesch~chte  des  Rdm~schen 
Rechts,' vol. iv. p.  180. 
1  Id ,  Opera, vol  111  col  26, '  Comm. 
on Cod ,'I ,  2, 6  "  Rat~onab~lls  Cons~ln. 
Non enlm debent  prlnclpes ex se ~psls, 
legcs  promulgare,  sed  adh~blto  peri- 
torum cons~ho  " 
2  Id ad  ,  vol  IV ,  col  816, '  Tractatus 
de  Praesumpt~onlbus,' '  Regula  Tert~a 
Praescr~pt~onum  '  '' Et probatur  1sta 
oplnlo,  quae  v~detur  commumor . .  . 
ubl  non  presumltur  causa  In  prlnclpe 
volente  resclndere  proprlum  con- 
trartum  Imo istud non  potcbt etlam 
da  plemtudlne  potestat~s, secundum 
Paulus  de  Castro  in  L.  D~gna  Vox 
C  De  Legbus  (Cod.  1.  xlv  4 ) 
Et  Baldus ln Cap  I  Ad haec de pace 
jur  firm.  Et  Lud.  Rom  . . . 
Querltur  pnmo, dlcens, quod prlncers 
non  potest revocare contracturn  a  se 
factum  . . Item eat In feudo " 
8  Id ~d ,  vol  1  col  1108, '  Comm  on 
DI~  ,' xxx  I  55 . "  Adnotavlt In prlmls 
Doct  non  posse  testatorem  adversus 
leges qulcquam Inducere  Et ~deo  nea 
lpsum, nec  quemquam  almm, except0 
prlncipe,  posse  clausula  derogatorla 
legum  ut~. Prlnc~p~bus  quldem  ~d 
permlttltur,  qu~  log~bus  solutl  aunt , 
ah~s  vero  mlmme,  nlsl  quatonu.;  ex 
pnnc~p~s~ndulgentlahocconsegualltul  " 
there is, therefore, in '  jure nostro '  no mention of  '' plenitude 
potestatis,"  or  of  "non  obstante " clauses.  Much  less  can 
marquises, dukes, or counts take away another man's rights.1 
,%lciatus  seems  clearly  to  interpret  the  doct~ine  that  the 
prince is "  legibus solutus 77 as meaning little more than that 
he  can  remit  penalties  that  he  has  himself  imposed,  and 
not as meaning that he can suspend ally law at his pleasure. 
The  conception  of  political  authority  which  we  find  in 
Alciatus is obviously very important, even il it stood alone, 
but its importance is greatly increased when we bring it into 
comparison with  that of  some other  important Civilians  of 
the sixteenth century. 
Row far it may be thought that some of  the conceptions of 
other  ~mportant  French  Civilians  of  the  sixteenth  century 
are  due  to  the influence  of  Alciatus,  and  his  teaching  at 
Bourges, we  cannot positively say, but it is certainly remark- 
able that several of  them set out conceptions which are more 
nearly akin to his than to those of  the Italian Civilians of  the 
fifteenth century with which we have dealt in the second part 
of  this volume. 
Brangois Connon, who died in 1551, is said to have studied 
law  at Bourges under  Alc~atus,~  and his  Commentaries on 
the Roman Law contain  some  very important observations 
on the nature of  law and its relation to the king.  The primitive 
world, he  says in  one place, was  ruled  by  kings who  were 
chosen for their capacity and virtue, and they ruled without 
any fixed system of  law.  When, however, they began to abuse 
their power, and men  saw how dangerous it was to entrust 
the wellbeing of  all to the goodwlll of  one, they elther thrust 
Id  ~d ,  vol  111  col.  113, '  Comm. 
on Cod ,' 11 ,  2, 2  "  Duh~um  tamen non 
est, qulnsupreml pnnclpes, SI volunt, has 
poenas,  l~bera,  quam  s~b~  vend~cant, 
potestate remlttere posslunt  De jure 
autem nostro non  possunt,  cum enlm 
omne ]us et lmper~um  ex translat~ono 
popul~  habeant,  non  al~ter  eo  dcbent 
ut~,  quam  ~ps~  qu~  tranrtulerunt 
Uterentur  qua propter In lure nostro. 
nullus  eat  ment~o  plen~tudln~s  potes- 
tat~s,  ~tcm  clausulae  non  obstanto, 
&c ,  ut Baldus alt  Sed qultl In Mer 
ch~ombus,  Ducibus,  Comlt~busque  ab 
h~s  constltut~  1  Et  multo mlnus posse, 
dlcendum ost, nec in e]us dlgn~tatls  con. 
cesa~one  id actum v~der~  potest, ut ]us 
alter~us  auferant " 
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out the kings and made laws, or rotained thc kings and im- 
posed upon them the restraints of  law.]  He goes on to cite 
a  judgment  which  he  attributes to Aristotle,  that to  obey 
the Law is to obey God and  the Law, while to obey a man 
is  to  obey  a  wild  beast,  for  the greed  and  anger  which 
turns  the  magistrate  from  virtue  is  like  that  of  a  wild 
beast. 
These are general conceptions, and when  he turns to the 
actual  conditions  of  his  time,  his  statements  are  different 
but  significant.  In discussing  the  source  of  Law  he  first 
mentions with approval the saying of  Demosthenes that law 
is  the agreement of  the whole  "  Civitas " and  the  similar 
doctrine of  Papinian  (' Digest,'  i. 3, I),  but he  admits  that 
in France it is the authority of  the king which binds men by 
laws.  Even  here,  however,  Connon  maintains  that it was 
from the consent of  the peoplc that this authority was drawn, 
and  thus no  law  is  made-without  the will  of  the  people, 
either  by  their  own  decree,  or  by  that  of  the  person  to 
whom  they have given authority to make it.3 
1 F.  Connanus,  'kbri  Commen- 
tarlorum  Juns Civllls,' vol. i. Bk  i. 7 
(p.  25) :  "Hoc  est  quod  dlc~tur, 
prlscls 1111s seculls omnla fulsse guber- 
nata  manu  regla.  . . . Erat  enlm 
repbus sola  naturae  ratlo  et jurls  et 
inlur~ae regula  . . . Itaque  non 
qulllbet  creabatur rex, sed inter ~psos 
esset ad res gerendas maxlme idoneus, 
qu~  virtute,  consilio,  prudentla,  ac 
anlmi magnltudine  et robore  maxlme 
pmestaret.  . . . Qul  non  amore  aut 
od~o, non  cup~ditate  aut  ~racund~a 
duceretur ad ~ndlcandun~,  sed quod ]us, 
quod  equltas  et  verltas  postularel , 
~d ommbus  In  rebus  constltucret,  ~d 
sequeretur et tueretur. 
Postquam vero coeplssent 11, qu~bus 
ad  hunc  modum  fuerat  data  rerum 
omnium potestas, contra rationls prae- 
sumpt~onem,  multa  pro anlml lihldlne 
fncere, et perlculosum vldoretur, umus 
arbltrio  fortunas  et  vltam  omnium 
comm~ttl  ,  quldam,  electls  regibus, 
leges  posuerunt,  aln,  retcntls  reglbus, 
tamqnam  frenos  legum  ~mecerunt,  ut 
eos  nlmle  potcntia  feroclentes durltia 
3ur1s cohiberent." 
2 Id.  id.  ~d , "  Bene  Arlstoteles : 
Qui  legem  praeesse  vult,  is  vldetur 
Deum  et leges  Imperare:  qul  autem 
vult  hominem,  adlunglt  et  beluam: 
nam  belue  s~mllls  est  cup~ditas  et 
iracundia,  quae  maglstratus  st opti- 
mum quemque a vlrtute detorquent." 
8  Id. id ,  I.  8 (p. 28).  "  Quod vero 
lex  dlcitur  esse  conventurn  quoddam 
totius  clv~tat~s,  bone  a  Demosthene 
dlcltur  quod  Athenienslbus  lex  nulla 
nlsl  de  ipsorum  consensu  lrnponl 
potuent.  Bene  et  Papmnlanus,  '  lox 
est  commune  proceptum  . . . com- 
mums  relpubhcao  sponslo '  (Dlg  I 
3,  1 )  Nam et Romanis legls sclscendl 
potestas fumt  penes populum 
Nos  qui  reg~bus paremus,  non 
commums sponslo, sed priuclpls auth- 
ontas  allmgat  leglbus  nls~  jam  turn 
ab  IN~IO regn~  const~tutl,  consensus 
etlam oa do re noster putatur accesslsse, 
Connon  is,  however,  clear  that the legislative  authority 
of the prince (at  least, of the Eoman Emperor) was unfettered 
by the necessity of  taking counsel ; he  cites the  opinion of 
Papinian that the Law is "  consultum virorum prudentum," 
but adds that this does not imply that the prince must consult 
tho  jurists ; it is customary to  do  so,  and it is right  and 
honourable, as the Code says "  Humanum est,"  &c. (' Code,' i. 
14, 8), but as Bartolus says, this is a counsel of  "  Humanitas," 
not a legal necessity.  Connon holds clearly and emphatically 
that the legislative power  of  the prince was  as complete as 
that of  the whole Roman peop1e.l 
On the other hand, he contemptuously repudiates the notion 
that law is superior to custom ; their authority is equal, and 
the later prevails over the earlier  ;  and he is equally dogmatic 
in repudiating the doctrine that the prince is "  legibus solutus." 
The  prince  is, indeed,  over  the people, but  he  is  still  one 
of  the  people,  and  he  wishes  that  all  princes  should  re- 
member the "  DignaVox "  (' Code,' i. 121, 4),  and should suffer 
their authority to be controlled by the law and  by equity.3 
A little later he lays down dogmatically the principle that an 
unjust  law is not  a  law  at all, and should be  corrected  or 
annulled ; and that, if  a king by hereditary right becomes a 
tyrant and violates  the divine  and human  laws, he  should 
be deposed.  The law and the king are sacred, and not to be 
violated, but evil law is to be abrogated and the tyrant to be 
expelled.  Until this has  been  done, they  must  be  obeyed; 
cum et 1111  regnand1 potestas data est, 
et nobls lmposlta necess~tas  perendi 
Sic  fit  ut  nulla  lex  non  de  popull 
voluntate constituatur, et sit tanquam 
pactum  quoddam consentlentium inter 
so  clvium,  ut  dlcebat  Lycophron 
sophlstes , quod eam aut srlscunt IPS], 
sut is cui elus sclscendae ferendaeque 
dederunt potestatem.  Ergo vel utllitas 
lpsa  lust1  prope  mater  st equl,  ut 
'.cr~b~t  Horatlus,  vel  conventlo  lpsa 
nostra,  nos  obl~gat leglbus,  ns  ut 
omnes parere debeamus." 
'  Id ld ,  8 (p 29). 
'  Id  ~d ,  10 (p 42). 
Id. ld , 8  (p  28) : "  Quod  si  lta 
e~t,  ne  prlnceps  quldem  ipse  legibus 
solutus  est,  quonlam  ~ta  praeest 
populo, ut unus tamen sit de populo, 
'  Dlgna  vox  est  majestate  Regnantis 
. . . et  re  Vera  ma]us  imperil  est 
submlttere  leglbus  prmclpatum.  Et 
oraculo  praesentls  edict1 quod  nobls 
llcere  non  patimur,  alns  ind~camus.' 
Quod  utlnam  sib1  edltum  puterlnt 
omnes  princlpes  omnlum  qul  unlus 
lmper~o  subsunt populorum . et poten- 
tlam  suam  lure,  lege,  equ~tate  prae- 
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but when it is done, men  are free from them.l  We  cannot 
say that these conceptions of  Connon are derived from those 
of  Alciatus,  but  there  are  obviously  important  parallels 
between them. 
Fran~ois  Duaren  was  also a  pupil  of  Alciatus and  a  con- 
temporary of  Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries 
on  the ( Digest ' we find some important observations on the 
sources of  law and the authority of  the prince. 
There is no  doubt, he  says in  one place, that the prince 
can make law, but he raises the question how far the people 
also  have the right to  do  this,  and he contends  that they 
clearly possessed this right in the time of  Julianus, that is, in 
the second century; he also cites Dion and Suetonius as showing 
that Augustus and Caligula were in the habit of  submitting 
legislative proposals to the people, and in a later passage he 
suggests that it  is  at least  possible  that the people shared 
their  power  of  legislation with  the prince, and  did  not  re- 
nounce  it entirely,  and  he  cites  the words  of  Julianus  as 
illustrating thh2 
1 Id. id.,  8 (p.  30) : "  Haec  igitur 
disputationis  nostrae  summa  sit,  in- 
justam  legem,  legem  non  esse, et vel 
tollendam  esse,  errore  cognito,  vel 
certe  corrigendam ;  dum  id  fiat 
parendum  ei  esse. 
Ut si  qui  justa  hereditate  rex est, 
tyranuicos mores induat, divina atque 
humana  jura  pervertat,  suorum  non 
salutem petat, sed sanguinem, eiicien- 
dus regno est:  dum id  fiat, rex est: 
nec  attentandus  a  quoquam  est,  nisi 
communi suorum decreto  deliberatum 
sit  et  constitutum.  Sanctum  est, 
enim  nomen  legis,  sanctum  ot  regis : 
neutrum quod fieri potest violandum : 
sed illa  abroganda,  si mala  est ; hic, 
si  tyrannus,  expellendus  est,.  Tum 
utrique  impune  non  pareas,  utroque 
solutus.  Ante  vero  si  obedientiam 
abjeceris, manus quodammodo  videris 
afferre patriae." 
Cf.  '  Sachsenspiegel.'  iii.,  64,  4 
(cf. vol.  iii.  p.  61,  note 2).  Vacarius, 
cf. illis volurfie, p. 23, note 4. 
1 F.  Duarenus,  '  Comment,  in 
Digest.'  i.  3,  cap.  3 :  "  Principem 
nulla dubitatio est legem condere posse, 
cum potestas  populi in eum translata 
sit. . . . Sed de  populo  quaeri  potest 
an  legis  constituendae  potestatem 
habeat.  Et  Julianus  satis  aperte 
ostendit  in  1.  Do  quibus,  hic  (Dig. 
i.  3,  32) tempore suo populum legcm 
condere  potuisse.  Ac  scribit  Dion, 
Augustum  leges  ad  populum  ferre 
solitum,  postquam  urbis  imperium  ei 
delatum  est.  Sed  et  Suetonius,  de 
Caligula loquens : '  tentavit, inquit, et 
comitiorum  more  revocato,  suffragia 
populo reddere.' " 
Id.  id.,  i.  4,  cap.  i.:  "Nam  jus 
quod  princeps  constituit,  vim  legis 
habet,  etsi  non  intervenerit  populi 
consensus, sed sola principis voluntas. 
. . . Quamvis  autem  juris  consti- 
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His  treatment  of  custom  seems  to  us  to  be  related. 
He first asks  whether  custom  can  override  the  law  when 
made by the prince, for "the event  shows that the law did 
not correspond with the customs of  the people "  ; and he cites 
as  from  Gratian  the  words  of  St Augustine  that laws  are 
confirmed when  they  are approved  by  the custom  of  those 
who  are  concerned.  He  also  repudiates  the interpretation 
of  the famous rescript of  Constantine as meaning that custom 
could not override law ; Constantine only meant that custom 
had in itself no greater authority than law.1 
Duaren  accepts  the principle that  the prince  is "  legibus 
solutus,"  though he adds that he does voluntarily  submit to 
the law, and he  cites "  Digna  Vox " (' Code,' i. xiv. 4), but 
he  very  emphatically  contradicts  the  conception  that  the 
rescripts  of  the prince are to be always obeyed.  They have 
no  authority  against  the law  or  the  public  interest,  they 
cannot  deprive a man  of  his legal rights, they ca~ot  annul 
a judicial  decision  (" res  judicrtta ")  when  there is no  legal 
right  of  appeaL2 
tuendi potestas fuerit principi concessa 
a populo : tamen  credibile est  pop11- 
lum eam potestatem magis cum prin- 
cipe  quodammodo  communicassc, 
quam  a se omnino abdicassc, quod et 
Julianus  oatendit,  paulo  ante  dis- 
putans  de  consuetudine.  D.  I.  Do 
quibus, supra prox. Tit. (Dig. i. 3, 32)." 
Id. id.,  i.  3,  cap.  12, 4 : "  Post- 
quam vero desiit populus leges condere, 
qusritur,  an possit  consuetudo  jus  a 
principe  constitutum  tollere.  Et 
existimo,  si  princeps  ab  initio  non 
cocgorit inobedientes ad parendum legi, 
sed  dissimulaverit  longo  tempore, 
adeo ut consuetudo inoloverit pa~datim 
legi  contraria,  ea  consuetudine  legem 
abrogari.  Eventus  enim  docet  eam 
legsm  moribus  populi non  convenien- 
tern,  atque ideo  contemnendam  esse. 
Can.  erit  autem  4  Dist.  (Gratian 
Decret.  D.  4).  Inde  illud  Augustini 
celebraturn est, '  leges  firmantur, cum 
moribus utentiumapprobantur. . . .' 
VOL.  VI. 
Vorum  obiicitur  nobis  rescriptum 
Constantini  1.  2.  Quae  sit  longn 
consuetudo  (Cod. viii.  52, 2). . . . Ex 
quo consequi videtur legem consuetu- 
dine abrogari non posse. 
Sed  alius  mihi  videtur  eorum 
verborum sensus quam vulgo crcdatur. 
Non  enim  his  verbis  significat  Con- 
stantinus,  si  consuetudo  legi  omnino 
contraria  sit,  non  posse  legem  ea 
abrogari,  sed  consuetudinem  majoris 
nuctoritatis  non  esse  quam  legem, 
imitatur  enim  legem,  et  vim  legis 
habet." 
Vd. id.,  i.  3,  cap.  6 :  "  Excipitur 
Princeps, qui  legibus  solutus  est lege, 
et  senatus  consultis. . . . Sed  is  so 
sponte  sua  legibus  se  subiicit,  et 
secundum  leges  profitetur  se  vello 
vivere 1.  Digna Vox  (C. i.  14, 4)." 
Id.  id.,  i.  4,  cap.  4: "  Rescriptum 
parendum  esse  sine  recusatione. . . . 
Quao  res  multas  cautiones  habet, 
ut saepe accidit ut rescripto parendum This  means,  as  we  understand  it, that  while  the  prince 
stands personally in some way outside of  the law, he cannot 
interfere with the due process of  law, or, by his brief, deprive 
a  man  of  his  legal  rights.  We  are  again  reminded  of 
Alciatus, 
We turn to another French Civilian  of  a little later date, 
Nicolas Vigelius, whose work on the  Digest '  was fist  published 
in 1568. 
His  discussion  of  the sources  of  law does not seem to us 
to be much  more than a  collection of  some of  the passages 
in the  Digest ' and '  Code'  which refer  to it,l except when 
he deals with the relation of  custom to law.  This he discusses 
in some detail, and he states his own conclusions dogmatically. 
He first  refers  to it in  dealing  with  what  he terms "  Ex- 
ceptiones  adversus  leges."  The seventeenth "  exceptio " is 
"  nisi lox alia lege vel consuetudine sit mutata,"  and he cites 
some words  of  that passage  of  Julianus, to which  we  have 
so  often referred, in which  he says that laws are abrogated 
not only by the will  of  the legislator, but also by the tacit 
conscnt of all, " per desuetudinem." 
Vigelius returns to the subject a  little later, and at some 
length.  Custom, he says, has the force of  law, and he confirms 
this by citing various passages from the '  Digest '  and  the  Code.' 
He cites as an a exceptio  that important rescript  of  Con- 
stantine  which  seems  to imply  that  custom  had  no  force 
against  law  (' Code,'  viii.  52, 2) and some words  of  Ulpian 
(Digest, i. 32, 3) ; but he concludes dogmatically that if  the 
non sit, ldque varns ex causis, propter  Quaerltur  do eo,  qu~  adversus senten 
quas  hodie  In  judlclis  rescrlpta  Im-  tlam  rescrlptum  impetravit.  Et cer- 
pugnarl  solent.  Prlmnm,  quod  re-  tum cst, 81  res ludlcata slt, ut nullus 
scrlptum  JU~I contrarium  slt,  aut  superslt locum appellation1  aut suppllca- 
contra  utllltatem  pubhcam,  1.  nee  tloni, rescr~pta  ejus retractandac causa 
damnosa  1.  rescrlpta  C.  De  Precibus  ~mpetrata,  nulllus esse momcntl.  . . . 
lmper  offer  1  ult (Cod  I.  19, 3, and 7)  Praetereaadversumrescr~ptum  obllc~tur 
C  si  contra  ]us  vel  utll~tatem  pub11  quod  per  mendacmm  et obreptloncm 
cam  (Cod  1  22,  6)  Quo  In  genere  ~mpetratum  s~t  " 
poni debet rescripturn, quo ]us allenum  1 Vlgollus, ' Dlgestorum JU~IS  Clvllfe 
tolhtur .  . unde intcll~g~tur  rescrlpta  Llbrl  Qulnquaglnta,'  I.,  1.  4,  1.  3,  1 : 
lmpetrari ~olum  posse a principe de 11s  1.  4, 1 , I  4,  3 
quae  neminl  damnum  inferunt. . .  .  a  Id id., I.  7,  17. 
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custom were subsequent to the written law, it prevails against 
it.  (We cite the last words of  the passage.) 
When he turns to the relations  of  the  prince to the Iaw, 
while  he cannot  directly  repudiate  the  doctrine "  Princeps 
legibus solutus,"  he argues that to act upon  this is contrary 
to the  LL Digna Vox,"  and that in several cases the Emperor 
had said they would not act upon it, but that while they were 
'L legibus soluti " they lived according to the laws ; and he 
quotes  some  lines  of  Cla~dian.~  TTigelius dearly  does  not 
like the principle that the prince is "  legibus solutus."  When 
we  come  to the authority of  the prince's  briefs,  he  states 
dogmatically  the limits  which  are set upon it  by  the law. 
In  spite of the reverence which is due to  the briefs of  the prince, 
no such brief  is to be accepted in  a  Court of  Law which  is 
contrary to the general law or the public service, unless it is 
such that it  inflicts no Injury upon any~ne.~ 
l  Id  ld , t  8  (pol  28).  "  Ergo  si 
scnpta lex extet contra consuetu&nem, 
consuetudo leg1 scriptae cedlt.  Hujus 
except~onls  rcplicatlo  haec  est .  nlsl 
lex scilpta consuetudmem praecessent, 
tune  enlm  consuetudo  postoa  In- 
secuta  praocedentcm  legem  tolht, 
eaque potlor habetur." 
Id.  ~d , I.  7,  18. "  Exceptio, 
n~sl  lmperator  vel  Augusta  leges  non 
observaverlt  Haec  exceptio  ep- 
probatur  1.  Pnnceps,  31  ff.  De 
Leglbus  (Dlg  1  3,  31)  , h~s  verbis 
prlnceps lcglbus solutus est  . . . 
Plane  non  omne  quod  llcet  hones- 
turn  est.  Itaque  quamvls  prlnclpi 
llcaat  praeter  leges  vlvere,  decet 
tarnen  eum  vlvore  secundum  leges. 
Quod  approbatur  1  Dlgna Vox  (Cod. 
I.  ulv  4)  . . . Concordat  1.  ex 
lmperfecto  23  ff.  De  Lcg~bus  . . 
'  Ex impe~fecto  testamento  legata  vel 
firlc~comnissa lmperatorom  vlndlcare 
lnverecundum est '  Decet enlm tantae 
majestatls, en9 servare leges, qulbus lpue 
solutus esse videtur  Concordat Item l 
ex ~mperfecto  3  C  do testamontis,  h~s 
verlols (Cod. VI. 23, 3).  Ex testamento 
nec imperatorem hereditatem vindicare, 
saepe  constltutum  est.  Llcet  enlm 
lex impern solemnltatlbus ]uns Impera- 
torem  solverit,  nlhll  tam  proprlum 
Impern  est,  quam  leglbus  vivere. 
Concordat denlque Instlt, qulbus mod~s 
testaments  lnfir  fin.  ubi  ,  Impp. 
Severus et Antoninus  (Inst. I  xvn  8). 
'  Llcet (~nquiunt)  leglbus soluti simus, 
attamen leglbus  vlvlmus,'  Huc  pert]. 
net  versus  apud  Claudlanum poetam 
'  In commune lubes si  quld, censesve 
tenendum,  Prlmus  Iussa  sub1  tunc 
observatlor aequi, Fit populus, nee ferre 
vetat,  rum  viderlt  ~psum,  Anctorem 
parere s~bl." 
Id  id ,  I.  10 (col. 35) : "  I'rlmo  : 
Rescr~ptum  prlncipls  regular~ter ut~le 
est,  et  servandum. . . . Concordat  1. 
sacrllegli  IX.  Cod.  De  Dlversls  re. 
~cr~pt~s,  his  verb18  (Cod  1  XYIII.  5). 
'Sacr~legn lnstar  est,  super  qnlbus 
cunque admlnistratlonibus vel dlgnlta- 
tlbus promulgand~s  obvlsre  benefirl~s  ' 
. . . Hujus  regulae exceptloncs sequun 
tur . .  (col.  401,  x11  except10  NISI 
rescrlptum contra ]us sit, vel utllltateni 
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A little later still, we  come to another important  French 
Oivilian who lectured at  Bourges from 1551  to 1572, H. Doneau, 
whose  work,  Commentariorum  de  Jure  Civili,'  was  first 
published in 1589-90.' 
Doneau is, in the first place, clear that law is established 
by the Roman people, for the prince only holds the legislative 
power because the people have conferred it upon him, and it 
is immaterial whether the people makes laws itself, or whether 
it does this by those to whom it gives the power to do so.2 
In another place Doneau seems to speak as though the con- 
sent of  the citizens were still required to make law, and he 
cites the important passages which  speak of  the L'  communis 
resipublicae sponslo " as a necessary element  in legislation ; 
this is the more significant as he adds that the obligation of 
law is greater when it represents a man's  own consent, than 
when it is imposed  upon  him  by  the will and authority  of 
another. 
1.  ult  C  Si  contra  jus,  et his  verbis 
(Cod.  I  xx11  b),  Olnnes  cujusque 
majorls  vel  minoris  administrationis 
nostrae  unlversae  relpublicae  ~ud~ces 
monemus, ut nullum rescnptum, nullam 
pragmaticam  sanct~onem,  nullam  sac- 
ram adnotationem, quae genera11 lurl 
vel  utilitatl  publicae  adversa  esse 
videatur,  in  dlsoeptationem  cujus- 
libet  litlgii  patiantur  proferri  sod 
generales  sacras constitutiones,  mod~s 
omn~bus  non dubltant observandas .  . ' 
Concordat 1  nec 3 C. De prec~bus  Imp. 
offerendis h~sce  verbis  '  Neo damnosa 
fisco,  nec  jurl  contraria  postular~ 
oportet ' (Cod  I  x~x.  3).  Propos~tae 
exception~s  replieatlo haoc est  '  Nisi 
rescriptum  contra  jus  neminl  obsit, 
et  prosit  potenti ' :  quae  repheatlo 
rcpprobatur  1  Rescr~pta, 7  C  Do 
I'recibus  Imp  off  h1s  verbls  (Cod  I 
xix  7)  '  Rescnpta contra ]us elicita 
ab  ommbus  judicibus  praeciplmus 
refutarr  msl  forte  aliquld  est  quod 
non laedat alium et pros~t  petenti,  vel 
crimen suppl~cantibus  indulgeat.' " 
1 We  wlLh  to  oxpress  our  great 
obligations to the excellent work of  M. 
Eysell, '  Donesu, sn T. ie et ses ouv~ages,' 
both for hls detailed study of  Doneau 
and  for  his  valuable  account  of  the 
other  Clvil~ans  w~tli  whom  wo  have 
been Jcalmg 
2  H  Doneau, ' Opera Omma,' vol  I , 
ed  Rom  1828,  I  8,  6  'Common 
tanorurn de Jure Civil1 '  "  Lex totlus 
popul~ Roman1  constltutio  est  . . . 
Pones  hunc  summa jurls  const~tuendl 
potestas  fuit  Nam,  ne  plinceps 
qu~dcm,  postea  hac  potestate  prae- 
d~tus  esset,  msi  populus  potestatcm 
suam in illum contulisset  . .  I  8, 14 
Jam ante dixi,  nihll  interesse,  utrum 
qlns quid constltuat, aut decernat ipse, 
an vero ii, qulbus ipse constituendi aut 
decernendi potestatem dedit " 
a  Id  id  id ,  i  16, 6  "  Accedit  ad 
haeo consensus clvium in jura  et loges, 
ex  quo  lex,  '  Commun~s re~pubhcee 
sponuio,' dlcitur in 1 1 ,  1 11  Dig  Do 
legibus  (Dig  1  3  1,  2)  Sponslo 
communls, quia in eam se omnes cives 
obl~gant  communi  consensu  tamquam 
sponsione  . . . und~  earn  scrvare 
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1t  seems reasonable  to relate this to Doneau's  treatment 
of  custom in relation to law.  He interprets the rescrlpt of 
Constantine (' Cod.,' viii. 52, 2) as referring not to a particular 
custom,  but to custom in general,  that is, as meaning that 
custom, as such, is not superior to law as such ; and that if 
a particular  custom and a particular law are in conflict, the 
later in time is superi0r.l 
When  Doneau  turns to the relation  of  the prince  to the 
existing law, he asserts dogmatically that all men are under 
the law, even the prince.  It is true that the prince is "  legibus 
et solemnitatibus juris solutus " by the "  Lex Regia ,' of  the 
Roman people,  but  he  is bound  "  communi principum  lege 
et sue," for the prince wills to Live according to the law.2 
He returns to the question in his Commentary on the '  Code,' 
and contemptuously  brushes  aside  the contention  of  those 
who favoured the prince, that it was derogatory to his dignity 
that he should not be able to do whatever he pleased, and he 
points  out that the Empire rests upon  good laws, which are 
established  not only by the words of  the prlnce but by his 
debent tanto diligentius  quanto major 
est  obhgatio  ea,  quam  sib1  quisque 
sponsione  sue  imposmt,  quam  quae 
aliena voluntate et imperio injicitur " 
Id  id  id, 1  10,  6  "In  his 
enim  verbis,  '  Consuetudo  non  vincit 
rationem  aut  legem,'  neque  'con 
suetudinis '  verbo  nomlnatur  species 
aliqua  consuetudinis,  ut apparet,  sed 
genus  ipsum  consuetudin~s  . . 
Itaque  totum  hoc  edictum  est  de 
consuetudine  et lege  in  suo  genere, 
non  in  specie  hujus,  aut  ill~us  vel 
consuetud~nis  vei legls  . . . Caeterum, 
31  species  Inter  se  conferantur, con 
suetudlnes  seu  legcs  abrogantes,  et 
leges  abrogatae,  negaro  non  potest, 
quln  lex  abrogans  vincet  priorem 
quae abrogatur " 
Id  id, i  17,  1 . "  Sed  an  omnes 
luri parere debent Y  Omnes,  quando 
qu~dem  commune precepturn est, quod 
omnibus  porntur. . .  Etiamne  prin- 
LepY  7  Et tenentur  etlam  pnnclpos 
legibus.  Dlcitur  quidem  princeps 
solutus legibus, 1 pnnceps d  cle leg~bus 
(Dig  1  3,  31) quia legibus  et solemn1 
tatlbus  JUrlS  solutus  est  a  populo 
Romano  lege  regia,  quae  de  elus 
lmper~o  lata est  (Dig I  4, 1 , Cod  vi. 
23,  3 )  At  tenetur leg~bus  commun~ 
princlpum lege  et sua, declaiant enim 
hl  se velle  legibus  vivere,  statuentes, 
n1h11 magis  conveniro  llnpeiio 1  3  C. 
De Testarncnto  ult  (Cod  vi  23,  3). 
Inst  quibus modis test  infirm  (Instit. 
ii  17, 8)  Extatque  hujus  sententme 
ronfirmatio cum ~usigui  commendat~ono 
conjuncta In  1  digna,  C  Do  Leg~bus 
'  D~gna  Vox '  (Cod  1  14,  4)  . . 
Quod sl  qu~dqu~d  prlncipi  placult  lex 
est (Dig  1  4,  l), etmm haec vo1unta.s 
lex  er~t Et quonlam prlncipes  In  se 
hoc  volunt.  etiam ips1 In  sese  erunt 
lex " 
Id , Opera,  vol  IX.,  '  Comm  on 
Code,'  vi  23,  3  (col  16).  ' Secl  pro 
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The general principle that the prince is under the law is so 
firmly asserted by Doneau, that it is not surprising that he 
should lay it  down  dogmatically that Imperial  Rescripts in 
particular  cases,  which  are  contrary  to law  and the public 
interest, are to be ignored by the judges.  He admits, indeed, 
that if  they do not injure  others, and in  some other cases, 
they may be received, but with these exceptions they are to 
be treated as null and void ; it is significant, he adds, that 
oven  if  they  contain  a "  non  obstante " clause, they  have 
no f0rce.l 
It would seem clear, as we  said before, that, whether  we 
attribute this to the influence of  Alciatus or not, these import- 
ant Civilians of  the sixteenth century represent very different 
conceptions from those of  most Italian Civilians of  the Mteenth 
century. 
We  can  now  turn  to Cujas, the greatest  French  Civilian 
of  the sixteenth century ; it is true that his work belongs to 
tum  esse  legibus  . . . Respondent 
bonl  prlnclpes,  hoc  jus  slbl  placere, 
ne  quld  ex  xmperfecto  tebtamento 
capiant,  non  quod  pro  sua  potestate 
Lapere  non  poss~nt,  sl  ea  utl volmt, 
sod  qula  solutl  leglbus,  n~h~lomlnus 
leebus  vlvere  volunt,  et  submlttere 
legibus  prmclpatum  (Inst. 11.  17,  8, 
Cod.  VI  23,  3). 
Dixerlt  allqu~i, quod  de  assenta- 
torlbus  pr~nolpurn mmis  quam  saepe 
aud~re  solet,  prlnclpem  facere  mfra 
digmtatem  et  magistratus  Imperlum, 
sl non fac~at  quae llbet, cum hoc elus 
lmperlo  tnbutum  sit,  ut  sit  solutus 
leglbus  caeterorum.  Hlc  egreglo  re- 
hponderunt  bonl  pnnclpes,  quod  In 
hoc  rescrlpto  leglmus,  tantum  abesse 
ut, dum prmclpes se subjlclunt leg~bus, 
ahqu~d  ~mminuant  de  majestate  im- 
pen1 et sue, ut nlhll s~t  tam proprlum 
~mpern  quam leg~bus  v~vere Et  recte, 
nam  proprlum  lmporlt  est  rempubll- 
cam  et  lmperium  ornare  morlbus, 
bonorum  morum  pars  magna  est 
obtempcrare  boms  legibus  Proprium 
lmpern eat, eas res constltuere maxlme, 
qulbus lmperlum conslstlt . stat autem 
omne  lmper~um bonls  leglbus,  hae 
stabllluntur  a prlnclpe, non  verb18 et 
ejus lussu, sed maxlme exemplo." 
1 Id ,  Opera, vol  I  '  Comm  De lure 
Civ111,' 1,  9,  12 . "  SI concessum quld 81t 
contra  ]us  vel  ut~lltatem publlcam. 
Quod totum genus dlstr~cte  vetatur les 
cr~pt~sajudlc~busadmltt~."  (Herefersto 
Code I  19,3,7. and Code I. 22,B )  Such 
Rescripts  may, however, be  admltted 
~f  they do  not lnjure a thlrd party, or 
~f  they  merely  remit  a  pumshment, 
and  In  some  other  cases  when  they 
merely prov~de  for some delay.  "  Quod 
sl n1h11  horum ent  non  dubltab~mus, 
quln  rescriptum  contra  jus  lmpetra- 
tum  non  debeat  a  judlclbus  admltt~. 
Quld  tamen,  81  prlnceps  nominat~m 
rtddlderlt in rescnpto,  velle  se  scrvarl 
quod  rescnblt,  non  obstante  lege 
contrana,  et  eam  legem  nomlnat~m 
appellet ?  Ne  SIC  qwdem  rescrlptum 
admlttendum." 
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the  later  years  of  the  century, but it appears  to ua  that 
it  is  closely  related  in  character  to that  of  the  Civilians 
with  whom  we  have  been  dealing.  Cujas'  observations  on 
politics  are scattered over  his various legal works, but when 
theg are put together they seem to represent something like 
a  &sternatic  theory  of  the  nature  of  the  State  and  its 
authorities. 
In commenting on  the famous passage of  Gaius, "  omnes 
populi " ('Digest,' i, 1,  9),  he sets out a far-reaching and signifi- 
cant judgment on the relation of  the organised State to human 
life.  There  may  be,  he  seems to mean,  men  who  are  not 
ruled  by laws  and  customs,  but these  do  not  constitute  a 
"  Populus,"  for where there is no law there is no "  Populus," 
and therefore  no  Commonwealth ; and he cites Aristotle  as 
saying that where  there is Law,  there is a  Commonwealth. 
So far his words are reminiscent of  Cicero as well as of  Aristotle, 
and, indeed, they are also closely parallel to Bracton, and they 
represent  the  same  profound  and  penetrating  judgment, 
that  without  rational  order  the  life  of  the  community  is 
impossib1e.l  Cujas does not, however, merely say that there 
can be no  Commonwealth without  Laws,  but he  also  holds 
emphatically that while there may be races of  men who live, 
like the beasts, without them, yet there is in all men  a right 
Reason which makes them capable, like us,  of  the greatest 
things ; for this Reason can be brought out like fire from ashes 
or from flint ; and, though they may be "wild  and outlaws," 
they  are  not, like  the beasts,  incapable  of  being  ruled  by 
custom and law.  The natural Reason, which is the Law of 
Nature, may be asleep  or  buried  in  them, but the light of 
Reason may be easily stirred up.a 
Cf  vol. i. p  4 and vol  UI. p.  67 f. 
Cujas,  '  Opera  Omnla,'  vol.  11. 
'  Comm  on  Dlgest,'  ad.  L.  lx  (z.e , 
DI~  I  1.  9) (col. 136) : "  Alt autem . 
' Omnes populi qul leebus et moribus 
reguntur '  Ergo quldem sunt qul nec 
leglbus nec mor~bus  reguntur et quldarn 
Bunt non popull  Nam ubl lex non est, 
Nam  Respubllce  est  re8  populi.  Et 
reote  Arlst.  4  Pol~tlc '  ubi  lox  est ' 
~nqu~t,  '  lbl  est  Respubl~ca  '  Et ubl 
Reepubllca,  ib~  leges  vel  mores,  qu~ 
sunt pro leg~bug  Sunt qul, bestlarum 
more, vltam ducunt, et In agrls agentes 
passlm, et ratlone recta nihll admlnls- 
trantes  Sunt plereque gentes  hujus- 
nec  pro lege mos, I~I  nec populue est.  mod1  sed  tamen  ]nest  eorum  anlmls 
Et 51 populus non est, nec Respubllca.  vis  et  materla,  non  mlnus  quam  In These  are  very  interesting  words,  closely  parallel  to  a 
famous passage in Cicero's 'De Legibus '  1 ;  but it is important 
especially as illustrating Cujas' judgment  that the foundation 
of  the Commonwealth is the Law, and the foundation of  Law 
is Reason. 
In another passage Cujas discusses the meaning of  "  Jus," 
and says that if  we  are to consider this properly  we  must 
begin  with  the Jus Gentium,  which  he  identifies with  that 
Natural Law which Reason teaches men, and which is present 
in all men.2 
He then discusses a phrase of  Modestinus (' Digest,' i. 3, 40). 
"  Jus,"  he says,  "is made by consent or necessity, or estab- 
lished by custom,"  and Cujas explains what  he understands 
this to mean.  "  Jus,"  which  is  made  by  consent,  is  Lex, 
for it is established by the command of  the "  Populus " or the 
"  Plebs."  Lex," that is, law in this sense, is binding upon us 
because  we  have  consented  to it,  or  because  it  has  been 
established by that State in which we  were born and brought 
up.  Again, Cujas puts it in another way.  What is "  Lex "  l 
he  asks.  It is an agreement  of  the Commonwealth  or the 
common consent of  all those who dwell together, or as Demos- 
thenes and Aristotle say, the common agreement of  the city.s 
nostris,  ad  maximas  res  gerendas,  et 
recta ratio quae facile elici potest, aut 
reddi  melior,  praecipiendo,  ut  ex 
cinere ignis, ignis ex silice non difficile 
elici  potest, quod insit ei haec natura. 
Nam quod sint quidam feri, et  immanes 
et exleges,  non  ideo  etiam  ut bruta 
non possunt non moribus et legibusregi. 
Consopita  est  in  quibusdam  et quasi 
consepulta ratio illa naturalis, quod est 
gentium  omne jus, et quamvis eo non 
regantur,  est  tamen  insitum  in  eis, 
quantumvis  feris,  ejus rationis  lumen 
quod facile excitari potest." 
Cf.  Cicero,  '  De  Legibus,'  i.  1-12 
and vol. i. (p. 8). 
a  Id. id., '  Comm. on  Digest,'  ad L. 
vii.  (Dig.  i.  1,  7)  (col.  129) : "  Qui 
voluit  definire  jus  civile  universum, 
non  praetermisit  jus  gentium,  ut 
Aristoteles  qui  jus  civile  divisit  sum- 
matim,  in jus  naturale,  quod  eSt  jus 
gentium,  et legitimum:  non  praeter- 
misit  consuetudinem,  non  equitatem, 
ut Cicero in Topicis.  Narn jus gentium 
eat  ratio,  qua  imbuti  sunt  omnes 
homines,  qulte  jubet  facienda,  pro- 
hibetque contraria, quam nemo ignorat, 
vel si quis eius ignorantiam obtendat, 
non excusatur." 
a  Id. id., '  Comm. on Digest,'  ad L. 
vii.  (Dig. i.  1,  7) (col. 130).  He cites 
Modestinus  (Dig.  i.  3,  40) :  "Ergo 
omne  jus  aut  consensus  fecit,  aut 
necessitas  constituit,  aut  firTnavit 
consuetudo. . . .  Nam  jus  quad  con- 
sensus fecit, lex  est, quae populi  aut 
plebis  jus~u  sancita  est,  nem  lex 
nulla  alia  ex  causa  nos  tenet,  quam 
quod  nos  ei  consenserimus, aut quad 
CHAP.  v.]  CIVILIANS  IN  THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY. 
JUS,  which  is made  by  necessity, is  in  the first  place  a 
"  senatus consultum," and Cujas cites Pomponius, '  Digest,' E 
2, 2.  When  it became  difficult for  the whole people to be 
gathered together on account of  their number, it was necessity 
which compelled men to give the care of  the Commonwealth 
to the Optimates.  In the second place, it was necessity which 
created  the form  of  "  Jus " which  is  made  by  the prince; 
it was  because  the  Senate was not equal  to the charge  of 
ruling the Provinces that the prince was created.1 
Jus, which is established by long custom, also rests upon 
consent,  but it is  a  tacit  and  unwritten  form  of  consent. 
Cujas adds that Jus, which  is established  by secessity, has 
indeed some form  of  consent, but it is a forced, not a free 
consent, such as that which makes law (lex) or custom.  The 
foundation  of  the  Senatus  consultum  is  necessity,  that  of 
law  and custom  is  will.2 
eam  civitatem  (civitas)  constituit,  in 
qua  nos  nati et educati  sumus  1,  cle 
quibus,  de  legibus  (Dig.  i.  3,  32). 
Quid  lex l  Communis  reipublicae 
sponsio 1.  1 ; de legibus (Dig. i.  3,  l), 
et communis consensus omnium simul 
habitantium, consponsio populi, Demos- 
thenes Lib. ii. uuvu?j~~  ~orvb  rijs sdhrws. 
Et  Arist.  6,uoAdyrupa  74s  sdhcws, 
in addit. ad Alex." 
Id. id. id. (col. 130) : "  Jus autem, 
quod  necessitas  fecit,  est  senatus 
aonsultum, 1.  2  5 deinde, de Orig. Jur. 
(Dig. i. 2,  2,  9).  Cum  difficile  posset 
populus  in  unum  convenire,  aucto 
nurnero  civium,  necessitatem  ipsam 
curam reipublicae  ad optimates, poli- 
tiores  viros,  ad  senatum  deduxisse, 
inde nata  senatus consulta. . . . Nam 
jus quod princeps facit, necessitas fecit. 
Nam non  ob  aliam rem creamus prin. 
cipem, quem ut decreta faciat  et jura 
det, ut est aperte scripturn  in  1.  2  5 
novissime, de Orig. Juria (Dig. i. 2,2, 11). 
dum ait, '  Sicut ad pauciores (id est, ad 
eenatum)  vias  juriscoustituenditransi~se 
videbatur, ipsis rebus dictantibus ' (id 
est  ipsa  rerum  necessitate),  ita  per 
partes evenisse (id est paulatim,  non 
ut  quidam  per  partes,  id  est  per 
suffragia.  Alii  per  partea,  id eat  per 
factiones).  Et rectissime  dicitur  ab 
Accursio  rem  a  populo  venisse  ad 
senatum,  et  a  senatu  ad  populum 
(principem)  per  partes,  per  vices, 
paulatim  pedetetimque.  Quid  vero, 
iniquit, per  partes  venit P  ut, inquit, 
necesse  esaet  reipublicae  per  unum 
consuli.  Nam  senatus  non  potuit 
sufficers  omnibus  provinciis  regendis, 
ob id constitutus  princeps,  qui rerum 
omnium esset  dominus,  quique potes- 
tate caeteros omnes praepolleret." 
Id.  id.  id.  (col.  130) : "  Verum 
notandum  hoc  jus,  quod firmavit con- 
suetudo longa, etiam  esse  consensum, 
sed taciturn et illiteratum.  Legem facit 
consensus expressus et literatus, suffra- 
gium,  conventio,  jussum,  decretum 
populi  aut  plebis.  Quinimo  et  jus 
quod  necessitas  constituit,  in  se  con. 
sensum  habet,  sed  coactum,  non 
Iiberum,  qualis  est  is  qui  legem  aut 
consuetudinem facit.  Senatus consulti 
principium  est  necessitas,  legis  et 
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We turn to his more developed theory of  the nature of law 
as  custom.  In another  work  Cujas  discusses this  question 
with immediate  reference to the famous passage  in  'Code,' 
viii.  52, 2 ; he  maintains  that  a  custom which  reason  and 
public utility approve, and which has been confirmed by long 
unwritten consent, and by a judgment in the Courts, abrogates 
any law which has ceased to serve its purpose and is of  little 
use to the Commonwealth.  For no law is binding upon men 
unless  it  has  been  received  by  custom ;  or,  as  he  puts 
it  in  another  place,  the  force  and  power  of  approved 
custom  is  such  that written  laws  do  not  bind  men  unless 
they have been accepted by the judgment of  the people, that is, 
unless they have been approved by cust0m.l 
This  is a  very  explicit  statement  of  the importance  and 
authority of  custom as representing  the reception  of  a  law 
by  the people.  Cujas puts  this principle,  however, in  still 
more general terms, in another work,  when  commenting on 
the famous definition by Papinian of  Lex, in 'Digest,'  i. 3, 1. 
We are bound, he says, by the Laws, for no other reason than 
that they have been received by the judgment  of  the people, 
and approved by custom, and he cites Aristotle as saying that 
the whole authority, which law has to compel men to obedience, 
comes from custom ; and he  cites a writer named Demetrius 
as saying that law is simply custom which has been written 
down, and that custom is unwritten law.2 
1 Id.  ~d,  vol.  ill.,  'Parat~tla In  52  (col  1196):  "Hic  ~gitur  quaeri- 
Libros  IX.  Cod~cis,' Code  VIII  52  mus,  de  vi  longae  et  probatae  con- 
(col.  211)  "Ea (Consuetudo) tamen  suetudlnis,  culus  una  vls  seu  v~rtus 
quam  ratio suas~t,  ut  alt  1.  1,  ratio  haec  est,  quod  leges  ipsae,  quae  ex 
quaedam major, et publica utilitas, et  scripto  constant,  nulla  alia  ex  causa 
lonym  tempus  tac~to et  llliterato  nos tenent, quam  quod judlclo popull 
omnium  consensu,  et  rerum  ludicat  receptae  sint, id  ost  quod etiam  con- 
arum firmavit auctontas, sane abrogat  snetudine sint adprobatae " 
legem,  culus  ratlo  vol  cessavlt,  vrl  1 Id id ,  vol. iv ,  '  In Llb. I. Defin. 
m~norest,velminusconfertRe~publicae, Papin.  Ad  1.  1 ff  De  legibus ' (Dig. 
quia  et deficere  videtur lex  tanquam  I.  3,  1) (col  1273)  "  Lex  enlin  est 
obllterata supra quam usus invaluit, et  commune praeceptum, communis spon- 
deficiente lege consuetudo sola domln-  s~o  omnium,  et  recte  1  de  quibus 
stur, et legis vim obtlnet.  . . . Sed et  (Dig I.  3,  32), leges nulla alia ex causa 
nulla  lex, allter nos tenet  quem  si et  nos tenere, quam  quod populi judiclo 
consuetudine recepta sit."  receptae et usu probatae  sunt, id  e5t, 
Id. ld.  id , '  Comm  on  Code,'  vili.  communi  sponslone  popuh,  et  idem 
So far, then,  Cujas conceives  of  law  as representing  the 
custom and consent of the community, but he also formally 
and explicitly accepts the principle that the people had trans- 
ferred their legislative authority to the prince.  In one work 
he  puts this  quite dogmatically and simply, that while  the 
public  and general  ancient laws were  made  by  the people, 
or the Plebs, they do not now make such laws, for they have 
transferred their authority to the prince.l  In another work 
he gives a summary of tho various forms of  Jus, which once 
belonged  to the  people,  but  had  been  transferred  to  the 
prince.2  It  should,  however,  be  noticed  that in  his  Com- 
mentary on the '  Digest,' Cujas' language about the nature of 
the authority  of  the prince  does  not  seem  quite the same. 
In commenting on the account  given by  Pomponius  of  the 
origin  of  the Imperial  power,  he  describes how,  by  a  slow 
process, Rome passed from the authority of  a king to that of 
the people, from that of  the people to that of  the Senate, and 
from that of  the Senate to that of  one man, not a king, but a 
prince  who  should  be  first  in  the  Commonwealth  and  the 
Senate,  but  should  not  take  to himself  all  the  right  (jus) 
of  the people or Senate, but rather should share 1t.S 
We  turn to Cujas' conception of  the relation of  the prince 
lpse  Arist.  ii.  Polit.,  6  ~6~0s  OUBF~LLIV 
Biav  FX6t rpds  ~d  ACIOEUBUI vapb 71  FOos, 
id  est  lex  nullam  vzm  habet,  qua 
compellat hom~nes  ut sib1 pareant, nlbi 
cam quam assum~t  ex more recepto, ex 
consuetudine, quae  non conflatur, nlsi 
diurno  tempore,  atque  adeo  recte 
Demetilus legem n1h11 ahud esse quam 
consuetud~nem  scnptam,  consuetu- 
dlnem esse  legem,  non  scnptam." 
Cf. Cujas, Opera, vol  in ,  '  De Feudis,' 
Llb. n  1 (col. 1827) 
'  Id.  id , vol  ill.,  '  Paratitla  in 
Llbros IX.  Codlois,' Cod. 1  14 (col 20). 
"  AC  prlmum  quldein  In  hoo  t~tulo 
agltur de legibus publi~ls  et general~bus, 
quae ant~qua  sunt lussa popul~  vel ple- 
bls  quales nullae feruntur hodle, pop- 
ull  potestate translata in prlncipem." 
Id id ,  vol  III., '  Comm  on  Cotlo,' 
vi  50  (col. 818). "  Jus omne,  quod 
populi  fuit, translatum  est  in  princi- 
pem  Populi  fu~t  leges  ferie  et per- 
ferre . . . hodle  est  prmupls.  . . . 
Populus  creavit  mag~stratum, hodie 
princeps.  . . . Populus  iildixit  bella 
. . . hodie  prlnceps  solus  . . . Popu- 
lus a magistratibus appellabatur, hodle 
prlnceps. . . . Bona vacantia  populo 
deferebantur, hodle  prlnclpl " 
Id id,  vol. 11  ,  '  Comm  on D~gest,' 
ad L  2 (Dig. 1.  2,  2) (col  148) : "  Per 
partes  . . . Et lento  progressu  a  vl 
et potestate reg18 ad populum, a populo 
ad senatum,  a  senatu  ad unum,  non 
regem, sed princlpem quasl In republ~ca 
et  senatu  primum,  qu~  nec  populi 
sibl, nec  senatus ]us omne v~nd~caret, 
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to the law, when made, that is, to his discussion of  the meaning 
of  "legibus  solutus."  In treating  the passage  of  Ulpian 
(Digest, i. 3,  31), which says, "  Princeps legibus solutus eat," 
he says that these words had been understood by the Greeks 
as referring to "  penal " laws, for  the prince  has no judges ; 
by the Latins as referring to all laws ;  but the truth is that 
they  only  apply  to "  Leges  Caducariae,"  not  to  others ; 
even if  the prince has not sworn to observe the lam, much 
more, if  he has.  The people was  bound  by the laws which 
it had made, and therefore,  also, the prince  upon  whom it 
had conferred its authority.  The proper meaning of  tho phrase 
is  that the prince  has  the power  of  making  and unmaking 
laws, but he must only use this power for a just  cause and for 
the good  of  the Commonwealth ; he has also some power of 
rectifying  things  done  without  1aw.l  In  another  work, 
commenting on 'Code,' vi. 23, 3, he sets out the same judgment 
in  much  the same terms,  and with  special reference to his 
own time.2 
1 Id  ~d,  vol  IV, 'Observationes,'  eo  tantum  pertmet,  ut  intelligatur 
Llb  xv.  30 (col  1755). "  Ad  1 prin  penes  prlnclpem  osse  omnem  potes 
cops  De  Legbus  (Dig  I.  3,  31)  tatem forendarum  vel  abrogandarum, 
De legibus poenarls Graecl ita interpre-  aut  derogandarum  legum,  ut  Augus 
tantur . . . qula  sclllcet  judlces  non  tmus  alt  In  Eplstola  quadam,  '  Im 
habet.  Latlnl,  de  qulbuscunquo  peratorem  non  esse sub~ectum  legibus 
leglbus, cum s~t,  lnscriptione  legls,  ea  qu~  habet In potestate ahas leges forre, 
sententla tantum acclplenda do leglbus  non  temere  qu~dem, sed  ex  justa 
caducarns, Julia, et Papla,  quae satls  causa  et  re  pubhca  atque  adeo 
etlam per se od~osae  erant  .  Sed et  confirmanda etlam quae non lure facta 
plerlsque  alns  prlnclpes  soluti  non  sunt.'  Ut principem leglbus adoptlonem 
erant, llcet lmperll lnltlo non Iurassont  non  lure  factam  confirmare  . . et 
In  loges,  et  multominus  sl  Jurassent.  matrimonlum statumque liberorum non 
Qum~mo,  ut populus  lpse su~s  leglbus  lure  quaesitorum ,  et  hoe  quidem 
tenebatur,  ~ta  prlnceps  . .  Cadu  solum est prlncipem  supra leges  esse. 
cams  leglbus  solutl  erant,  ex  S  C  Non  placet  quod  de Aohllle Horatms, 
quodam  eorum,  quae  facta esse  Jus  ' Jura negat slb~  data, nlhll non arrogat 
tmlanus refert, et elns qulbusdam veluti  armls ' " 
solemnibus manumlsslonum  Quod  2  Id ~d ,  Opera, vol  111 , '  Comm  on 
igltur d  1 Prmceps, et DIO 53, dlcens  Cod ,' vl  23, 3 (col  687)  "  Prlnclpom 
hoc  se  ex  Latlno  sermone  transferre  non  v~nd~care  heredltatem  Im 
Arhve~ai  7wv vdpwv,  non  de  omnibus  peratorem,  non  ~tem,  qma  defunct0 
leg~bus acc~plendum est  Et  quod  extraneus  est  Et  addlt  rat~onom, 
Dlo  Chrysostom ,  pnnclpem  esse  quia  lex  lmperli  solemmtatibus  lurls 
~WY  V~WOY  rrra~w . . . et  Idem  Jus-  Imperntorem  solverlt,  mhll  tamcn  est 
tlnlanus In  Puo-  105 (Nov  196, 2,  3)  tam proprlum Imperato11 quam lugibus 
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It  is quite clear that Cujas refuses to admit that the Roman 
Emperor was above the law; he recognises, indeed, his legis- 
latlve  power,  but maintains  very  confidently  that  he  was 
vivere.  Et legem  imperii  vocat  earn 
quae  pnmum  Augusto  detulit  lm. 
pennm,  ut  refert  Dlonyslus  Llb  52 
Quod  Augustum  privileglurn  dlcitur, 
leg  un.  ult.  de  Caduc.  toll.  (Cod  vl. 
51  8  14,  a).  Quodque  Dlonyslus 
scrlblt se transferre ex Latlno sermone 
AI ov~wv  rLv wdPwv  id est solvuntur 
leg~bus  Et  lnde  D  Chrisos  m 
Oratlone  quadam  trad~t principem 
esee,  rGv  v6pwv  ;?rdvw  Et slrn~l~ter 
Justin, in Nov.  15, leges  nit1  prlnclpe, 
et esse el  submlssas,  atque subjectas, 
quad  scll.  in  potestate  slt  solius 
prlnclpls,  ex  usu  reipubllcae  leges 
ferre,  vel  abrogare,  vel  derogare,  et 
oas ipsum quandoque sequi  non posso. 
Quapropter  aliquando  major  v~detur 
potestas  esse  prlnclpls,  quam  populi 
fuerit  Populue  enlrn  suls  logibus 
tenebatur,  prlnceps  SUIU  legibus  non 
tenetur  . . . Ea  est  lex  ~mpern, 
quae Augustum solvlt loglbus, maxlme 
si non ~uraverit  In  leges lnltlo imperil 
Nan solebant enlm jurare in leges, cum 
Pllnlus scrlb~t  In  Panegyrlco , '  jurare 
magistratus  qu~dem  In  leges, sed enlm 
~urisjurandl  verba  ignota  esse  prm- 
c~plbus  '  NISI  cum magistratus cogunt 
Jurare In leges 
Hod~e  quia  pnnceps  statlm  mltlo 
Imponi jurant  in logos, tantum abest, 
ut  leglbus  soluti  slnt,  qum  quam 
maxlrne legibus  obstrlngantur  ex  suo 
jurelurando  Et ut soluti sunt prm- 
clpes  leglbus,  tamen  ut  lnqult  1.  3 
(Cod  vl ,  23,  3),  mhll  est  tam 
proprium  prlnclpatus  quam  secundum 
leges  v~tam  degero  . . . Et elegantor 
Impp  Severus  et  Anton.  In  5  ult. 
Inst  qulbus  modls  testamenta  m- 
firmentur  (Inst  11  17,  8),  llcet, 
lnqu~unt,  solutl  slmus  leglbus, tamen 
leebus vlvimus.  Et elegantlus,  1  4. 
De  Leglbus (Cod  I.  14,  4), preclarum 
esbe  ot  cllgnum  vocls  prlncipls,  profi- 
tentis so  leg~bus  alligatum  esse, et de 
auctorltate  legum  pendcre  auctori- 
tatem prlnclplq, et revere  maps esse 
lmperio  legibus  submlttere  Im- 
perlum  . . . (Col  688),  Contra tamen 
lnvenlo In  qulbusdam  leglbus omnlno, 
~ta  esse solutos prmclpes, ut nee secun- 
dum  leges  vlvant  Invenlo  solutum 
esqo  princlpem  legibus  caducarns, 
Juha  nempe  et Papla,  1  quod  princ. 
de  leg  2  (Dig  I.,  4,  1)  SI tlb~  re- 
hctum  sit  legatum  et  hornlnem  ex- 
emerls  1.  mortuus  fuoris,  antequam 
dles  legat] cederet, oaducum  fit  lega- 
turn  Sed  si  lcgatum  rolictum  slt 
princlpl,  et  1s  obler~t, quod  omnes 
obirc  oportet,  antequam  dies  legatl 
cederet, legatum non fit caducum, sod 
cedlt  heredl  prmclpis.  Et hoc  est 
quod sit 1 prlnceps de legibus, '  Pnn- 
ceps  legibus  solutus  est '  (Dlg.  i. 
3,  31 )  Nam  d~llgentor attonde  ad 
incnpt~onem  legls quae est Ulplanl ex 
quatuordlclm  ad  legom  Juliam  et 
Paplam,  quae  sunt  leges  caducarlae. 
Prmceps  ergo  est  leglbus  solutus, 
I.  1.  Juha et Papia, non omnlbus leg]- 
bus  . . . Nec  vlvere  dlcam  unquam 
generallter  esse  verum  quod  ait  1. 
prlncops  (Dlg  I  3,  31) cum ~d  tantum 
sit  scc~p~onclum,  speclallter  de  lege 
Julla et Papla, non de leg~bus  omnlbus, 
ot  tamen  maximo  id  affirmabo  cum 
ent pnnceps,  qui  juravit  In  legorn, 
ot  quod  contra  leg~mus  In  plensque 
nuctorltat~bus  '  Prlnclpem  esse  supra 
legem,' hoe  00 pertmet  ut lntell~gatur 
prlnclpem  habere  potestrttem  ferendl 
et abrogandi leges, non temere qu~dem 
sed ex justa causa et e republics 
Ao  consoquenter  posse  prlnclpern 
confirmare  quae  non  Jure facta sunt, 
ut  leglrnus  adoptionem  non  lure 
factam  a  princlpe  confirmarl .  . et 
matrlmonlum  mju3tum,  statumque 
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normally bound to obey the law so long as it was law ; and 
it must be observed that Cujas says in the passage last quoted 
that the princes of  the modern world were bound by the oath, 
which they took on their accession, to obey the laws ; that is, 
it is clear that besides what he conceived to be the rational 
and critical interpretation of  the jurisprudence of the ancient 
world,  he had  no  doubt  about the constitutional principle 
of  his own  time.  It may also be observed that Cujas very 
emphatically asserts that it is a mere error to maintain that 
the prince  has "property,"  in the strict sense  of  the word, 
in  that  which  belongs  to  the  private  individual;  he  has 
rights over it "  imperio," but not "  dominio." 
We think that it is plain that in France from Alciatus to 
Cujas,  a  number  of  the  most  important  O~vilians  of  the 
sixteenth  century maintained  a,  conception  of  Law  and its 
relation to the prince very different froin that of the Italian 
Civilians of  the fifteenth century, and even from that of  the 
Civilians of  the fourteenth century. 
We  must  also  observe  that  one  of  the  most  important 
Civilians  of  the  century  in  Germany,  Zasius,  a  native  of 
Zurich, but for many years Professor of  Roman Law in the 
University of  Freiburg in the Breisgau, during the first part of 
the sixteenth  century, represented  in  some important points 
the same principles as Alciatus and the French Civilians with 
whom we have just been con~erned.~ 
prlnc~pe  confirman.  . . . Legimus 80s 
poenae venlam facore et nbolere crimen 
~ndulgentia  st bcnlgnltate  sua  Eos 
ax causa  et~am  veniam  legibus facere. 
Et hoe solum est, quod dlcltur pr~ncl 
pem esso supra leges  non plncct, q~od 
de  Ach~llo  ait Horatms, '  Jura negat 
sib1 data, mhll non arrogat armis ' " 
1 Id. ~d ,  vol. v , '  Observationes,' xv. 
30 (Col  1765)  "  Verum  no abutlrnur 
etlam llla sententla '  omnes esso pnn- 
c~plr,'  ex 1 3 C  De quadr  praesc  (Code 
vll  37,  3)  cujus  mens  haec  est,  ut 
omnia tam fisoal~a  quam patnmonlaha, 
de qulbus  In  ea  lege sg~tur,  princlpls 
asso  intelllgamur.  At  et jurls  civilis 
Senoca hanc  vocem  esse  alt  '  omnla 
reg's  cqse,  etlam  qnao  s~bl  qulsque 
prlvatus habot et poqsldot,' quam tamen 
~ts  exclpit  rectisslmo, '  ut  omnla  rex 
imperio possideat, singull dom~nio  ' 
Nec  enlm  quae  tua  sunt, pnnclpis 
sunt , aut certe tua sunt, aut certe tUa 
non  sunt, quonlam  dom~mum  In  soh 
dum duorum esse non poteqt  ot com 
munia  quoque csse Inter  se ot prlncl- 
pem  dixerlt  nemo,  et fiscaha  quoque 
lpsa proprie prlnclpls non sunt " 
2  For  an  account  of  his  llfe  and 
work cf  the oxcellent work of  Stlnlzlng. 
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We  find  some  important  judgments  in  his  Commen- 
taries  on  the  'Digest,'  and  we  have,  in  one  of  his 
"  Consilia,"  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  question  whether 
the Emperor  could interfere with a judgment  of  the Reichs 
Hammer-Gericht by an Imperial writ or brief. 
-. 
Zasius uses  the strongest terms to describe the "  Potestas 
immensa " of  the Emperor ; he is a living law, and what he 
decrees  as law,  or  decides  in  judgment,  is  held  to be  law. 
He is "  legibus solutus," and can make law "  solus " ; whether 
Zasius  meant  by  this  that he  can  issue  laws  by  his  own 
authority, or that he is the only person who can make law, 
is not c1ear.l 
We  must not, however, be misled by these high-sounding 
phrases.  Zasius  goes  on  at once  to  say  that  the  Roman 
prince, if  he has made any contracts or agreements even with 
private  persons,  is  bound  by  them ; for,  though  God  has 
placed the laws under the control of  the prince,  he has not 
done this with contracts ; they belong to the "  Jus Gentium " 
and are founded on natural reason.  This,  he maintains, is 
the common doctrine  of  the "  Juris Periti,"  such  as  Cynus 
and Baldus, and he relates it to the  tradition of  feudal tenures.= 
Zasius  returns to this  question  of  contractual obligations in 
his treatise, '  In mu feudorum.' 
'Geschlchte  der  Popularen  Literatur 
des romischen und canonlschen Rechts, 
in Deutschlsnd ' 
Zasius, ' Opera Omnia,' Frankfort, 
1590,  vol.  I. , '  Comm  on  Digest,' 
I.  2,  2  (p.  124)  "  (Ratum  esset) 
EX quo  colllgltur,  princlpls  Roman] 
poteatatom  esse ~mmensam  , est onim 
lex  anlmata In  terns  . . . Et quid- 
quld  statuerit, nut  sontentlam  dando 
decrevent,  ceteris  paribus  pro  lege 
servatur .  . lpse enim s~cut  est leg]- 
bus  solutus  its  solus  legem  condere 
potest " 
Id ~rl  irl  ~d . "  Contractus tamen 
81  quos  pllnceps  Romanus  etlam 
privaLls  persoms  perfeccr~t,  oum  obll 
gant  ut  fidem  conventionls  servelo 
cogatur.  Llcet  enlm  Dous  prlnclpl 
subjecerit  leges,  non  tamen  subjecit 
oontractuum  v~ncula,  qua8 ~urls  gen- 
tium  sunt,  naturallque  ratlone  con- 
slstunt, ot praecipue in pr~ncipe  bonam 
fidem reqununt.  Quae est rcmmunls 
junspor~torum doctrina,  Unld  Cynus. 
Doctor  . . . Undo  nimlr  improvlde, 
ne  quid  durllis  dlcam,  nuper  qu~dem 
exdoctor  aullcls  contranum  respon. 
derat.  Nec  porro tutum mlfil videtur 
quod  Jacobus  de  Sancto  Georgio  In 
practlca feudorum, In prlncip  asseruit, 
pnnclpem  Romanum  aufcrre  vasallo 
feudum  posso  Cum  enzm  vlm  con- 
tractus feuda habeant, stare contrsictu~ 
pr~nceps  tenebltur " 
Vd  ~d,  vcl.  iv.,  'In  usu  feu- 
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He  also  maintains  that  the  prince's  actions  must  be 
conformed to reason  and equity, and he  cites not  only  the 
well-known stories  about Trajan and Agesilaus, but also the 
rescript  of  the  Emperor  Anastasius,  which  instructs  the 
administrators of  the Empire that they were not to pay any 
heed to rescripts  or pragmatic sanctions which were contrary 
to the general law or to public utility.= 
Zasius considers this question further in a passage in which 
he discusses what is meant by the phrase "  legibus solutus." 
Does  this, he  asks,  mean  that the prince  can  act  contrary 
to the law  and  annul  the  Civil  Law?  The  Canonists, he 
says, maintain that this was true of the Pope ; it would thus 
be  true  also  of  the Emperor;  but this  assertion,  he  says, 
never pleased him, for various reasons, and especially because 
laws (jura) are given by God through the mouth of  the prince. 
He considers that some laws may be suspended in particular 
cases,  and that this is  done by  a "  non  obstante7' clause. 
But again, he says, if  the prince should annul a man's  legal 
rights without  due cause, his action  is  null  and void, even 
though he does it in the form of  a law or decree.  This is the 
law of  Germany, and he says that he had heard a judgment 
given against the prince in the prince's "  consistory." 
1 Id. id., vol. i., '  Comm. on Digest,' 
i.  2,  2 (p.  124) : "  Et in universum, 
princeps  nihil  admittet  quod  rationi 
obviet et equitati, ut est eligantissimus 
text. in Leg. Digna Vox. (Cod. i. 14, 4). 
Licet  enim  absoluta  potestas  legibus 
non  ligetur,  ut  supra  diximus,  ea 
tamen  potestate  abuti  non  debet: 
quantoenim est sua potestas immensior, 
tanto  magis  aequitatem  exigit  et 
justitiam,  quam  in  primis  colere  et 
colendam praescribere  debet. . . .  In- 
signis oxtat D. Trajani  sententia . . . 
denique  optime  Rex  Agesilaus . . . 
quod et imperator Anastasius salubriter 
sancivit  in 1.  fin. C.  si quid contra jus 
(Cod. i.  22,  6) ; quem textum utinam 
doctores pro suo quisque, vel comrnodo 
vel  ingenio,  non  ita  distorqueront." 
(The  text  of  Code  i.  22,  6,  reads : 
"  Omnis  cujuscunque  majoris  vel 
minoris  administrationis  universae 
nostrae  reipublicae  judices  monemus, 
ut  nullum  rescriptum,  nullam  prag- 
maticam  sanctionem,  nullam  sacram 
adnotationem  quae  generali  juri  vel 
utilitati publicae adversa esse videatur, 
in  disceptationem  cujuslibet  litigii 
patiantur proferri, sed generales sacras 
constitutiones  modis  omnibus  non 
dubitent  observandas.") 
1 Id. id., Opera, vol. i., '  Comm.  on 
Digest,'  i.  3,  31 (p. 167) : "  Sed quia 
in  L.  nostra  principem  ab omnibua 
absolvisse  legibus,  et  leg8  positiva, 
quaero  an  per  hoc  princeps  possit 
facere contra legem : an possit tollere 
jus  civile:  Certe  Canonistao  hoc 
tenent  de  Papa,  quod  possit  tollere 
jus  positivum  . . .  et  sic  etiarn  l~oo 
This reference to a definite case in the Courts is  of  great 
interest, and it seems probable that this  is  the case which, 
as we have said, is dealt wit'h at  length in one of Zasius' "  Con- 
silia,"  which has happily been preserved.  The plaintiff  had, 
many  years  before,  brought  a  case  against  the  defendant 
in Ihe Reichs Kammer-Goricht,  and the  Court had  ordered 
the defendant to pay a certain sum of  money to the plaintiff. 
The defendant had t'hen taken  the  matter  to  the Emperor 
Maximilian, who issued a mandate, "  de plenitudine potestatis 
et ex certa scientia," annulling  the judgment.  After further 
negotiations,  a  compromise  had  been  arrived  at, by  which 
the plaintiff  was to receive 1000 florins,  but this was  never 
paid.  On  the death of  Maximilian,  the plaintiff  applied for 
the execution of  the original judgment.1 
Zasius begins  by laying  down  two  general principles, the 
first  that the Emperor  could not override the judgment  of 
the Court, and the second, that the Emperor was bound  by 
his contract. 
He recognises that there had been much discussion about 
the effect  of  the  use  of  such  phrases  as  "  ex  plenitudine 
potestatis " and  "  ex  certa  scientia,"  when  employed  by 
the Emperor  in  his briefs  or writs, but  he  is  himself  quite 
clear  that the prince  could  not  annul "  Ites  Judicata " by 
the use of such phrases.  He had always held, and still main- 
tained,  whatever  other  doctors  might  say,  that the prince, 
could  not,  by  his  "  plenitudo  potestatis " or  his  " certa 
scientia,"  or in any other way,  annul the lawful right  (jus) 
which  a  man  might  demand,  except  for  some  great  public 
cause.  The  authority of  the prince  is  of  the largest  kind, 
imperatori esset permissum.  Sed mihi 
nunquam  placuit  ista  asaertio,  per 
multas  rationes  quas  jam  obmitto, 
et  maxime,  quia  jura  sunt  divinitus 
per  ora  principum  promulgata,  ut 
dicunt  patres  in  decretis.  Bene 
credo quia aliqua jura ex causis possint 
in  particulari  tolli,  vel  contra  eas 
indulgeri, quod quotidie fit per clausu- 
lam  non  obstante.  . . . Quapropter 
~i princeps  noceret  tollendo me& jura, 
VOL.  VI. 
hoc  non valeret, causa non  apparente, 
otiamsi  hoc  per modum legis, decreti, 
aut sto.tuti faceret, contra  doctrinam 
Baldi in 1.2 C. eod. : et ita servat nostra 
Germania  integritatem legis : et  vidi 
ita  judicari  in  Consistorio  Principis 
contra  Principem,  securi  quo  pact0 
adulentur vel Itali vel alii principibus." 
Id. id.,  vol.  vi. "  Con~ilia  " Liber 
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for the protection of 111s  subjects, but an authority to injure 
them, belongs not to a prince, but to a tyrant.  He dismisses 
rather  conteinptuously the contention  that it  must  always 
be  presumed  that the prince  had some just  reason  for  his 
action, and contends that the use of  such phrases as "  pleni- 
tudo potestatis,"  &c., had become so much a matter of  con- 
vention  that no  great  force  could  be  attributed  to them. 
He concludes, therefore, that the prince  could not take away 
a man's lawful rights by the use of  such phrase8.l 
1 Id  id ,  11  10  1 "  Praemltto pro  tudlne potestatls, nee ex certa scient~a, 
indubhato,  quod  sententla  diffin~tiva,  sed  nec  ullo  a110  modo,  jus  alter1 
a  domluo  judice  Camerae  lata,  vim  quaes~tum  tollere, vel infirmale poss~t, 
habet  re1  ludioatae . . . quod  ig~tur  nisi  hoe  ingens  pubhcae  utllitatis 
per  sententlam  diffin~tlvam  proceruin,  causa urgeret  . . . 
Imperil  Cesaris  nomme  decisum  est,  10  Proinde  eiusdem  leges  a  doc- 
refrican a110 processu non debet.  . . .  toribus malo In argumentum trahuntur. 
4.  Secundo  praem~tto, princlpem  quasl princlpls Romani absoluta potes- 
Romanum  suo contractu  ligarl, sicuti  tas  ad  jura  privatorum  vlolanda  se 
pr~vatum  aliquem  Deus enlm qui legcs  extendat  SCIO  bone  princlpls  potes 
merepositivaspr~nclp~sub~ecit,eundem  tatem  ad  tutelam  subdltorum,  ad 
subjecit contractibus.  . . .  ]ustitiam  asserendam  esso  ampllssl 
G  Et  quod  prlnccps  Romanus  mam  caeterum  ut  in~uria  subjectls 
contrsctu  eatenus  obligatur,  ut  nec  fiat,  illlo  prlncipls  potestatem  non 
pleiutudo  potestatls,  nee  ulla  urgens  aguosco, sed tyrannl  . . . 
cla~isula  sum eximat, tenet  Philippus  11  Nec  obstet  quod  ex  doctoribus 
Decius  . . . Idem  Declus . . . qul  aliqu~ putant,  causam  lustam  in 
dlcit  Principem  licet  loge  positiva  principe  semper  praesami  . . . Si  In 
non obligetur, tamen dictamine rationis  Caesarls mandatis  absurda,  non  veri- 
subici. . . .  simllia,  item  impertinentla  et  quae 
His  SIC  praemlysis,  aliqua  ex  prima  fronte  inlqua  apparent,  con- 
act~s  mihl  presentatis  dubla  colligere  tinentur,  et princeps  in  mandatis  et 
volul, quae videbantur magis necessaria  clausulis  hujusmod~ emittendl  esset 
ut  3ivlderentur  Primo  an  princeps  facllis,  ]am  justa  causa  presuml  nec 
de  plen~tudine  potestatls,  et ex  certn  deberet nec posset  . . . 
scientia,  per  sua mandata,  rem  ]udi-  13  Accedat  quod  cum  hujusmodi 
catam  a  domino  auotore  obtontam  clausulae  plenitudine  potestatls  at 
cassare et annulare potuerit. . . .  certae  sc~entlae, hoc  tempore  velut 
Breviter  igltur  agentes,  diximus  ex  styli  consuetudine,  in  omnibus 
mandata  hujusmodl  t~tulo Caesans  prope  impenahbus literis, ut d~vlis  N. 
emlssa, quamvis ex plenltubne potes-  a110  quodam  loco  fatetur,  insera  et 
tatis et ex  certa scientia exierint, rem  saepenumero  ~mpertinenter  asscrlbi 
~udlcatam  predlctam  cassarl  non  consueverlnt,  non eat tanta In  01s  vls 
potulsse,  nee  esse  cassatam,  quod  ponenda  . . . 
mulhplic~ter  probari  potest.  15  Et  ut  finlam,  81  a  ~ust~tle 
7. Et  primo quicqu~d  dicant doctores  lustus dicltur, et principem Romanum 
In  hoc  punto,  ego  scmper  tenui  et  ]usturn  esse  necesse  est,  consequltur 
ten03  quod  prlnoeps,  nec  ex  plenl-  ut  in  eo  just~tiam residere  dice- 
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This is important, but it is not all that Zasius 11as to say ; 
so  far he  has argued  on  general grounds that the Emperor 
could not override the judgment  of  a Court of  Law, or violate 
the clear rights  of  any subject,  by invoking  some supposed 
absolute authority.  He goes on to contend that in this par- 
ticular  case  the Emperor  Maximilian was bound  by a  Con- 
stitution of his own.  He describes the Diet held  at Worms 
in 1495, and says that Maximilian promulgated a Constitution 
that he would not obstruct the proceedings or judgments  of 
the Reichs Kammer-Gericht, nor evoke its cases  to himself, 
nor annul, nor suspend its decisions, and that he had confirmed 
this Constitution on several later occasions.  This Constitution 
had received the force of  a contract by the Emperor's oath 
to observe it, and the Emperor is bound by his c0ntract.l 
He sums up,  therefore,  that the authority of  the Roman 
prince does not extend to in~ustice  ; although he is free from 
merely positive  law, he is subject to reason  and the Divine 
Law,  the  right  (jus) claimed  by  another  which  belonged 
to the Jus "  Naturale " or "  Gentium " could not be  taken 
away by any words of  the Emperor, such as "  de plenitudine 
potestatis " or "  ex  certa  scientia," except for some obvious 
publlc cause ; the use  of  such phrases in the Imperial writs 
mu8  . . . At  cum  justitia  uniucique  sum  judicii  Camerae imperil,  In  ejus 
tnbmt  quod  suum  est,  quomodo  processibus ct sentontns non impedire, 
princeps alteri quod suum est aufelet  '?  nec ad so avocare, lrr~tare,  suspendere, 
Quomodo injuriae  ab eo  nascentur  a  aut ulla via, slve appellationis, auppli- 
quo ]urn processerunt 1  catloms  aut  restitut~onls, ad  sese 
16  Recte  ergo  concludo  quod  per  trahero,  aut  rescindere  vellt,  &c. 
clausulas supra dictas quautumcunque  Quam constitutionem sou ordinatlonom, 
slnum  effundant,  alteri  quod  suum  dic~tur  Divus  Caesar  verbo  majestat18 
est, slne ratlone, immo contra retionem,  sou  dignitatis  suae  promlsissc  vero 
pro solo voluntatis et potentiae lib~to,  existente  quad  eandem  ordinet~onem 
aufcrri non possit "  Caosar  In  ali~s  sequent~bus ~mpern 
'  Id  ~cl ld .  ''  26. Tertla  ratio  consessibus saepe renovaverit, sicati et 
sumltur  a contractu  seu constitutiono  novissime de anno, &c , 10, in civitate 
Dlvi  Caesarls  N  Nam  in facto  mihi  Augusta  factitaturn  e99e  fertur, prout 
refertur,  quod Caesarea majestas ante  ex  actis  apparet  Cum  igltur  dlvus 
complures  auuos  cum  prmclpibus,  Caesar se d~ctam  ordmationem servare 
procoribus,  legationibus  et  statibus  promiserit,  non  est  dub~urn quin  In 
sacrosnncti imperil  Romani  dum  con  vim  contractus  transient  .  Sed 
vcntus imperil Wormaciae haberentur,  supra in secundo evident~ali  ev~cimus, 
cOn3titutionem et ord~uationcm  fecent,  Caesarm  RUO  contractt~ ohllgari  et 
quad  sua  ma~cstas  statum et pIocur  sublet." 11as  therefore  little  significance.  Thc  Emperor,  therefore, 
cannot annul the "  res judicata "  in the case under discussion, 
and more especially because he was bound by his own contract 
made  with  t,he Empire.  Re concludes,  therefore,  that t,he 
Court  should  order the judgment  given before in favour  of 
the plintiff to be carried 0ut.l 
We shall have occasion in later chapters to dca,l with some 
other  important  jurists  of  the sixteenth  century,  specially 
wit,h  Bodin, Peter Gregory of  Toulouse, Barelay, and Althusius, 
but primarily as political  writers,  not jurists,  it seems to us 
better to treat them from that point of  view. 
In this chapter we have endeavoured to put together some 
observations  on  the  political  theory  of  some  imporlsnt 
Civilians  of  the sixteenth  century,  mainly  in  France,  and 
we think that we have done enough to make it clear that they 
represent  a position  different in some respccts  from that of 
the Civilians of  the f~urteent~h  and  fifteenth centuries,  and 
analogous  rather  to that  of  some  of  the  most  important 
Civilians of  the thirteenth century, like Azo and Hugolinus. 
1 Id. id. id., 67 : "  Epilogando igitur, 
et  velut  sub  summerio  recolligendo 
quod  supra  diffuse  scripsimus:  cum 
Principis  Romani  potestas  ad  injus- 
titiam extendi  nec  debeat  nec  possit, 
scilicet quocl princeps etsi sit lege mere 
positiva  solutus,  rationi  tamen  et 
juri  divino subjectus sit : nec alterius 
jus  quaesitum, quod  de  jure  naturali 
vol gentium prodidit, auferri per princi- 
pem  possit,  ne  de plenitudine  quidem 
potestatis,  vel  certe  scicntia,  nisi 
fortassis  ax  causa  publicae  utilitatis 
princeps moveretur, et de ea manifesto 
apparoret :  et  constet  quod  dictae 
cleusulae,  plenitudinis  et  scientiae, 
passim  sine  dolectu  in  principalibus 
liltcria  inou!oari  consuetae,  noti  it6 
multum  operentur,  id  quod  Divns 
N. ultro por  litoras suns confcssus cst: 
et maxime  predictae clausulae nullam 
prorsus  habeant  efficaciam  si  constet 
principi  esse  obreptum ; hisque  con- 
sequens sit quod  Divus  Caesar  supra- 
dictis  mitndatis  ab eo  obreptitie  ex- 
tortis,  rem  judicatam  domini  actoris 
tollere  et  cassare  nec  potuerit  nec 
voluerit,  attento  procipue  contractu 
et  orclinatione  sun  cum  imperio 
facta. . . . Concludimus, partes  dom- 
ini  judicis  et  dominorum  assessorum 
esse, ut sontentiom  ct rem  juclicatarn 
praedictam,  juxta  petite,  domini  act- 
oris, esse exequendam  pronunc~ent,  et 
exequantur." 
PART IV. 
TBE  POT,ITICAJ~ TIIEORY  OF  TITE  1,A'I'EE 
SIXTEENTII  CENTURY. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THE SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF LAW. 
WE have  so  far been  dealing  with  the history  of  political 
theory  and ideas in the first  part  of  thc sixteenth  century, 
for it appears to us that it is wise to distinguish in our treat- 
ment between the earlier and the later part of  the century. 
How far indeed there are any important differences between the 
general character of the earlier and later conceptions we shall 
have  to consider, but it is obvious that in the second  half 
of  the century there was  a great deal more political writing. 
The fact is obvious, and some of  the causes are obvious and 
apparent, for the last  fifty years  of  the century were full of 
the clamolrr and noise of  civil war and revolutionary move- 
ments.  We may say at once that it seems clear to ourselves 
at least that these movements had no reIation at all to what 
is called the  Renaissance,"  whatever that word may mean, 
and that the great revival  of  religion,  the Reformation, or 
what is called tho counter-reformation, was only, and only in 
part, the occasion and not the cause of  these movements. 
As von Ranke long ago pointed out, the peat international 
conflicts of  the sixteenth century were not caused by the re- 
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times deflected by them ; and the same thing is true of  the 
political principles and theories.  It is at first sight a curious 
thing  to iind  a  Scottish  Protestant  like  George  Buchanau 
expressing almost the same judgments  in political theory  as 
the Spanish Jesuit Mariana ; but the fact is that the difference 
of  religious belief, as such, had little or no relation to political 
conceptions. 
All this, however, we  shall have to consider ; the fact is 
that, whatever the reason may have been, there was  a great 
outburst  of  energetic political theory  in the second part of 
the sixteenth century, and our  business is to examine this, 
and to consider what were the relations of  this to the traditional 
conceptions of  the Middle Ages. 
We thought it  well to begin the preceding part of  this volume 
by  drawing attention to a work which seems to us to bc in 
many ways very representative of  the normal attitude of  men 
in the sixteenth  century  to  political  authority-that  is, do 
Seyssel's ' La  Grant  Monarchie  de France,'  a  work  written 
apparently with no specially controversial intention, and we 
pointed  out  that, to him,  the Government of  Francc was  a 
monarchy indeed, but limited by the various laws and organisa- 
tions of  the country. 
In 1583 there was  published in England  (but it had been 
written apparently in 1562) the work entitled  De Republica 
Anglorum,' by Sir Thomas Smith, a man of  large and varied 
experience of  public office, an Ambassador, a Privy Councillor, 
and a  Secretary of  8tate.l  This work  also appears to have 
been  written  without  any  special  controversial  intention, 
and  we  think  that  a  consideration  of  the  main  prin- 
ciples  set out in this work  may  serve  to indicate  some  of 
the  normal  conceptions  of  Englishmen  about  politics,  and 
especially their conception of the place and authority of  law. 
After describing the six forms of  good and bad governments 
in the terms of  the Aristotelian traditi~n,~  he goes on to deal 
in  more detail with  the  contrast  between the king and the 
Cf. J. W. Allen, '  Political Thought  T.  Smith,  '  De  Repnblica  Anglo- 
in  tilo Sixteenth Century,'  p. 263.  run],' i. 3. 
CHAP.  I.]  THE  SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF  LAW.  32 7 
tyrant.  The  king  he  describes as  one  who  by  inheritance 
or  by  election  has  received  the  Crown  with  the  consent 
of  the  people,  and  who  governs  it  by  its  laws,  to  the 
benefit both  of  the country and of  himself.  The tyrant, on 
the other hand, is one who rules without the consent of  the 
people, who makes and unmakes laws at his pleasure, without 
the advice  of  the citizens, and  who  puts  the advantage of 
himself  and his kindred before the common g0od.l 
He goes on to say that this '' tyrannical power "  was given, 
as it was  said,  to the Roman  emperor  by  a  decree  of  the 
people, and some say that the same power  belonged to the 
King  of  France  and some of  the Italian princes, that they 
possessed  the power  of  making  and unmaking  laws, and of 
imposing taxes  without the consent of  the people ; he adds 
that it was  said that it was Louis XI. who first changed the 
sdminlstration  of  the  French  kingdom  into  this  absolute 
and tyr-~nnical  power.  There are, he says, some who  main- 
tain that this was not a form of  tyranny but the proper form 
of  monarchy.  Smith,  however,  regards  such  an  unlimited 
author it,^  as one  which  might  be  valuable  in  time  of  war, 
but is in tirne of  peace dangerous to the pe~ple.~ 
1 Id. id., i.  7: "When  one  person 
beareth tho rule, they define that to be 
the estate of  a Iring, who by succession 
or  election,  commeth  with  the  good 
will of  tho people  to the government, 
and  dot,]]  administer  the  common 
wealth by the lawes  of  the same and 
by equitie,  and  doth seeke  the profit 
of  the people as much as his owne. 
A tyrant  they  name  him,  who  by 
force commeth to  the Monarchy against 
the will  of  the people, breaketh lawes 
alreadie made  at his pleasure, maketh 
other without  the advise  and consent 
of  the people,  and regardeth  not  the 
wealth  of  his  communes but the  ad- 
vancement of  him selfe, his faction, and 
kindred." 
Id.  id.,  i.  7 :  "The  Emperors 
claime  this  tyranicall  powor  by  pre- 
tained, by which all the people of  Rome 
did conferre their power and authority 
unto  Caesar  wholly . . . Some  men 
doe judge  the same  of  the  Kingos  oi 
Fraunce, and certaine Princes of  Italie 
and other places,  because  they make 
and abrogate lawes and edicts, lay on 
tributes and impositions  of  their  own 
will,  or  by  the  private  counsel1 and 
advise  of  thoir friends and favouritee 
only,  without  the  consent  of  the 
people. 
The people  I  call  that  which  tlie 
word  '  populus'  doth  signifie,  tllo 
whole  bodie  and  the three  estates of 
the commonwoalth ; and they  blame 
Lewes  tho  XI.  for  hindering  tho 
administration royal1 of  Frauuce, from 
the lawfull  and regulate raign  to tho 
absolute  and  tyranicall  power  and 
tencc  of  that Rogation  or plebiscitum,  government. . . . 
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This is a very emphatic and important statement, that in 
normal  political society, and in its normal  circumstances, it 
is the Law and not the prince which is supreme.  This is the 
conception of  Bracton and of Fortescue, and, as in Fortescue, 
the statement receives  a  greater  emphasis by  the reference 
to France, while Smith, like Fortescue, thinks  of  the French 
conditions as being recent  developments. 
It is interesting to compare the conceptions of  Sir Thomas 
Smith  with  those  expressed  in  the  contemporary  work  of 
Francis  Victoria,  who  was  a  Doniinican  and  Professor  at 
Salamanca.  Victoria  has  a  high  conception  of  the  nature 
and place  of  the king  and his legislative authority, but he 
also sets out in very  dogmatic terms his judgment  that the 
king is bound by the Law.  Some, he says, contend that the 
king  is  above  the  whole  commonwealth, and  that  no  one 
can be bound except by a superior ; but it is clear that the 
king is bound.  The laws of  the king have the same authority 
as those  which are made by  the whole commonwealth, but 
laws made by the whole commonwealth are binding upon all 
men.  It is open to the king to make laws or not, but it is 
not open to him to be bound or not.  As  in contracts, a man 
may or may not enter into a contract, but when it is made 
it binds him.l 
administration  which  the Greekes  do 
call  ?rapBaglhciav,  not  tyranny,  but 
the  absolute power  of  a  king,  which 
they  would  pretend  that everie  king 
hath, if  he  would  use  the same ; the 
other  they  call  Paa~hsia  voprfc?,  or 
the  royal  power  regulate  by  lawes. 
Of  this I will not dispute at this time. 
But,  as such  absolute  administration 
in time of  warre, when all is in armes, 
and  whon  lawes  hold  their  peaco 
because  they cannot be heard, is most 
necessarie:  so  in  time  of  peace,  the 
same  is  very  daungerous,  as well  to 
him that doth use it, and much more 
to the people  upon  whom  it is used: 
wheroof  the  cause  is  the  frailtie  of 
man's  nature,  which  (as Plato saith) 
cannot abide or beare  long that abso- 
lute and uncontrouled authoritie, with- 
out swclling  into too much pride  and 
insolence." 
1 Fronciscus  Victoria,  '  Relectiones 
De  Potestate  Civili,'  xxi. : "  Queritur 
tamen,  an leges civiles  obligant  legis- 
latorem,  et  maxime  reges.  Videtur 
onim  aliquibus  quod  non,  cum  sint 
supra  totam rempublicam,  et  nullus 
possit  obligari  nisi  a  superiore :  sed 
cortius  et probabilius  eat  quod  obli- 
gentur. 
Quod  probatur  primo : quia  huius- 
modi  legislator  facit  injuriam  reipub- 
licae,  ot reliquis  civibus, si,  cum ipse 
sit pars reipublicae, non habeat partom 
oneris,  juxta  personam  tamen  suam 
et  qualitatem,  et  dignitatem.  Sod 
ista  obligatio  eat  indirccta,  et  ideo 
The  principles  of  government  which  are  set  out  by  Sir 
Thomas  Smith  may  be  conveniently  conipared  with  those 
which had been laid down a few years earlier, that is, in 1556, 
by  Bishop Ponet in his work  entitled  'A  Short Treatise  of 
Politike Power.'  Ponet certainly shows no signs of  the influ- 
ence of  that theory of the Divine Right of  Kings with which 
we have dealt in a previous chapter, but sets out with singular 
clearness the  same  constitutional  traditions  as  Sir  Thomas 
Smith.  Like him, he repeats the Aristotelian  description of 
the three good governments-the  Monarchy, Aristocracy, and 
Democracy ; but  adds, "  And  where  all together,  that  is, 
a king, the nobilitie, and the Commons, a mixte state, which 
men by long continuance have judged  to be the best of  all ; 
. . . but yet every kynde of  these states tended to one ende, 
that is,  to  the maintenance  of  justice,  to the wealthe  and 
benefit  of  the hole multitude, and not of  the superiour and 
governours alone1'  (Ponet, '  Short Treatise,' Part I.  p.  7).  Ponet, 
however, also deals with the subject of  the relation of  political 
authority to God, and in Part 11. he asks the question whether 
kings,  princes, and other governors have an absolute  power 
and  authority  over  their  subjects.  "  Forasmuch  as  those 
that be the rulers in the world, and wolde be taken for Goddes 
(that is, the ministers and images of  God here in earthe . .  .) 
clayme and exercise  an absolute  power  . . . or  prerogative 
to doo  what  they lust, and none may  gaynesaye them;  to 
dispense  with  the  laws  as  pleaseth  them,  and  freely  and 
without correction or offence doe contrary to the lawe of nature 
and other Goddes lawes, and the positive lawes and customes 
of  their countreyes, or breake them : and use their subjectes 
as men doe their beastes, and as lords doe  their villanes and 
bondemen, getting their goods from them by hooke  and by 
aliter  probatur.  Nam  eandem  vim  populari  regimine  plebiscita  obligant 
habent latae leges a rege, ac si ferantur  ipsum  populum : ergo  similiter  leges 
8 iota republica,  ut supra declaratum  regiae  obligant  ipsum regem : et licet 
est.  Sed leges  latae a  republica  obli-  sit  voluntarium  regi  condere  legem, 
gailt  omnes,  ergo  etiam si ferantur a  tamen  non  est  in  voluntate  sua  non 
rege,  obligant  ipsurn regem.  Et con-  obligari, aut obligari.  Sicut in pactis. 
firmatur, quia  in  aristocratic0  princi-  Libere enim  quisque paciscitur,  pactis 
patu,  senatus-consulta  obligant  ipsos  tamen tenetur." 
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crooke,  with  'sic  volo  sic  jubeo,'  and  spending  it to  the 
destruction  of  their  subjectes ; the miserie of  this  tylllc  re- 
quirith to exsmyne whether they doe it rightfully  or wrong- 
fully " (Id. id., Part 11. p. 17). 
He answers the question first by pointing out that political 
authority  was  ordained  by  God  Himself,  to  the  end  that 
justice  should  be  maintained  by  men.  "  Before,  ye  have 
heard how  for  a  long tyme, that is until after the general 
flood, there was no  civille or politike power, and how it was 
first ordayned  by  God  Himself,  and  for  what  purpose  He 
ordayned it : that is (to comprehende all briefly) to mayntene 
justice : for every one, doing his deutie to God,  and one to 
another, is but justice " (Id. id., Part. 11. p. 18). 
It  is,  however,  his  constitutional  principles  which  are 
most fully and emphatically developed.  He asks the question 
again, whether kings and princes have an absolute authority 
over  their  subjects,  and  answers  confidently:  "  Ye  have 
heard also, how States, Bodies politilie, and Commonwealths, 
have  authority  to make  lawes for  the  maintenance  of  the 
Policie, so that they be not contrary to Goddes lawe, and the 
lawes of  Nature,  which if  ye note  well  the question before 
propounded,  whether  kings  and  princes  have  an  absolute 
power,  shall  appear  not doubtful, or  if  any wolde  affirm it, 
that he shall not be able to maintain it "  (Id.  id., Part 11. p. 18). 
And  this  leads  him  to  make  the  same  distinction,  with 
which  we  are  familiar  in  Fortescue,  between  those  States 
which  aro governed by laws made by the prince, and those 
in which the community has retained the legislative power in 
its own  hands.  There are two kinds  of  princes,  "the one, 
who alone maye make positive laws, because the whole State 
and body  of  the country have  geven  and resigned to them 
their authoritie so to do.  Which nevertheless is rather to be 
compted  a  Tiranne than a king. . . . And thother be suche 
unto whom the people have not geven such an authority, but 
keep it themselves ; as we  have before sayed concerning the 
mixte State  (Id. id., Part. 11. p. 21). 
Ponet  recognised  that  the  Roman  Empire  had  tho  first 
character, but this  Empire had long ceased  to exist, and he 
exclaims impatiently, " I beseech thee, what certayntie should 
there be in anything, when all should depend on one's will and 
affectione ? "(Id.  id., Part 11. p. 24). 
He had already pointed  out that it was  just  in order to 
prevent the oppression of  the members by the head, that the 
various constitutional forms had been created in various states : 
Ephors in Sparta, the Tribunes in Rome, $he Council or Diet 
in Germany ; "  in Fraunce and England, Parliamentes, wherein 
there mette and assembled of  all sortes of  people, and nothing 
could  be  done  without  the knowledge  and  consent  of  all" 
(Id. id., Part I. p. 10). 
In a  later  section  of  the  treatise  Ponet  considers  the 
question whether it is lawful to depose a wicked ruler and to 
kill a tyrant, and his answer is very explicit.  He cites the 
deposition  of  Chilperic  by  the  Pope,  the  depositions  of 
Edward  11.  and  Richard  11.  in  England,  and  the  recent 
deposition of  the King of  Denmark, and he  urges  that "the 
reasones,  argumentes  and lawe  that  serve for  the deposing 
and displacing of  an  evil  governour, will doe  as  muche for 
the proofe that it  is lawful  to kill a tiranne " (Id. id., Part 
VI.). 
With special reference to England, he says that it pertained 
to the authority of  the High Constable, ''  not only to summone 
the  king  personally before  the Parliament  or other  Courtes 
of  Judgment  (to answer  and receave  according to  justice), 
but also on just occasion to commit him unto warde 71 (Id. id., 
Part VI.) ; and in more general terms,  LL Kings, princes and 
governours have their  authoritie of  the people, as all lawes, 
usages and policies  declare and testifie . . . and, is any man 
so  unreasonable to denie that the hole  maie do as much  as 
they have permitted one member to doo 4  or those that have 
appointed  an  office  upon  trust,  have  not  authoritie  upon 
juste  occasion  (as the abuse  of  it) to take awaie that they 
gave ? " (Id. id., Part VI.). 
The  only  limitation  he  makes  is  that no  private  person 
may kill the tyrant except by public authority, except in the 
case that the public authority is utterly negligent ; but the 
prince, committing crimes against any of  his people, such as 332  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV. 
CHAP.  I.]  THE  SOURCE  AND  AUTHORITY  OF LAW.  333 
murder, theft, rape,  &c., should be punished  like any other 
criminal (Id. id. id.). 
The  theories  of  Ponet are,  especially in  this  last  part of 
his treatise, developed in terms far removed froin Sir Thomas 
Smith's restrained and judicious  manner, but the substance of 
his constitutional position is the same, and serves to indicate 
the importance in England of  the political tradition of  Bracton, 
Fortescue,  and  St  Germans ;  and  even  some  of  Ponet's 
most drastic contentions were, after all, founded upon political 
traditions which were not unimportant. 
So far we have been  dealing with writings  which  are not 
related to the great political  controversies of  the latter part 
of  the century.  We must now turn to the literature which 
belongs  to these.  We turn to that great Humanist, George 
Buchanan, who  vindicated the deposition of  Mary, Queen of 
Scots.  In his  treatise,  '  Dc Jure Eegni  apud Scotos,'  pub- 
lished in 1578, he  deals first  with  the origin and nature of 
Law, for, as he evidently thought, until this had been made 
clear  it was  not possible  to  discuss properly  the place  and 
authority of  the ruler. 
The treatise is in the form of  a dialogue between Buchanan 
and  a  person  he  calls  Maetellanus  (presumably Maitland). 
God,  he says,  is  the author  of  huinan  society,  and He im- 
planted in man the Law of  Nature, of  which the sum is that 
man  should  love  God  and his  neighbour  as himself ;  it ia 
this Divine Law which is the source of  human society.  This 
society must have an authority to maintain peace and harmony, 
and this authority is that of  the king.  If  the qualities re- 
quired  for  a king were fully  and properly  developed in  one 
man,  we  should  recognise  him  as  king  by  Nature,  not  by 
election, and give him an unrestrained  power ; even if  these 
qualities are not perfect, we  shall still call the ruler king, but 
we  should  give  him  as  conipanion  and  restraint  the  Law. 
"  Metellanus " asks whether, then, Buchanan  does not think 
that the prince should have a complete authority, and Buch- 
anan answers that he should by no means have this, for he 
is not only a king but a i~lsn,  and liable to err through ignorance 
or  sin,  and therefore the wisest men  have thought  that the 
law should be added, to enlighten his ignorance, and to bring 
him back into the right way if  he errs.l 
Buchanan expresses this again in more general terms, and 
says  that kings  were  created  to  maintain  "  aequitas,"  and 
if they had done this they would have retained ail authority 
free  and "  legibus  solutus " ; but,  as is  natural in  human 
things,  the  authority  which  was  intended  for  the  public 
good changed into a "  proud lordship."  Laws therefore were 
made by the people,  and the kings were compelled to  obey 
the law,which the people had created.  They had found, by 
much  experience, that it was  better to entrust  their liberty 
to the law than to the 
The  king  is  subject  to the law, and Ruchenan then  dis. 
cusses the question, who  is  the legislator ?  The  people, he 
says, who  have  conferred  authority  upon  the prince  should 
have the power  to impose a limit upon  this authority.  He 
explains  that he  did  not  mean  that this  power  should  be 
given to the whole mass of  the peoplc, but that, as "  our " 
George Buchanan, '  De Jure Regni 
apucl Scotos.' 
(p. 8) : "  B. Hnec igitur (prudentia), 
si  summa  et  perfecta  in  quopiam 
esset,  tum  natura,  non  suffragiis 
regem  esse  diceremus ;  liberemque 
rerum  omnium  potestatom  ei  tra- 
deremus :  sin  talem  non  reperiamus, 
qui  proxime  ad  illam  eccellentem 
naturae pracstantiam accessorit, simili- 
tudinem  quandam  in  eo  veri  regis 
nmplaxi,  etiam  regem  appellabimus  . . . Et quoniam adversus animi effec- 
tiones,  quae  possunt  et  plerumque 
solent avertere a vero, no satis firmus 
sit, timemus, lcgem ei, velut collegam, 
eut  potius  modcratricem  libidinum, 
adjiciemus. 
&I. Non censes igitur rerum omnium 
arbitrium penes regom csso debere 7 
B.  Minime.  Nam  eum,  non  solam 
regem, sed otiam hominem esse memini, 
multa per ignorantiam errautcm, multa 
sponte peccantem,  multa  prope  invi- 
tum ; q~iippo  nnimal ad omnem favoris 
et  odii  auram  facile  mutabile.  . . . 
Quamobrem  legem  ei  adjnngendam 
censuerunt homines prudentissimi, quao 
vel ignoranti viam ostendat, vel aber- 
rantem  in  viam  reducat.  Ex  hi3 
opinor, intelligis, &s  dv  ~d?ry,  quodnam 
ego veri regis officium esse reor." 
a  Id, id. (p. 8) : "  Illud igitur, quod 
initio diximus, tenere eemper  oportet, 
roges primum  tuendao  aoquitati fuisse 
constitutos.  Id illi si tenere potuissent, 
imperium,  quale  acceperant,  tenere 
perpetuo  potuissent,  hoc  est  liberum 
et legibus solutum.  Sod  (ut humana 
sunt omnia) statu rerum in pejus pro- 
labente, quod  publicae  utilitatis causo 
fuerat constitutum imperium, in super- 
bam  dominationem  vertit.  . . . Legos 
igitur,  hac  do  causa,  inventae aunt  a 
populis,  regesque  coacti,  non  sua  in 
jucliciis  licentia,  sed, quod populus in 
se  dadisset,  jure  uti.  Multis  enim 
edocti erant experimentis, melius liber- 
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custom  is, men  chosen  from  all the '' orders " should  enter 
into counsel with the king, and only after this rrpo,L?o~hevpa 
should the final judgment  be given by the peop1e.l  Maitland 
objected  that  the  people  were  rash  and  inconstant,  and 
says that these advisers will be no better.  Buchanan replies 
that he thinks differently.  For the many not only know more, 
and are wiser than any one of  them, but they are wiser and 
know more than any single person, even if  he excel every one 
of  them in prudence  and intelligence ; the multitude judges 
all questions better than any one man.2 
Buchanan  also  maintains  that  the  interpretation  of  the 
Law must not be left to the judgment  of  the king.3 
We shall return to Buchanan later when we  deal with the 
whole  question of  the position of  the king, but in the mean- 
while it is clear  where he stands with regard  to the source 
and the authority of  the Law.  He is, under his own  terms, 
setting out the normal medimval conceptions. 
We  must  turn to the treatment  of  law  in the great  and 
complex mass of  the political trwts of  the period of  the civil 
wars in France.  The immediate occasion of  these civil wars 
was, no doubt, the question of  religion ; but it is also evident 
that the religious conflict was  the occasion rather  than  the 
cause of  the development of  a very emphatic constitutionalism. 
1  Id.  id.  (p.  13) :  "M.  Quando 
igitur regem  solvere legibus non  licet, 
quis  tandem  est  legislator,  quem  ei 
tanquam  pedagogum  dabimus  ?  . . . 
B. Neminem ergo ei dominum impono, 
sod populo, qui ei imperium in se dedit, 
licere volo,  ut ejus impcrii  modum  ei 
presoribat : eoque jure,  quod  populus 
in  so  dadorit,, ut rex  utatur, postulo. 
Neque has leges per  vim, ut tu inter- 
pretaris imponi volo, sed oommunicato 
cum rege consilio, communiter statuen- 
dum  nrbitror,  quod  ad  omnium  salu- 
tem  communiter  facint.  . . . Ego 
nunquam  existimavi  univorsi  populi 
judicio,  cam  rem  permitti  deberi ; 
sed  ut, propo  ad consuetudinem  nos- 
tmm, ex omnibus ordinihua selecti  ad 
regem  in  concilium coirent.  Deinde, 
ubi apud eos, rpoflo6Aeupa factum esset, 
id ad populi judioium deferetur." 
Id.  id.  (p.  13) :  "  B.  At  ego 
longe aliud ao tu opinaris exspecto. . .  . 
Primum, non omnino verum est, quod 
tu putas,  nihil  ad  rem  facere  multi- 
tudinis  advooationem,  quorum  e 
numero  nemo  fortassis  erit  excellenti 
sapientia praeditus.  Non  enim solum 
plus  vident  et  sapiunt  multi,  quam 
unus quilibot eorum seorsum, sod etiam 
quam unus, qui quemvis eorum ingenio 
et prudentia  praecedat.  Nam  multi- 
tudo fere melius quam singuli de rebus 
omnibus judicat." 
Vd.  id., p.  121. 
It was between the years 1573 and 1579 that there appeared 
several tracts or pamphlets, the ' Remonstrance aux Seigneurs 
GentilshommeS  et  autres,'  the '  Droit  des  Magistrats,'  the 
Franc0 Gallia,' the '  Archon et Politie '  (or '  la Politique '), and 
the '  Vindiciae contra tyrannos17  and others which are related 
to each other in subject-matter and in principles.  The general 
principle, which they seek to assert, is well expressed in the 
' Bemonstrance.'  This  work  is  addressed,  primarily, to the 
nobles and gentlemen  of  the Reformed  Religion  in  France, 
but also to all those Frenchmen who sought the preservation 
of  the kingdom,  and it begins  with the declaration  that the 
name  of  Frenchman  (Francs) was  a  proper  description  of 
men who desired to maintain an honourable liberty under the 
authority of  their kings.l 
It  goes  on  a  little later  to  denounce  the  flatterers  and 
parasites who tell the king that if  he were under the rule and 
order of  the Law he would be nothing but a '  valet " of  the 
people, and to lament the fact that the Courts of  Parlement, 
which were formerly over the kings and resisted their absolute 
power,  were  now  basely  servile  to the commands  of  those 
from  whom  they  expected   reward^.^  The  statement  that 
the king  was  under  and not  over  the  Law,  and  that the 
Parliament was the organ of  the supremacy of  the Law, may 
seem somewhat  extreme, but it should be remembered that 
it is practically  what  had  been  said  in  the  early  years  of 
the sixteenth century by de Seyssel in the '  La Grant Monarchie 
de France.' 
The  same  principle  is  restated  in  the '  Droit  des  Magis- 
trats.'  It  is  the part  of  a  detestable  flatterer,  and not of 
"  Remonstrance  aux  Soigneurs, 
gentils hommes, et autres, faisans pro- 
fession  de  la  Religion  reformee  en 
E'rance,  et tous  autres bons  Franpais 
desirant la conservation de ce royaume." 
(In '  MBmoires  de  l'estat  de  France,' 
Ed. 1676, vol. iii. p.  64.) 
Id.  id.  (p.  73):  "  Voyons  nostre 
roi,  environn6  de  tels  flattereaus  et 
parasites,  qui  pour  lui  gratifier,  oscnt 
dire, que de reduire les Roys 1  la reigle 
et ordre prescrit par les loix c'est autant 
que les faire valots du peuple. . . . 
(p. 74): Lea  cours de  parlement  qui 
anciennement  estoyent  pardessus  les 
Rois,  et  s'opposoient  avec  grande 
integrit6  It  leur  puissances  absolues, 
aujourd'hui se laschent servilement aux 
commandemonts do tous ceux dont  ila 
esperent  proufit." 
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a  loyal  subject,  to tell  the  prince  that  sovereigns are  not 
bound  by  the  Laws.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  bound 
to govern by them,  for  they  have  sworn  to  maintain  and 
to protect  them1  In a  later  passage of  the same work  we 
find  a  good  illustration  of  the  circu~nstances  under  which 
the  Huguenots  thus  appealed  to  the  supreinacy  of  the 
Law.  The  author  admits that subjects have  not  the right 
to force their lord to change the order of  the State in matters 
of  religion, but must submit to persecution, if  the lawa com- 
mand it, for their religion.  It is, however,  wholly different 
if  by  public edicts, lawfully issued  and confirmed by  public 
authority, they haye been permitted to exercise their religion. 
In that case  the prince is  bound  to obey  them, or  by  the 
same authority to revoke them.  Otherwise he is exercising 
a manifest tyranny, and it is lawful, under proper conditions, 
to resi~t.~ 
The same conceptions are restated and further developed in 
the treatise called 'La Politique, Dialogue de l'authoritc! des 
Princes, et de Is libertc! des peuples,' generally cited as 'Archon 
et Politie.'  Tyranny, Politie says, in an hereditary kingdom, 
is when  a legitimate prince is not content with what he has 
1 "  Du  Droit  des  Magistrats " (in 
'  Mirmoires  cle  l'estat  de  France,'  Ed. 
1576),  vol.  ii.  p.  760 : "  Car,  pour 
certain,  c'est  une  parole  tres  fausse, 
et non  ~oinet  d'un  loyal  sujet 8  son 
Prince,  mois  d'un  dirtestable flatteur, 
de  dire  que  les  souverains  ne  sont 
astraints  B  nulles  loix.  Car,  au  con- 
traire, il n'y en a pas une, par laquolle 
il  ne  doyve  et  soit  tenu  de  redor 
son  gouvernement,  puis  qu'il  a  jur6 
d'estre  le mainteneur  et protecteur do 
toutes." 
2  Icl. id. (p. 788): "En tel cas, donc- 
quos,  assavoir,  si  on  veut  forcer  10s 
consciences  d'idolatror,  que  ferons lea 
sujets ?  Certainemdnt,  do  vouloir 
contraindre  leurs  seigneur  iL  changor 
l'estat  public  il  n'y  auroit  ordre : at 
pourtant  il  faut  que  tous  endurent 
paticmment  la  persacution,  co  neant- 
moins servans 8  Dieu,  ou  bien  qu'ils 
se retirent d'ailleurs. 
Mois, les Edits, estans legitimement 
dressez  et  emologuez  par  authorit6 
publique,  par  lesquels  sera  permis 
d'exercer  la  vraye  Religion : je  die 
qoe  le  princo  est  d'autent  plus  tenu 
do  les  observer,  que  nuls  autre,  que 
l'estat do la Roligion est de plus grande 
consequence quo  nu1  autre:  ou  bien 
par mesme ordre, et telle connaissanco 
de cause qu'il  appartient, les rovoquer. 
Sinon, je  did,  qu'il  uae  de  manifesto 
tyrannie,  B  laquelle  il  est  permis  do 
s'opposer,  avec  lea  distinct,ions  ci- 
dossus mentionnees ; voire  par raison 
d'autant  meillenre,  que  nos  ames  et 
nos  consciences  nous  doyvent  estre 
plus  cheres  que  tous  lo8  biena  de  ce 
monde." 
lawfully acquired, but violates the ancient laws and cnstoma 
of  his c0untry.l 
Archon  protests  that  this  is  to  put  the  king  under  the 
law, but there is a sentence in the Pandects which says that 
he is not under the law, though "  par honnestetc? " he should 
carry it out.  For it is he who makes the law, and he does 
not  submit  to it except  so  far as he pleases,  otherwise  hia 
power is not sovereign but bridled and re~trained.~ 
To  this  contention  Politie  replies by  considering  the real 
source of  laws.  He cites the definitions of  law by Papinian, 
Demosthenee, and  Chrysippus  (L Dig.,'  i.  3.  1, and 2), and 
the opinion of Cicero that the deliberation and consent of  the 
commonwealth are implied in tho laws, and that the prince 
must therefore be subject to them.3 
When Archon contends that the Civil Law is composed of 
the ordinances of  princes, and that in all its parts it is subject 
to their power, Politie replies that in general terms the Law 
includes  all  ordinances  which  are  just ;  these  have  been 
formed by the people in their customs.  If they are not suit- 
able, the prince  can  adjust them  to the needs  of  particular 
times and persons, but must not usurp the power to do this 
without the consent of those who are most concerned.*  Archon 
objects that this is very far indeed from the opinion of  many 
kings,  who  consider  that  their  subjects,  their  lives,  and 
property  are  completely  under  their  power.  Politie  agrces 
that they are under their jurisdiction, but only by process of 
"  Archon  ct  Politie,"  in  (' MB- 
moires de l'etat  do France,'  Ed. 1576), 
vol.  iii.  p.  102 : "  Politie.  Mais  celle 
(tyrannie) qui survient on une royaume 
qui  est  tenu  pour  hereditaire,  est, 
quand  un  prince,  lirgitimement  pour- 
venu,  ne  ae  contento  pas  de  ce  qu'il 
trouvo  de  droit  equitable  luy  estre 
acquis,  ains  pour  dominer  plus  seig- 
neurialement  viole  les  anciennes  loix 
et ooutumes de ses pays." 
Id.  id.  (p.  110) :  "Archon.  Tout 
cecy  tend  it  mettre  lo  Roi  sous  la 
lei,  touteffois  il  y  a  un  axiome  anx 
Pmidectes,  qui  clit  qu'il  n'ost  sous  la 
loi,  combion  quo  par  honnestotb,  il 
s'y  doit  ranger.  Par  ainsi, puis  que 
c'est  lui qui la donne, il no s'y  subnlet 
pas  s'il  ne  luy  plait ; 011  autrement 
on  ne  doit pas  nommer sa puissance, 
souveraine, mais bridee et restrainte." 
a  Id.  (p.  110) : "  Politie.  Ciceron 
. . . dit  que  l'cntretenement  et  con- 
soil  de  la  rirpublique  estans  situoz 
dans les loix, faut necea3aircment que 
le  prince  y  soit  sujet:  d'autant  quo 
son autorite soit de 18, st se maintient 
par  closcrite  la consorvation  en icelle."  de justice  qui  eqt 
4  Id. (p. 117). 
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law,l and he adds a reminiscence of  the Feudal Law, that the 
Lord owes the same faith and love to his vassal as the vassal 
to him, and loses his lordship for the same causes and crimes 
as the vassal loses his fief.2 
In  another place the author of  this treatise, like the author 
of  the ' Droit  des  Magistrats,'  appeals  to  the supremacy  of 
the  Law  as  justifying  the resistance  of  the Huguenots  to 
persecution,  when  the  exercise  of  their  religion  had  been 
granted  them  by  formal laws  and edicts ; and he  extends 
this principle  to the general legal rights  of  the people, for, 
as he  says, there  are few  kingdoms  or  principalities  where 
the chief  rulers  are not restrained  by many  laws to which 
they have sworn, when  they were  accepted,  and which  they 
have promised  to the sovereign power  to obey-that  is, to 
the estates which arc formed by the whole body of  the pe~ple.~ 
(We shall have much more to say later of  the conception of  the 
soyereign power which is represented in these words.) 
The best known of  these Huguenot works is the ' Vindiciae 
Contra Tyrannos,' published in 1579.  There has been much 
discussion of  its  authorship, but we  are not here concernecl 
with this but with the judgment  of  the author on the origin 
of  law and its relation to the prince.  His judgment  is very 
clearly  expressed.  Men  would  have  been  satisfied  to have 
received law from one good and just  man, but the judgment 
1 Id. (p. 120) : "  Archon.  Quoy,  10s 
roys  n'ont-11s  pas  puissance  sur  la 
mort et sur la vle do leurs sulets ? 
"  Politlo. Oul  bien,  mals  avec  con- 
nai-sanco  de  cause  ot  informations 
valables, et non autrement " 
"Id  1d. 
a  Id  (p. 128). "  Pol~tle  : Et 81  par 
loix ct edits solennols,  le peuple a obtenu 
de  ses  pnnces  l'exerc~ce de  la  vraye 
Relig~on  , et puis  apres par  mauvals 
consoil,  le  prlnce  se  vout  dcsdlro  et 
ostor  tyranniquement  co  qu'll  avalt 
salnctement  accord6,  lcs  sujets  ont 
double raison de ne luy obeyr en cast 
endro~t,  et  de  conserver  leur  vraye 
hbert6,  par  les  moyeus  16gitimcs sus 
declarez,  dont  nous  parlerons  encore 
apres. 
Cola  se  doit  estendre  aussi  aux 
autres  dro~ts  du  pouple,  lesquels  no 
pouvent  estre  abohs  sans  manifesto 
confus~on  et aneantissemeut des Estats, 
et  A  plus  forte  ralson  quand les  101s 
re~glent  des longtemps la grandeur dos 
prlnces  et  maglstrats  souvoraln.; . 
comme  11  se  trouvera  bien  peu  de 
royaumes  et  pr~nclpautez, dont  1~s 
principaux  gouverneurs  no  soyent llez 
et retenus en l~mites  par beaucoup de 
lois,  queux  mesmos  lurent  A  leur 
recoption,  et promettent  b la  souver- 
a1net6 (c'est  a  dire  aux  Estats com- 
posez  du  corps de  tout le  peuple)  de 
garder invlolablement." 
of kings was too uncertain and variable.  Laws were therefore 
made  by  the wise  men  and the magistrates.  The  principal 
function of  the king is to keep and maintain the law.  It is 
better to obey the law than  the king ; tho law is  the  soul 
of  the king, while the king is the instrument of the law.  The 
law represents the combined reason and wisdom of  the many, 
for  the many  see  and understand  more  than  the  one.  It 
has  thus come about  that while  in the earliest  times  kings 
reigned  absolutely  and  their  will  was  law,  this  now  only 
continues  among  barbarians,  while  the  more  polite  and 
civilised people are bound  by  laws.  We  do  not  accept the 
saying  of  Caracalla  that the emperor  makes  laws  but  does 
not  receive  them ;  rather in  all well-ordered kingdoms  the 
king receives the law from the people, and does not  obtain 
the kingdom  until he  has  promised  to give  every  man  his 
right  ($us) according  to the laws  of  the country.  He can 
only amend or add to the laws when th~s  has been approved 
by  the people,  or  the chief  men  of  the people, formally  or 
informally, called t0gether.l 
'  Vlndlciae Contra Tyrannos ' (Ed. 
Edlnbnrgh,  1579), Q.  111.  (p  114): 
"  Certo  cum  populus  ]us  aequabile 
quorerot,  ~d sl  ab uno  ]usto  et bono 
vlro consequebatur,  eo contentus erat. 
At  qula  vix  id  fieri  poterat,  et raro 
contlngebat ; saepe voro, dum arb~t~la 
Regum, logum Instar essent, evemebat, 
ut aha  alns  loquerentur.  Leges  tum 
quae cum omntbus una eademque voce 
loquuntur,  a  prudont~or~bus  et ceter~s 
magtstratibus  proxlmo  inventae  fuer 
unt.  Reg~bus  vero id preclpua munorls 
commendatur,  ut  legum  custodes, 
mlmstn et conservatoresossent.  Inter- 
dum cham, quia lox IU omnem eventum 
prospicere non  potueret, quaedam  cx 
eadem  aequitate   natural^  supplerent. 
. . . (p  115) Quls vero ambigat, quin 
legl,  quam reg1  parere,  ~d est homlm, 
utll~us  et honestlus sit ?  Lex est bom 
regis anlma  per hanc movetur, sent~t, 
vlv~t.  Rex  leg~s organum  est,  et 
quasl  corpus, per  quod llla  suas  vlres 
exerlt,  sue  munera  obit,  sua  sensa 
oloqu~tur. Anlmao vero, quam corporl 
parere lustus est. 
Lex  est  multorum  prudentum  in 
unum collecta ratlo et saplentla.  Plures 
autom  ocnlatlores  et  persplcaclores 
sunt  quam  unus.  . . . (p.  117) Inde 
vero  pactum  eat,  lnqult  ~dem,  ut 
quum pr~mls  tempor~bus  reges absolute 
Imperarent,  quorum  arbltrmm  lox 
erat,  paulo  post  Inter  polltiores  eL 
civ~llores  passlm leg~tlml  fiereut, ~d  eat, 
log~bus  servand~s  custodlendlsque obh- 
garentur , absoluto  vero llla potostas, 
penes barbarorum  roges  tantum man- 
erot. . . . (p 119) Non  denique  quod 
ipse Caracalla, Imperatoros  legos  dare, 
non acclpcre.  Quln potlus In omnibus 
rcgnis bene const~tut~s,  regom a populo 
leges, quas tuoatur quasquo ~ntucatur, 
acapere.  . . . (p.  121)  Noque  emm 
Imperator,  Rex  Franciae,  Ropes  HIS- 
panlao, Anghae, Poloniae, Hnngarlne et 
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The author of the '  Vindiciae '  adds some important observa- 
tions  on  the  actual or  traditional  practice  of  some  of  the 
more important countries of  Western Europe.  In the empire 
the emperor  a rogat  in  concilio,"  and, if  they approve, the 
princes,  barons,  and  representatives  of  the  cities  sign  the 
decree, and only then  is  the law valid ; the emperor swears 
to observe  the laws  which  have  been  thus  made,  and not 
to make  other  laws  except  with  the common  consent.  In 
France, where the authority of  the king is commonly thought 
to be higher than elsewhere, laws were formerly made in the 
Assembly  of  the three Orders, and all commands of  the king 
were  void,  unless  the  Senate  (i.e.,  the  Parlement) ratified 
them.  In England, Spain, and Hungary  the custom is the 
same as it always was.  He concludes that if  it is true that 
the laws are greater than the king, if  kings  must  obey the 
law as the  slave  does  h~s  master, who  would  not prefer to 
obey the law rather than the king ?  Who would  obey the 
king  if  he  violated  the law, or would  refuse  to defend  the 
law whlch had been violated ? 
These  writers  are  ageed in  maintaining  that  the  king 
was  under  the law  and not  over  it, for his  authority  was 
derived from the law, and the law proceeds ultimately frorn 
prlnclpatum rocipluntur, quam . . . so 
secundnm  leges  patrias  ]us  culque 
buum  reddlturos promlser~nt.  . . . (p. 
122)  In  summa,  prlnclpes  legltimi, 
loges a populo acoipmnt, dladema voro 
honoris,  sceptrum  potostatls,  Inmgne, 
ut  et  acceptas  tueatur  et ex  earum 
praocipua tutcla gloriam slbl quao~ant. 
. . . 61  quid  abrogandum,  surrogan- 
dum, doroganclum,  putabit,  populum, 
popuhve  opt~mates, aut  ordlnanos, 
aut oxtra ord~ne  convocatos, aclmonebit 
logomquo rogab~t  At  sane non  prius 
jubebit,  quam  ab nsdem  r~te  cxpensa 
comprobataqno fuent." 
Id (p 123). "  Imperator rogat pn 
mum  in Comltlls  SI probatur,  Pnn 
clpes,  Barones,  ~lvltatum  logat1  sub- 
signent ac demum  lox  rata osse solot. 
Jurat voro se logos (p. 124) latas serva. 
turum, et novas non  nls~  do  communi 
consensu, ullas laturum. .  In Francis, 
ubi  tamen ampl~sslma  vulgo  censetur 
regum  auctontas,  ferebantur  olim 
loges  In  trium  ordinum  conventu, 
regiove consiho ambulatorio.  Ex quo 
vero  Parlamontum  statarium  est, 
frustra  sunt omma  regum  edlcta,  nl 
sonatus  illa  comprobet,  cum  tamen 
senatus  sou  Parlamenti  aresta,  31  lox 
dcs~t, legis  vim  passlm  obtineant 
Et in  Angllro, Hispaniro,  Hungarico, 
et  caotor~s  idem  Iurls  est,  ut  et  In 
antiquls  quoque  fult. . .  Quod  sl 
vero,  ut  ostcndimus,  logos  rcglbus 
pot~ores  sunt, si reg09 legibus, ut servl 
dominls,  parere  tencntur,  quis  non 
legi,  quam  reg1  perore  maht  ?  quls 
reg1  legom  violant1 obsoquatur.  Quls 
v~olatao  auxlllum ferre recuset  1 " 
the community.  They  admit that, in the earliest  stages  of 
human  life,  men  may  have  submitted to the  authority  of 
rulers, uncontrolled  by law ; but they found long ago that it 
was  imposs~ble  to  submit  to  the  arbitrary  and  capricious 
rule of  one man, and this only now survives among barbarous 
and uncivilised people ; and, as we have just seen, the author 
of  the '  Vindiciae ' asserts this principle  of  the supremacy of 
the Law of  the community  as representing the normal con- 
ception of the greater European countr~es. 
It  may be suggested  that these writers  wero  Protestants, 
though, as we have observed,  there is nothing in these con- 
tentions  which  represents  an  appeal  to  distinctively  Pro- 
testant  opinions.  We turn, therefore,  to a  group of  writers 
who belonged to the Order of  the Jesuits. 
We begin with Molina, an important Spanish Jesuit, whose 
work,  ' De  Justitia  et Jure,'  was  published  in  1592.  He 
maintains  that the Light  of  nature teaches  that it is in the 
power  of  the commonwealth  to entrust authoaty over itself 
to onc  or more persons,  as it judges  best.  This authority is 
greater  or  less  according  to its judgment,  and if  the ruler 
endeavours to exercise more authority than is given to him, 
he acts tyrannica1ly.l 
Having  thus  set out clearly  the source and limits  of  the 
authority of  the ruler,  Molina  approaches the subject  with 
which  we  are here immediately concerned-that  is, the con- 
ditions of  the legislative authority. 
One of  the functions of  the king is to make laws, but the 
questlon  must  be  considered  whether  the  people  gave  hini 
the power  to make laws only with their approval, or without 
Molina,  '  De  Justatla  et  Jure,' 
vol  i ,  Tract  il.,  Disp  23 : "  Lumen 
lpsum  naturae  docet,  In  relpubllcac 
arbitno  osse  positum,  oommittero 
al~cui,  vol  aliqu~bus,  regimen et potes- 
tatem supra se ipsum,  prout  voluerit, 
expocl~reque  jud~cavent.  . . . (3) Cum 
autem potestas a repubhca  in rectores 
derlvetur,  pro  IPRIUS relpubl~cae  arb]- 
tratu,  poterit  sane  In  unaquaque 
re~pubhcae  specle, derivarl amplior, et 
minus  ampla,  neque  ost  malor  In 
re~publicae  rectorlbus quam a republ~ca 
fuerlt  1111s  concessa.  Quln  potiu~,  81 
rectores  eam  extendant,  maioremque 
slbi  usurpant,  in  tyrannidem  per  In 
jnstitlam, quamea in parte comm~ttunt, 
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it ; and Molina thinks that if  it is the custom that laws have 
no  force unless they are approved by the people, it must be 
assumed  that the commonwealth  only  granted  to the king 
the legislative power, subject to this condition ; for it is more 
probable that the king increased his power, the subjects not 
venturing to resist, than that they had dlmlnished the power 
which  they  had  given  him.  If, as  Castro  suggested,  thc 
custom was that the commonwealth should obey all the laws 
of  the prince which were  not  actually unjust, it would have 
to be  concluded that it had granted all its authority to the 
king, but it could scarcely be believed that any commonwealth 
had  done this.l  Molina's  principle  seems  to be  clear, that 
it is  almost  incredible that the commonwealth should  have 
completely  surrendered  all  that  authority,  which  originally 
belonged  to it, to the ruler. 
It must not indeed be supposed that Molina was an enemy 
of  monarchy ; indeed,  he  clearly  holds  that it is  the best 
form of  government, for it tends more to internal peace than 
any other form,2  and he  maintains  that the authority of  the 
monarch  is  greater,  not merely  than  that of  individuals  m 
the commonwealth, but than that of  the whole commonwealth 
-that  is, within  the limits of  the authority whlch has been 
granted to him.3  But again, it must  be  observed  that this 
authority is limited, and if  the king  attempts to take more 
1 Id. id.  id, Tract n.,  D~sp  23,  6 : 
"  Cum potestate regia ad rempublicam 
moderandam  conluucta  est  potestas 
foroudi  leges,  qulbus  gubernetur. . . . 
Si namque usus habeat, ut tales leges 
vim nou habeant, nisi a populo appro 
bentur,  censendum  est  rempubIlcam 
nou  maiorem potestatem reglbus con 
cesslise, quam  condendi eas  leges  de- 
pendentes  ab  approbatlone  popul~ 
Verlslmile esto, si popull  ad  id adver 
terunt, non maiorem potestatem reglbus 
concesslhse ; imo esto non adverterent, 
baec vldetur fuisse re~publicae  Intentlo, 
s~bl  regem  coust~tucntls,  quendo ahud 
non  expresslt,  semperque  est  pot~us 
presumendum  regem  per  potentiam 
ampllasse  suam  potestatem,  subditls 
non  audent~bus  reslstere,  quam  sub- 
dltos restrlnxisse  1111  potestatem semel 
concessam.  Quare fas erit re~publlcae 
non  acceptare leges, quae ipsam nota- 
blllter  gravent,  quando  ad  commune 
bonum  necessanae  omnino  non  sunt. 
Quod sl princeps  ad id eam coglt, in- 
lust~t~am  committet.  Si  vero,  lnqu~t 
Castrus, usus receptus habeat, ut leg]- 
bus  prluclpum  non  in~qu~s  omnlno 
paleatur, censendum est, rempubllcam 
omnem  omnlno suam potestatem  reg1 
concesslsse, quod  vix  de  allqua  credl 
potest." 
Id ~d.  ~d.,  Tract I]., Disp.  23, 14. 
Id  ld  ld ,  Tract n., DIR~  23, 8. 
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than had been granted to him, the commonwealth is entitled 
to resist him as s tyrant.l 
Molina  very emphatically  maintains that the royal power, 
or  any other  supreme  civil power  which  the commonwealth 
may create, is derived immediately from the commonwealth, 
and only "  mediately " from God.  For it is by the natural 
light and the authority which God has granted to the common- 
wealth  that it should choose that form of  civil power which 
it thinks most expedient.=  He adds that there always remain 
two powers : one in the king, the other in the commonwealth. 
The latter is indeed restrained in action, so long as the former 
continues,  but restrained  only  as far as the commonwealth 
has granted power  to the king.  If this power is abolished, 
the commonwealth resumes its whole power ; and even while 
it continues,  the  commonwealth  can  resist  the  king  if  he 
behaves unjustly or exceeds the power granted to him.3 
It is clear that Molina  does not acknowledge any absolute 
"  Divine  Right,"  or  indeed  any  form  of  absolutism.  His 
language  is  grave  and  measured,  but  his  conclusions  are 
1 Id.  id  ~d.,  Tract ii., Dlsp.  23,  10 : 
"Si  tamen  rex  potestatem  slb~  non 
concessam,  vellet  assumere,  posset 
quidem respubllca ei tanquam tyranno 
ea  in  parte,  resistere,  perinde  ac 
cuivis  alter1 extraneo,  qul  relpublicae 
inlur~am  vellet ~nferre. Ratlo Vera est, 
quia neque rex ea in parte est reipub- 
licae  superior,  neque  respubllca  est 
1110  lnfer~or  . sed manet, ut se habeat, 
antequam  1111  unam  concederet potes- 
tatem " 
Id. id.  ~d.,  Tract ii.,  Disp.  23,  4: 
"  Dlcendum  est tamen  cum  Durando. 
. . .  Tum  regiam  tum  quamvis  aliam 
supremam  civilem  potestatem,  quam 
pro  arbitratu  respubllca  sib1  elegerit, 
esse immediate a republics, et mediate 
a  Dm, per  lumen  naturale et potes- 
talem  quam  reipubllcae  concessit,  ut 
sib1 del~goret  ~lvllom  potestatem  prout 
vellet,  expedireque  judmaret.  Quare 
descendit  a  lure  natural],  est  tamen 
slmpllc~ter  de lure humano re~publicae, 
pro  arbitratu  sib1  deligentis,  non 
solum  personam  aut  personas  qmbus 
tribmt potestatem, sod  etiam modum, 
quantltatem, ac durationem talls potes- 
tatis." 
Id  ~d ~d , Tract  11  ,  Disp  26,  6 : 
"  Nili~lom~nus  negandum  non  est 
manere  duas  potestates,  unam  in 
Rege,  alteram  vero  quasi  habitualcm 
In  repubhca,  lmpeditam  ab  aciu, 
lnter~m  dum illa alia potestas perdurat, 
et tantum praecise impeditam,  quen- 
tum respubllca  Independenter  In  pos- 
terum  a  se  Reg1  1111  eam  concessit. 
Abolita vero  ea  potsstate  potest  lee- 
pubhca  lntegre  utl  sua  potestate. 
Praeterea,  illa  perdurante,  potest 
respubllca  1111  resistere,  sl  allquid 
lnjuste  in  rempublicam  committat, 
llmitesve  potestatls  61bi  coucessae  ex- 
cedat.  Potest  etlam  respubllca  exer- 
cere ~mmed~ate  quemcunque usum suae 
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clear.  He does not indeed refer directly to the constitutional 
traditions  of  Spain,  as we  shall presently  see, that Mariana 
does, but it is at least  probable that he has them in mind. 
He believes in monarchy, but a monarchy of  limited powers- 
limited  by  the  conditions imposed  by  the  commonwealth; 
and that these limitations  can be enforced by  the action  of 
the commonwealth.  The terms in which he states his argu- 
ments and conclusions are, no  doubt, much more restrained 
than those of  George Buchanan,  or of  the French Huguenot 
pamphlets, but the principles are the same.  The community 
is the immediate source of  all political and legislative authority, 
and the king has only a limited authority which is determined 
by the conditions under which the community has granted it. 
From Molina we  turn to  Suarez, one of  the most famous 
Jesuit writers of  that time.  The most important of  his works 
for our purpose, '  De  Legibus ac De Legislatore,' was  indeed 
only  published  in  1613, but  it appears  to  us  that it may 
reasonably be put alongside the work of  Molina. 
The authority to make law, he says, from its very nature, 
resides not  in  one  man  but in the community, for  all men 
are by nature born free, and no man therefore has by nature 
jurisdiction  or  lordship  over  other  men,  and  he  repudiates 
the  conception  that  political  authority  was  bestowed  im- 
mediately by G0d.l  He is  careful indeed to point  out that 
it is  not any chance body  of  men without  order  or  definite 
purpose  which  has  this authority, but a community united 
by  the  common  consent  and  special  intention  to  form  a 
political and mystical body and to pursue one political end.2 
1 Suarez, '  De  Legibus ac De Legis-  andi  seu  regendi  politice  homines. 
latore,'  iii.  2,  3 :  "Dicendum  ergo  nulli  homini  in  particulari  data  est 
est,  hanc  potestatcm  (condendi legis),  immediate  a Deo . . . (4). Hino facile 
ex  sola  rei  natura  in  nullo  singulari  concluditur  altera  pars  assertionis, 
homiue  existere,  sed  in  hominum  nimirum,  potestatem  hanc  ex  solius 
collectione"  (he  cites  St  Thomas  juris  natura  esse  in  hominum  com- 
Aquinas, i. 2. 90, 3, and i. 2. 97,  3) . . .  munitate." 
"Ratio  prioris  partis  evidens  est,  Id. id., iii.  2, 4: "Alio  ergo mod0 
quae  in  principio  est  tacta,  quia  ex  consideranda  est hominum multitude, 
natura  rei  omnes  homines  nascuntur  quatcnus  speciali voluntate  sou  com- 
liberi,  et  ideo  nullus  habet  jurisdic-  murli  consensu in unum  corpus politi- 
tionom  politicam  in  alium,  sicut  nec  cum  congregantur  uno  societatis  vin- 
dominium. . . .  Potestas  ergo  domin-  culo, et ut mutuo se juvent  in ordine 
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This community has  the power  to transfer its jurisdiction 
to one person, but the nature and form of the authority thus 
created  is  created  by  human  will.  Suarez  seems  to  prefer 
monarchy,  but he  seems  to  think  that  this  may  often  be 
combined  with  other  forms of  political  authority;  and  he 
adds  a  little  later that  while  a  monarchy  may  be  strictly 
hereditary, it also has first been derived from the community, 
and is  subject  to  those  conditions  under which  it was  first 
created.l 
He had already said that political authority was not given 
by  God  to  any  one  man  directly;  he  corrects  this  by 
saying that God  had  only  done this in  rare cases, but that 
generally when the Scriptures say that God gave the kingdom 
to  some  definite  person,  this  only  meant  that  the  Divine 
Providence  had  so  ordered  or  permitted,  and  this  did  not 
exclude human acti~n.~ 
ad  unum  finem  politicum,  quomodo 
efficiunt unum corpus mysticum, quod 
moraliter  dici  potest  per  se  unnm ; 
illudque  consequentes  indigent  uno 
capite." 
'  Id.  id.,  iii.  3,  8 : "  Communitas 
autem  humana  potest  suum  jurisdic- 
tionem  transferre  in  unam  personam, 
vel aliam communitatem . . ." 
iii.  4,  1. : "  Ex dictis  in  supcriore 
capite  possumus  aliqua  inferre. . . . 
Primum est, quod  licct  haec potestas 
absoluta sit de jure  naturae, determi- 
natio ejus ad certum modum potestatis 
et regiminis  est  ex  arbitrio  humano. 
Declaratur ;  nam  triplex  est  politica 
gubernatio  simplex,  Monsrchia  . . . 
Aristocratia  . . . Democratia.  Ex 
quibus  confici  possunt  varii  modi 
gubernationis  mixte, seu composite ex 
illis  simplicibus  per  participationem 
vel omnium, vel  duorun ex illis. . . ." 
iii. 4,  3 : "  Qua  propter  necesse est 
ut primus  (Rex) habucrit  potestatem 
supremam  immediate  a  republica : 
successores autcm illius ab illa .  b ant 
mediate  et  radicaliter.  Et quia  re8 
transit  ad  successorem  cum  suo 
onere,  conditiones  illae  cum  qu bus 
primus rex a republica regnum accepit, 
ad  successores transeunt, ita  ut  cum 
eisdem oneribufl  regnum habeant." 
'  Id.  id.,  iii.  4,  2 :  "  Ratio  ex 
dictis est, quis haec potestas ex natura 
rei  est  immediate  in  communitate ; 
ergo  ut  iste  incipiat  esse  in  aliqua 
persona, tanquam in supremo principe, 
necesse  est,  ut  ex  consensu  com- 
munitatis  illi  tribuatur.  Deinde  ex- 
plicatur a sufficiente partium enumera- 
tione:  nam  haec  postestas  potest 
intelligi  data  regibus  immediate  ab 
ipso Deo,  sed hoc,  licet aliquando  sit 
factum  ut in  Saul, et Davide, tamen 
illud  fuit  extraordinsrium,  et  super- 
naturale  quoad  modum;  iuxta  com- 
munem autem, et ordinariam providen- 
tiam  non  ita  fit,  quia  homines iuxta 
naturae  ordinem  non  revelationibus, 
sed  quae naturali  civilia sunt.  ratione  . .  reguntur  . . . . in  . .  his  . 
Neque  obstat  quod  scriptura  inter- 
dum  dicit, Deum dare  regna. . . . In 
his enim solum significatur, haec omnia 
non  fieri sine speciali providentia  Dei, 
vel  ordinantis  vel  permittentls. . . . 
Hoc  tamen  non  excludit  quin  per 
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The  first  important  aspect  of  Suarez'  political  theory  is 
then  clear.  The  community  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all 
political authority, and therefore of  Law, and the conception 
that the authority of  the prince was directly derived from God, 
while it may have been  true in  some exceptional cases, was 
not normally true ; normally his authority was  derived from 
the community,  and was  subject  to such  conditions as the 
community may have imposed. 
We  turn to another  question  whcn  we  consider the prin- 
ciples of  Suarez with regard  to the legislative power  of  the 
prince when  he  has  been created by the community.  It is, 
however, not at all easy to arrive at a quite clear conception 
of  his position, and we give our opinion subject to correction. 
In one place he says that the power  of  making laws belongs 
to all  supreme kings,  but  this  is  subject  to the conditions 
under  which  the power  was  given  him  by  the community. 
We  must  therefore  ask  whether  the consent  of  the  people 
ifi  required when the king makes law.  Suarez seems to us to 
answer that in principle, and normally this power belongs to 
the king  alone, but custom may  require  the consent  of  the 
peop1e.l 
In another place he says that in some countries the absolute 
power  of  making laws, as it was  said, was  not given  to the 
king, but that he could only do this with the consent of  the 
kingdom,  expressed in  public  assemblies, and this  was  said 
to be the case in Aragon.  But in other countries the power 
of  the prince  was  not  thus limited ; and this was  the case 
"  in perfecta  monarchialv for  in  this the people  transferred 
1 Id.  id.,  iii.  9,  2 : "  Primo  ergo 
constat  ex  dictis,  hanc  potestatem 
(condendi leges) esse in omnibus regibus 
supremis. . . . 
4.  Atque  hinc  sequitur  secundo, 
etiam  in  principe  supremo  esse  hanc 
potestatem  eo  mod0  et sub ea  condi- 
tione,  sub qua  data est,  et translata 
per  communitatem.  Ratio  est  clara 
ex  superioribus  dictis,  quia  haec  est 
veluti  conventio  quaedam  inter  com- 
munilatrm  et  principrm,  et  ideo 
potestas  recepta  non  excedit  modum 
donationis  vel  conventionis.  . . . Et 
juxta  hoc  etiam  definiendum est,  an 
requiritur consensus populi ad ferendas 
hujusmodi leges, quando scilicet, popu- 
lus  per  reges  gubernatur.  Nam  per 
se loquendo, et jure  communi, potestas 
legislativa  proprie est in solo supremo 
principe.  . . . Juxta  consuetudinem 
autem, requiri potest consensus populi, 
saltem  quoad  acceptionem,  de  quo 
infra  vidobimns." 
its power  absolutely.  Suarez seems to mean  that this  was 
the ordinary character of monarchical auth0rity.l 
Finally, we  must ask what Suarez held about the relation 
of  the prince to the law when made, but again it is difficult 
to  feel  confident  that  we  understand  his  meaning.  He is 
aware that some think that the prince or legislator, whether 
~cclesiastical  or Civil, is bound  to obey his own laws ; and 
he seems to mean that it is the will of  God that the legislator 
should be bound  by  his  own  laws, but he refuses  to accept 
the interpretation  of  the phrase  that the prince is  legibus 
.  solutus " as  applying  only  to  some  "leges  caducarii " (as 
Cujas  maintained 2),  and explains  it  as  meaning  that  the 
prince is exempt from the  via legum coactiva."  3 
It  must,  however, be  observed  that  just  as  St Thomas 
must  be  understood  as  rr'eaning  that  while  there  was  no 
ordinary  process  of  law  against  the  king,  the  community 
has  the right and power  to restrain  him  or, if  need  be,  to 
depose him  if  he  becomes a tyrant, so Suarez had said in an 
earlier passage  of  this treatise  that the king  cannot be  de- 
1 Id.  id.,  iii.  19,  6 : ''  In  primo  similiter  affirmari  potest,  nisi  ubi  ex 
notanter dixi, '  in supremo legislatore,'  consuetudine constiterit." 
quia inferior magistratus potest habere  "f.  pp.  315-318. 
facultatem limitatum, sub tali vel tali  Id. id.,  iii.  35,  4:  "  Nihilominus 
limitatione.  Imo  in  aliquibus  pro-  communis  et  constans  sententia  est, 
vinciis,  licet  per  reges  gubernentur,  teneri  principem,  seu  legislatorem, 
dicitur  non  esse  translats  in  regem  tam  civilem  quam  ecclesiasticum,  ad 
absoluta  potestas  ferendi  leges,  sed  servaudas suas leges, quando  materia 
solum  consensu  regni  in  comitiis  communis et ejusdem rationis est in ipso 
ejus, ut dicitur esse in regno Aragoniae.  et in aliis. . . . 
. . . Nam ibi  supremus  logislator non  11. Deus  autem  non  solum  ut 
est solus rex, sed rex cum regno.  auctor  gratiae,  sed  etiam  ut  auctor 
Ubi  autem  tale  pactum  non  inter-  noturae  vult,  legislatorem  humanum 
ceesit inter regem et populum, nec do  non  habere  potestatem  ad  ferendas 
ill0 potest usu aut scripta lege constare,  leges,  nisi  cum  universali  obligation0 
non est data principi potestas cum illa  illarum,  qua  totam  rempublicam  ut 
limitatione,  sed  absolute  constituitur  constantem ex corpore et capite com- 
caput reipublicae.  Et ita servatur  in  prehendat."  . . . 
perfeota  monarchia,  in  quo  suprema  27. He  repudiates  the  conception 
potestas est in imperatore vcl rege, vel  that the phrase '  legibus solutus ' only 
quocunque  alio,  qui  in  temporalibus  applied to '  leges caducarii.' . . . 
non  habet  superiorem : nam  in  illum  28. "  Vera ergo est communis inter. 
transtnlit  populus  suam  potestatem  pretatio,  qua8  leges  has  intellegit  de 
absolute et simpliciter, ut ex ordiuario  exceptione principis a  vi  legu~n  coac. 
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prived  of  his power unless he becomes a tyrant, but that, if 
this happened, the kingdom could justly make war upon him? 
Suarez clearly agrees with Molina in repudiating the theory 
of  the  Divine Right " and recognising that the community 
is the immediate source of  all political and legislative authority, 
and has the power to determine the form of  this, according to 
its own judgment.  But he is not so clear about the question 
whether  the community normally  retains  a  share in legisla- 
tion.  As  we  understand  him, he inclines to tho view  that 
normally this belongs to the prince. 
We  turn  to a  more  determined  constitutional  thinker in 
Mariana, also a member of  the Society of Jesuits, whose work, 
'  De Rege,'  was brought out in 1598.  He conceived of  men 
as having originally been without any fixed order  or society, 
but as having been driven into society by their own weakness, 
by  their  deplorable  confusions,  and by  the  crimes  of  men 
against each other.2 
Thc  first  government  of  the  community  was  that  of  a 
king, appointed for his good qualities, and at first there were 
no  laws.3  These  were  finally  made  because  men  doubted 
the  justice  and  impartiality  of  the  prince,  while  the  law 
always speaks with the same voice.  Mariana adds an important 
description of  law : it is reason drawn from the mind of  God, 
and free from all changeableness, which enjoins things honour- 
able and useful, and forbids what is contrary to them4 
It  must  not  be  thought  that Mariana  was  an enemy  of 
monarchy ; on the contrary, he carefully discusses the advan- 
tages  and disadvantages of  monarchy,  and concludes that it 
is the best form of  government, provided that it is of  a con- 
stitutional kind.5  We shall deal with the meaning of  this in 
1 Id. id., iii. 4, 6 : "  Et  eadem ratione 
non  potost  rex  illa  potestate  privari, 
quia verum illius clominium acquisivit, 
nisi  fortassc  in  tyrannidem  dcclinet, 
ob quam possit regnum justum  bellum 
contra illum agere." 
Mariana, ' De Rege,'  i.  1. 
Id. id., i. 2 (p. 18). 
Id. ill.,  i.  2  (p.  18) : "  Scribendi 
leges  duplex  causa, extitit.  Principis 
aequitate in suspicionem vocata,  quod 
unus  vir  non  praestabat  ut  pari 
studio omlies complecterctur, ira odio- 
que  vacaret:  leges sunt  promulgatae, 
quae cum  omnibus semper atque una 
voce  loquerentur.  Est enim lax ratio 
omni  pcrturbatione  vacua,  a  monte 
divina  hauste,  honesta  et  salutaria 
proscribens, prohihmsque contraria." 
Id. id., i. 2 (pp. 19-27). 
n  later  chapter.  In the meanwhile  we  are concerned  with 
the relation of  the king to the Law, and on this point Mariana 
says  very  emphatically  that  when  the  monarchy  is  con- 
trolled by Law, nothing can be better ; when it is free from 
that control, nothing can be worse.1 
The authority  of  the king is derived  from the people ; it 
is  they  who  determine  the  laws  of  succession,  and  they 
have &ven him  an authority restrained  by the laws.2  And, 
in  another  place,  Mariana  says  the  prince  must  show  an 
example  of  obedience  to  the  laws : no  one  may  disobey 
them, least of  all the king.  He may indeed, if  circumstances 
require it, propose now laws, may interpret and mitigate old 
ones, and may provide for cases not determined by the law. 
To  overturn  laws at his  pleasure,  to show no  reverence  for 
tho customs  and ordinances of  the country, is the pecaliar 
vice  of  the tyrant;  legitimate  princes  may  not  behave  as 
though they had obtained an authority free  from the laws.3 
The prince  should remember  that most  laws  have not been 
made by the prince, but by the will of  the whole common- 
wealth,  whose  authority  in  commanding  and  forbidding 
'  Id.  id.  id.  (p.  23) : "  Ad  haec, 
constri~to  1cgit)us prinoipatu  nil~il  cst 
mclius ; soluto,  nulla  postis  gravior ; 
et  est  arymentum  opprossae  por 
tyrannidcm reipublicae, oum contemp- 
tis legibus ad rectoris nutum vertitur." 
Id. id.,  i.  3  (p.  36) : "  Praescr- 
tim cum leges successionis mutare non 
ojus  (regis) sed  rcipublicae  est,  qua0 
imperium dedit iis legibus constricturn. 
Id. id., i.  4  (p. 38) : Legcs, quibus 
constriota est succossio, mutarc ncmini 
licet,  sine  populi  voluntate,  a  quo 
pondent jura regnandi. 
Id. id.,  i.  5 (p. 44): Rex  quam  a 
subditis  accepit  potostatem,  singulari 
modestia  exercit.  . . . Sic  fit,  ut 
subclitis non tanquam servis dominetur, 
quod  faciunt  tyranni  sed  tanquam 
liberis praesit : et qui a populo potes- 
tatem accepit." 
Id. id.,  i.  9 (p.  79) : "  Postremo 
sit  principi  persuasum,  legcs  sacro- 
sanctas, quibus publioa salus stat, tum 
rlemum  fore  stabiles  si  suo  ipse  eas 
exemplo sanciat.  Ita ergo vitam  in- 
stituat,  ut  neque  quemquam  alium 
plus legibus valere patiatur, eum enim 
fas  jusquo  legibus  contineatur  in 
omni vitae  parte,  qui  leges  violat,  a,b 
aequitate  discedat,  et  a  probitato, 
nocesso  est ; quod  nulli  conceditur. 
Regi  multo  minus.  . . . Licobit 
quidcm  regibus,  rebus  exigentibux, 
novas loges rogare, interprctari voteres 
atque  omollirc,  supplcre  si  quis 
eventus  loge  comprehensus  non  est . 
Pro suo tamon arbitratu legos invertere, 
ad  suam  libidinem  st  commodum 
rrferre  quao  agit  omnia,  nulln  moris 
patrii  institutorumve  revorentin,  pro. 
prium tyrannorum esse vitium credat : 
neque in legitimos principes cadore ita 
se gerere, ut legibus solutam  potesta- 
tem obtinere et exercere videantur." 350  THE LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV. 
is  greater  than  that of  the prince,  and as  the  prince  must 
obey the laws, he may not change these without the consent 
and decision of  the whole body (L'  universitas ',).I 
In another  chapter,  which  deals more generally with  the 
relation  of  the authority of  the king to that of  the common- 
wealth, he not only contends that the authority of  the king 
is limited by the laws, but refers to the constitution of  Aragon 
as  providing  a  special  officer,  the  justitia,"  who  had 
been  created  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  the  king  by 
the  authority  of  the  law,  and  even  as  sanctioning  the 
principle  that  the  chief  men  could  meet  together  without 
the knowledge of the king for the purpose of  maintaining the 
laws and defending their liberty.2 
We turn to a greater, more massive, more restrained political 
thinker  in  Richard  Hooker.  It  may  indeed  be  doubted 
whether  any  political  thinker  of  the  sixteenth  century  is 
equal to him in breadth and justice of  thought.  It is true that 
his work was concerned primarily with law as related to the 
Church and Church order, but, like Gratian and Aquinas, he 
rccognised  that it, was  impossible to form an adequate con- 
ception of  Church law without taking into account the prin- 
ciples of law in general.  It is true also, as we shall point out in 
later chapters, that he said much  which is of  great import- 
'  Id.  id.,  i.  9  (p.  81) : "  Praeser- 
tim, quum plures leges non  a principe 
latae  sint,  sed  universae  reipublicae 
voluntate  constitutae :  cujus  major 
auctoritas  jubendi  vetandique  cst 
majus  imperium  quam  principis ;  si 
vcra sunt, quae superiore disputatione 
posuimus.  Atque iis legibus non mod0 
obedire princeps  debet, sed neque oas 
mutare licebit,  nisi  universitatis  con- 
sensu certaqne sontcntia." 
Id. id., i.  S  (p. 69) : "Me  tamen 
auctore, quarido regia potestas, si legi- 
tima eat, a civibus ortum habet, iis con- 
cedentibus primi reges in quaque repub- 
lica in rerum fastigio collocati sunt ;  eam 
leglbus et sanctionibus  circumscrlbent 
no  sese  nimio  eflcrat,  luxuriet  in 
subditorum  perniciem,  degenerotque 
in  tyrannidem.  . . . Idem  recentiori 
memoria  in  Hispania  Aragonii  prao- 
siterunt, studio tuendae libortatis acres 
at incitati, ncque ignari a parvis initiis 
multum imminui jura  libortatis.  Med- 
ium  itaque  magistratum  crearunt, 
tribunitiae  potestatis  ad instar  (vulgo 
hoc tempore Aragoniae Justitia dicitur) 
qui  legibus,  auotoritate  et  populi 
studiis  armatus  regirtm  potestatem 
certis hactenus finibus inclusam tenuit : 
ac  procoribus  praesertim  crat  datum, 
ut  fraudi  non  esset,  si  quando  inter 
se  consilio  cornmunicato  per  caurarn 
tuendarum  legum,  defendendae  liber- 
tatis, inscio rege, conventus haberent." 
ante with  regard  to the political  order  in  general,  but  his 
conception of  this is dominated by his conception of  law. 
Hooker  was  a  great  and  independent  thinker,  but  his 
independence  consisted  not  in  ignoring  the  past  and  the 
great political writers of  the past, but in gathering together 
and  putting  into  clear  and  intelligibly  ordered  form  the 
principles and implications of  the past, not as one  who  was 
bound and restricted by its authority, but as one who thought 
out  again for  himself  tho  great  principles and traditions  of 
mediaeval society.  For it is indeed  perhaps  the most inter- 
esting  aspect  of  his  work  that  he  repeated,  restated,  and 
enlarged the normal  conceptions of  the political civilisation 
of  mediaval Europe and handed them  down  to the modern 
world. 
It is, we  think, clear that it is from  St Thomas Aquinas 
that, directly  or indirectly, Hooker took the analysis of  the 
general nature of  law, and he therefore accepted the division 
of  law in the most general sense into the Eternal Law of  God, 
the Natural Law, the Divine Law, and Human Law. 
His definition of  the Eternal Law is : "  This law therefore 
we  may  name Eternal, being that order  which  God, before 
all  ages, has  set down  with  Rimself  to do  all  things  by." l 
This law is not a mere command of  God's  will,  but the ex- 
pression of  His  wisdom.  <'  They err therefore who think  of 
the will of  God to do this or that, there is no reason besides 
Eis will . . . That law Eternal which God Himself hath made 
to  Himself  . . . that law  in  the  admirable  frame  whereof 
shineth with  most  perfect  beauty,  the countenance  of  that 
wisdom  which hath testified concerning herself.  '  The  Lord 
possessed  me in the beginning of  His  way,  even before  His 
works of  old I was set up.' " 
This is clearly in substance the same judgment  as that of 
St Thomas  Aquinas : "  Et secundum  hoc,  lex  eterna  nihil 
aliud ost, quam ratio  divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est 
directiva omnium actnum, et motionum." 
R.  Hoolrer,  '  Of  the  Laws  of  St  Tllomas  Aquinas,  Summa 
Ecclesiastical Pollty,' i.  2,  6.  Thoologica,' i.  2. 93, 1. 
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When  Hooker  turns  to the Natural  Law  he follows  the 
same tradition by saying that while all things were governed 
by the Eternal Law, the relation to this of  the rational crea- 
ture differed from  that of  the unrationalal  By the law  of 
nature, therefore, Hooker means the law which man's  reason 
recognises  as binding  upon  him ; and it might  properly  be 
called  the law of  rea~on.~  This  is practically  the same  as 
Aquinas7 ('  lex  naturalis  nihil  aliud  est  quam  participatio 
legis aeternae in rationali creatura." 
We  go  on  to the question  of  human law.  This brings us 
to the conception of  the nature and purpose of  the Common- 
wealth or State.  Hooker's conceptioil of  the origin of  political 
society  is  expressed  in a  well-known  passage : "  The  laws 
which have been hitherto mentioned  (i.e., the Natural Laws) 
do bind men absolutely evcn as they are men, although they 
have never any settled fellowship, nor any solemn agreement 
among themselves what to do or not to do.  But, forasmuch 
as we  are not by ourselves  supplied with competent store of 
things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life 
fit  for the dignity  of  man,  therefore, to supply the defects 
and imperfections  which  are in us,  living  single  and solely 
by  ourselves,  we  are naturally inclined  to seek communion 
and fellowship  with  others.  This  was  the cause  of  mcn's 
uniting  themselves in politic  societies,  which  societies  could 
not be without government, nor government without  a  dis- 
tinct kind of law from that which hath been already declared. 
Two foundations there  are which bear up public  societies : 
the one, a mutual inclination, whereby all men desire sociable 
life and fellowship ; the other, an order expressly or secret$ 
agreed  upon,  touching  the  manner  of  this  union  in living 
together.  The latter is that which we call the law of  a common 
weal, the very  soul of  a politic body,  the parts whereof  are 
by  law  animated, hold  together,  and set  on  work  in  such 
actions as the common good requireth. 
Laws  politic,  ordained  for  external  order  and  regiment 
amongst  men,  are  never  framed as  they  should  be,  unless 
1 Hoolcor, id., i. 3,  1.  a  Aquinas,  'Sum.  Thool.,'  i.  2.  91, 2. 
Id.  id.,  i.  8, 4, 8  and 9. 
presuming the will of  man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, 
alld  averse  from  all  obedience  unto  the sacred  laws  of  his 
nature ; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of 
his  depraved mind, little better than a  wild  beast,  they do 
accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to form his outward 
actions, that they be no hindcrance  unto the common  good 
for which  societies are instituted : unless they do this, they 
are not perfect."  l 
If  we  add to this  passage  another which  follows  a  little 
later, we  have a fairly complete view of  Hooker's  conception 
of  the origin and purpose of  political society.  '(  We all make 
complaint of  the iniquity of  our times ; not unjustly, for the 
(lays  are  evil.  But  compare  them  with  those  times  when 
there  wcre  no  civil  societies,  with  those  times  when  there 
was  as  yet  no  manner  of  public  regiment  established,  with 
those  times  wherein  there  were  not  above  eight  persons 
righteous  living  upon  the face  of  the earth ;  and we  have 
surely good cause to think that God hath blessed us exceed- 
ingly and hath made us behold most happy days." 
Hooker's  statement  has  a  little of  Cicero7s conception  of 
the naturally sociable  disposition  of  men, something also  of 
Aristotle,  that the State is necessary  for  the good  life,  but 
also very clearly it represents the Stoic and Patristic tradition 
of  the coercive  State as the necessary  remedy for the Pall; 
and it is  interesting  to  observe  that  Hookcr  thinks  of  the 
period  between  the Fall and the Flood  as  illustrating  the 
lamentable disorder which followed from the absence of  this. 
The character  of  human nature in Hooker's  view requires 
government  and law.  How  then  were  these  created 7  He 
sets  aside  very  emphatically  the  notion  which  was  later 
developed in a  somo~vhat  absurd work of  Sir ltobert Filmer, 
that political authority was related to that of  the father of  FA 
family.  To fathers within their private families nature has 
given  a  supreme  power.  . . . Howbeit  over a whole  grand 
multitude having no such dependence upon any one . . . im- 
possible it is that any should have cornplete law£  ul power, but 
by  consent  of  men,  or  immediate  appointment  of  God; 
Id. id.,  i.  10, 1.  Id.  id., i. 10,  3. 
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because,  not  having  the natural  superiority  of  fathers, this 
power  must needs  be either usurped and thus unlawful ; or 
if  la~vf~ll,  then  either  granted  or  consented  unto  by  those 
over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily 
from God,  unto  whom  all  the  world  is  subject.,,l  And, 
equally  emphatically,  IIooker  derives  a11  political  authority 
froin an agreement among men to set up some "  governincnt 
public,"  to  which  they  granted  authority  to  rule  and 
govorn. 
('  To  take away all such  mutual grievances, injuries, and 
wrongs,  there  was  no  way  but only  by  growing  unto com- 
position  and  agreement  amongst  themselves,  by  ordaining 
some kind of  government  public, and by yielding themselves 
subject  thereunto ; that, unto whom  they granted authority 
to govern, by them the peace,  tranquillity, and happy estate 
of  tho  rest  might be procured.  . . . Without which conse,nt 
there  were  no reason  that  one  man  should  take upon  him 
to be lord  or  judge  over  another ; because,  although there 
be, according to tho opinion of  some very great and judicious 
men, a kind of  natural right in the noble, wise, and virtuous, 
to govern those which are of  servilo disposition ; nevertheless, 
for mailifeslation of  illis, their right, and men's  more peace- 
able contontment  on both sides, the assent of  those who  are 
governed seemeth necessary." 
Rooker  here  represents  the  normal  conception  of  tho 
Middle Ages, which  had been only reinforced  by the revived 
study of  the Roman  Law,  that all political  authority  is in 
some  sense  dcrivcd  frorn  the  community.  EIe  seems  here 
also  to suggest  that behind  this grant  of  authority  by  the 
community thcro lics some agreemerlt or "  contract ,' betwoen 
nicn to forrn a political community, the conception with which 
we are familiar in IIobbes and Locke. 
Hooker thinks that at Iirst the government was left in the 
hands of  one  man, but men  soon  began  to feel  the incon- 
venience of  this.  "  Thcy saw that to live by one man's  will 
becomes the cause of  all rnonls misery.  This constrained them 
to come  unto laws,  wherein  all rnen  might  see  thcir  dutiea 
Id. id,, i. 10, 4. 
be,forclland,  and know the  penalties  of  transgressing them."' 
We have already seen this opinion as expressed by Buchanan 
and Mariana." 
This  leads  Hooker  to  consider  more  fully  the nature  of 
law and its coercive authority, for ''  laws  do not only  teach 
what is good, but they enjoin it ; they have in thcm a certain 
constraining  force."  He makes  a  distinction,  a  vcry  im- 
portant  distinction,  between  those  whose  function  it is  to 
devise " laws  and those who  give them coercive authority. 
It  is  the  wise  men  by  whom  laws  should  be  "  devised." 
Men  of  ordinary  capacities  are  not  competent  to  do  this, 
but it is not  the wisdom  of  these  '' devisors " which  gives 
these laws coercive authority.  This can only be given by the 
whole  community, for, "by the natural law, to which  God 
has made all men subject, the power to make laws belongs to 
the wholc  community,  and therefore  it is mere tyranny for 
any prince to take this upon himself, unless he has received 
this  authority  from  the  community,  or  immediately  and 
personally from God Himself."  "  Laws thcy are not, therefore, 
which public approbation hath not made so."  4 
He  is  indeed  careful  to  add  that the  community  may 
give its consent,  not  directly  but by representation, ('  as in 
Parliaments, Councils, and the like Assemblies, although ve 
be  not  personally  ourselves  present,  notwithstanding  our 
assent is by reason of  other agents there in our behalf " ; and 
he extends this even to the position  of  an absolute king, on 
the assuinption that he had received  his  authority from the 
community ;  and this  authority  continues  so  long  as it is 
not  revoked  by  the same authority as that which  gave it. 
"  Laws, therefore, human, of  what kind soever, are available 
by consent." 
Hooker's  words  do  not  suggest  a  direct reference  to  ally 
one  political  writer,  but it seems  to us  reasonable  to  say 
that his very careful but dogmatic judgment  is founded, first, 
upon  the  doctrine  of  the  Roman  Law  that  the legislative 
'  Id. id., i.  10, 6. 
Cf. pp. 332,  348 
a  Id. id., i. 10, 7. 
Id. id.. I.  10, 7 an11  C.'. 
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power is derived from the "  populus " (i.e., the community) ; 
while his conception of  the place of  the wise men in " devising 
Law may be related to the ternls of  the famous definition  of 
Papinianel  In the second place, it is probably related to the 
saying of  St Thomas Aquinas that the power of  making laws 
belongs either to the whole multitude or to him who "  gerit 
vicem  and has the care of the whole m~ltitude.~ 
Hooker's  statement  ik?  drastic  and  far-reaching;  if  his 
principle that it is the community, and only the community, 
which  can give  the Law its coercive power,  is dcrived from 
the Roman Law, he is explicitly and dogmatically generalising 
tl~is  principle as applying naturally  to all political societies, 
as in the famous phrase  we have just  quoted : "  Laws they 
are not, which public approbation hath not made so." 
In a later Book of  the ' Ecclesiatical Polity ' he again deals 
with this subject, and in one  place  he cites the well-known 
words of  Bracton : "  Attribuat lex legi, quod lex attribuat ei, 
potestatern  et dominium,"  and  '' Rex non  debet  esse  sub 
homine, sed sub Deo et lege."  Hooker admits, indeed, that 
there  are  different kinds  of  kingdoms,  some  by  conquest, 
some  by "  agreement  and  composition " ;  and in  this  last 
casc the authority depends upon the nature of  the agreement ; 
but he concludes : "  Happier that people where Law is their 
king in the greatest things,  than that whose king is himself 
the  Law,"  and "Most  divinoly  therefore  Archytas  maketh 
unto  public  felicity  these  four steps  . . . 6  ,6aa~hGv~ 
IJ~,UL~LOF,  d  8d  ZpXwv ~K~XOUBOT,  6  62  &PXdp~~~~  2hf;Bfp0~,  h 
8'5hn  lco~vovla  eir8alpov." 
These are Hooker's  general principles,  but it is important 
to observe  that hc applies them specially to England.  In a, 
passage  which  follows immediately  upon  that just  cited, he 
ways :  "In which  respect,  I  cannot  choose  but  commend 
highly their wisdom, by whom the foundations of  this common- 
wealth  have been  laid;  wheroin,  though  no  mannrr pcrson 
'  'Digest,'  i.  ifi.  1 :  "  Lex  est  s~o," 
commune  preceptum,  virorum  pru-  St  Thoma.;  Aqmnas,  ' Summa 
dentum  consultum,  delictorum  quao  Theologica,' i. 2.  90, 3. 
aponte  vel  ignorantia  contrahuntur  "Rookor,  v~ii.  2,  3. 
coercitio,  communis  reipublicae  spon-  a  Id. ~d.,  vnl. 2, 12. 
or cause be un-subject to the king's power, yet so is the power 
of  the king over all and in all, limited, that unto all its pro- 
ceedings the Law itself  is a  rule.  The axiorns  of  our royal 
are these:  '  Lex  facit regem,'  the king's  grant 
of  any favour made contrary to the law is void ; '  Rex nihil 
potest,  nisi  quod  jure  potest.'  Our  kings,  therefore,  when 
they take possession of  the room they are called unto, have 
it painted out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities 
and rites of  their  inauguration,  to what  affairs by the said 
law their supreme authority and power reacheth."  * 
And  again,  in  a  passage  which  is  primarily  related  to 
Church Law in England, but has a general application : '' The 
Parliament  of  England,  together  with  the  Convocation 
annexed  thereunto,  is  that  whereupon  the very  essence  of 
all government within this kingdom doth depend ; it is even 
the body of the whole realm, it consisteth of  the king and of 
all that within  the land are subject to him, for they are all 
there  present,  either  in person,  or  by  such  as they  volun- 
tarily  have  derived  their  power  unto.  . . . Touching  the 
supremacy  of  power,  which  our Kings  have in  the case  of 
making laws, it resteth principally in the strength of  a nega- 
tive voice ; which, not to give thern, were to deny thein that 
without which  they were  but Icings  by mere  title, and not 
in exercise of  dominion. . . .  Which laws, bcing made amongst 
us,  are not by any of  us so taken or interpreted,  as if  they 
did receive their force from the power which the Prince doth 
communicate  unto  the  Parliament,  or  to  any  other  Court 
under  him,  but  from  power  which  the  whole  body  of  the 
Realm,  being  naturally  possessed  with,  hath  by  free  and 
deliberate assent derived unto him that ruleth over them, so 
far forth as hath been declared." 
Finally, we must consider the treatment of the source and 
authority of  Law as it is presented  by that most important 
jurist  of  Lower  Germany,  Johannes Althusius,  whose  work, 
first published in 1603, was for a long time almost forgotten, 
but was recovered by Professor von Gierke, and which again 
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serves to bring out very clearly the fact that the conception 
of  an ordered or constitutional libcrty was not asserted merely 
by controversial  writers  likc  George  Buchauan  or  Mariana, 
or the pem1)hleteers of  the Huguenot Party and the Catholic 
League  in France,  but  by  a  writer  learned,  judicious,  and 
measured in his  thought and in his language,  who  also, like 
Hooker,  sets  out,  not  only  philosophical  principles,  but 
also what he conceived to be the actual constitutional system 
of  a great country.  For, as Hooker finds  an embodiment of 
the principles  of  a  free  and ordered  society  in  the English 
constitution,  Althusius  finds  tho  same  in  the  Government 
of  the  German  Empire  and of  the  States and cities  which 
formed it.l 
In order  to understand Althusius'  conception  of  Law, we 
must  observe  his  conception  of  the  nature  and  origin  of 
political  society.  He accepts  the Aristotelian principle  that 
a  solitary man is not capable of  a  self-sufiicing life, but also 
traces  the origin  of  political  society  to an express  or  tacit 
contract between those who are to live together.  He accepts 
the Oiceronian  definition  of  the people as being a society of 
men living under a  common system of  law, and working for 
the common good.  The object of  the government of  society 
is tho common good, and its final end is a life in which  men 
quietly and rightly serve God.2 
Althusius accepts the Aristotelian conception  of  the neces- 
sity of  society, but he also clearly asserts that the formation 
of  political  society  rested  upon  tho  contract  or  agreement 
betwecn  those  who  formed it.  The  statement of  thin  con- 
ception is interesting and important in relation to the political 
Our  citations  from  Althusius  are 
taken from the text of  the edition  of 
his  work  published  in  1614,  and  re- 
cently republished  by  Professor  C.  I. 
Friedrich  of  Harvard  University,  and 
we  desire  to express  our  obligalions 
to him  for  having  made this edition 
easily  accessible  to  students.  We 
follow  his  numeration  of  paragraphs 
in each book.  The scope of  our work 
does  not  allow  us  to  deal  with  the 
political  theory  of  Altl.illsius as com- 
pletely  as we  should  desire,  but  that 
is the loss necessary because  Professor 
von Gierke has handled  the subjoct in 
a mastcrly and comprehensive fnrllioa 
in his work, '  Johan~les  Althusius  nnd 
die  Entwicklung  der  naturreclltlichel~ 
Staatstheorien.' 
Althusius,  '  Politica  metllodice 
digesta,'i.3,4,7,  19, 30. 
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theory  of  the seventeenth  and eighteenth  centuries,  but it 
belongs rather to those times than to the history of  mediaeval 
political  t,heory, and wc  refer our  rcaders  to the  discussioil 
of  this subject  by  von  Gierke  in  his '  Allhusius,'  especially 
part II.,  Chap. ii., 2. 
We turn to what is here properly our subject when we con- 
sider Althusius'  conception  of  law and its place in tho State. 
The  administration  and government  of  the  commonwealth, 
he says, is nothing else than the execution of  thc Law, and 
he illustrates this principle by citing hristotle as saying that 
there is no commonwealth where the Laws are not supreme ; 
and again, the supremacy  of  the Law is the supremacy  of 
God,  while  that  of  a  man  is  tho  supremwy  of  a  beast. 
Cieero calls the magistrate the servant and interpreter of  the 
law;  we  are all servants of  the law that we  may be free; 
Ylato  says that the  Law is  queen,  and should  control not 
only  the  other  citizens  but kings  themselves?  In another 
place  Althusius says that the magistrates  are bound  by the 
civil  laws  of  the  kingdom  and  of  the  i'Majestas."  The 
magistrate may be  called  a  living  law  for  he  does  nothing 
except by the Law's   command^.^ 
It  is  important  to  observe  that  from  these  principles 
Althusius  draws  the  conclusion  that  it was  right  to  say 
that  the  magistrate  is  not "  legibus  generalibus  solutus " ; 
he is not free from eithcr the natural law or the civil laws. 
Althusiua was, of  course, aware that many thought differently, 
but he is only willing to concede that the prince was in such 
Td.  id.,  xxi.  10 :  "  Sic  itaque 
administratio  et  gubcrnatio  reipub- 
licao,  nihil  aliud  ost  quam  legis 
executio.  . . . 
17. Ariatotle  Lib.  Pol.  iv.  4 : Rcs- 
publica  nulla est ubi  loges non tenent 
imperium ! Cicoro Pro Cluentio.  Lrgum 
minixtri magistretu~,  logum intorprotrs, 
judices,  logum  dcnique  idcirco  omnoa 
servi  sumus  ut  libori  esse  possirnus. 
. . . Arist.  Lib.  iii.  Polit.  dicit,  eum 
qui legem  praoesse jubet,  deum prae- 
osso jubet, qui hominem, best,iam. . . . 
Pialo : Epist.  vii.  " Leu  rogina  esse 
dobo:,  ac  dominari,  non  sliis  tantum 
oivibus sod ipsis otiam regibus." 
a  Id.  id.,  xxiv.  48 :  'L In adminis- 
tratione hac sua, magistratus obligatus 
est legibus Decalogi . . . atque civili- 
bus  rogni  et  Majostatis  lcgibux . . . 
ad quns tanqnani ad cynosnram, nor- 
mam at regulam, orll~lia  ncgocia admin- 
istrationis  suae  rcferre  debet.  . . . 
Undo magistratus lox viva,  exsecutor, 
custos at minister  legis  dicitur ; qui 
nihil nisi lege jubento  %elit,  faciat, vel 
omittni, 11t rocte  dicit Vasquez,  c.  14 
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a  sense  exempt  from  the  penal  laws,  that  he  was  not  to 
be  punished  unless  he  violated  the fundamental  laws,  and 
his own agreement with the people ; and Althusius  refers to 
Cujas as holding this  0pinion.l  The  prince  cannot  do  any- 
thing  against  the law  of  the commonwcalth, for  the law is 
of  the nature  of  a  contract  by  which  the prince  is bound, 
and the authority which the people have conferred upon the 
prince is by its own nature limited  to that which is for the 
good of  the citi~ens.~  We  shall return to the subject of  the 
contract  between the prince and people in the next chapter ; 
in the meanwhile it is worth while to observe that Althusius 
conceives  of  the  Law  as  having  this  character.  We  have 
seen this conception in writers of  the fourteenth and fifteenth 
cent~ries.~  Althusius  admits,  indeed,  that  the  prince  is 
"  legibus solutus,"  but only in the sense that the Law may 
in some cases give him the right of  "  dispensation.', 4 
In order, however, to appreciate  fully Althusius'  principle 
of  the supremacy  of  law over the prince,  we  must consider 
his conception of  the  LL Majestas " or sovereign power in the 
commonwealth.  It is probable that he takes this term from 
B~din,~  and he agrees with him in interpreting it as meaning 
that authority which recognises no other as equal or superior 
to it~elf.~  So far he does not differ from Bodin, but, having 
Id. id., xsiv. 49 : "  Qua  de  causa 
recte  dicitur,  magistratum  non  esse 
legibus  generalibus  solutum . . . non 
tantum naturalibus sed etiam civilibus. 
. . . Dissentiunt  plurime,  per  1.  31. 
De  Legibus  (' Dig.,'  i.  3,  31)  quae 
tamen uon  obstat, si eam intelligis de 
legibus  poenariis,  quibus  magistratus 
eat  solutus,  non  respectu  obligationis, 
sed executionis.  Nam si deliquerit (at 
non contra legos fundamentales et con- 
ventionem  propriam  cum  populo 
initam), non punitur.  Cujas. Lib.  36. 
Obs. c.  35." 
Id.  id.,  xxiv.  50  (The  prince 
cannot  do  anything  against  the  law 
of  the  State) :  "Tum  quia  lex  est 
contractus, 1.  1,  ibi.  communis reipub- 
licae  spousio, de  legibus  (i.e.,  'Dig.,' 
i. 3,  1) . . . ex quo contraotu princeps 
obligatur. . . . Ergo concessio  imperii 
a  populo  principi  facta  etiam  verbis 
generalissimis,  ex  materia,  subjccta, 
limitata,  et  restricts  est  ad  meram 
utilitatem civium." 
Cf. Part I. C.  2; Part 11.  C.  2. 
Id.  id.,  xxiv.  50 :  "  Princeps 
etiam solutus est legibus in casibus, in 
quibus  jus  ipsi  dispensationem  con- 
cedit." 
For  the  discussion  of  Bodin's 
position, cf. Chap. 111. 
Id.  id.,  ix.  15 :  "  Ideo  potestas 
imperandi  universalis  dicitur,  quae 
aliam  superiorem  vel  parem  aut 
sociam  non  agnoscit.  Atque  hoe 
supremum  jurisdictionis  universalis 
jus, est forma et substantialis essentia 
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said this, he begins to develop a sharply marked contradiction 
of Bodin's  theory.  No  single  persons, he  says,  can  receive 
this complete authority  (LL plenitudo potestatis ") ; they must 
recognise  that it lies  in  the  consent  and agreement  of  the 
associated body.' 
We must turn to a long passage in which Althusius draws 
out his own conception in opposition to that of  Bodin.  Bodin, 
he  says,  contradicted the principle  that the supreme  power 
belonged to the whole community.  He begins by pointing out 
that even Bodin admits that the supreme power is subject to tho 
Natural and Divine law ; and he urges that a really absolute 
power would be a mere tyranny.  He refuses dogmatically to 
attribute the supreme power to the king or the  ~ptimates,'~ 
and maintains that it can belong  only to the whole body of 
the  LL universal " association-that  is, to the commonwealth 
or kingdom, for it is from this body that, after God, a11 legiti- 
mate authority comes.  The  king,  princes, or  LL optimates 71 
recognise that the commonwealth by which they are set up 
or  removed  is  superior  to  them,  and that they  are  bound 
by a contract to obey it.  The king, therefore, has no supreme 
and perpetual power which is free from the law, and does not 
hold the  LL Jura Majestatis,"  but only, and that by the grant 
of  the  society,  the  administration  of  these.  The  monarch 
therefore must  render  an account  of  his  administration and 
may be depo~ed.~ 
Majestatis,  aeu  majoris  illius  status 
quem  diximus,  quo  sublato,  vel  ad- 
empto Majestas illa concidit." 
1 Id. id.,  ix.  19 : "  Administratores 
potestatia hujus plures esse possunt, ita 
ut singuli, im~ositae  solicitudinis, non 
in plonitudinem potestatis adsumantur. 
. . . Et singuli hi non habent penes se 
supremam potestatem, sed omnes simul 
unam aguoscant in consociatorum cor- 
porum consensu et concordia." 
*  Id. id.,  ix.  20 : "  Huic sententiae 
nostrae,  qua regno seu universali con- 
sociatione  summa  potestas  tribuitur, 
contradicit  Bodinus  Lib.  1,  c.  5,  '  De 
Ropub.'  Ibi  enim ille jus  Majestatis, 
quod regni jus appellavimus, dicit esse 
eummam  et  perpetuam  potestatem, 
nec  lege,  neque  tempore  definitam, 
quam  majestatis  affectionem late  ex- 
plicat  Bonnet.  Lib.  1,  '  De Majestate 
Politica.'  Ego in eo, quo Bodinus haec 
sensu accipit, nullum borum requisitum 
genuinum  in  jure  hoc  Majestatis  ag- 
nosco.  Non enim est summa potestas, 
non perpetua,  neque loge soluta. 
21.  Summa  non  est,  quia  legem 
divinam naturalemque  sgnoscat  omnis 
humane  potestas,  arg.  Rom.  c.  13. 
Minister  Dei  est  tibi  in  bonum.  Si 
minister  Dei  est,  ergo contra  Domini 
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We  have dcalt with this aspect  of  political  theory in  the 
- 
sixteenth century at some length, for, as it seems to us, the 
conception of the nature and authority of  law was still, as in 
the Middle  Ages,  the  most  imp~rt~ant  element  of  political 
potest. . . . Absoluta  vero summa, et 
legibus omnibus soluta potcstas tyrannis 
dicitur.  . . .  Remota, alt (Augustinus) 
justitia,  quid  sunt  regna  nisi  magna 
latrocinia.  In  quo  quidem,  nec 
Bodinus a nobis dissentit . . . Quaes- 
ti0  igitur  nobis  est, de  civili loge  et 
jure, an huic etiam imperium et fasces 
subijiciat,  qui summam dicitur habere 
potestatem.  Negat  Bodinus,  et plur- 
imi  alii  cum  eodcm.  Erit  igitur  ex 
horum  sententia summa potestas  quae 
civili loge  non est definita ; quod ego 
non dixerim.  Nam lege civili potesia- 
tom  solvere,  eat  etiam  aliquatenus 
naturalis  et  divinao  legis  vi~mulis 
eandem  exuere.  Nulla  enim  est, nec 
ease potest, lex civilis quae non aliquid 
neturalis  et  divinae  aequitatis  im- 
mutabile  haboat  admixtum. . . .  Quod 
si igitur lex civilis generalis a principe 
lata est  aeqaa  et justa,  quis  eundem 
ab  obligatione  istius  legis  solvere 
potest ?  . . . Quatenus vero  lex  illa 
civilis in quibusdam discedit a naturali 
aequitate . . . fatebor, eum  qui  sum- 
mam babet potestatem, noc  superiorem 
nisi Deum  et naturalem equitatem st 
justitiam  agnoscit,  illa  lege  non 
teneri. . . . 
22.  Atque  in  hoc  sensu  acceptn 
lege, soluta  summa potestate, concedo 
in sententiam Bodini . . . Cujacii . . . 
et  aliorum  jurisconsultorum.  Sed 
hanc  summam  potontiam  nequaquam 
possum  tribuere regi  nut  optimat~bus, 
quam sententiam tamen Bodinus acer- 
rime propugnare conatur, sed jure, illa 
tantum  corpori  univorsalis  consocirs- 
tionis  nimirum  reipublicae  vel  regno, 
tanquam propria  est adscribenda.  Ab 
hoc corporc, post Deum, profluit omnis 
potestas  legitlma,  in  hos,  quos  reges, 
optimatesve  vocamus,  1.  1.  I)c 
CvusL.  Prin.  (' Dig.,'  i.  4,  1). . . . 
Corpus  igitm  hoc  consociatum,  rex, 
princeps,  optimatesve  suporius  ag- 
ncscunt,  a  quo  iidem  constituntur, 
removontur,  deficiuntor, et  exauotor- 
antur,  sicuti  latius  probaverim  in 
dictis  locis. 
Quis vero summam dicit potestatem, 
quae superiorem agnoscit alinm ?  Quod 
et Bodinus  probat.  Quis  lege  solvet 
eum,  in  quam  ipsemet  consonsit,  et 
ad cujus  obedientiam  se  per  modum 
contraotus obligavit. . . . 
23.  Quantacunque enim est potestas, 
quae  alii  conceditur,  semper  tamen 
minus  est ejus potestate,  qui  eandem 
concessit,  et  in  ea  praeeminentia  et 
superioritas  concedentis  reservata  in- 
telligitur.  . . . Unde  efficitur, regem 
summam, perpetuam, legeque solutam 
potestatem  non  habere,  et por  conse- 
quens  nec  illius  jura  Majestatis  esse 
propria,  quamvis  eorundem  adminia- 
trationem  et  exercitium  ex  corporis 
consociati concessione habeat.  . . . 
24.  Quod  si  igitur  etism secundum 
Bodinum  duplex  est  Majestas,  regni 
et  regis,  quaero,  utra  ex  hisce,  sit 
altera major  et superior ?  Negari  non 
potest,  illam  majorem  esse,  quae 
alteram constituit, quaeque immortalis 
est in subject0 suo, pcpulo scilicet, et 
alteram  minorom,  qua8 in  unius  per- 
sona  consistit  et cum  endem moritur. 
. . . Undo fit, ut otiam snmmus mon- 
archa  rationem  reddere  teneetur  ad- 
ministrationis  suae . . . atque  etiam 
exauctorari  possit.  . . . Sod  infert 
Bodinus : Inanis est potentia regis .  .  . 
si comitiorum ac  populi jussis  tenetur.  . . . Atque  hoc  modo  incipiet  esse 
aristocratis  vel democratia,  quae ante 
erat  monarchia.  Ncgamus  hoc,  et 
Bodini opiniones allatas  in  c.  39,  ubi 
do  mcnarchae  potestato  dicitur,  re- 
futamuu." 
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theory,  and  it will,  we  hope,  be  clear  that  the  medizval 
prillciple  of  the  supremacy  of  law  was  still  asserted  and 
unciers tood. 
We  shall in a later chapter inquire how far there had also 
developed  in  the  histeenth  century  a  conceptiou  that  tho 
king was absolute aud abub l: kaw. CHAP.  11.1  TI=  PRINCE  UNDER  THE  LAW.  365 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE PRINCE  UNDER  THE LAW. 
WE have, in the last chapter, considered some aspects of  the 
conceptions  of  the source  and  authority of  law,  that is, of 
those who were clear that the law was greater than the ruler. 
We shall, in a later chapter, discuss the position of  those who 
took  the opposite view.  But, before  we  do this,  we  must 
deal  with  the  conception  of  the  source  and nature  of  the 
authority of  the prince. 
We think it will be found to make for greater clearness if 
we  treat  this  subject  under  the following  heads :  (I)  The 
Source of  the Authority  of  the Ruler;  (2) The  Conception 
of  a  Sovereign Power  behind  the Ruler;  (3) The  Relation 
of  the Ruler to the Courts of  Law;  (4) The Theory of  the 
Contract between  the Ruler and the People ; (5) The Right 
to resist, and even to depose the Ruler ; (6) The Magistrates 
or Ephors. 
(1) The  Source of  the Authority  of  the Ruler.-There  is 
no need to discuss this at  any great length, for while there were 
a few, with whom we shall deal in a later chapter, who trace 
the authority of  the king to the direct appointment of  God, 
these were quite exceptional.  The great mass of  opinion was 
clear, that is, that while  God was  the ultimate source .of  all 
authority,  the immediate  source  was  the Community itself, 
and it should  be  remembered  that this  judgment  was  con- 
firmed by the whole tradition of the Roman Law and by the 
medireval and contemporary Civilians. 
This was the current opinion, apart entirely from the politi- 
cal controversies  of  the time.  We may begin  by observing 
again  t,he words  of  t'he Slmnish Dominican,  Soto, the Con- 
fessor of  Charles V.  a,nd Professor at Salamanca.  The public 
civil authority is  the ordinance  of  God, the commonwealth 
creates the prince, but it was God who taught men to do this.I 
We  find  the  same  principle  stated  by  his  Dominican  con- 
temporary  and colleague  in  Salamanca, Franciscas Victoria, 
in  tho  ternis  of  a  careful  distinction  between  ''  Potestas " 
and "  Authoritas."  The  Royal "  Potestas  is  not  derived 
from the commonwealth,  but from God Himself, for though 
hc  is established  by  the  commonwealth, for  the  common- 
wealth creates the king, it transfers not "  Potestas " but its 
own "  Authoritas " to him.2 
The  same  judgment  is  expressed  by  such  a  careful  and 
experienced  politician  as Sir Thomas  Smith.  In a  passage 
already cited, he contrasts the king and the tyrant, not only 
with reference to their  relation  to the law, but also  to the 
source of  his  authority.  The  king is  one who  has  attained 
the royal power by hereditary succession or by election, with 
the consent  of  the people,  while  the tyrant is one  who  has 
obtained  power  by  force,  and  without  the  consent  of  the 
peopla3 
We have cited these  opinions, not as being  in themselves 
very important, but merely as illustrations of  what we  think 
was the normal opinion, apart from the controversies  of  the 
later part of  the century.  When we pass to those who wrote 
under these later conditions,  we naturally find all this much 
more  sharply  a,sserted.  George  Buchanan,  for instance,  in 
his work, '  De Jure Regni apud Scotos,' which is in the form 
Soto, ' De Justitiib  ct Jlirn,' iv. 4,  1 
(1).  309) :  "  Ecce  yuo~naclmo(lum 
publice  civilis  potestas  ordinatio  Doi 
est ;  non quod respublica non creaverit 
pxinripes, sed quod id fecerit divinitus 
erridita." 
Frm-iscus  Victoria,  '  re la ti one^ 
de  Potsestate Civili,'  viii. :  "  Videtur 
ergo  quod  regia  potestas  sit  non  a 
republics, sed ab ipso Deo, ut Catholici 
doctores  sentiunt.  Quamvis  anim  a 
republics  conatituntur  (creat, namqric 
respublica repem), non potestatem, sod 
propriam authoritatom in regem trans- 
fert." 
8  T.  Smith,  'Do  Republics  Anglo- 
rum,'  I.  7:  "  Rcrum  summam  ad 
unum  nliqliem  delatam  potestatcm, 
regiam case perhibent, qui vel natalium 
fiplendore, vel suffragiorum  prerogotiva, 
per  consontientern  populi  voluntatem, 
earn  adeptus. . . . Tyrannum  appel- 
lant,  qui  per  vim  absque  consensu 
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of  a dialogue between himself  and (( Metellanus " (Maitland), 
in asserting the subordination of the King of  Scotland to the 
laws,  maintains  that though  the kings  of  Scotland received 
the  throne  by  hereditary  succession,  they  were  created  by 
the laws  and the will  of  the people  just  as  much  as those 
kings who were o1ected.l 
The Huguenot writers of  the period between 1573 and 1580 
set out this conception in different ways.  Hotman does this, 
with  reference  primarily  to  history,  in  his  work  ' Franco 
Gallis,'  originally  published  in Latin in 1573.2  We are not 
here  concerned  wit'h  tho  historical  value  of  his  contentions 
about the nature of  the Merovingian  and Carolingian mon- 
archies,  but only  with the conclusions  which  he drew from 
his  study  of  hiatory.  He  contended  that  the  supreme 
authority in  the  time  of  these  monarchies  belonged  to the 
general assembly of  the whole people, which he relates to the 
States General of later times,3 and that it was this assembly 
which  elected  and  deposed  kings.4  He gives  a  number  of 
examples of  the authority of  the States General, including  a 
statement  that  it  was  the  States  General  which  decided 
between the claims to the French crown of  Edward 111.  and 
Philip  of  Valoi~.~  In one  place  he  says roundly  that the 
"  Concile  des atate " (the States General) had the power  to 
elect and to depose kings, and to entrust the administration 
of  the kingdom during a minority to such a person as it thought 
best.6 
The treatise entitled '  La Politique,  Dialogue  d7Archon et 
de Politic,' published  in 1576,'  has a very high conception of 
monarchy, and speaks of  the Prince as the Image and Vicar 
of  God ; but if he has this character, he must also represent 
the goodness  and justice  of  God.s  Hereditary succession  or 
Urorge Bucllanan, '  De Juro Rogni ' 
(p.  26) : "  B.  Equibus omnibus facile 
inlelligi  potest,  qualem  a  majoribus 
acceporunt  potestatem :  non  aliam 
videlicet,  quam qui suffragiis electi in 
loges jurant.  . . .  Illud autem, opinor, 
vides qui nasountur nobis reges, eox et 
logibus  et populi  suffragio oreari,  non 
minus  quatn  quos  ab initio  diximus 
eleotos." 
Cf.  Allen, op. rit. (p. 309). 
Hotman, '  Franco Uallia,'  I.  (pn~e 
647). 
"d.  id., xi. (p. 661). 
Id. id., xvii. (p. 701). 
Id. id., xu. (p. 712). 
Cf. Allen, op. cit. (p. 314). 
'  LIL  Politique,'  &c. (p. 90). 
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election are both tolerable : the best is to combine the two, 
but even in the case of those who hold by hereditary succession 
the peoples who have the right to place magistrates over them- 
selves have also the right to depose  them.l  The best known 
of  these works, the ' Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' published in 
1577, also speaks of  kings  as the Vicars  of  God,2 and  says 
that it is  God  Who  has  LL instituted  kings,  but it is  the 
people  who  constitute  them,  who  bestow  kingdoms  and 
approve  their  election.  Icings  must  remember  that  they 
reign "  a Doo sed per populum et propter populum."  There- 
fore if in some countries kingship has become hereditary, it is 
still the custom that the childron do not succeed their fathers 
till they bave been constituted anew by the people,  and are 
only held to be kings when they have received the investiture 
of  sceptre and crown from those who represent the "  Majestas " 
of  the pe0p1e.~ 
George  Buchanan  and the Huguenot  writers  express  this 
judgment  in  strong and unqualified  terms, but we  find  tho 
same  opinions  expressed  in  as thorough-going a  fashion  by 
some of  the Roman Catholic writers  of  the last years of  the 
sixteenth century.  Among the most important tracts written 
in defence of  the depositioii of  Henry 111.  of  France is  that 
of  Bouchsr, '  Do justa  Abdicatione Henrici Tertii,' published 
1 Id.  (p.  96) :  "  Politie.  I1  me 
semble  que et l'un  et I'autre  ne sont 
si louables  que cou~  qui sont par elro 
tion ot succossion  tout ensemble. . . . 
Politie.  J'nvoue  bien  qua  par  cous- 
tume  la  cl~ose  est  tellement  reclue 
qu'elle  (hereditary succession)  est r6- 
put6  pour  droit,  mais  puis  que  lrs 
pe~iplos ont  lo  droit  rle  met,tre  10s 
inagistrat~  Bur  eux . . . il  faut  con- 
clurre  qu'ils  10s peuvont  demettre, et 
par Ib  sont electeurs de leurs princes." 
"  Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.'  Qu. 
r. (p. 9). 
Id.,  Q.  ITI.  (p.  70) :  " O~tendi- 
mus  antea  Deurn  lteges  institurre, 
reg":% rrgibus darc, regrs eligo~e. Dici- 
mus  jam,  populum  reges  constiturrr, 
lcgna tradore, clectionem suo suffrngio 
comprobars. . . ."  (1'.  79) : Quo nem- 
per racordantcs reges se a Deo quidom, 
ued par  populum  ot  propter  populum 
regnare. . . ."  (1'.  82) : Etsi vero, ex 
quo  virtutern  potrum  imitati  filii, 
nepotesve,  regna  sibi  quasi  haeredi- 
taria  fecisse  videntur,  in  quibusdam 
regioniblis  electionis  libera  facultas 
desiisse quodamrnodo vide~tur  ; man- 
sit tamen  perpctuo  in  omnibus regnix 
bone  constitutis ea consoetudo, ut de 
mortuis  non  pzius  snccoderent  liberi, 
quam a populo quasi de novo con~titu- 
orentur,  noc  tanqi~am  suis  llaerodes 
patribiis agnoscerontur, sed turn dornum 
reges censorml ur, cum ab iis qni populi 
majcsiatem  representant,  rogni  in- 
vostituram,  quasi  per  sceptrum  et 
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in  1589.  Bouchcr  was  a  theologian  of  some eminence, and 
his work is largely concerned with the question of  the power 
of  the Pope  to  depose  kings.  We  are  not,  however,  here 
concerned with this question, but with  his  conception of  the 
relation of the authority of  the king to that of  the community. 
With regard to this, he exprcsscd himself  as clearly and dog- 
matically as the Huguenot writers. 
It  is  the people  or  commonwealth  which  establishes  the 
king, but while it bestows this authority upon him, the final 
authority  end  L'  Majestas " remains  with  the  people.  It 
resided  with  them  before  there  were  any  kings,  and  even 
kings must  render  their  account for  any offence  against it.1 
This "  Majcstas " is embodied in the Rstate~.~ 
It is  the people,  then,  from  whom  the king  derives  his 
authority,  and not  from  God  only,  and  he  repudiates  the 
interpretation of  St Paul's words in Romans xiii. 1  as imply- 
ing  the latter.  We  recognise,  he  says,  that kings,  like  all 
good things, come from God, but in accordance with the Jue 
~entium,  it is through the pe~plc.~ 
It would be difficult to find a more explicit repudiation of 
what  we  cell  the  "Divine  Right,"  and  a  more  thorough- 
going  affirmation  of  the  principle  that the royal  authority 
1  J.  Bouchor,  '  De  Justa  Henrici 
Terlii Abdicatlono,' 1. 9 : "  Jus autem 
illud cum in duobus positum sit, ut et 
a  populo  sou  republics  constituuntur 
reges,  et regibus  constitutis, sic  penes 
eos summam  potestntem esse  constet, 
ut  summa  in  eos  tamen  populi  sou 
reipublicae  jus  ac majostas  remaneat, 
huiusque adoo laoeae vel imminutne, ei 
ms ita ferrat, rex tenori possit." 
Id., 111. 7 : "  Msiostrte reipublicao ac 
populi  quae  sit,  dictum  antoa  ost. 
Quae ut prima  per se ar regibus auti- 
quior eat, it,a authonticum  quid  penes 
se,  vol  teste  scriptura  habet,  quod 
deponere,  quodque  abiicere  a  se  nec 
possit  nee  debeat.  Cujusque  legibus 
omnes  omnin  generis  homines ac reg88 
ipsi  teneantur.  Quippe,  cum  pones 
eos  non  aliunde  majestas  sit,  quam 
quia publica ab iis  potestas  referatur. 
Quae  Caesar  ab iis  aemcl,  ut sceptro 
rcos amonneat, loge Julia constat, quae 
poonam  majestatis,  non  dignitat,is 
tantum, sed et animae amissionem esae 
jubet." 
'  Id. id.,  111.  8 : ''  Porro  majesta- 
tem  illam  cum  pones  ordines  seu 
comitia esso constot, id  quoquo  sequi- 
tur,  qui  ordinos  laeserit,  publicae 
majestatis  supra  omnes  teneri  atque 
reum  esao.  Nam  pones  comltia  ut 
regni  mojostas  sit,  cum  universn 
regnorum  consuetude docot, tum quia 
perpetua  in  Gallia  srtrro~ancta  eorum 
auctoritas ease consuevit." 
Id. id., I. 13 :  "  Et nos,  quidem, 
ut rogcs  a  Deo,  ut et bonum  omne, 
ease  agnoscimus,  ita  intermedio  iure 
gentium, et per  populum, ut aunt. ita 
esse, sane fateamur." 
was inferior to the sovereign authority, or "  Majesta~,'~  of the 
community ; it was  derived from it, and was  answerable to 
it.  Boucher adds, dogmatically, that no one is born a king ; 
there is no Christian kingdom whore hereditary succession has 
such a force that the right of  establishing the king does not 
remain with the peop1e.l 
Boucher does not, however, state these principles as merely 
abstract, but maintains that they were embodied in the actual 
constitutiorlal  systems  of  the  European  countries,  and  he 
refers specially to the Empire, to Arsgon, and to the authority 
of  Parliament in England, and he attributes the comparative 
absence in France of the constitutional forms of  this supreme 
authority  of  the  community  to  the  recent  tyrannical 
innovations  of  Louis  XI.2  He  cites  the  deposition  of 
Merovingian  and  Carolingian  kings  in  France,  of  Richard 
11.  in  England,  and  the  recent  deposition  of  the King  of 
Denmark.3 
With  these  writers  we  may  place  Mariana,  the  Spanish 
Jesuit  of  the late sixteenth centurg.  He also  considers the 
monarchy  to be  the best  form  of  government, and he care- 
fully discusses the advantages and disadvantages of  succession 
by  inheritance  or  by  election.  He  finally  concludes  that 
hereditary  succession  is  best,  but  the  succession  should  be 
determined by law, not by the will of  the king, for the common- 
wealth  gave him  an authority restrained  by  laws,  and any 
change  therefore  must  be  made  with  the  consent  of  the 
" Ordines "  (the  Estates  or  Cortes).4  In  another  place, 
cliscussing the relation  of  tho commonwcalth  to a king  who 
becomes  a  tyrant, he  argues that tho commonwealth,  from 
which tho royal authority arises, may call the king to account, 
and may deprive him of  his  authority.  When it transferred 
1 Id. id., 1. 17 : "  Omnino rox nemo  "  Sic commodius fero cogitabam, here- 
nascitur.  Ncque  ullum  omnino  vel  ditarium  esse  principatum."  . . . (p. 
inter  Cllristianos  rognum  ost,  In  quo  37) : "  Neque pro regis arbitrio succes- 
hereditario  successio  sic  polloat,  quin  sionem  etiam  inter  filios  mutandam 
penes  populum  constituendi  jus  re-  videri.  Praesortim  cum  leges  surces- 
maneat."  sionis  mutaro  non  oj~is,  sed  reipub- 
'  Id. id., I. 21, 22.  licae  sit,  qune  imperium  dedit,  iis 
Id. id., I. 23, 24.  lagibus constrictum, ordinum consensu 
Mar~nna,  ' Do  Rege,' I.  3  (p. 34) :  id fariat opus eat."  Cf. I. 4 (p. 38). 
VOL.  VI.  2 A its  authority  to  the  prince,  it  reserved  to itself  a  great,er 
auth0rity.l 
It may, no doubt, justly  be said that these writers, especi- 
ally  the  Huguenots  and  Mariana,  express  a  highly  contro- 
versial  mood.  But it  should  be  observed  that  the  same 
judgment  is  expressed  by  Hooker,  substantially,  but  in 
characteristically  measured  terms.  Hooker  deals  with  the 
subject in the first book  of  the '  Ecclesiastical  Polity,'  when 
Ire  discusses  the origins  and first forms  of  political  society. 
The first form of  social authority was, he thinks, that of  the 
father over his family, but that is not the nature of  authority 
in a political society.  "  Howbeit over a whole general multi- 
tude,  having no  such  dapendcncy  upon  any one,  and con- 
sisting  of  so  many  families  as every  political  society  doth, 
iinpossible is it thn,t any should have complete lawful power, 
but by consent  of  man  or immediate  appointinent of  God ; 
bccause,  not  having  the natural  authority  of  fathers,  this 
power must needs be either usurped, and thus unlawful ; or, 
if lawful,  thm, either  granted  or  consented  unto  by  those 
over whom  they exercise  the same, or else  given  extraordi- 
narily from God, unto Whom all thc world is subject." 
He returns to the subject in the eighth book,  where he is 
dealing with the relation of  the king to the Church.  iL  First, 
unto me it seemeth almost out of  doubt and controversy, that 
every  independent  niultitudc,  before  any  certain  form  of 
regiment  established, hath, under  God's  supreme  authority, 
full '  dominium  over itsclf, evcn as a man, not tied with the 
bond of  subjection as yet, unto any other, hath over himself 
the like power." 
Hooker is indeed careful to defcnd the right of  hereditary 
succession to kingship,  but he is  also clear in asserting that 
this hereditary right  arises  from the  original  conveyance " 
by the community.  "  Tho  case  thus  standing, although  we 
judge  it as bcing  most  true that Icings,  even  inheritors,  do 
Id.  id.,  I.  6  (p.  57) : "  Certe  a  in principem jura  potestatis transtulit, 
republica,  unde  ortu~n  habet  rcpia  ut non sibi  majorem reservavit potes- 
potestas,  rebus  exigentibus  regem  in  tatem." 
jus  vocari  posse,  et si sanitatrm  ros-  Hooker, ' Ecales.  Polity,'  I.  x. 4. 
puat,  principntu  spoliari.  Noquo  it@  ,'  id. ~d.,  VIII. 2, 5. 
CIIAP.  II.]  THX PRINCE UNDER  THE  LAW.  371 
hold  their right to the power  of  dominion  with dependency 
upon the whole body politic,  over which  they rule as kings ; 
yet so it may not be understood,  as if  such dependency  did 
grow, for that every supreine governor  doth personally  take 
from them his  power by way  of  gift, bestowed  of  t'heir own 
free accord upon him at the time of  his entrance into the said 
place of  government.  But the cause of  dependency is in that 
first  original  ccsnvcyance,  when  power  was  derived  by  the 
whole unto one ; to  pass from him unto them, whom out of  him 
nature by lawful birth should produce, and no natural or legal 
inability make uncapable.  Neither can any man with reason 
think  but  that the  first  institution  of  kings  is  a  sufficient 
ooiisideration  wherefore  their  power  should  always  depend 
on  that from which  it did then flow.  Original influence  of 
power from the body into thc king is tho cause of  the king's 
dopendency in power  upon the body."  Hooker denies that 
the individual king must be elected, but affirms that it was 
from the cominunity that the right  of  hereditary succession 
was derived. 
We have discussed the position of  Althrxsius with regard to 
I he supremacy of  the law, in the last chapter, and need o~ily 
here draw attention to an important passage in which he sets 
out the origin  and nature of  the authority of  the adminis- 
trator  or  prince.  He  recognises  that  while  the  common- 
wealth is formed by the free association  of  all its members, 
and establishes  the laws  necessary  for this, it cannot  itself 
administer  them ;  and therefore  it appoints  ministers  and 
rulers,  and transfers  to  them  the  necessary  authority  and 
power ; it gives them the power  of  the sword and commits 
itself  to their  care and rule.2  Althusius  is  clear  that there 
must be rulers or princes in the commonwealth, but the rulers 
are appointed  by the commonwealth, and their authority is 
Id. id., VIII. 2,  9.  nullo modo fungi potest,  po~tea  minis- 
*  AHhnsius,  ' Politics,'  xviii.  10 :  tris et rectoribuu a se eloctis demanda- 
"Nam  populus  primo  se  in  corpuH  vit,  ntquc  in  cos  ad muneria  uui  ex- 
quoddam  cortis  lrgibus  consociavit,,  poditionem  necossariam  auctoritatem 
jura  necessaria et utilia  ad hanc  ron-  et potestatem transtulit, gladioque  ad 
~ociationem  sibi  constituit,  eorumque  earn  rem  illos  accinxit,  iisque  fie  re- 
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always less  than that which  the commonwealth reserves  to 
itself.  Their authority is  only to rule  according to the just 
laws of  the commonwealth, and they @re  only God7s  ministers 
if  they rule for the common good.  The prince is not  above 
the laws, but the laws above the prince.  There neither is, nor 
can be, any such thing as that absolute power which, as it is 
sometimes said, is given to the prince.l 
Finally,  we  may  put  beside  Hooker  and  Althusius  the 
judgment  of  the great  Jesuit, Bellarmine.  IIe is  no  doubt 
arguing, not for the direct, but for the indirect  authority of 
the Papal See in temporal matters ; but his judgment is clear 
that, while it is true that the royal or imperial power is from 
God, it must be understood that it does  not normally come 
immediately from Him, but mediately through the consent of 
men, for as St Thomas Aquinas had said, lordship and princi- 
palities belong not to the Divine, but to the Human Law.2 
(2) The  Conception  of  the "  Sovereignty " of  the  Com- 
munity.-We  shall, in a later chapter, consider the theory of 
sovereignty as set out by Bodin, and we  do not wish here to 
anticipate this.  It is enough, for the moment, to say that in 
Bodin7s view  there  must  be  in  every  political  community 
some supreme power  which makes all laws and magistrates, 
1 Id.  id.,  xviii.  27 :  "  Qunntum- 
cunque enim est imperium et jus quod 
alteri conceditur, minus tamen semper 
est eo quod concedens sibi resorvavit. 
. . . 28.  Transfertur  vero  in  hosce 
administratores et rectores a membris 
universalis consociationis sola potestas 
secundum  justas  leges  administrandi 
et regendi  corpus,  et jura  universalis 
hujus  consociationis.  . . . 32.  Hoe 
agens, minister Dei dicitur, Rom. c.  13. 
. . . 37.  Non  est princeps supra legcm, 
sed leges supra principem. .  . .  38.  Nam 
contra  leges  aliquid  posse  non  est 
potestat,is, sed impotentiao  nota. . . . 
39.  Unde  et quod dicitur absoluta st 
plenissima  potestas  prinoipi concessa, 
nulla est, nec esse potest." 
Bellarmine, '  Do  Potcstate  Summi 
Pontificis,'  111.  (p.  51) :  "  Porro 
quod scribit  sanctus  Gregorius datam 
f uisse imperatori coolitus, non significat 
imperatoriam  potestatem  esse  imme- 
diate a Deo, sed esse a Deo in 00 sensu, 
quo dioit apostolus ad Rorn. xiii., nou 
est potestas nisi  a Deo.  Omnis enim 
potestas  a  Deo  est;  sed  aliqua  im- 
mediate, ut Moisis, ut Sancti Petri, ut 
Sancti  Pauli ;  aliqua  mediante  con- 
sensu  hominum,  ut  potestas  Rcgum, 
Consulum, Tribunorum-nam  (ut  Sane- 
tus Thomas docet  in 2.  2. Q.  10. Art. 
10. et Q.  12. Art. 2) dominia et princi- 
patus humani,  do  juro  humano  sunt, 
non de jure  divino."  Cf.  Id. id., xxi. 
(page 174).  For the same principle 8,s 
held by Molina and Suarez, cf. pp. 343, 
344. 
and  which is subject to no law, except that of  God  and  of 
nature, and to this power he gives the name of  "  Maje~tas.)~  1 
Bodin7s work  was  published in French in 1576, but it is im- 
portant  to  observe  that  some  of  the  Huguenot  pamphlets 
were  published  a  little  earlier,  or  about  the  same  time, 
Hotman's ' Franco Gallia ' in 1573, the  Droit des Magistrats ' 
in 1574, and the '  Archon et Politie ' in 1576, and in some of 
thexe  we  find  already  developed  a  conception  of  a  power 
belonging to the community or its representative  authority, 
which is supreme over all other powers, even that of  thc king, 
and  this  supreme  authority they  call  the "  So~verainetB,~' 
while they speak of the king as "  Souverain." 
Eotman,  in  discussing  the  power  of  what  he  calls  the 
'' Concile des Estats,"  meaning the States General, maintains 
that it had power to elect and to depose kings, and hc goes on 
to say that even after the election of  the king, it reserved and 
retained in its own hands the ''  sovereign authority " of  the 
government of  the kingdom.2 
It is, however, in the '  Droit des Magistrats '  of  1574 that 
the distinction between the "  Souverain 77 and the ''  Souver- 
ainetd "  is first  carefully and  completely drawn  out.  There 
are  magistrates  or  officers,  who  are  indeed  inferior  to  the 
'' Souverain,"  and are appointed by him, but do not properly 
hold  from the "  S~uverain,'~  but from the "  S~uverainetB.~~  8 
The  distinction is clear, but is  made  even clearer when  the 
author adds that the ''  Souverain " himself, before he is put 
in " real possession  77 of  his sovereign administration,  swears 
fidelity  to  the "  80uvorstinet8.~'~ And  again,  empires  and 
Cf. pp. 418  ff. 
Elotman,  ' Franco  Gallia,'  xx. 
(in '  Memoires  de  llEstat,'  vol.  i.  p. 
712) :  " Que  plus  est,  mesme  aprds 
I'election du roi, le Concile se reservoit 
encores et retenoit  par devers  soy  la 
souvermne authorit4 du gouvernement 
des affaires du Royaume." 
a  "  Du Droit des Magistrats " (ed. in 
'  Memoires  de I'Estat,' vol.  ii. p.  748 : 
"  Or faut-il entendre que tous ceux cy 
(the magistrates) encores quils  soyent 
au-dessous de  leur  souverain  (duquel 
aussi ils recoyvent  commandement, et 
lequel les installe  st approuve) toutes 
fois  ne  dependent  proprement  du 
souverain, mais de la souverainet4." 
Id.  id.,  vol.  ii.  p.  748 :  " Le 
souverain  mesmes,  avant qu'estre  mis 
en vraye possession de son administra- 
tion  souveraine,  jure  fidelitb  8,  la 
souverainet4,  soua  les  conditions  ap- 
posees B son serment." 374  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV. 
kingdoms  are  fiefs,  which  owe  homage  and  fidelity  to the 
"  Souverainet6." 
These  are  trenchant  sayings,  and  t,he conception  of  the  - 
king as a vassal of  the "  Souverainetd "  is unusual, to say the 
least, tfhough not unintelligible ; but what we  are here con- 
cerned with is tjhe sharp distinction between the king who is 
"  Souverain,"  and some greater  authority behind him, which 
holds the "  Souverainet6," for there are those who represent 
the "  Souverainet6 "  and it is for them to provide for the tenure 
of  the sovereign's fief, if  he has lost it by his offences against 
his   subject^.^  The  king  or "  Souverain " is  not  above the 
laws, but is subject to them, for  he  has sworn  to maintain 
and defend  them.3  While  it is not lawful  for  any  private 
person  to  resist  the tyrant, there  are  magistrates,  inferior 
indeed to him, but whose function it is to act as bridles and 
restraints  upon  the  sovereign  magistrate.  There  are  such 
officers  in  several  Christian kingdoms, such  as  dukes,  mar- 
quesses, counts, &c. ; they were formerly "  estats et chergea 
publiques,"  and were  appointed  'l par  ordre  legitime,"  and 
though  these  offices  have become  hereditary,  the nature  of 
their  right  and  authority  has  not  changed:  such  are  also 
the  elective  officer# of  the  cities, such  as  mayors,  consuls, 
syndics, &c.4 
l Id.  id.,  vol.  ii.  p.  776 : "  Outre 
tout  cela,  puisque  les  royaumes  et 
empires  mesmes  sont  fiefs,  devons 
hommages et services h la souverainet6. 
Je  di donc au cas oh nous sommes, 
qu'un  roi,  ou  mbme  un  Empereur, 
relevant  de  la  souverainet6,  commet- 
tant felonie contra ses vassaux, assavoir 
ses  sujets  (ce  que  jamais  no  puisse 
advenir) perd  son fief,  non  pour  Btre 
adjudge5  aux  vassaux,  mais  pour  y 
btre  pourvu par ceux qui repr6sentcnt 
la  souverainot6. . . . Or  est  il  ainsi 
que  I'Emporeur  mesmes, comme nous 
l'avons cy devant not6, doit hommape 
B l'Empire, duquel il est le premier et 
souverain  vassal  (ce  que  dolt  estre 
encores 9.  plus forte ou pour lo  moins 
aussi  forte  raison  estim6  rlo  13  con- 
dition  des  Roys  &  l'end~oit  du 
Royaumo) ." 
Id. id. (p. 750) : L'  Car pour t,olLa~n 
c'est  une  parole  trds  fausse,  et  non 
poinct  d'un  loyal sujet  It  son  princc, 
mais  d'un  detestable flatteur,  de  dire 
quo  10s  souverains  sont  contraints  & 
nulles  lois.  Car, au  contraire, il  n'y 
en  a  pas  une,  par  laquelle  il  no 
doyve  et  soit  tenu  do  regler  son 
gouvornement,  puis  qu'il  a  jur6 
d'estre  lo mainteneur et protecteur  de 
toutes." 
This is followed by a citation of  the 
' Digna  Vox ' (Cod. I. xiv. 4) and  the 
story of  Trajan giving the sword to be 
used against him if  necessary. 
Id. id.  (p, 746) : "  I1  n'est  licite 
A  aucun  particulier  cl'opposer force  A 
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It is of  these officers that the author of  the treatise says, as 
we  have seen, that they hold not from the  'L Souverain " but 
froill the "  Sonverainetd," to which the  Souverain " himself 
has  sworn  fidelity ; and he  goes  on  to say  that thcre  is  a 
mutual obligation between the king and these officers of  the 
kingdom, for the whole government is not in the h~nds  of  thc 
king,  but  only  the "  souverain  degr6 " of  the  government, 
while each of  these inferior officers has his part in it according 
to his rank.l 
The  pamphlet  generally  known  as  '  Archon  et  Politic,' 
which was published in 1576, represents the same conception. 
In discussing the limitations on  the arbitrary  power  of  the 
prhce it says that there are inferior authorities, a deputies " 
of  the people ; these create 6he prince and can depose him, 
and they would be traitors to their  country if  they suffered 
the "  principaut6 " to become a tyranny.  They, as  souver-  - 
ains magjstrats," are above the prince (in their public capacity), 
while  as private persons they are  below  him.2  And  again, 
la  force  du  tyran,  de  son  authorit6 
privee." 
Id.  id.  (p.  745) : "  Tiercement,  il 
y en a d'autros, lesquels encores qu'ils 
n'ayent  la  puissance  souveraine  et 
ordinaire  B  manier,  toutes  fois  sont 
ordonnez pour servir comme de brides 
et  freins  au  souverain  magistrat." 
Id. id. (p. 747) : "  Je viens mainte- 
nent  eux  magistrats inferjeurs. . . ." 
(p. 748) :  "  Tels  sont  aujourdhui  les 
officiers  de plusieurs royaumes  Chres- 
tiens,  entre lesquels il  est raisonnable 
do  conter  les  Ducs,  Marquin.  Contes, 
Vicomtes, Barons, Chastelains, qui ont 
jadis  e~t6  estate et charges pilblics, qui 
so eommettoyent  par ordro legitimo, et 
qui depuis, pour estro dovenues dignitez 
hereditaires, n'ont  pourtant  change la 
nature de lour droit et authorit6 : auasi 
il  feut  comprendre  en  ce  nombre  10s 
officiers electifs dos villos, tels quo sont 
10s M~ires,  Viguiers, Consuls, Capitous, 
Syndiques,  Eschevins  et  autres  sem- 
blabl~s." 
Id.  ~d  (p.  '748):  "  Par  cela,  11 
appert qu'il y a uno mutuelle obligation 
ontre  un  Roy  ot  les  officiers  d'un 
royaume:  auquel  royaume  tout  le 
gouvernement  n'est  pas  mis entre 10s 
mains  du  Roy,  ains  seulement  le 
souverain degr6 de ce gouvernmement, 
comme  aussi  les  officiers  inferieurs  y 
ont  chacun leur  part selon leur  dcgr6, 
et lo tout Q certaines conditions d'une 
part et d'autre." 
a  "La  Politique.  Dialogue  entre 
Archon et Politio "  (ed. in '  M6moiros de 
l'Estat,'vol.  iii. (p. 127) : "Car il y a des 
puissances  inf6rieures  et  deputez  du 
peuple,  nutheurs  des  princes,  qui  les 
ayant faits 10s peuvent  defaire, et tels 
ne  pouvent  laisser par raison la  prin- 
cipautB  dcrliner  &  tyronnio,  car  ils 
trahiroyont 18 patrie qui a constitu6 tellr 
estats  pour  empencher  la  Tyrannio. 
Si ello  snrvient, c'ost  aux sujets  par- 
tiriiliers  de  rrcourir  humtlenlont  et 
sans  confusion  eu  remede  vers  ceu:r 
I&  qui  sont  comme  souverains Magis- 
trats  pardessus  le  prince  en  rest 
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after  discussing the right  of  subjects,  who  have  by  solemn 
edicts  obtained  from  the  prince  the  right  to  exercise  their 
religion,  to refuse obedience if  the prince  attempts tyranni- 
cally to violate these, and to defend their liberty by all lawful 
means ; the  author  of  the  tract  goes  on  to say  that  this 
applies  also  to the other  rights  of  the people.  There  are, 
indeed, few kingdoms or  principalities  whose  rulers  are not 
bound  and  restrained  by  many  laws,  to  which  they  have 
sworn  at their  "reception,"  and  they  have  promised  the 
a So~verainetB,~~  that  is,  the "  Estates " composed  of  the 
body of  all the people, to keep these invio1ably.l 
This conception, that behind  the authority of  the king or 
prince there is a greater authority still, and that this resides 
in  the  community, was  also  carefully  set  out  by  Mariana. 
After saying in general terms that the prince should understand 
that the authority of  the whole commonwealth is greater than 
that of  any one pers~n,~  Mariana devotes a whole  chapter to 
the consideration of  this  question in  detail.  He was  aware 
that  there  were  different  opinions, that  some  learned  men 
maintained  that  the  king  was  greater  not  only  than  the 
individual  citizen,  but  than  all  the  citizens,  and  that  the 
commonwealth could transfer the supreme power to the prince 
without  any limitati~n.~  And,  he  continues,  this  seems  to 
au  oessous  par  un  regard  ordma~re. 
Et ne  faut polnt  penser que le  prlnce 
puisse sans tyrannle, oqter cest  ordre : 
car cela vlent de la premldre source du 
gouvernemens establis  de  Dieu  et de 
nature, comme 11  en a est6 parl6." 
1 Id. (p. 128)  "  Cela  se dolt esten- 
drc aussi aux autres dro~ts  du peuple, 
lesquels ne  peuvent  estre  abolis  sans 
mon~feste  confusion et an6antissement 
des  estats,  et  a  plus  forte  raison, 
qaand les lo~x  reiglent d6s long temps 
la  grandeur des prmces et magistrats 
souveralns : comme 11  se trouvera blen 
peu de royaumca et prlnc~pautez,  dont 
les  prlnciprtux  gouverneurs  ne  solent 
1102 et retonus en llmltes par beaucoup 
de lolx, qu'eux  mesmes jurent  Q leurs 
re~opilon,  et promettent  A  la  souver 
amt6  (c'eat A-dire,  aux  Estats  com 
post% du corps  de tout le  peuple) de 
garder lnviolablement " 
Mariana, '  De Rege,'  I. 6  (p. 61) : 
"  Quod  caput  eat,  sit  prmclpl  per- 
suasum  tot~us  re~pubhcae majorem 
quam  un~us  auctorltatem  esse,  neque 
pessimls  homlnibus  credat  d~versum 
aflirmantlbus, gratificandlstudlo . quae 
magna pernicies est." 
Td  id , I.  8  (p.  71) :  "  Vldeo 
tamen  non  deease  viroa  eruditionls 
opln~one  praestantes, qui  secus statu 
ant , Regem non singul~s  mod0 c~v~bus, 
sed etlam universis majorem esse  .  . ." 
(p 72)  "  Praeterea cum negare nemo 
posset,  quln  respubhca  supremam  st 
maximam potestatem pos81t sme oxcep- 
tione prln~ipi  deferre." 
be the form of  government  among some peoples where there 
is no public "  con~ensus,'~  where the people or the chief  men 
never assemble to deliberate about the affairs of  the common- 
wealth, where men must obey whether the king's  government 
is just  or unjust.  Such an authority, Mariana, however, says, 
is excessive, and tends to tyranny ; Aristotle had indeed said 
that it existed among barbarous peoples, but "  we  are not con- 
cerned with barbarians, but with the government of  Spain and 
with  the best  form of  g0vernment.l  He  concedes that the 
king is supreme in those matters which by the law and custom 
of  the nation are left to his judgment,  such  as  making war 
and administering  justice ; in those matters the king has  an 
authority greater  not  only than  the  individual  citizen, but 
than  all.  On  the  other  hand  there  are  matters,  such  as 
legislation and taxation, in wh~ch  the authority of  the common- 
wealth is greater than that of the prince.  Finally, and this is 
.  . 
the most important part, the commonwealth has authority to 
coerce the prince if he is vicious and wicked, ~f he prefers to 
be feared rather than loved, and becomes a tyrant.2 
Id  ~d ,  1  6 (p 72)  "  Est autern 
porspicuum,  ~d lnstltutum in  qu~bus- 
dam  gentlbus  vigere,  ubl  nullus  est 
publ~cus  consensus, nunquam  populus 
aut proceres de republ~ca  dellberaturi 
convenmnt :  obtemperandum  tantum 
necessltas  urget,  sive  aequum  sive 
lniquum regls lrnperlum slt.  Potestes 
mmla  proculdublo,  proximeque  ad 
tyrannidem  vergens,  qualem  ~nter 
gentes  barbaros  vigere  Artstoteles 
affirmatum rel~qult  .  nos  hoc  loco 
non  de barbans, sed de pnnc~patu  qul 
m nostra gente vlget, et v~gere  aequum 
@st,  dcque  optima  et saluberrlma  im- 
perandl forma dlsputamus." 
Jd. ~d.,  I.  8  (p. 72)  Ac  primum 
llbenter  dabo,  regiam  potostatem 
supremam  in  regno  ease  In  rebus 
omnibus,  quae  more  gentis, instltuto, 
ac  certa  lege,  princlpls  arbitrio  smt 
permissa,  sivc  bellum  gerendtim  slt, 
slve jus  dlcendum subditls, slve duces 
mag~stratusque  creandl :  majorem 
non  ringulls  modo,  sed  unlversls 
habeblt potestatem, nu110  qui resistat, 
aut fact1 ratlonem ex~gat Quod mon- 
bus  populorum  ferme  omnlum  fixum 
vldemus, ne a rege constltuta retractare 
cuiquam llceat, aut de ipsis dlsceptare. 
Credam tamen,  in dlverso  qnamvls 
genere,  majorem  reipubllcae  quam 
prlnclpls  esse  auctorltatem,  modo 
universae In  unam conspirantis senten 
tiam.  Certe  ad  trlbuta  Imperanda, 
abrogandasque  leges,  ac  proesertim 
quae  de  successlone  In  rcguo  Runt, 
mutandas, reslstente mult~tudlne  impar 
unlus  prlncipls  auctorltas  sit,  et  sl 
quae  aha  gentis  moribus  unlversitatl 
reservata  haudquaquam  prmclpls  In 
arbitrlo  poslta  sunt 
Postromo, quod caput eat, pr~nc~p~s 
malo coercend~  potestatem in republlra 
restdere, 81 vltns et ~rnp~ob~tate  ~nfertus 
slt,  lgnoransque  VCrum  lter  glonae, 
metul  a  clvlbus  qUam  amarl  mallt. 
metuque  paventibus  et  pcrculsts  lm- 
perare,  ln]urlam  facere  pergat  factus 
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These  writers  may  seem  to represent  somewhat  extreme 
opinions, and it is therefore important to observe that Hooker 
and  Althusius  affirm the  same  principles.  In one  passage 
IIooker  says:  "Besides,  whon  the law  doth give  him  (the 
king) dominion, who doubteth but t'hat the king who receiveth 
it must hold  it of  and under  the law?  According  to  that 
axiom,  Attribuat rex legi, quod lex  attribuat ei, potestatern 
et dominium ' ;  and again, '  Rex non debet osse sub homine, 
sed sub Deo  et lege.'  Thirdly, whereas it is not altogether 
without  reason  that kings  are  judged  to have  by  virtue of 
their  dominion,  although  greater  power  than  any, yet  not 
than all the states of  those societies conjointly wherein such 
sovereign  rule  is  given  them."l  And  again,  with  special 
reference to England : "  This is therefore the right whereby 
kings do hold their  power;  but yet in what  sort  the same 
doth rest and abide in them it somewhat behoveth  to search. 
Wherein,  that  we  be  not  enforced to make  over-large dis- 
courses about the different conditions of  sovereign or supreme 
power,  that which  we  speak  of  kings  shall be  with  respect 
unto the state and according to the nature of  this kingdom, 
where the people  are in no subjection, but such  as willingly 
themselves have condescended unto, for their own most behoof 
and  security.  In kingdoms,  therefore,  of  this  quality  the 
highest  governor  hath indeed universal  dominion, but  with 
dependence upon  that  whole  entire  body,  over  the  several 
parts whereof  ha hath dominion ; so  that it standeth for an 
axiom  in this case.  The  king is  'L  major  singulis, universis 
minor." 
We  have  already  seen  that  Althusius  is  clear  that  the 
LL Majestas " or sovereign authority which recognises no other 
as  superior  or  equal to itself,  belongs  and  can  only belong 
to the whole political community, and we need only refer here 
to  another  passage,  as  expressing  this  judgment.  The 
"  Majestas " belongs to the people and it cannot transfer this 
to any other person.  It cannot be divided or transferred, it 
is created by the whole body of  the members of  the kingdom, 
'  Hooker,  'Ecclesiastical  Polity,'  2  Id. id., viii. 2,  7. 
vi11.  2,  3. 
and  without  them  it  cannot  stand.  The  king,  therefore, 
however great his authority, can never deprive the members 
of  his kingdom of  the right to resist him if  he acts unjustly. 
This  JUS,~'  that is, the  "Majestas,"  is  the very  soul and 
vital  spirit  of  the commonwealth, and  it can  never  grant 
it to anyone else without destroying itse1f.l 
(3) The  Relation  of  the King to the Court8 of  Law.-We 
have seen in  former volumes and in the earlier parts of  this 
one  that  in  constitutional  theory  and  practice  it  was  a 
1  generally accepted  principle that the king  could, in  normal 
circumstances,  take  action  against  his  subjects  only  by 
process  of  law.  The  famous  clause  of  Magna  Carte  (39) 
represents the normal conception of  feudal law, and the normal 
practice  of  mediaeval  society.  It  is therefore  important to 
inquire whether this principle continued to be recognised in 
the later sixteenth century. 
George  Buchanan  deals  with  this  question  under  two 
terms ; and first, whether the king should have the power of 
interpreting  the  law.  Maitland  had  urged  that  the  king 
should have  this  power, but Buchanan replies  that he was 
asking more than the most '(  imperious " of  kings demanded. 
This power belonged to the judges ; to give this power to the 
king would give him the opportunity to twist the law to his 
own  convenience.  If  this were  once permitted, it would  be 
useless to have good laws ; it would be better to have no laws 
at all  than  such a  LL liberum  latrocinium,"  under  colour  of 
1 Althusius, '  Politice,'  xxxviii.  127 : 
"  Quis  item  dicet  populum  tale  jus 
majestatis  in  alium  a  se  transferre 
potuisse.  Stat  enim  illa  communis 
juris-oonbultorum  sentcntia, jus majes- 
tatis  nec  cedi  nec  distlahi,  nor  ulla 
ratione annullari  posse  a  suo domino. 
. . Est enim  indivlduum et incom- 
municabile,  neque  temporis  diuturni- 
tate prae~cribi  potcst ullo modo.  Nam 
jus noc majestatis a mcmbris universis 
et singulis  regni  constitutum  est,  ab 
illis incepit  et sine  illis  consistere  et 
conservari  non  potest.  Nequaquam 
vero  cum  rege  nascitur,  qui  etiam 
plenissimam  potestatem  hebens,  non 
potest  membris  sui  regni  sibi  inique 
agenti  potestatem  et  voluntatem  re- 
sistendi  adimcrre.  Unde  jus  hoc 
dicitur  anima  et spiritus vitati?  regni 
et reipublicao,  quem  alii,  citro interi- 
tum  sui  ipsius,  communicare  nequa- 
quam  potest.  Natura  ergo  hujus 
administrat~onis  regi  demsndata  cst, 
nt imperium  suum  suhmittst  legi  et 
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1aw.l  In the  second  place,  Buchanan  contends  that  any 
private person had the right to appeal to the courts of  law in 
a  dispute between himself  and the king about  his property ; 
and that it makes no difference in principle whether it is the 
king himself  or his "  Procurator "  whom he calls into court.2 
When  we  turn  to tho  French  Huguenot  writers  we  find 
some very important assertions of  the same principles.  The 
"  Remonstrance " says  that  the  Courts  of  "  Parlement " 
were once above the kings, and opposed themselves to their 
absolute power, while "  to-day " they submitted servilely to 
the commands of these from whom they hoped for advantnge.3 
The other Huguenot tracts are clear and emphatic in asserting 
the principle that the king could only take action against his 
subjects by proccss of  law.  In the tract '  Archon et Politie,' 
"  Archon " asks indignantly whether the king has not got the 
power  of  life and  death  over  his  subjects,  and "  Politit! " 
George  Buchanan,  '  De  Jure 
Ragni'  (p.  14) :  "  B.  Sed  tu mihi 
legum  nomine  plus  postulare  videris, 
quam  qui  eorum  imperiosissimi  sunt 
sibi  sumant.  Scis  enim  ad  judices 
rejici  solere  hoc  genus  questionum, 
cum aliud lex dicere, aliud legis auctor 
voluisse  videtur,  perinde  atque  illas 
quae de ambiguo jure  aut legum inter 
se  discordia  oriuntur . . .  cum  regi 
legum  interpretionem  concedis,  hanc 
tribuis  ei  licentiam,  ut lex non  dicat 
quod  lator sentit,  aut quod  in  com- 
mune sit aequum et bonum, sed quod 
in  rem  sit  interpretis;  utque  is  ad 
ornnes  eam  actiones,  commodi  sui 
causa,  velut  Lesbiam  regulam  in- 
flectat. . . . 
Vides,  opinor,  quoniam  uno  versu 
des  principi  licentiam:  nempe  ut 
quod  vult  ille,  dicat  lex ;  quod 
nolit,  non  dicat.  Id si semel recipia- 
mus, nihil proderit bonas leges condere, 
qua8  principem  bonum  sui  officii 
admoneant,  malum  circumscribant. 
Imo, ut dicam  apertius, nullas omnino 
leges habere  praestaret, quam liberum 
latrocinium,  atque  etiam  honoraturn, 
sub legis praetextu, tollerari." 
a  Id. id.  (p.  36) : "  B.  Si  privatus 
quispiam  praedium,  aut  a-gri  sui 
partem,  contra  quam  aequum  est,  a 
rege teneri contendat, quid hic privato 
faciendum  censis ?  Ccdetne  agro, 
quoniam  regi  judicem  fcrre  non 
poterit  9 
M. '  Minime.'  Sed non  regem,  sed 
procuratorem ejus adesse jubebit. 
B.  Jam  istud  perfugium,  quo  tu 
uteris  quam  vim  habeat,  vide,  mea 
enim nihil  refert, an ipse rex advenit, 
an  ejus  procurator;  utroque  enlm 
mod0  regis  periculo  litigabitur :  ei, 
non  procuratori,  ex  eventu  judicii 
damnum  aut  lucrum  accedet.  Ipse 
denique  reus est, id  eat,  is  cujus ros 
agitur." 
'  Kemonstrance  aux  Seigneurs,' 
&c. (p. 74) : "  Les cours de Porlement 
qui anciennement  estoyent par  dessus 
les roys, et s'opposoyent  avec  grande 
integrit4  8,  leur  puissanoe  ahsolue, 
aujourdhui  se  laschent  servilement 
aux commandement de tous ceux dont 
ils ccpdrent proufit." 
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answers that they have this power, but only "  avec conoissance 
de cause, et informations valables,"  that is, if  one may ven- 
ture a paraphrase, by legal process  and on  proper evidence.l 
The  author  of  the '  Vindiciae  Contra  Tyrannos ' contends 
that even to-day the "  Senatus Lutetiarum " (the Parlement 
of  Paris) is set in a certain sense as a judge between the king 
and  the  people,  even  between  the  king  and  any  private 
person ; and he adds that, lest the Parlement should be afraid 
of  the king, tho judges could not formerly be appointed except 
with the nomination of  the Parlement, or removed from their 
office except for a legitimate (legal) cause.2 
It may indeed again be suggested that Buchanan and the 
Huguenot  pamphleteers  represented  an extreme and revolu- 
tionary  position ;  and  it  is  therefore  very  important  to 
observe that Bodin,  who  certainly  asserted  the  doctrine  of 
the absolute authority of  the king of  Prance in the strongest 
terms (as we shall see in a later chapter), sets out a conception 
of  the relation of  the courts of  law to the king, which  is at 
least  analogous  to  that  of  Buchanan  and  the  Huguenots. 
In tho first place, it should be observed that Bodin considers 
at some length the question whether the prince should him- 
self  act as a judge, and he is very clear that the prince should 
not  do   SO.^  In the second  place, Bodin discusses at length 
the  question  whether  the  judges  should  be  perpetual  or 
removable  at the pleasure  of  the prince.  He  admits  that 
there had been different opinions about this, and even refers 
to Michel 1'Hopital as having been in favour  of  their  being 
remo~able.~  He  admits  that  under  a  monarchy  certain 
1 'Archon  et  Politie '  (p.  120) : 
"  Archon.  Quoy,  les  rois,  n'ont  ils 
pns puissance  sur la mort et sur la vie 
do leurs  sujets ?  Politie.  Ouy,  blcn, 
mais  avec  connaissance  de  cause,  ct 
informations  vdables  et  uon  autro- 
ment." 
'  Vindiciae  Contra  Tyrannos,'  Q. 
111.  (p.  97) :  "  Hinc  otiam  hodie 
Ronatus Lutetiarum  qui curia Psrium, 
seu  Patriciorum  nuncupatur ;  quasi 
judex inter legem st populum quadam- 
lcnus constitutus, imo inter Rcgcm st 
privat um  quemlihet, singulos  adversus 
regis  procuratorom  assercre,  si  quid 
contra  jus  invadat  quasi  obligatione 
tenetur. . . .  (p. 98): Ne  vero  regem 
metuorent  Senatores,  nequc  olim  in 
eum gradurn,  nisi  a  Senatu  nominati 
co-optabantur, nequo  absquo  ojusdem 
suctoritste,  logitima  de  causa  exauc- 
torari poterant." 
Bodin,  '  Do  Republica,'  iv.  O 
(p  450). 
4  Id. id., iv. 4 (p. 138). 383  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURP.  [PART  IV. 
offices, such as those of  {,he governor of  the provinces, should 
be terminable ; but, with regard to the judges,  his opinion is 
very  different : the judges,  and especially those who have to 
decide  on  the Life,  t,he reputation,  and the fortunes of  the 
citizens, and from whom there is no appeal, should hold  by 
a perpetual tenure.l  He gives  an interesting account of the 
history  of  the  actual  practice  in  France,  with  reference 
especially to a law of Louis XI.  IIc admits that the practice 
had varied, and that by long custom the document appointing 
judges  colltained a  clause  which  said  that they should hold 
lhoir ofico at the king's  pleasure ; but this clause, he holds, 
was merely f~rrnal.~  Again, he admits that some maintained 
that it would be better that the tenure of  magistrates should 
be  terminable,  but this he says is false,  and would  be per- 
nicious,  for it is evident that princes are beset by flatterers 
and courtiers,  and would  make  merchandise  of  the magis- 
tracies or talie them away from the best men, who hate such 
conrticrs and their  vices.3  This  custom  of  a,ppointing ter- 
minable  magistracies,  Bodin  says,  savours  of  a  tyranny  or 
Id.  id.,  iv.  4  (p.  439) :  "Cum 
autcm  juris  dicendi  aequnlitate  civi- 
tates  et  imperia  maxime  omnium 
ogere videantur, collegia jlldicum  per- 
pctua croabantur, es  potisbimum qnibus 
de  capite,  fama  ac  fortunis  omllibus 
oivium judicandi sit potcstas, provnca- 
tione semota : non solum ut diuturno 
usu  judicandi  prudentiam  ac  peritiam 
sibi comparcret, vcrum ctiam ut plures 
eadem potestate  conjugati, perindo ut 
magna  vis aquarum, diificilius corrum- 
pantur." 
Td.  id.,  iv.  4  (p.  441) : "  Rlagis- 
tralus  omnos  et  ministros  magis- 
tratuum  sua  l~ge  perpetuos  esse 
(Louis  XI.) jussit  . . . sed  illa  de 
toto  gencre  oKcirtlium  lata  lex,  ne 
cuiquam  imperium  nisi  volenti,  ant 
morte, ant scelere  admi-so  eriperetur, 
immobilis  hactenus extitit : cui etiam 
snbrogatum est uno capitc quo cavetur, 
mngistratus abdioare copendum nemi- 
nem  cujuscunquc  criminalis  causn, 
nisi  judicatus  ct  damnatus  sit,:  cui 
legi  locum  esse  jussit,  non  solum  se 
vivo  ac spirante,  verum  etiam Caroli 
filii principatu : quod etei jure non po- 
terat, successores tamen legi paru~rint  : 
tamotsi majorum formula magistratuum 
tabulis inseritur, ut imperio vel munere 
fruantur  quoad  regi  libuorit. . . . 
Clausula  tamen  restat  inanis  illa 
quidem." 
a  Tcl.  id.,  iv.  4  (p. 442) : "  Putant 
plerique  magistratus  meliores  futuros 
ac imperia sanctiora, si more majorum 
preoaria  darentur,  id  tamen  falsum 
esse  docuimus,  et, ut verum  sit, por- 
niciosum  tamen  esset:  quia  satis 
unicnique  perspicuum  est  principes 
adnlatoribls  et  canibus  aulicis  fere 
somper obsesses, tnrpissimum  qucstum 
ao  mercaturam  magistratus  facturos: 
aut  imperia  optimia  quibusque  qui 
fero semper anlicorum hominum vitam 
vilnre,  vitiis  omnibus  inquinalum 
odcrunt,  iclentidem  cropturors." 
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"  domina,l-ion," not of  a  monarchy, for a  lzingdom  must, so 
far as possible,  be governed  by laws, not by the caprice  or 
mere will of  tho prince.l 
(4) The Conception of  a  Contract  between  the Ruler  and 
the People.-We  can now approach the consideration  of  t>his 
subject, for we  have  considered its presuppositions ; that is, 
first, that the  authority of  the  ruler  was  derived  from the 
community ; second,  the  theory  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
community ; third, the principle  that the person  and rights 
of  the individual members of  the community wcre protected 
even against the ruler by the courts of  law. 
It is even more necessary to remember that the conception 
of  a  contractual  relation  was  the fundamental  principle  of 
a11  feudal society, and was  therefore  an important part  of 
the normal political tradition  of  the Middle Ages.  We have 
endeavoured  to set  this  out in  previous   volume^.^  It will 
therefore  be  convenient  to  begin  our  consideration  of  the 
developn~ent  of  thc theory  of  a  contract  between  ruler and 
people in the later sixteenth century by observing the terms 
in which the resistance of  tjhe Low Countries to Philip 11.  of 
Spein was justified  by William  of  Orange.  We are not here 
concerned  with  the great religious  movements of  that time, 
nor  with  the  complex  or  economic  conditions  and national 
fcding which no doubt had their place in that resistance ; we 
are concerned  wit,h the constitutional principles  which  wcre 
sct forward in jilstiiication of  it ; and, in the first place, in the 
'  Apologie '  of  William of  Orange. 
1  Id.  id.,  iv.  4  (p.  142):  " Haec 
aut,em  precarla,  tribuenclorum  magis- 
tratuum ratio, t,yrannidem aut domi- 
nationem  non  rega!em  monarchicam 
sapit.  Regnum  eniln legibus  oportot 
(q~iantum  fieri  poterit),  non  prinripis 
arbitrio  ac  voluntato  gubornari ;  ut 
quidem  domino  licet,  quem  subditi 
velut aliquem Deum de coelo dcla,psum, 
adorant  ac  metuunt, eiusque  arbitria 
pro  naturae  legibus habent.  De  rege 
altlor  statuendum  est,  quo=  n  hub- 
ditis amari potius quam metui oportet : 
cius autem amandi ratio compendiaria 
futura  est,  si  praemia  idem  onmia, 
omnes item honores et ac magistratus, 
pauci~  quae  dcnotavimus exceptis,  ab 
eo  tribuantur,  nec  nisi  juclicio  con- 
stituto eripiantur.  Quibus  enim  jure 
ac  legibus  erepta  potestas  est,  do 
principo  qucri non possunt." 
2  Qf. especially vo,. iii. part 1 chaps. 
2  and  4:  part  2  cl~:~~)ra.  G  and  6; 
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the Duchess  Mary.l  We  are  not  here  concerned with  tjhe 
historical  validity  of  these contentions, but with the nature 
of  the conception which they represented.  It is obvious that 
while there is no direct reference to a contract, it was implied 
that the prince who violated tho laws was liable to be suspended 
or deposed ; that is, that there was  an implicit contract. 
It is si,~ificant that in  the Articles  of  Agreement which 
were laid before the Duke of  Anjou in the year 1581 by tho 
envoys of  the Estates sent to offer him the government, it is 
clcariy stated that, if  the Duke or his successors were at any 
time to violate the terms of  the Agreement, the estates would 
be  ipso facto  released  from  their  fidelity  and  would  be  at 
liberty  to  appoint  another  prince  or  to  make  such  other 
arrangements as they might think s~itable.~ 
Philip  Marnix  de Ste.  Aldegonde 
(Euvres,  vol.  vii.,  ' Orctison  des 
Ambassadeurs  du  Serenissime  Prince 
Matthias Archiduc d'Autrichd  (p. 134): 
"  En  tant  que  par  les  privileges  de 
Brabant  est expressement  pourvue  et 
dicte,  que  si,  je  ne  di  point  lo  lieu- 
tenant du prince, mais aussi lo  prince 
mesme,  viole  les  loix  et  clroictes  du 
pays, il est en cc cas loisihle, non seule- 
ment  aux  Estats  en  general,  mais 
aussi  particulierement,  k  ceux  aux- 
quels  appartiendra,  de  quelques  con- 
ditions  qu'ils  soyent,  de  refusor  au 
roi  tout  homage  et  obeissance,  si 
longuement  et jusque  Q tant qu'il  ait 
cogner  et  amend6  sa  faute,  et  qu'il 
ait en  tout satisfait  B  ce  qui est pre- 
script et limit6 par  les loix et ordon- 
nances. 
Au  reste,  si  quelqu'un,  estant 
au nom du prince establi au gouverne- 
ment  du  pays,  alloit  k  l'encontre 
desdictes privileges, il est par le mesme 
faict declare estre decheu de son gou- 
vernement et dignitb, et doibt estre de 
tous  tenu  pour  depos6,  de  maniere 
qu'aucun  no  se  pout-joindre  Q  luy, 
comme  a  celuy  qui  de  faict  st sans 
aucune  forme  do  droict  ou  solemnit6 
de loix.  doibt etre jug6  non  idoine  k 
exercer aucun  office en la  Repuhlique, 
mais  aussi tenu  pour  inhabile  B  faire 
testament et infame." 
(They give as an example the deposi- 
tion by the Estates of  John, Duke  of 
Brabant,  grand-nephew  of  Philip  le 
Hardi,  Duke  of  Burgundy,  and  the 
appointment  of  his  brother  Philip, 
until  John  shou!d  amend ; and  they 
say  that  John  recognised  by  letters 
under  his  seal  that  this  action  was 
legitimate.) 
"  Laquelle loy estant particulidre au 
pays de Brabant au temps de la uerenis. 
sime Marie, espouse do Maximilien. . .  . 
Empereur Auguste . . . fut, par traict6 
et couvenant public, faicte commun et 
universe1  par  tout  le  pais  bas,  ainsi 
qu'il  se  trouve  par  ecrit  $8  annales 
publiques. 
Somblable  mani$re do  faire  a  est6 
jadis  ~ractiqu6e,  par les Hollandais et 
Zelandais  st  souvent  usurpbe  en 
Flandres,  comme  la  fidelit6  des  his- 
toriens le nous tesmoigne." 
Id.,  vol.  vii.  (p.  214),  Art.  2: 
"  Et en cas que S.A. ou ses successeurs 
eoutrevinssent Q  ce-dit trait6, en aucuns 
parts d'icelui, les Etats seront  de fait 
absous  et  dGrharg6s  de  toute  obeis- 
mace  serment  et fidelit6, et pourront 
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We think that it is with the impression of  such a survival 
in the sixteenth century of the contractual conceptions of  the 
feudal state in our minds that we  shall best  understand the 
treatment of  the contract between ruler and people  in other 
writers of  the century. 
George  Buchanan  asserts  the conception of  a  contract  in 
precise and dogmatic terms,  in a  discussion of  the right  to 
depose a king who  becomes a tyrant.  Maitland urged  that 
subjects  are bound  by  their  oath  of  obedience to obey  the 
king.  Buchanan  admits  this,  but  replies  that  kings  also 
promise to administer the law '' ex aequo et bono," and that 
there is therefore a mutual contract between the king and the 
citizens.  A contract is void if one of  the parties violates its 
provisions, and therefore if the king breaks  the bond  which 
united him to the people, he loses whatever rights he had by 
the  contract,  and  the  people  is  free  as  it was  before  the 
agre0ment.l 
The  Huguenot  pamphlets  assert  the  principles  of  the 
contract  with equal  emphasis.  The '  Droit  des Magistrats ' 
contends that so far  from its being true that the people had 
wholly  surrendered their liberty to the king, it is rather true 
that they only accepted him on  certain  conditions, and thus 
it follows  that, if these  conditions were violated,  those who 
had power to give this authority had the right also to with- 
draw it.  And again, it was on certain promises and conditions 
that a king was  accepted by his people, conditions founded 
on  equity  and  natural reason,  that he  should  conduct  the 
government according to the laws, of which he is or ought to 
be  thc supreme pr~tector.~  It  is again worth observing that 
prcndre un  autre prince, ou  autrement 
pourvoir  aux  affaires,  comme  ils 
trouveront ronrenir." 
George  Buchanan,  'De  Jure 
Regni ' (p. 38) : "  B.  Obstricti sumus ; 
sed  illi (the kings) contra, priores pro- 
mittunt  se  ex  aequo  et  bono  jus 
dicturos.  . . . Mutua  igitur  regi  cum 
civibus  eat  puctio. . . . Qui  prius  a 
conventis  recedit,  contraque  quam 
pactus est facit, nam is  pacta et con- 
venta  solvit  ?  . . .  Soluto  igitur 
vinculo, quod regem cum populo con- 
tinebat,  quicquid  juris  ex  pactionc 
ad  eum  qui  pacta  solvit, pertinebat,, 
id, reor, amittitur. . . . Is etiam, cum 
quo erat conventum,  aequo fit, atque 
ante stipulationem  erat, liber." 
a  '  Droit  des  Magistrate'  (p.  753) : 
"  Je nie  qu'il  puisse  apparoir  d'une 
telle quittance (the contention that the 
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the '  Droit  des  Magistrats,'  in  a  passage to whic.h we  have 
already referred, in which it speaks of  kingdoms and empires 
as  fiefs  of  the "Souverainet6,"  refers  to  the  feudal law  as 
declaring that the lord loses his fief  if  he commits "  felonie 77 
against his vassals, and applies this to the case of  an emperor 
or king in his relations to his subjects.l 
The  'Archon  et  Politie  speaks  of  the  reciprocal  pacts 
and conventions  between  the prince  and the people  which 
may not be violated by either party.2  The '  Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos '  sets out the principle of  a  foedus 77 between king 
and people.  It was the people who made the king, and the 
people imposed a condition which the king promised to ob- 
serve.  The condition was  that the Iring  should reign  justly 
and according to the laws, and when he had promised to do 
this the people promised that they would faithfully obey him, 
but, if  the king did not fulfil his promise, they would be free 
from all obligation to him.  There are indeed two contracts, 
one between God and the king and people, t'he other between 
the king and the people.  God is the avenger if  the king does 
liberty),  et dis  au contraire,  quo  les 
nations, taut quo le droit et equit6  a 
eu  lieu,  n'ont  cre6  ni  accept6  leur 
Roys  qu'8  certaines  conditions.  les- 
quelles  estans  manifestement  violees 
par eux, ils s'ensuit  quo ceux  qui ont 
en  puissance de leur baillor tell8 auto- 
rit6 n'ont en moin do puissance  de lea 
en priver." 
Id. (p. 769) (After citing  tho  terms 
of  tho Treaty of  Arras botween Charles 
VII. and tho Duke of  Burgundy, that 
if  Charlos  violated  the  Treaty  his 
vaqsals and subjects would be absolved 
from their 09th of  allegiance to him) : 
"  Devons-nous  en  moins  estimor 
d'une  promosse  et  condition  sous 
laquelle un Roy aura est6 accept6 par 
eon  peuple,  et  qui  est  mesme  fondee 
sur equit6 et raison nat~irolln,  a~savoir 
do  reigler  son  8dministra.tion  solon 
lea  loix,  desquels  il  est  ou  doit  estre 
le souvcrnin protectour." 
1 Id.  (p.  776) : "  Outre  tout  cela, 
puisq~le les  royaumes  et  empires 
mesmos  sont  fiefs,  devons  hommageb 
et services  8  la  soovcrainet6,  venous 
8 consicioror ce que porte les droits de~ 
fiefs.  I1 est dit au livre 11.  Tit. xxvi. 
Par.  24,  et Tit.  47,  que  le  seigneur 
commet  felonnie  contre  son  vassal 
comme  lo  vassal  contre son  seigneur. 
. . . Je di donc au cas oh nous sommes, 
qu'un  Roi  ou  mesme  un  Empereur, 
relevant do la souveraint6 commettant 
felonie contre ses vaseaux, A savoir ses 
sujets (ce que jamais no pulsse advonir) 
perd  son  fief,  non  pour  eetrc  adjug6 
aux vassaux, mais pour y estre pourveu 
pgr  coux  qui  repr6sentent  la  aouve- 
rainet6." 
"Archon  et  Politie'  (p.  114): 
"  Politie.  Mai~  il y a loi entre les deux 
parties  qui  ordonne  actions  et  con- 
venances reciproques, qni no se peuvent, 
ni par le Prince, ni par leu sujots, sans 
justice  violer." 
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not keep tthe  first pact, while the whole people and t#hoso  persons 
who are responsible for the protection of  the people have the 
same authority if  the king does  not fulfil his  contract  with 
ihem.1  It  is,  however, perhaps  more  important  that  the 
author  of  the '  Vindiciae ' maintains that a contract of  this 
kind was a part of $he constitution of  almost all contemporary 
states (imperia) which  were worthy to be called states ; and 
he  ill~st~rates  this  from  the  Empire  and  other  elective 
monarchies, and then from hereditary monarchies like France, 
England,  and  Spain, and  smaller  states  like  Brabant.  He 
finds  the essential expression of  this in  the coronation cere- 
monies and especially in the coronation oaths, and concludes 
that no  one  can  deny that there  is a  mutual  and  binding 
conkact between kings and their  subject^.^ 
The author of  the '  Vindiciae ' sums up the whole matter by 
declaring eml?hatieallg that the king who violates the contract 
is  perjured and unworthy  of  his  office,  and that the people 
who refuse obedience to him have violated no obligation, and 
he appeals to the principle of  the feudal law that the vassal 
is free from the service if  the lord has committ'ed "  felonie 77 
against him.  And finally he says that even if  there were no 
ceremonies  of  coronation, if the king  had  taken  no  oaths, 
nature itself  would teach men that kings were created by the 
people that they should rule justly,  and that if  they do not 
1 '  Vindiciae  Contra  Tyrannos,'  Q. 
111.  (p.  159).  "  Diximus  in  con- 
stituendo  rege  duplcx  foedus  initum 
fuisse ; primum inter Doum  et regem 
et populum, de qus, supcr : secundum 
inter regem  et populum  do quo nobis 
jam  agendum est.  . . .  (P. 160) : In 
eo  pacto  agebatur  de  creando  Rege. 
Populus  enim  regem  faciebat,  non 
Rcx  populum.  Itaque  non  dubium 
est  quin  populus  stipularetur,  Rex 
promittcret  . . . . . . Stipulabatur 
ille a roge,  an non juste  et secundum 
legns rognaturus esset ?  Hic facturum 
spondehat.  l'opulus  demum so  juste 
imperanti  fideliter  obsequuturnm  re- 
spondebat.  Itaqne  promittebat  rex 
puro, populus sub conditiono ; quae si 
non  impleretur,  populus  ipso  jure 
omni  obligatione  solutus  censeretur. 
In  pximo  foedere seu  pacto  pietas  in 
obligationem venit ;  in secundo justitia ; 
illo  promittit  reu,  se  pie  obecliturum 
Deo :  hoc  se  juste  imperaturum 
populo;  illo,  so  gloriam  Dei ;  hoc. 
utilitatem  populi  curaturum ;  in 
illo  inest  conditio,  si  legem  meam 
observaris ; in  hoc,  si  jus  unicuiqua 
suum  tribueris.  Illius,  ni  impleotur 
Deus  proprie  vindox  eat ; hujus  legi- 
time universus populus,  quive univer- 
rium  populum  tuendum  susceperint, 
regni procores." 
Vd.  id.  (p.  182) : "  Quod  si  vero 
hodierna  impcria  spectemus,  nulIum 
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do this they  are no longer kil 
ledgcd by  the peop1e.l 
seatur,  in  quo  inter  principom  ot 
subditos  pactum  ejusmodi  non  intcr- 
cedat." 
He  cites  the  oath  of  the  Emperor 
Charles  V.:  "Loges  latas  custodit- 
urum ;  novas,  inconsultis  electoribiis 
non  laturum ; publica publico consilio 
curaturum ;  nil  ~lienaturum oppig- 
neraturumve ex iis, quae ad imperium 
pertinent, et caetera." 
The Archbishop of  Cologne  requires 
the emperor at his coronation to swear 
to  defend  the  Church,  to administer 
justice, kc., and when the emperor has 
done this, ho  asks the princes whether 
they  will  take  the oath  to him.  He 
refers to Poland, and the recent corona- 
tion  of  the  Duke  of  Anjou;  to  Bo- 
hemia and to Hungary ; and maintains 
that the same practice  obtained  even 
in hereditary kingdoms like France. 
(p.  164) : "Rex  Franciae,  quando 
inauguratur, rogant primo Laudunonsie 
et  Bellovacencis, Pares  Ecclesiastici. 
populum qui adest  universum, oum ne 
rcgem esse cupiat, jubeatque  ?  Unde 
etiam  a  populo  tune  eligi  in  ipsa  in- 
augurationis  formula,  dicitur.  Ubi 
populus oonsensisse videatur, jurat  se 
loges  Franciae  privilegiaque  ac  jura 
in  univorsum  omnia  et  tuiturum, 
domanium non  alienatnrum et cetera. 
. . .  Nec  vero prius  accingitur  gladio, 
ungitur, ooronatur  a paribus  . . . aut 
Rex  proelamatur,  quam  populus  jus- 
serit :  neque  etiam  prius  ei  pares 
jurant,  quam  ipsis  fidem  doderit,  se 
loges accurate custoditurum.  Eae vero 
sunt, no  patrimonium  publicum  dila- 
pidet,  ne  vectigalia,  portoria,  tribute 
suopte arbitrio imponat, indicatve,  ne 
bellum  decernat,  pacemve  faciat : 
denique  ne  quid  in  publicum,  nisi 
publico  consilio  statuat.  Item  sua 
senatui,  sua  Comitiis,  sua  regnj  offi- 
ciariis  constet  auctoritas ; et  cetera, 
qllaR  perpetuo  in  regno  Francico 
~gs  and should not be acknow- 
observata fuere." 
When the king enters any province 
for the first time, he confirms and swears 
to observe its privileges-e.g.,  Toulouse, 
Dauphin& Brittany, Provence. 
The conditions in England, Scotland, 
Sweden, and Denmark  were  much the 
same as in France, while in Spain they 
were  even  more definite, and he  cites 
the  tradition  that  in  Arapon  the 
"  Proceres " addressed the king  at his 
ooronation as follows :- 
(p.  166) "  Nos  qni  t,antum valemus 
quantum  vos,  et  plus  possumus 
quam  vos,  regem  vos  eligimus  cum 
his et his conditionibus.  Inter vos et 
nos  unus  imporat  magis  quam  vos" 
(referring, no doubt, to the Justiza). 
If  the king violated his oath he  was 
to be  excommunicated,  and  his  sub- 
jects  were  released  from  their  oath 
!ike the vassals of  the excommunicated 
lord. 
This  was  also  the  rule  in  smaller 
States such as Brabant. 
(p.  167) :  "In  Duce  enim  suo 
inaugurando, oonventionibus  antiquis, 
quibus  nil  fere ad reipublicae  conser- 
vationem  deest.  coram Duce  porlectis, 
ni eas omnes observaverit, sibi integrum 
esse  alium  quemlibet  suo  arbitratu 
eligere,  palam  ei  diserteque  protes- 
tantur.  Ipse vero tum in eas, accepta 
oonditione ultroque agnita, sese sacra- 
mento  devincit.  Quod  etiam  pos- 
tremo in  Philippi  Hispaniarum  Regis 
inauguratione  observatum  fuit.  In 
summa:  inter regem et subditos con- 
tractum  mutuo  obligatorium  esse, 
nemo  negare  possit;  nempe  ut  bene 
imperanti, bone  ohediatur, qui quidem 
jure jurando  ab illo primum, deinde ab 
his confirmari solet." 
'  Id.  id.  (p.  168) :  "  Quodsi  vero 
conditionis  implendae  defoctu,  con- 
tractus  ipso  jure  solutus  est,  quis 
perjurum  populum  vocet  qui  regi 
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We find a writer of  the Catholic League like Boucher setting 
out  the same conception of  the contractual relation  between 
the prince  and  the people;  and again  with relation  to the 
tradition of  the feudal law as to the mutual obligations of 
lord and vassal, and the doctrine of  the feudal law books that 
the lord would lose his rights for the same offences as those for 
which the vassal would loso his fief.1  And, in  justification of 
the  deposition  of  Henry  III., Boucher  contended  that  the 
royal authority depended upon the mutual contract between 
king and people, in such a sense that, if the king were to vio- 
late it, he could not be recognised as king.2 
It may again be urged that the works which we  have just 
cited  were  the outcome of  violent  and revolutionary  move- 
ments  and  it is  therefore  very  important  to  observe  that 
Richard  Hooker,  in  a  passage  of  which  we  have  already 
"  quoted  part, affirms the same  principle  of  the "compact " 
between the ruler and the community. 
'' Tho ease thus standing,"  he says, "  albeit we  judge  it a 
thing most true that kings, even inheritors, do hold the right 
conditionem,  quae  implere  debuit  st 
potuit,  negligenti, legemque, in  quam 
jnravit,  violanti,  obsequium deneget P 
Quis  vero  contra,  eum  regem  foedi- 
fragum, perjurum, eo beneficio prorsus 
indignum non oenseat. 
(p.  169) :  Etenim,  si  vassallum 
clientelae  nexu  lex  liberat,  in  quem 
senior  feloniam  commisit,  etsi  sane 
senior fidem proprie  non  dat vassallo, 
sod vassallus ipse. . . . An  non multo 
magis solutus erit populus ea fide, quam 
regi  praestitit,  si rex, qui  primus  ipsi 
tamquamdomino proourator, solemniter 
juravit, fidem fregerit. 
An  non vero etiam si non isti ritus, 
non ea sacra, non ea sacraments. intcr- 
venircnt ;  satis  tamen  ipsa  natura 
docet,  reges  ea  conditione  a  populo 
constitui, ut bene  imperent 7  Judices 
ut jus dicant 1  Duces belli, ut exercitus 
adversus  hostes  educant 7  Quodsi 
verc saeviunt, injmiam ininrunt, hostes 
ipsi fiunt ; ut reges non  sunt ita nec 
agnosci a populo debere." 
1 J. Boucher, '  De justa  abdication0 
Henrici 111,' i. 19. 
Id. id.,  iii.  3 :  "  Adde  quod  cum 
Rege  publica  fides  necessario  oon- 
junota  est, ut ne  Rex quidem sine ea 
esse posset.  Pendet enim id ex mutuo 
contractu  illo,  quo Rex  populo  fidem 
suam,  huic  vicissem  suam  populus 
obligavit.  Mutuumque  adeo  promis- 
sum est, ut dum populus summum ei 
imperium  defert,  et  nt  in  publicum 
commodum  vertat  obtostatur,  id, 
vicissim princeps facturum so recipiat, 
ac  iuramento  firmet,  tanto  existima- 
tionis studio, ut fidci nomine ac laude, 
nihil  antiquius  reges habero  perpetuo 
velint.  . . . Ex  quo fit,  ut qui  fidem 
illam  semol  abjicerot,  oi  reliquum 
nihil  sit,  quo regis  nomine  tueri  iure 
pnsset, ut oh id, titulo ivto mcrito  sit 
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to the power  of  dominion, with  dependency upon  the whole 
entire body  politic  over  which  they rule as kings, yet  so  it 
may not be understood, as if  such dependency did grow, for 
that every supreme governor doth personally take from them 
his power by way of  gift, bestowed upon him at his entrance 
into his said place of  sovereign government.  But the cause of 
this  dependency is  in  that first  original  conveyance, when 
power was  devised by the whole unto the one ; to pass from 
him  unto  them, whom  out  of  him  nature  by  lawful  birth 
should  produce,  and  no  natural  or  legal  inability  make 
uncapable.  Neither can any man with reason think but that 
the  first  institution  of  kings  is  a  sufficient  consideration 
wherefore  this  power  should  always  depend  on  that  from 
which they flow.  Original influence of  power from the body 
into the king is the cause of  the king's dependency in power 
upon the body. 
By  dependency  we  mean  subordination  and  subjection.  . . . May then a body politic at all times withdraw in whole 
or in part that influence of  dominion which passcth from it, 
if  inconvenience doth grow thereby ?  It must be presumed 
that supreme governors will  not  in such case  oppose them- 
selves and be stiff  in detaining that, the use whereof  is with 
public detriment : but surely without  their consent I see not 
how  this  body  should  be  able  by  any  just  means  to help 
itself, saving when dominion doth escheat.  Such things must, 
therefore, be thought upon beforehand, that power  must bo 
limited  ere it be granted, which is  the next thing we  are to 
consider.  In power  of  dominion all kings have not an equal 
latitude.  Kings  by  conquest make  their  own  charter. . . . 
Kings  by  God's  own  special  appointment  have  also  that 
largeness  of  power,  which  he  doth  assign  or  permit  with 
approbation.  Touching kings which were first instituted by 
agreement and composition made with them over whom they 
reign, how far this power may lawfully extend, the articles of 
compact  between  them  must  show, not  the articles  only of 
compact at the first beginning, which for the most  part are 
either clean worn out of  knowledge, or eke known unto very 
few, but whatsoever hath been  after in  free  and  voluntary 
manner  condescended  unto,  whether  by  express  consent, 
whereof  positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allo~vanco 
famously  notified  through  custom  reaching  beyond  the 
memory of  man."  l 
It  will  be  observed  how  careful  and  how  precise  is  the 
statement of  the theory of  "  compact "  between the ruler and 
the community.  It rests ultimately  upon the principle that 
normally  the  power  of  the  king  is  derived  from  the  com- 
munity, not necessarily immediately in the case of  the indi- 
vidual king, but by grant to a particular family ; this implies 
what  Hooker  calls ''  subordination  and  subjection " of  the 
king.  He  does  not  admit  that  this  implies  the  power  to 
revoke the authority granted to the ruler, without his consent, 
but  it does imply  that his powers  as such must  be limited 
from the outset and throughout by the terms of  the ''  com- 
pact."  Further,  and  this  is  a  notable  conception,  the 
"  compact "  does not mean merely some original or primitive 
agreement, but all the laws and customs of  the constitution 
that has gradually grown up and been accepted.  Hooker, in 
saying this, is not running counter  to the conception of  the 
contract, as embodied especially in the coronation oaths of 
king and people ; but he is bringing this into closer relation 
to the principles of  the supremacy of  the law, that law which 
is the living expression of  the custom  and life of  the com- 
munity.  The "  compact " is on the king's part the promise 
to obey the law, and we  therefore once again cite a passage 
in which his relation to tho law is expressed. 
"  In which respect, I cannot  choose  but commend highly 
their  wisdom  by  whom  the  foundations  of  this  common- 
wealth have been laid ; wherein, though no manner of person 
or cause be unsubject to the king's power, yet so is the power 
of  the king over all and in all limited, that unto all his pro- 
ceedings the law  itself  is  a  rule.  The  axioms of  our regal 
government are these : '  Lex facit regem,'  the king's grant of 
any favour made contrary  to  the  law is void ; '  Rex  nihil 
potest,  nisi  quod  jure  potest.'  Our  kings, therefore, when 
they take possession  of  the room they are called unto, have 
1 Hooker, '  Erclesit~stical  Polity,'  vin. 2,  9, 10, 11.  Cf.  p. 370. 394  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV. 
it painted out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities 
and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said law 
their supreme authority and power reacheth." l 
We turn again to Althusius ; for he states the principles of 
a contract between the prince and the community from whom 
he  draws  his  authority,  very  precisely  and  emphatically. 
By the establishment of  the supreme magistrate the members 
of  the kingdom bind themselves to obedience to him, for he 
receives  from  the  community  the  rule  (imperium)  of  the 
kingdom, but the people  and  the supreme magistrate enter 
into  an agreement  with  each  other  with  regard  to  certain 
laws  and  conditions  to  which  they  bind  themselves by  an 
oath ; and this cannot  be recalled or violated  either by the 
magistrates or the s~bjects.~ 
And again, in terms both general and emphatic, Althusius 
declares that no kingdom or commonwealth was ever created 
without  a  contract  between  the  subjects  and  the  prince, 
which was to be kept religiously by both, and that if  this were 
violated, all the authority founded upon it would fall to the 
gr~und.~ 
The  supreme magistrate  has  only  so much  power  as was 
expressly granted to him by the members of  the community, 
while that which was  not  granted  remains with  the people. 
An  absolute power, or what is called 'i plenitudo potestatis," 
cannot  be  granted  to the supreme magistrate, for  to grant 
this would  destroy that justice  without which kingdoms are 
mere  bands  of  robbers ; an  absolute  power  is not  directed 
1 Id. id.,  viii. 2,  13.  Cf. p.  357. 
2  Althusius,  '  Politica,'  xix.  6 : 
"  Constitutio  magistratus  summi  est, 
qua illi imperium et administrationem 
repi, a corpore consociationis univer- 
salis delatam suscipienti, regni membra 
se  ad  obsequia  obligant.  Seu,  qua 
populus  et magistratus  summus inter 
se  mutuo  ccrtis  legibus  et constitu- 
tionibus  do  subjectionis  et  imperii 
forms,  ac  modo  paciscuntur,  jura- 
mento  ultro  citroque  fide  data  et 
nccepta  promissave. 
Pactum  hoc,  seu  contractum  man- 
dati . . . cum magistratu summo ini- 
tum, utramque partem contrahentium 
obligare  dubium  non  est,  adeo  ut 
revocare  illum,  vel  violare  noquo 
magistratui neque subditis eoncedatur." 
Id. id.,  xix.  16 : "  Itaque nullum 
unquam  regnum,  nullave  respublica 
instituta  fundataque  fuit,  nisi  ultro 
citroque  habito  initoque  contractu, 
pactisque  inter  subditos  et futurum 
corum principem  conventis,  et obliga- 
tione  mutua  statuta,  quam  utrique 
religiose conservarent ; et qua violata 
polestas illa cvauesceret ac tollcretur." 
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to the good  of  the  subjects,  but  to  a  private  satisfaction. 
The  right  (that is,  jus)  granted  to  the  magistrate  by  the 
people is less than that of  the people, and belongs to another 
(i.e.,  the people), it is not his own.1 
Althusius does not, however, set out this principle of  the 
contract merely as a theory.  Like the author of  the 'Vindiciae,' 
he  maintains  that it  could  be  found in  almost  all  modern 
kingdoms, whether elective or hereditary, in France, England, 
Sweden, Spain,  and the German Empire ; and he relates it 
to the form of oath taken by the princes on their acce~sion.~ 
We  venture  to think  that we  have said  enough  to show 
that the conception of  a  contract  between king  and people 
was  not  merely  archaeological  nor  unimportant  in  the  six- 
teenth century.  It was  set out with force and clearness by 
the  most  sober  and  dispassionate  writers  like  Hooker  and 
Althusius, and it was clearly founded, first, on the relation  of 
the king to the law, second, on the conception embodied in 
the coronation orders, and third, on the continuing influence 
of  the feudal tradition of  the Middle Ages. 
(5) The Right of Resistance and Deposition.-In  discussing 
the conception of  the sovereignty of  the community  and  of 
the  contract  between  ruler  and  people,  we  have  already 
touched upon this, but the subject is of  so much importance 
that we must deal with it in more detail. 
We need hardly repeat the emphatic terms in which William 
of  Orange in  his '  Apologie  and  the  other  documents  we 
have  cited  with  regard  to  the  revolt  of  the  Netherlands, 
Id. id.,  xix.  7 : "  Tantum autem  humans  societas  porfringit.  Deinde 
juris  habet  Iiic  summus magistratus,  per  absolutam  potestatem  tollitur 
quantum illi a corporibus consociatis,  justitia,  qua  sublata,  regna  fuerint 
seu  membris  regni,  est  expresse  con-  latrocinia.  . . . Tertio;  talis potestas 
cessum;  ut  quod  non  datum  ipsi  obsoluta,  non  rcspicit  utilitatem  et 
est, id penes  populum, seu  universam  salutem  subditorum,  sed  voluptatem 
consociationem,  remansisse  dicendum  privatorum. . . . 
est.. . .  13. Deinde  apparet  ex  hoc  con- 
9.  Absoluta  potestas,  seu  plenitudo  tract~,  ]us summo magistratui a populo 
potestatis, quam vocant, summo magis-  datum,  esso  minus  populi  jurc  ot 
tretui dari non potest. . . .  alienum  non  ipsiiis  proprium." 
10. Nam  qui  plenitudine  potestatis  Id. id., xix.  38-42. 
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declare t,hat Philip 11.  had forfeited his authority, as he had 
violated t'he agreements upon which it rested.l 
The question of  the right  of  resistance and deposition was 
raised in Scotland also, not merely as theory but as a practical 
question, even earlier ;  and it was  discussed  by one  of  the 
best known writers and scholars of  that time in Europe, that 
is, by George Buchanen.  But behind George Buchanan there 
was a greater and more powerful figure, that is, John Knox, 
who not only defended the right of  resistance and deposition 
in principle, but did much to carry it out in fact.  We must 
therefore  take account  of  some of  the principles laid down, 
especially by Knox in the course of  that triumphant revolt 
which  Buchanan  defends.  We  are not here  concerned  to 
discuss  the merits of  that conflict,  or the character of  those 
who took part in it, least of  all of  the Scottish nobles, the most 
unscrupulous  and politically  incompetent  representatives  of 
that class in Europe ; but we are greatly concerned with the 
formulation and development of  the principles of  the revolt. 
And  for this  we  must look, before  George Buchanan's  '  De 
Jure Regni ' was published, mainly to the declarations of  tho 
Reformed preachers and of  John Knox, as we  find them in 
Knox's  history of  the Reformation  in  Scotland.  (It is  not 
necessary  for  our  purpose  to  assume  that  John  Knox's 
reports of  these were always precisely accurate.) 
The first statement which  we  should notice  is that of  tho 
Reformed  preachers to the  LL Congregation " in reply  to tho 
proclamation of  the queen regent, Mary of  Guise, in August 
1557.  "  In oppin audience  they  (i.e., the preachers) deolair 
the authority of  princes and magistrates to be of  God. . . . 
To brydill the fury and raige of  princes in free kingdoms and 
realms, they affirm it apperteins to the nobilitie, sworne and 
borne consallouris of  the same, and allswa  to the Barrouns 
1  William  of  Orango,  '  Apologie '  "  Au  rebte, si quelqu'un  1  au nom du 
(p.  48) : "En somrne par son sorment  prince  Btablis  au  gouvernement  du 
il (tho princo) voult qu'on  cas do con-  pays,  allant  Q  I'encont,re  des  dictos 
cravention,  noup  ne  Ini  soyons  plus  privildges,  il  est  par  le  m6me  faict. 
obligez,  nous  ne  lui  rendions  aucun  JBclarB ostre declleu  de son gouverne- 
service  ou  oh6issance."  Cf.  St Alde-  ment et dignit6, et cloibt estre do touts 
gonclo,  '  auvres,'  vol.  vii.  (p.  134) :  tern1 Tour depo~6." 
and Pepill, quhais voties  and consent are to be requyret  in 
all great and wechty materis of  the commonwealth." 
At the meeting of  the "  haile nobility, barouns and broughes 
in Edinburgh,"  in  October  of  the same year, the preachers 
were required to give their judgment on the question whether 
the Regent "  ought to be suffered  so tyrannouslie to impyne 
above them,"  and John Willock  and John Knox  spoke for 
them.  The  declaration  of  Willock  is  reported  as  follows : 
"  First, that, albeit  magistrates  be  God's  ordinance,  having 
of  him power and authoritie, yitb is not thir power so largelie 
extended, but that it is bounded and limited by God and His 
Word. 
And  secoadarlie,  that  as  subjects  are  commanded  to 
obey thir magistratis, so are magistratis commanded to geve 
some deutie to the subjectis ; so that God, by His Word, has 
prescribed the office of  the one and of  the other. 
Thirdlie,  that albeit  God  hath  appointed  magistrotis  his 
licutennenties  on earth, and has honoured  thame with  His 
auni title,  calling  thom  Goddis,  that yith  he  did  never  so 
estables any, but that for just  causes thei mycht have been 
deprived. 
Fourthlie :  that  in  deposing  of  princes,  and those  that 
had bene in authoritie, God did not alwyse use his immediate 
powere.  . . .  And  hereupon  concluded  he,  That  since  the 
Queen  Regent  denyed  her  cheaf  deutie to the subjectis  of 
the  Realme,  which  was  to minister  justice  unto  them  in- 
differentlie, to preserve thair libertie from invasion  of  stran- 
gearis, and to suffer them have Godis' Word openlic preached 
among them ; seeing, moreover, that the Queen Regent was 
an open and obstinat idolatress,  a,  vehement mainteanere  of 
all superstition  and idolatrie ;  and finallie  that she utterly 
despised the oounsall and requestis of  the Nobilitie, he could 
see no reason why they, the born Counsalleris, Nobilitie, and 
Barouns of  the Realme,  that they should not justly  deprive 
her  from  all  regiment  and  authoritie  amonges  tham."  2 
Knox  reports  that  he  approved  Willock's  statement,  but 
adds  that all this referred  to the Regent  and not to Queen 
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Mary, and that the deposition of  the Regent should be con- 
ditional upon her refusing amendment. 
It  was  not,  however,  long  before  the  question  of  the 
authority of  Queen Mary herself  was raised.  Knox gives an 
account of  a conversatioil between himself  and the Queen in 
1561.  a Think  ye,  quod  sche  (i.c.,  Mary),  that  subjectis 
having  power,  may resist  their  Prince ?  If  those  princes 
exceed their boundis  (quod he), madam, and do against that 
~vhairfor  they should be obeyed, it is no doubt but that they 
may be resisted, even by power."  l 
In 1564 the  General  Assembly  of  the  Church  appointed 
certain  members to meet  the Lords  of  the Council,  and to 
confer upon  complaints that John Knox had spoken lightly 
of  the  queen's  authority.  The  proceedings  are  reported 
mainly in the form of  a dialogue between Knox and Maitland 
of  Lethington.  The  most  important  question  raised  was 
that of  the interpretation  of  Romans  xiii.  Knox had  dis- 
tinguished  between  the ordinance  of  God  and the  persons 
placed  in authority, and maintained  that subjects were  not 
bound to obey the prince in unlawful things, and might resist 
him.  "  And now, my Lord "  (he goes on), "  to answeir to the 
place of  the Apposstle  who affirms  that such  as resiste the 
power, resistis the ordinance of  God, I say, that the power in 
that place  is  nocht  to be  understande  of  the unjust  com- 
mandiment of  men ; but of  the just  power  whairwith  God 
has armit his magistrates and lieutenants to puniche syn and 
mentene  vertew.  . . .  Then,  will  ye,  said Lethington,  mak 
subjectis  to  controlle  thair princes  and rulers ?  And  whet 
harm, said the uthcr, soulde the Commonwealthe ressaif, gif 
that the corrupt effectiounis of ignorant rulers were moderatit, 
and  so  brydillit  be  the  wisdome  and  discretion  of  godlie 
subjectis,  that  these  soulde  do  wrong  nor  violence  to no 
man." 
Maitland  appealed  to  the  judgment  of  the  Reformers, 
Luther,  Melancthon,  and  others,  evidently  knowing  only 
their earlier opinions, and Knox answered, it is interesting to 
observe,  by citing the Apology  of  Magdeburg,  that is,  pre- 
Id. id.,  vol. ii. p.  282.  a  Id. id., vol, ii. p. 437. 
sumably, the Declaration  of  the Magdeburg Clergy, to which 
we already referred.l 
These  are important and unambiguous  statements  of  the 
position of Knox ; he refused to admit that the prince repre- 
sented the authority of  God in such a sense that it was never 
lawful to resist him, and maintained that it was well that he 
should be restrained by the wisdom of  their godly subjects. 
It was some years later that George  Buchanan published 
his work entitled '  De Jure Regni apud Scotos,' and we must 
observe the terms under which  he vindicated  the right of  a, 
community to depose the ruler who abuses his power ; and in 
the first place, his careful criticism of  the arguments for the 
necessary  submission  of  Christian  men  to  rulers,  however 
unjust. 
He  represents Maitland as  urging that  St  Paul  had commanded 
Christian men to pray for  princes, and among them were wicked 
emperors like Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero.  Buchanan answers 
that what  St Paul commands  in 1 Timothy  ii.  is that we 
must pray for kings and other magistrates that we  may live 
quiet lives in godliness and honesty, and he points out that 
in order to understand St Paul's  meaning  we  must  observe 
the very careful terms which  St Paul uses in the Epistle to 
the Romans to describe  the function of  the ruler.  He is, 
St Paul  says,  a  "minister"  to whom  God  has  given  the 
sword that he may punish the wicked and protect the good ; 
and he  quotes  St Chrysostom as saying that St Paul is not 
speaking of  the tyrant, but of the true and lawful magistrate, 
who  represents  the  power  of  God  on  earth.  It does  not 
follow that bccauso we  are to pray for wicked princes we are 
not to resist them, any more than because we are to pray for 
robbers  we  are not to resist  them.2  Buchanan  follows this 
1 Jd.  id.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  442,  463.  gladius  a  Deo  sit traditus,  ut malos 
Cf.  p.  286 in this volume.  puniat  ac  bonos  foveat  et sublevet.' 
Georgo  Buchanan,  '  De  Jlire  ' Non,  enim,  de  tyranno,'  inquit 
Repi ' (p. 28) : "  Jn Epistola  autem  Chrysostamus, 'haer a Pauloscribuntur, 
ad  Romanos  rogem  etiam  definit  sed de voro et legitimo magistratu, qui 
prope  ad  dialecticam  subtilitatem ;  veri  Dei  vices in  terris gerit ; cui  qui 
'  esse,'  enim  ait,  '  ministrum,  cui  resistit,  certe  Dei  ordinationi  resistit.' 400  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENT-.  [PART  IT. 
up by  pointing  out that St Paul's  purpose  in  laying  stress 
upon  the Divine authority of  the magistrate  was  to correct 
t,he anarchical tendencies of those Christian men who thought 
that because they were the free sons of  God they ought not 
to be under any human authority, and that in the passage in 
Romans  xiii.  St Paul  was  referring  not  to  any  particular 
magistrate but to the function or office of  the magistrat8.l 
When he had thus disposed of  the theological argument in 
favour of  non-re~ista~nce,  after mentioning some cases of  tho 
deposition of  kings, he goes on to the more serious discussion 
of  the meaning of  the authorihy of  the oommunity over the 
king. 
Maitland asks, how can the king who has become a tyrant 
be called "  in jus "  ?  Buchanan answers by asking which is 
the greater, the king or the law, and when Maitland  admits 
that it is the law, Buchanan asks which is greater, the people 
or the law, and Maitland admits that it is the people, for it is 
the people which is the source and author of  the law.  Buchanan 
then concludes that, if the law is greater than the king and the 
people is greater than the law, there is no difficulty about the 
authority which can call the king to answer to the law.  The 
people is greater than the king and thus when the king gives 
account to the people it is the lesser who is called to account 
by the greater.2  This  brings him to the judgment to which 
we  have  already  referred,  that  the  king  is  answerable  in 
Sed,  nec  statim, si  pro  malis  princi-  tent,ior est, ac  velut rectrix et mode- 
pibus  est  orandum,  hinc  colli~ere  ratrix et rupiditatum et actionum ojus. 
debemus,  eorum  vitia  non  esse  puni-  M.  Id jam concessum est.  B.  Quid 7 
enda ; non magis certs quam latronum  Populi et legis  nonne eadem vox est ? 
pro  quibus etiam orare jubemur ; noc  M.  Eadem.  B.  Uter potentior, popu- 
si  bono  principi  parendum  est,  ideo  lus  an  lex 7  M.  Universus  opinor 
malo non est rcsistondum."  populus.  . . . Est cnim velut parens, 
1  Id. id., p.  28.  certe auctor, legis, ut  qui eam, ubi visum 
Id. id.  (p. 33) : "  M.  QU~R  enim  est,  condere  aut  abrogare  potest. 
tyrannum e Rege factum in jns  voca-  B.  Igitur,  cum lox  sit rege,  populus 
bit  ?  . . .  B.  Ad  hanc  igitur  lege  potentior,  videndum  nunc  sit, 
imaginem componamus Regem, legem,  ad quem, regem  in jrls  vocemus. . . . 
et populum.  Regis et legis eadem est  B.  Populus  igitur  rege  praestantior. 
VOX.  Uter  aucloritatem  habet  ab  M.  Necesse  est.  B.  Si  procstantior 
alter0 7  Rex no a lege, an lex a Rege.  est, etiam et major.  Rex igitur  cum 
M.  Rex  a  lege. . . .  ad populi  judicium  vocntur, minor  ad 
(p.  34.)  B.  Lcx  igitur  rego  po.  mujurcm in jus  vocatur." 
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private cases to the courts, and this must be much more true 
in greater matters.l 
When we  turn  to the Huguenot  writers,  we  find they are 
equally clear about the right of  resistance to and deposition 
of  the unrighteous king.  Hotman, the '  Droit des Magistrats,' 
and the '  Vindiciae '  all appeal to the precedents of  the earlier 
periods of  the French kingdom as showing that the national 
council or Estates had the right of  deposing evil kings.2  They 
also  cite  more  recent  examples, the '  Droit  des  Magistrats ' 
and  the '  Vindiciae,' the  depositions of  the Emperors  Adolf 
and  Wenceslas  and  the  recent  depositions  of  the  King  of 
Denmark and of Mary, Queen of   scot^,^ and the '  Vindiciae ' 
-  -... 
also refers to the depositions of  ~dward  11.  of  England  and 
of  Eric of  S~eden.~  We have already pointed  out that the 
'  Droit  des  Magistrats ' compares  the  position  of  the  king 
who holds of  the so~ereignty  with that of a feudal lord, who 
will lose his fief if he commits "  Felonie " against his vassals, 
that is, his s~bjects.~  The Catholics had held that the Church 
is above the Pope and  can  dopose him for heresy,  and the 
people has the same authority over the king who has mani- 
festly become a  tyrant,  says  the '  Droit  d&  Magistrats ' ; 
while  the '  Vindiciae ' maintains that the people is absolved 
from its obedience to the king if  he has  violated his "  oon- 
.  .- 
tract," the "  people "  is greater than the king, and can depo~le 
the tyrant.7 
We  have already referred  to Boucher, as a representative 
of  the Catholic League in France, as maintaining the right of 
the community to depose the king who violates that contract 
with  the people  upon  which his authority  depends, and we 
need only here refer to his detailed discussion of  the right to 
Id.  id.  (p.  36) : "  B.  Nunc,  tu 
velim  consideres,  quam  non  mod0 
sit  absurdum,  sed  etiam  iniquum, 
de  praedicto,  de  luminiburi,  do  stilli- 
cidii~  adversus  regem  judicium  dari ; 
parricidii,  veneficii,  perdeulliouia,  nul- 
lum ense judicium : in minoribus rebus 
severitato juris uti, in maximis flagitiis 
summam  licentiam  et  impunitatem 
permitti."  Cf.  p.  350. 
Hotman, '  Franco Ga!lia  ' (p.  656) ; 
'  Drcit des Magistrats ' (p. 66) ; '  Vin- 
diciae contra Tyrannos ' (p. 201). 
a  '  Droit  des  Magist~at~a  '  (pp.  760 
and 765) ; '  Vindicine,' Q. 111. (p. 203). 
"  Vindiciae,' id. id. 
'  Droit  dcs  Magistrats'  (p.  70). 
Cf. p.  374. 
Id. (p. 79). 
' '  Vindiciae,' Q. 111. 3 (pp. 160-169). 
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depose the tyrant.  He cites St Thomas Aquinas (' DO Reg.' 
I. 6) as holding that it is lawful for a people to depose the 
unjust  king if it belongs to them to appoint him, and this is 
followed  by  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  question  whether 
and under what circumstances it is lawful to kill the tyrant.l 
We  have  already  dealt  with  some  aspects  of  Marianays  -.  . . -  -- 
theory of  the state and government, and we  need only recall 
that, while he is  a strong supporter of  monarchy, he thinks 
of  laws as having been made to restrain the  king, and  that 
these  laws have  been  made by the comrn~nit~y  from  whom  .- 
the king receives his authority. 
He therefore maintains  that inasmuch as the authority of 
the king is derived from the commonwealth, the king can be 
compelled to give account to the law, and, if he will not amend, 
he may be deposed ; for the community, when  it bestowed 
power on a king, kept the greater power in its own hands.l 
This is Mariana's general principle, and he goes on to con- 
sider how the authority of  the community over the prince is 
to be exercised.  He is in this chapter discussing and defend- 
ing the revolt against Henry 111. of  France and his assassina- 
tion.  He  defends  tyrannicide  as  lawful,  but  it should  be 
observed  he makes a  careful distinction  between the tyrant 
who has usurped power and the lawful king who has become 
a tyrant by  abusing his power.  bll philosophers and Lheo- 
logians, he says, are agreed that the usurper may be slain by 
anyone.3  It is  different, however,  in the case  of  a  prince, 
who  holds his  power  by  the consent  of  the  people,  or  by 
hereditary  right.  His  private  vices  must  be  tolerated, 
but, if  he  injures the commonwealth, lays  his  hands  upon 
public  and  private  wealth,  treats  the  public  laws  and 
religion with  contempt, there must be no hesitation.  At tho 
same time the nature of  the action  against  the prince must 
be  carefully  considered, lest  evil  should  be  added  to evil. 
1 J.  Boucher,  ' Do  justa  Abdica-  tem respuat, principatu spoliari, neque 
tione,' 111.  13-19.  ita in principem jura  potostatis  trans- 
Mariana, '  Do  Rege,' I.  6  (p. 67)  :  tulit,  ut non  sihi  majorem  reservavit 
"  Certc a republics undo ortum habet  potestatem." 
regia  potestas,  rebus  exigentibus,  3 Id. id., I.  G  (p. 58). 
rrgcm in jns  vocari posse, et si snnita- 
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The best and safest course is  that a public  assembly should 
meet  and  consider  what  is  to be  done ; the prince  should 
first be admonished, and if  he will correct his former faults, 
he should be re-established.  If, however, he will not do this, 
the commonwealth may  deprive him  of  his  authority, may 
declare him  a  public enemy, may  make war  upon  him  and 
slay him ;  and it will  be lawful for  any private  person  to 
execute this sentence.l 
If, however,  it is not possible to hold  a public assembly, 
and the commonwealth is  oppressed by  the tyranny  of  the 
prince,  and  yet  men  desire to  destroy  the tyranny  and to 
punish the manifest and intolerable crimes of  the prince, tho 
man who follows the public wishes and endeavours to destroy 
him is not, in Mariana's judgment, to be condemned.  He does 
not think that there is much  danger that many will follow 
this example ; and he does not mean that the decision with 
regard to such action should be left to any single and private 
person ; if the public voice cannot be expressed, learned and 
grave men should be consulted.2 
Id.  id..  I.  6  (p.  -59) : "  Nam  si  morem  gesserit,  si  republicae  satis- 
princeps  popllli  consensu  aut  jure  fecerit,  peccataque  correxerit  vitae 
trereditario imperium  tenet, ejus vitia  superioris,  restituendum  arbitror, 
et  libidines  ferandae  sunt  eatenus,  neque  acerbiora  remedia  tentanda. 
qiioad eas legea honestatis et pudicitiae,  Si  medicinam  respuat,  neque  spes 
quibus  est astrictun, negligat. . . . Si  ulla  sanitatis  relinquatur,  sententia 
vero rempublicam pessumdat, publicas  pronunciata,  licebit  reipublicae  ejus 
privatasque  fortunas  praedae  habet,  imperium  detrectare  primum.  Et 
leges  publicas  et  sacrosanrtam  reli-  quoniam  bellum  necessario  concita- 
gionem  contemptui :  virtutem  in  bitur,  ejus  defendendi  consilia  expli- 
supsrbia  ponit  in  audacia  atque  care, expedire  arms, pecunias in  belli 
adversus  superos  impiet,ate,  dissimu-  sumptus,  imperare  populis:  etsi 
landum non  est,.  Attente tamen cogi-  res  feret,  neque  aliter  se  respublica 
tandum  quae  ratio  ejus  principis  tueri  possit,  eodem  defensionis  jure 
abdicandi  toneri  debeat,  ne  malum  ac vero potiori auctoritate  et propria. 
malo  cumuletur,  scelus  vindicetur  Principem  publicum  hostem  declnra- 
scelere.  Atque  ea  expedi. a  maxima  turn  ferro  perimere.  Eademque 
et tuta  via  cut,  si  publici  convent,us  facultas esto cuiquam privato, qui spe 
facultas dotur, communi consensu quid  impunitatis  abjecta,  noglecta  salute 
statuendum  sit  deliberare,  fixum,  in  conatum  juvandi  rempublicam 
ratumque  habere  quod  communi sen-  ingredi  voluerit." 
tontia steterit.  Id. id.  id.  (p.  GO) : "  Roges  quid 
In  quo  his  gradibus  procedatur.  faciendum, si publici conventus facultas 
Monendus in primis princeps erit atque  erat sublata ; quod saepe patefit ron- 
ad  sanitatom  revocandus,  qui  si  tingorc.  Par  profecto,  mea  quidem 404  TEE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART IT. 
Mariana concludes the chapter with a critical discllssion of 
the Decree  of  the  Council  of  Constance,  which  condemned 
tyrannicide. 
Cardinal Bellarmine  is cautious  and  restrained  in his  dis- 
cussion of  this subject, but', as we have already pointed  out, 
he is clear that the authority of  the prince, while it is derived 
ultimately from God, is derived immediately from the consent 
of  man.'  In another passage he says that although we are 
bound by the Divine Law to obey the king  as long as he is 
Icing,  the Divine Law does not say that there are no causes 
for which the king may be deprived of  his liingdom ; if this 
were  not  so,  there  would  be  scarcely  any  commonwealth, 
since they have been for the most part established after the 
expulsion of  their kings.2  It is no doubt true that Bellarmine 
is  really  concerned  to  vindicate  the  right  of  the  Pope  to 
depose heretical kings, but his words leave little doubt that ho 
recognised the right of  the community to depose the king for 
just cause. 
sententia erit,, cum principis tyrannide 
opprcssa  republlca ;  sublaia  civibus 
inter se conveniendi facultate, voluntas 
non  desit  delendae  tyrannidis,  scelera 
principis manifesta mod0 et intoleranda 
rmdicandi,  exitiales  conatus  compri- 
mcndi ;  ut  si  sacra  patria  pessun- 
clot, publioosque  hostes  in  provinciam 
attrahat :  qui  votis  publicis  fsrens, 
cum perimere  tentarot, hsudquaquam 
inique  cum  fecisse  existimabo.  . .  . 
Neque  est  periculum  ut  multi  eo 
exemplo  in pr~ncipem  vitam saovianl , 
quasi  tyranni  sint,  neque  enim  in 
rujusquam  privati  arbitrio  ponlmus ; 
11on  in  multorum,  nisi  publica  vox 
populi  adsit, v~ri  eruditi  ot graves in 
consilium adhlbeantur." 
Cf. p.  372. 
Bellarmine,  'Do Potestate  Summi 
Ponteficis,'  xxii  (p.  181) :  "  Non 
ignoraham  aervire  et obedire regi  a880 
juris  Divini ; ot iclco  non  hor  ncgavl 
in  meo  libro:  sod  dixi,  juris  humani 
esso,  ut  hunc  aut  illum  haheamus 
rogem,  jure  autem  divini  sorvare 
veram  fidem ac religionem:  quamvis 
enim jure  divino tenoamur rogi parore, 
dum rex  est,,  non  tamen  jure  divino 
cavetur ut regi nullis de causis regnum 
abrogari  posset ; alioquin quotguot ab 
oxordio  mundi  regnis  exuti  sunt, 
ornnos  per  injuriam  exuti  fuissent, 
nequo  ulla  esaet  respublica,  aut pone 
nulla,  jure  instituta :  reipublicae 
siquidem, ut plurimum, exactis regibus 
constituuntur." 
Cf.  id.  id.,  xxvi.  (p.  200) :  " Sic 
igitur,  jure  divino  tenctur  populus 
rcgi  sorviro,  dum rex est :  sed SI  rox 
desinat  esse,  quod  multis  modis  fieri 
potjest,  nulla  remanet  obligatio  ser- 
vitutis  aut  obod~entiae.  Non  est 
nutem  de  jure  divino,  ut rex  justis 
rle rausis deponi non possit." 
For a parallel judgment as  expressed 
by  Molina and Susrez, vf. pp.  343, 347. 
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The  only  important  writer  among  those  with  whom  we 
have dealt in this chapter who  is not willing  to approve of 
the deposition of  the king in  Hooker.  We have discussed his 
treatment of  the "  compact " or agreement between the com- 
munity and its ruler, on which his authority rests, but as we 
have seen he does not admit that this implies that the com- 
munity  can  withdraw  its authority without  the consent  of 
the rulrr.  '' It  must be  presumed  that  supremo governors 
+
  will not in such case oppose themselves and be stiff in detaining 
that, the use  whereof  is with  public  detriment ; but surely 
without  this consent I see not how the body should be able 
by any just means to help itself, saving where dominion dot11 
escheat.''  l  It must, however, be observed that Hooker adds 
that just  on this  account  the authority  which  is  bestowed 
upon the ruler must be carefully limited. 
"Such  things therefore must be thought upon beforehand, 
that power may be limited ere it bo granted."  2 
When we turn to Althusius we find that he deals with this 
question  carefully  but  dogmatically,  and  mainly  in  that 
chapter in which he discusses the nature of tyranny and the 
remedies  for it.  He is concerned with tyranny, ''  exer~it~io," 
and describes it as that by which the foundations and bonds 
of  the commonwealth  are destroyed.  For these foundations 
and bonds consist primarily in the mutual promises to observe 
and defend the fundamental laws,  which  were made by the 
community  and  the  king.  The  violation  of  the  contract 
between  ruler and people,  which  we have already discussed, 
is  tyranny.  Again,  Althusius  describes  the  exercise  of  an 
absolute power by the supreme magistrate as tyranny.  And 
again,  he  describes  as  tyranny  tho  attempt  to hinder  the 
meeting  of  the  assemblies  of  the  kingdom  and  the  free 
expression  of  opinion  in  them  when  they  meek3 
Hooker,  '  Eccles.  Polity,'  viii.  2,  menta et  vinculum universalis consocia. 
10.  t~onis obstinate,  porseveranter,  et 
Id. id. id.  insanabiliter  contra  fidem  datam  et 
Althusius,  '  Politics,'  xxxviii.  1 :  prae~tatum  juramentum,  a  magistratu 
cG .  ryrannis  igitur  est  juste  ac  recte  summo tolluntur et evertuntur. 
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When he has thus described tyranny, he proceeds to discuss 
the remedies for it.  Like Calvin, he does not allow the private 
subject to resist or revo1t.l  He is emphatic and unequivocal 
in maintaining that the tyrant is to be resisted and, if necessary, 
deposed  by the properly  constituted  authority;  the public 
officers who are responsible and competent to carry this out 
are the Optimates or Ephori ; he sometimes speaks as though 
these public officers were  to act alone, but in another place 
he seems clearly to mean that they are to oall together the 
General Council  of  the Estates,  and  that it is  to  examine 
and judge  the action of  the tyrant.  If  there are no Ephors, 
the people should appoint "  defensores !' for this purpo~e.~ 
It is interesting to observe that Althusius is aware of  the 
contentions of  Albericus Gentilis, which we  discuss in a later 
chapter ; but Althusius  bluntly replies  that the people  and 
tho Ephors are  superior  to the prince, who had received his 
authority from themS3 
He concludes the chapter by that assertion which we  have 
already  cited,  that  the  indivisible  and  incommunicable 
tibus  a  cap. 9 et seq., fundamenta  et  diximus,  de  Ephoris,  personis publicis 
vincula  consocintionis  diximus  con-  dicta  sunt.  Plane  privati,  quando 
sistero in  fide ultro citroque a corpore  magistratus  tyrannus  est  exnrcitio. 
consociato et rege data et accepta  ad  quia  non  habent  usum  et  jus  gladii, 
leym fundamentalium et aliarum, in  neque eo in re utentur." 
quas tempore  initiationis suae juravit  Id. id.,  xxxviii.  57 : "  Nota  Vera 
summus  magistratus,  imprimis  vero  et  cognita  ut  fiat  tyrannis  ejusmodi 
ad  illarum,  quae  consociationem uni-  (i.e., exercitio),  necefise est, ut optimates 
versalem conservant,  observationem et  regni  concilium indicant, et generalcm 
defensionem,  atque  rectam  reipub-  omnium ordinum conventum cogaut, in 
licae gubernationem. . . .  eoque tyranni opera et facta  examin- 
9.  Similiter, quando summus magis-  anda  proponant  st dijudicanda.  . . . 
tratns  ahsoluta  potestate,  seu  pleni-  Vel  si Ephori nulli sint, ad hoc  ipsurn 
tudine  potestatis  in  administratione  a populo vindices et dofensores publici 
sua utitur. . . .  constitnantur." 
20. Specialis  tyrannis  est  . .  .  Id.  id.,  xxxviii.  81 :  "Par, 
Qui  puhlicos regni  conventus  et con-  postea  (idem Gentilis dicit) in parem, 
rilia  malis  artibus  prohibet,  vel  im-  multo  minus  in  superiorem  habet 
pedit, suffragiave  eorum qui mittuntur  imperium.  . . . Ergo  Ephori,  qui 
conducit,  limitat,  rcstringit,  coarctat,  aunt  minores  Rege,  nou  possunt  re- 
ne  quoad  sentiunt  dicere  audeant,  sistere tyranno.  Contrarium ego assero. 
velint  vel posslnt."  Revera  enim  Populus  et Ephori  sunt 
*  Id.  id.,  xxxviii.  65:  "Quid  vero  superiores  principe,  quem  ipsi  con- 
de  subditis  et  privatis  ac  populo  stituerunt,  a  quibus,  quam  habet 
aentiendum eat ?  Nam  quae hactenus  potestatem ille  acceplt."  Cf. p.  450 
"  Majestas " belongs to the members of  the whole  kingdom, 
and cannot be transferred by them to the prince.1 
(6) Magistrates,  Nobles,  or  Ephors.-There  remains  one 
development in the political theory  of  some of  these writers 
which deserves a separate treatment, that is, the conception 
that while the supreme authority belongs to the community, 
and under it to the king, there are officers of  the community 
whose function it is to protect its rights against dl  attempts 
on the part of  the king to violate them. 
We have referred in an earlier chapter to that very impor- 
tant passage in  Calvin's  Institutes,  in  which,  after  he  had 
used the strongest language against resistance by any private 
person  to  the  public  authority, he  says  that if  there  were 
magistrates of  the people  appointed  to resist  the licence of 
rulers, such as the Ephors in Sparta, or the Tribunes of  the 
people  in Rome, or  the three Estates in modern  kingdoms, 
they were  bound  to interfere  and to protect the liberties of 
the pe~ple.~ 
Whether  Calvin  derived  this  directly  from  some  earlier 
writers  we  do  not  pretend  to know;  but what  is  clear  is 
that the conception assumed considerable importance in some 
political writers of  the later part of  the sixteenth century. 
We  must also examine it, because though  it may at first 
sight  seem  strange, it is  related  to  certain  experiments  or 
developments in mediaeval society.  We shall therefore do well 
to approach the consideration of  this conception by again ob- 
serving its appearance in the '  Apologie '  of  William of  Orange. 
He speaks of  the nobles as being bound by their oath to 
compel the Duke of  Brabant  (Philip of  Spain) to do  justice 
to the country ; and again, he  says, that among the other 
rights of  the vassals of  Brabant is the privilege of  exercising 
the same powers as the Ephors of  Sparta, that is to maintain 
the power of  a good prince, and to bring to reason the prince 
who violated his oath.3 
Id. id., xxxviii.  127.  Cf. p.  361.  (p. 47) :  LL Si, dis-je, 10s nobles suivant 
vf.  p.  266.  leur  serment  et  obligation,  ne  con- 
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It is obvious that in this place the conception of the nobles 
or principal vassals of  a state as having the responsibility to 
check and correct the arbitrary and illegal actions of  the king 
or lord, is derived from the traditions of  feudal law, especially 
as we have them in the Assizes of  Jerusalem or in the Pseudo- 
Bracton ;  l  while  the comparison  of  this with  the  position 
of  the Ephors in Sparta may be derived from Cal~in.~ 
It is these conceptions which are developed in tho Huguenot 
tracts.  They are clear and emphatic, like Calvin, in maintain- 
ing that private persons cannot take action against the lawful 
prin~e.~  But the whole people can do so through its officers 
who have been appointed to act as a check and restraint upon 
the sovereign magi~traite.~ 
ne  doibvent  ils  par  eux-mesmes estre  nombre  les  officiers  Qlectifs de  villes, 
condamnez  de  perjure,  infidelit6  et  tels  que  sont  les  Maires,  Viguiers, 
rebellion envers les Estats du Pays. . .  ."  Consuls,  Capitaux,  Syndiques,  Esche- 
(P. 48) : "  Entre autres  droicts,  nous  vins et autres semblables." 
(the  vassals  of  Brabant)  avons  ce  '  Vindiciae,'  Q. 11. (p. 63):  "Cum 
privi1dge  de  servir  8,  nos  Ducs,  ce  de universo  populo  loquimur,  intelli- 
que les  Ephores  servoient  B  Sparte  R  gimus, eos qui a  populo  authoritatem 
leurs  Rois,  c'est  de  tenir  !a  roiaute  acceperunt,  magistratus, nempe,  reges 
ferme  en la  main  du  bon  Prince,  et  inferiores,  a  populo  dilectos,  aut  alia 
faire venir R  la raison celui qui contre-  ratione  constitutos,  quasi  imperii 
vient  R  son serment."  consortes,  et  regum  Ephori  qui 
1 Cf.  vol. iii. part i. chap. 4.  nniversi  populi  coetum  representant. 
a  Cf. p. 266.  Intelligimus  etiam  Comiti~,  quae  nil 
a  Cf. '  Droit des Magistrats '  (p. 476) ;  aliud  sunt,  quam  regni  cujusque 
Vindiciae,'  Q. 11. p. 43.  epitome,  ad  quem  publica  omnia 
4  'Droit  des  Magistrats'  (p.  746):  negotia  referantur.  . . . Tum  Duces, 
"  Tiercement,, il yen  a d.autres, lesq~~els seu  Principes  tributum,  in  singulis 
encore  quils  n'ayent  1s  puissance  singuli.  Demum  Judices  et  Prefecti 
souveraine  et  ordinaire  &  manier,  singularium urbium, id est Chiliandrae, 
toutesfois  sont  ordonnez  pour  servir  Centuriones  et  caeteri  qui  totidem 
de bride et de frein au souvcrain magis-  familiis  prae-erant. . . . Ejus  genus 
trat. . . ."  (P. 748): "Tels sont  au-  aunt  in  omni  regno  bene  constituto, 
jourd'hui  les  officiers  de  plusieurs  officiarii regni, principes, pares, patritii, 
royaumes  Chrestiens,  entre  lesquels  optimatcs,  ot  ceteri  ab  ordinibue 
il  est raisonnable de conter les  Ducs,  delegati,  e  quibus  compleatur,  aut, 
Marquis,  Comtes,  Vicomtes,  Barons,  conciliumextra Ordinem, parlamentum, 
Chastellains, qui ont jadis est6 estats et  diaetae, caeteriquo conventus, in diver- 
charges  publiques,  qui  se  commey  sis regionibuu, diversa nomina  sortiti, 
ttoyent  par  ordre  16gitime,  et  qui  in  quibus  nequid  out  respublica  aut 
depuis  pour  estre  devenues  diguitez  ecclesia  detrimenti  capiat,  providen- 
hereditaires, n'ont  pourtant  chang6 la  dum  est.  Illi  vero,  singuli,  regi  in. 
nature  de  leur  droit  et  authorit6 ;  feriori sunt, ita universi  superiores." 
cornme aussi il faut comprendre en ce 
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The author of the '  Vindiciae '  distinguishes sharply between 
the officers  of  the king and those of  the nation, such as the 
chancellor, the constable, the members  of  the "  parlements," 
the peers of France, and others.1 
The '  Droit  des  Magistrats ' says  that the whole  govern- 
ment  is  not  placed  in  the hands  of  the king, but  only  the 
a Souverain  degr8 " of  the  government : and  each  of  the 
inferior officers has  his  share in  this, for they have received 
their  authority  from the "  Souverainet6 " to maintain  the 
laws, even by force if  necessary, for the protection  of  those 
who were under their charge.  They are below the "  Souver- 
ah," but they do not depend properly on the '' Souverain " 
but on the '' SouverainetB." 2 
These magistrates are, in case of necessity if the "  Souver- 
ain " should  become a tyrant, to resist him, and the Estates 
to whom such authority is given by the laws are to set things 
right and even to punish the tyrant, and must not be thought 
of  as seditious or rebellious if  they do this, but as carrying out 
t,hrir duty aJnd tho oath which they have taken to God  and 
their c~untry.~ 
'  Vindiciae,'  Q. 111.  p.  88. 
'  Droit  des  Magistrats ' (p. 749) : 
"  Mais  d'autre  cost6,  puis  que  ces 
officiers  inf6rieurs  du  royaume  ont 
receu de par IR souverainte, l'observa- 
tion  et  maintenance  des  lois,  entre 
ceux qui leur sont commis. . . .  Je di 
donc,  que  s'ils  s'ont  reduits  B  tel 
necessit6, ils  sont  tenus (mesmes  par 
armes  si  faire  se  peut)  de  pourvoir 
contre  une  tyrannie  toute  manifeste, 
h.  la  salvation  de ceux  qu'ils  ont  en 
charge." 
Id.  (p.  748) :  "  Or,  faut-il  en- 
tendre,  que  tous  ceux-cy,  encores 
qu'ils soyent au-dessous de leur Souver- 
ain  (duquel  aussi  ils  repoyvont  com- 
mandement,  et lequel  les  installe,  et 
approuve),  toutes  fois  ne  dependent 
proprement  du Souverain,  mais  de la 
Souverainet6." 
Id.  (p. 769) : "  La  sommaire  de 
tout ce que dossus, est.  Quc le souver- 
sin gouvernement  est tellemeat  entre 
les mains du roy, ou autres tels souver- 
ains magistrats, que si  ce  n6anmoins, 
se  destournans  des  bonnes  loix  et 
conditions  qu'ils  auront  jurees,  ils  se 
rendent  tyrans tous manifestes,  et ne 
donnent lieu ti meilleur  conseil ;  alors 
il est permis aux magistrats inIBrieurs 
de  pourvoir  B  soy,  et  B  ceulx  qu'ils 
ont  en  charge,  r6sistans  B  ce  tyran 
manifeste. 
Et quant  aux  Estats ou  autres,  $. 
qui  telle  autorite  est  donn6e  per  lea 
loix, ils s'y peuvent et doyvent opposer 
jusques  B remettre les choses, et punir 
mesmement le tyran, si besoin est, selon 
leurs  demerites.  En  quoi  faisant, 
tout  s'en  fault  qu'ils  doyvent  estre 
tenus  seditieux  at rebelles,  que  tout 
au  rcbours  ils  s'acquittent  du  devoir 
et sermsnt qu'ils  ont B  Dieu et 8,  leur 
patrie." 
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The  whole  conception  is  summed  up  by  the author  of 
the  'Vindi~iae.~  Princes  are  chosen  by  God,  and  are 
established  by the people ; as  individuals  they  are inferior 
to the prince, but the whole body and those who represent the 
whole,the officers of the kingdom, are superior to him.  The 
authority  of  the prince  rests  upon  a  contract  between  him 
and the people, tacit or expressed, natural or even civil, that 
the  people  must  render  obedience  to the  prince  who  rules 
well, that they will serve the prince who serves the common- 
wealth, that they will  obey the prince who  obeys the  laws. 
Of  this treatise or contract the officers of  the kingdom are the 
guardians.  The prince who violates the contract is a tyrant, 
a  exercitio,"  and  therefore  the  officers  of  the  kingdom  are 
bound to judge him according to the laws, and if  he resists, to 
compel him by f0rce.l 
No  doubt  these  conceptions are expressed in  violent  and 
drastic terms, but it must be observed that they are related 
to the medizeval traditions.  In the first place, it is obvious 
that in  the feudal  system the king  was  thought of  as con- 
trolled, if  necessary, by the great vassals or tenants-in-chief. 
This is set out, not only in the Assizes of  Jerusalem, but in 
the  law  books  of  the  German  Empire  of  the  thirteenth 
century, like the '  Sachsenspiegel ' and the '  Schwabenspiegel,' 
and is illustrated by the constitutional forms of  the deposition 
"  Politie.  Car  il  y  a  lea  puissances 
infBrieures  et  deputez  du  peuple, 
autheur  des  Princes,  qui  les  ayant 
faits  les  peuvent  defaire,  et  tels  ne 
peuvent  laissez  par  raison  la  prinoi- 
paut6  decllner  B  tyrannie,  car  ils 
trahiroyent  la  patrie  qui  a  constitu6 
tels  tats pour  emp6cher la  tyrannie. 
Si  elle  survlent, c'est aux  suiets  par- 
ticuhers  de  recourir  humblement  et 
sans confusion au remdde vers ceux-18, 
qui  sont  commes  souverains  magis- 
trats  par-dessus  le  Prince,  en  cest 
endroit,  quoy  qu'ils  soyent  privez  et 
au-dessous pour un regard ordinaire." 
'  Vindiciae,' Q. 111.  (p. 214) :  "In 
summa principe~  eliguntur a Deo, con- 
stituuntur  a populo.  Et singull prin- 
cipe inferiores sunt, ut universi, et qui 
universes repraesentaut, regni officiarii, 
principe superiores sunt.  In constitu- 
endo  principe  intervenit  foodus inter 
ipsum et populum, taciturn, expressurn, 
naturale,  vel  etiam  civile,  ut  bene 
imperanti,  bene  pareatur,  ut reipub- 
licae  inservienti  omnes inserviant,  ut 
legibus  obtemperanti  omnes  obse- 
quantur et cetera.  Huius vere foederis 
seu  pacti,  regni  officiarii  vindices  et 
custodes  sunt, qui  hoc pactum perfide 
et pervicaciter  violat, is vere exercitio 
tyrannus  est.  Itaque  regni  officiarii 
ipsum, et secundum  leges  judicare,  et 
renitentem  vi  coercere,  si  alias  non 
possunt,  ex  officio  tenentur." 
of  the  Emperors  Adolf  and Wenceslas.  Even  so  careful  a, 
writer as Bracton admitted that at least some would say that 
the "  Universitas  Begni  et Baronagium " could compel the 
king to do justice to an aggrieved person in his court, while the 
interpolator of Bracton and Fleta assert clearly that the king's 
curia,"  that is,  the earls and barons  taken together, were 
superior to  him.  In the  second  place,  we  must  remember 
those  very  interesting  constitutional  experiments,  the  ap- 
pointment of a committee of the barons to secure the execution 
of  the Great Charter, the demands of  the barons in 1244, and 
the  appointment  of  a  committee  of  twenty-four  to  super- 
intend the execution of  the Provisions of  Oxford in 1258 and 
1264.  In the third  place,  it should  be  observed  that the 
conception of some of  the great officers of  the crown as being 
properly officers of  the nation is implied in the Provisions of 
Oxford with respect to the appointment and tenure of  office of 
the justiciar, the treasurer, and the chance1lor.l 
The  truth  is,  no  doubt,  that the Huguenot  writers  were 
influenced  by  the actual conditions of  France, by  the fact 
that some of the princes of the blood and many of  the nobles 
were in violent and open  opposition to the king, but behind 
the influence of these conditions we  must recognise the con- 
tinuing  influence  of  traditional  conceptions  of  the  Middle 
Ages  and  of  the  feudal system. 
It  is  therefore important  to  observe that  Althusius  also 
maintained the same conception, that there are officers of  the 
commonwealth whom he also calls "  Ephori,"  whose office it 
is to defend the laws and constitutions of  the commonwealth, 
even against the supreme magistrate. 
The Ephors, he says, are entrusted by  the consent  of  the 
people  with  authority,  as  representing  them,  to  create  the 
supreme  magistrate,  to help  him  with their  counsel  in  the 
affairs of the commonwealth, and to restrain his licence in all 
matters which may be harmful to it, to see that the community 
if3  not  injured by  his  private  desires  and by  his  action  or 
inacti~n.~  It is important to observe that in the conception 
Cf. vol.  iii.  part i. chap  4, vol.  v.  Althusius,  '  Politics,'  xviii.  48 : 
part i.  chap. 8 ; this volume, p.  31.  "  Ephori punt, quihus populi, in corpus 41  4  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV. 
doubt using sharper and more dogmatic terms than had been 
used before, but they were not asserting a new principle. 
It is hardly necessary to point  out that the doctrine that 
the prince was controlled by the law and the courts of law in 
his relation to private persons and properties was a common- 
place of  mediaeval political theory and constitutional law. 
The  theory of  the  contract  between  the  prince and the 
people was  again in no sense new in principle, it rested upon 
the immemorial tradition of  the mutual oaths which  prince 
and people made to each other in the Coronation ceremonies, 
and it was  obviously related  to the  whole  character  and 
principles of feudal society. 
And finally, the right of the community to resist and even 
if necessary to depose the prince who persistently violated the 
laws  of  the  community  was  founded  upon  important  pre- 
cedents in  various  countries,  and  had  been  maintained  not 
merely by violent and highly controversial writers like Mane- 
gold and John of  Salisbury or Marsilius of  Padua, but by such 
careful and judicious writers as St Thomas Aquinas. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  ABSOLUTE  MONARCHY. 
WE have  so  far endeavoured  to set out the continuance in 
the  sixteenth  century  of  the  conception  that  the  king  is 
under the law ; we  must now consider how far, and in what 
terms, the conception that the king was above the law wa,s 
developed in this period.  It  is, we think, clear that this was 
an innovation, that there is really sca,rcely any trace of  such 
a  conception in the earlier  or later Middle Ages,  except  so 
far as it can be  found  in  some of  the Civilians, and  even 
among them, as we  have pointed out, there had been,  and 
still was, much difference of  opinion. 
It will be well, we think, to begin by considering the theory 
of  the absolute monarch  as it  was  expressed by  a  prudent 
and moderate practical  statesman and thinker-that  is,  by 
Michel L'HGpital, who was Chancellor of  France from 1560 to 
1573.  We  are not here directly concerned with his relation 
to the Wars of  Religion and his policy of  compromise or tolera- 
tion, nor are we  for the moment  concerned with his attitude 
to the States  General, to which  we  shall return  in  a  later 
chapter, but with his conception of  the relation  of  the king 
to the law. 
It is  clear  that while  he  held  that kings  should govern, 
not only with moderation  and goodwill towards his subjects, 
but also with justice and 'i legalit6," he condemned all revolt 
against the monarch, however unjust he might be, and main- 
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the obedience which they owe to their s0vereign.l  He claimed 
indeed that France had lived for many years in tranquillity, 
because  there  were  good  laws  under  which  the  people 
rendered  obedience  to  the  prince,  while  the  prince  sub- 
mitted  himself  voluntarily  to  the  law ;  a  but  it  must  be 
observed  that  L7HBpital spoke  of  the  obedience  rendered 
by  the  King  of  France  to  the  law  as  voluntary,  not 
obligatory. 
It seems clear to us that these phrases,  though incidental, 
represent L'HBpita17s  normal judgment.  In  the speech which, 
as  chancellor,  he  addressed  to the  meeting  of  the  States 
General at Orleans in 1559, we find him saying that no excuse 
could  be  made for those  who  took  arms  against  the king, 
for no  subject ma~y  defend himself  against the prince or his 
magistrates,  whether  they are good  or evil ; the obedience 
which we owe to him is more binding, even, than that which 
we owe to our fathers.3  And, in another place, in the same 
speech, more explicitly  still, while he expresses his wish that 
kings  should  recognise  that  the property  of  their  subjects 
1 Michel  L'HBpital,  '  Oeuvres  In- 
edites,' vol. i. (p. 380) : "  Trait6  de la 
Reformation  de la  Justice."  "Fidolo 
advertissement  pour lcs  princes  fran- 
qais  de  traiter tels snbjects avec telle 
mod6ration, doulceur et bienvieillnnco 
et  principallement  avec  telle  justice 
et 16galit6, quilz leur donne h. cognoistre 
leur  affection,  plus  paternelle  que 
seigneurialle.  plus temp6res quo absoleue 
. . . et  quilz  tiennent  pour  ennemys 
tous ceux qui lui bailleront autro consoil : 
non  que  je  veuille  approuver  10s  r6- 
bellions contre les monarques. quelque 
fasoheux,  injustes, et exacteurs  qu'ils 
puissent  estre,  spachsnt  bien  que  le 
subject,  non  plus  que  l'cnfant  n'a 
jamais  juste  cause  de  se  r6volter  de 
1'oMysance de son soubverain." 
Id. id., vol. ii.  (p. 100) : " I1  y  a 
plus  de  cent  cinquante  ans  quo  lo 
royaulme  de  France  vit  en  graude 
paix  et tranquillit6 parce  qu'il y a de 
bonncs  loyx,  soubs  lo  discipline des- 
quels le peuple rend le debvoir et I'ob6ys- 
sance B son Prince, et le Prince tout le 
premior so  soubmet volontairement  A. 
la  loi.  . . .  Aristote et toua les autres 
politiqnes . . . conviennent  tous  en 
co point quo la respublique est heureuse, 
en laquelle lo  Prince est volontairement 
obey  d'unq  chascung,  et  lui  mesmo 
ob6yt  B  la loy." 
a  Id.,  ' Oouvres  ComplAtes,'  vol.  i. 
(p.  395) :  "  Si  I'on  disoit  que  18s 
armcs qu'ilz prcnnent ne sont pas pour 
offcnsor aulrung, mais pour se defendre 
seuloment,  ceste  excuse  vauldrait 
peultestre contre l'estranger, non contre 
le  roi  leur  souverain Seigneur:  car  il 
n'est  loisible au subject do se dirfendre 
contre le Prince, contre ses magistrats, 
non  plus  qu'au  fils  contre  son  pdre, 
soit  B  tort, soit  B  droict, soit  que  le 
Prince  et Magistrat  soit  maulvais  et 
discoles, ou soit qu'ils soit bon.  Encore 
sommcs nous  plus  tenues  d'obClyr  au 
I'xince  qu'au  $re." 
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belongs to them "  imperio, non  dominio et proprietate,"  a,ll 
are bound to obey his laws, except the king himse1f.l 
The position of L'HBpital is interesting ; it certainly does 
not correspond with that of  De Seyssel, nor with the opinion 
of  some  foreign  observers  of  the  French  constitution  like 
Machiavelli.  It corresponds, however, with  a  declaration  of 
the President  of  the Parliament  of  Paris in  1527, that  the 
king  was  above  the  law,2 and  with  the  judgment  which 
Bud4 at least sometimes expre~sed.~  Whatever  may  be  the 
origin  of  this  conception  in  France,  we  have  to  observe 
L7HBpita17s  opinion, for it is that of  a prudent and responsible 
politician. 
It is, however, in the famous work  of  J. Bodin, '  De  Re- 
publics,' published originally in French in 1576 and translated 
into Latin by himself, and republished in 1586, that we find, 
apart  from  some  of  the Civilians, the first  important  and 
reasoned  development  of  the  theory  that  the  king  was 
absolute  and above  the law.4 
The work of  Bodin, whatever may be thought of  its intrinsic 
and permanent  value, is  indeed  a  large  and comprchensive 
study of  politics,  and in  order that we  may understand  his 
conception  of  the authority of  the king, we  must begin  by 
considering, briefly, his general theory of  the nature of  political 
society. 
Hc,  begins  with  a  definition  of  the commonweellh  (Xes- 
'  Id.  id.,  vol.  i.  (p.  392) :  "  Je 
voudrais  aussi  que  les  rois  se  con- 
tentassent  de  leur  revenue . . . esti- 
massent que le bien do leur dictes sub- 
jects leur appartiennent, ' imperio, non 
dominio et proprietate.'  Ainsi les sub- 
jects  l'aimassent  et reconnussent pour 
roi et seigneur . . . leur ob6yssent . . . 
par vraye obClissance, qui est do gardcr 
. . . ses  loyx,  Bdicts  et  ordonnances, 
ausquels touts doivent ob6yr, et y sont 
subjects, except6 lo roi seul." 
' Recueil dcs lois anciennes,' vol. xii. 
(P. 277) : "  Nous ne voulons r6vocquer 
en  douto  ou  disputer  de  vostre  puis- 
VOL.  VI. 
sance, ce  seroit espece de sacrilege, et 
seevons  bien  quo  vous estcs  par  sue 
les loix, et que 18s loix et ordonnances 
ne  vous  peuvcnt  contraindre,  et n'y 
estes contrainct par puissance coactive ; 
mais entendons dire que vous ne dovez 
ou  ne  voulcz  pas  devoir  tout  ce  que 
vous  pouvez,  ains  seulcment  ce  que 
est en raison, bon et Bquitable, qui n'est 
autre choso que justice." 
a  CE.  p. 293. 
'  Our references are to the  Second, 
the Latin Edition, for  this was prepared 
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of  law was not, however, peculiar to the Civilians ; it is clear 
that, even as early  as  the ninth  century, the conception of 
law,  as  representing  the  deliberate will  of  the community, 
was expressed in such famous words as those of  the "  Edictum 
Pistense,"  LL Quoniain lex  consensu  populi  ct  constitutione 
regis fit " (M. G. H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol. ii. 273) ;  and by the 
end  of  the thirteenth  century  at least  law was  thought of, 
not only as customary but as being  made.2  The  theory of 
Bodin  was,  therefore,  not,  stricbly  speaking,  new,  but  we 
think it may properly be said that it represents a much sharper 
and more dogmatic enunciation of  the conception. 
So far,  then, we  have in  Bodin a  dogmatic  statement of 
the absolute power  of  the State, limited only by  the divine 
law,  the natural law,  and the law  of  nations.  But  Bodin 
not' only maintains that there is this absolute power in  the 
State, but  seems  to  assert  that  this  authority  rests  upon 
force.  Reason itself, he says, teaches us that the common- 
wealth is founded  upon force, and he argues that Aristotla, 
Demosthenes,  and  Cicero  were  in  error when  they  thought 
that  in  the beginning  princes  and kings  were  given  their 
authority on account of  their ju~tice.~ 
Bodin's  discussion of  this is somewhat meagre and inade- 
quate ; it  is  incidental to his  contention  that in  the State 
man has lost his natural liberty.  He had in an earlier passage 
defined this natural liberty as that of a soul good and guided 
by nature, which, under God, rejects all authority but that of 
itself  and of  true rea~on.~  He now defines the citizen as a 
'  Cf  vol  1  chap  19, p  238 
2  Cf  vol  In  p  46  ff , and  vol  v. 
part I  chap  6 
3  Id  id, I  6  (p  46)  "  Ea  nos 
Ipsa  ratio deduclt, Imporlo  sclllcet  a~ 
respubllcas vl prlmum co~lulsse,  ot~am 
sl ab h~stor~a  deseramur  quamquam, 
pleni  sunt  hbr~  plena  ant~qu~tas, 
plenae  leges,  primum  lllud  homlnum 
genus,  nlhll  pnus  habu~sse, quam 
obv~os  quosque spol~are,  dlripere, occi- 
dere,  aut in  serv~tutem  adlgere.  . . 
Atque  In  eo fall1 mlhl  vldontur  An8 
toteles  Inquam,  Demosthenes,  Cscero 
qu~  Herodotum  (opinor) so~utl,  prln- 
clplo reges ob summam integ~ltatls  ae 
~ust~t~ae  opinlonem  prlnclpatum adep- 
tas fmsse  arb~trantur  hluo  herolca 
nobls  ac aurca secula  finxerunt, quae 
allbl cert~ss~mis  nc test~monns  refutasse 
nobls v~demur  " 
Id  id , I.  .4  (p  14)  "  Est  enbn 
naturalis llbertas hujusmodl, ut nnlma 
bene  a  natura  ~nformata.  imDerlum 
alterlus post Deum lmmortalem renc~at, 
praeterquam  sui  ~pslus,  ~d est  rectae 
ratlorus,  quae  a  dilma voluntate  per 
se lpwa  nunquan~  ab~rrat  " 
freeman who is subject to the supreme authority of  another, 
and says that l~berty  could not have been  taken from man 
except by great force ; the citizens, therefore, have lost some- 
thing of  their natural liberty when they were subjected to the 
authority of  an0ther.l 
We  could wish  that Bodin had developed in  more  detail 
what  he  meant  by  "the  forcev  which  created  the 
commonwealth,  and  his  conception  of  liberty,  but  he 
did  not,  as  far  as  we  have  seen,  do  so.  Indeed,  it 
seems  to  us  that  his  reference  to  the  fact  that  man 
had  lost  his  "natural"  liberty  in  socicty  is  little  more 
than  a  preliminary  to the judgments  upon  actual political 
conditions. 
There is  another  and more  serious error, he says, and he 
attributes it to Aristotle-that  is, the contention that a man 
is  not  a  citizen  (civis) who  does  not  share  in  the  public 
a~thority.~  hd  this leads to another  and  most  important 
general  principle-that  is,  that  the people  can  transfer  to 
one  man,  and without  limit of  time, its authority over the 
citizens,  which  includes  the  power  of  life  and  death,  an 
authority which is not subject to any laws, and which he can 
hand on to any successor whom he ~ishes.~  The prince who 
has  this  power  has  "  Majestas,"  while  the  prince  who  is 
bound by the laws, or holds authority only for a time, and 
has  to  render  account  to  the  people,  does  not  hold  this 
'L Maje~tas."~  In  another  place  Bodin  asserts  that  the 
prince  should not  swear to the laws, for  this  is to destroy 
Id. id ,  I  6 (p 45) . "  Est autem 
clvis  nlhil allud  quam llber homo qu~ 
summae alterius potestat~  obligatur 
(p. 46) Llbertas autem, slno VI maxima, 
nec  nisi  perruptls  naturae  legbus, 
er~pi  potu~sse  vensimlle  est  . . .  Ex 
quo intolllgitur verarn esse civls, quam 
posu~mus  defimt~onem,  ~d est llberum 
hominem, qu~  summae  potestntis, Im 
per10  teneatur.  .  .  .  Ita  quoque 
clvlbus  omnibus  allquid  de  libertate 
natural1 detrahitur, ut summae altenuq 
potestat~  subnciant~i~  " 
Id  ld.,  I.  6  (p  51)  ' Gravius 
tamen pcccatur ob 115,  qu~  clvem esse 
ncgont,  qui  non  sit  impern,  suflra- 
glorrtm,  conc~h~que  pubhc~  partmeps. 
Haec cst Ar~~totells  d~sc~plma,  quam In 
statu  popular1  tanturn  locum  habere 
confitetnr " 
8  Id  id , I  8  (p  82)  "  Nam 
populus  summum  perpotuumqllo  Im 
perlum  in  clveq,  ac  v~lae  necisquo 
potestatem,  leglbus  omnlbus  solutum, 
un~  ex  clvibus  tnbuere  potest,  ut 
quemcunque veht  Impern successorem 
deslgnare pofls~t  " 
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the  Majestas,"  and to confuse the government of  one man 
with t,hat of a few, or of  the peop1e.l 
Bodin has  thus set  out the principle  that there  must  be 
in any ~olit~ical  community sonie authority which is supreme 
and  absolntc,  above  the laws,  because it  rnakes  the  laws. 
It is not our function here to discuss thc truth of  this con- 
cept,ion, how far it is a truism, and how  far it is an illusion. 
It  is not our part here to discuss the later history of  this con- 
ception, but we  think it well to point out to thc student of 
political theory that, as this theory was profoundly different 
from that of  the Middle  Ages,  it was  also  wholly  different 
Prom  that of  Locke, to whom  the State has  no  more of  an 
absolute  authority  than  the  individual.  It must  also  be 
remembered  that this  conception of  Bodin is not  the same 
as that of  Robbes, for this supreme or sovereign power is not 
free from all law, for it is not the source of  all law.  Above the 
positive  law, which  is  made by the sovereign, there  are, in 
the view of  Bodin, as we have seen, the divine law, the natural 
law, and the law of  nations (Jus Genti~m).~ 
This is not, however, the only limitation upon the supreme 
power.  As  we  have  already pointed  out, Bodin  maintains 
that the prince should not swear to maintain the laws ; the 
prince has power by his own will to make laws and to amend 
them, if  "  Aeq~it~as  7'  demands  it ; but a "  Conventio 77  or 
contract between the prince and the citizens binds them both, 
and  cannot  be  changed  without  mutual  consent ;  in  this 
matter  the prince  is  in  no  sense  superior  to  his   subject^.^ 
1 Id. id.,  I.  8  (p.  94) : "  Plerique 
tamen  ita statuunt, et quidem  ii  qui 
plus in eo genere sapere sibi videntur, 
principem  in  leges  patrias  jurare 
oportere.  Quae  quidem  disciplinae 
jurn, majestatis,  quae sacrosancta  esse 
debont,  omnino  labefactant  et  con- 
vellunt, ot unius potestatem  cum pau- 
corum populive imperio conturbant." 
a  Cf. p. 414. 
Bodin,  id., I.  8  (p.  87) : "  EIoc 
igitur  teneamus,  principi  legcs  a  se 
latss sua voluntato, ac sine subditorum 
consensu  abrogare,  vcl  quadam  ex 
partc legibus derogare,  vol  subrogarc, 
vel  obrogare licere,  ac semper licuisse, 
si aequitas ipsa id postulare videatur. 
. . . At conventio inter cives ac prim- 
cipem  mutuam habet  obligationem,  a 
qua discedi  sine mutuo consensu  non 
potebt.  In quo genere  princeps  nihil 
habet,  quo  subditis  superior  esse 
videatur." 
Cf. I. 8 (p. 99) : "  His ita constitutis, 
sequitur  principem  summum,  pactis 
conventis aeque  ac privatos  obligari : 
sive  cum  exteris,  sive  cum  civibus 
contmxerit." 
Bodin, unfortunately, does not, as far as we have seen, attempt 
to define or describc these contracts between the prince and 
his  subjects.  A8  we  have  seen  in  the earlier  part  of  this 
volun~e,  this  question  was  much  discussed by  the Civilians 
of  the fourteenth and fifteenth  cent,uries, and we  have the 
impression that their  conception may have arisen especially 
from their  familiarity  with  the  contractual conceptions  of 
feudalism, partly also from the question of  the obligation of 
treaties made between thc emperor and various Italian cities.l 
Custom, Bodin clearly refused to recognise as having  any 
authority over tho prince.  Bartolus and Baldus give custom 
an important place in their treatment of  law, as was also done 
by  some  Civilians  and  Canonists  of  the  fiftccnth  ~entury.~ 
Bodin,  on  the other  hand, emphatically says  t'hat customs 
have little authority as compared with law, and were entirely 
under tho control of  the prin~e.~ 
There is,  however, another limitation  upon  the authority 
of  thc  prince.  Bodin  contemptuously  rejects  the  vulgar 
opinion that all things belong to the prince.  This is a mere 
confusion  with  t,he principle  that  all  things  are  under  his 
"  Imperium  '7  and "  D~minatus.~~  "  Proprietas 77 and "  Pos- 
sessio 77  belong to the individual ; and he  cites a judgment 
of  the Parliament of  Paris that the prince can bestow his own 
property  on whom hc will, but not that of  another person ; 
the prince  cannot  lay  his  hands  upon  othcr  men's  wealth 
sine justa cause." 
1 Cf. pp.  16-19 ; pp. 183-156. 
Cf. pp.  16-19; pp.  150-153. 
9  Id.  id.,  I. 9  (p.  154) : "  Legum 
etiam  vis  multo  major  est  quam 
morum ;  nam  legibus  mores  anti- 
quantur, leges moribus non item, sed in 
magistratuum  officio  ac  potestate 
positum  est  leges,  quae  consuetudinc 
quodammodo  exoluerunt,  ad  usum 
revocare ; consuetudo nec poenas, nec 
praemia  ~roponit,  quae legum  propria 
sunt, nisi lex quicquam permittat quod 
antea  vetitum  esset ;  denique  con- 
~netildo precariam  vim  habet,,  ct 
quamdiu  principis  arbitrio  videbitur : 
at si consuetudini sanctionem subiiciat, 
legem efficit.  Ex quo perspicitur leges 
ac  mores  ab eorum,  qui  summam  in 
roipublicao potnstatem habent, arbitrio 
ac voluntate pendere." 
"d.  id.,  I. 8  (p.  100):  "  Quanto 
aequius judicatum pridem est in Curia 
Parisiorum,  principem  quidem,  quod 
sun  intersit,  res  largiri  posse,  quod 
intersit alterius, non posse. . . .  Eadcm 
Curia decrevit, principem logibus civili- 
bus derogare posse, durn tamen id fiat 
sine  fraude  cuiusquam  . . . (p.  103) 
Hoc  igitur  fixum  sit  principi,  rtlirnis 
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find a true monarchy.  In  the ancient world he found that the 
Spartan monarchy was  only nominal ; the government  was 
rcally in the hands of  the peop1e.l  In .Roine, after the expul- 
sion  of  the  kings,  men  attempted  to  divide  the  supreme 
authority,  but  in  the  end  the  Plcbs  obtained  the  power 
of  making  laws, and gradually  possessed  themselves  of  the 
other  L'  iura  maiestatis,"  in  spite  of  the  resistance  of  the 
opti~nates.~  In Spain and England  he  thinks that the laws 
were  made "  rogatione  populi " and  could  not  be  annulled 
except  in  the  assemblies  of  the  people ;  and  again,  in 
England, he  says  that by ancient  custom  laws  were  made 
<'  consensu  ordinum " ;  though  he  says  in  another  place 
that  while  the  English  estates  had  a  certain  authority, 
the "  iura maiestatis " belonged to the prin~e.~  Of  the con- 
temporary Empire he says that the emperor swore to observe 
the laws of  the Empire, and was bound by tha laws and decree8 
of  tho  princes ;  and in  another  place  the "  Maiestas " of 
the Empire resided in the assembly of  the princes and nobles, 
and the  emperor  could  not  make  laws  or  appoint  officials 
without their consent.  In Bodin's judgment  the Empire was 
not a monarchy but an aristocracy.' 
In France alone did  Bodin find a  government  which had 
the nature of  a supreme and sovereign monarchy.  The estates 
could indeed  humbly  present  their  petitions  to  the prince, 
but he controlled all things at his will, and whatever he com- 
manded  had the force of  law.  The notion  that the prince 
should  be  controlled  by  the  authority  of  the  people  was 
dangerous and  disturbing to the commonwealth ; there  was 
indeed no reasonable ground why the subjects should control 
their princes or why the asseniblies of  the people should have 
any  authority,  except  to  appoint  a "  procnrator " for  the 
prince if  he were a minor,  or insane,  or a  captive ; and he 
warned them that such a government  would not be that of 
Id. id., 11.  l (p. 177).  Id. id., I. 8 (p. 91). 
Id. id. id (pp. 178-180).  0  lrl. id., I. 8 (p.  87). 
Id. id., I. 8 (p. 93).  7  Id. id., 11. 1 (p. 223). 
Id. id., I. 8 (p. 96). 
the people, but of  the "  optimates."  Bodin also maintained 
that the coronation oath of  the French kings was not an oath 
to keep the  and that in France laws  had  often  been 
abrogated  without  the meeting  or  consent  of  the  estates.3 
France was a pure monarchy, while the estatcs had no power 
except to petition the king to do this or thaL4 
We must, however, be careful to observe that in one place, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  Bodin  dealt  at length  with  the 
question  of  the permanent  tenure-that  is, the independence 
of  the judges-and  contended that they should bc irremovable 
except  by  process  of  law,  for  a  precarious  tenure  of  the 
judicial  office  was  appropriate  to  at  tyranny  and not  to  a 
monarchy, which should be governed, as far as might be, by 
laws, not  by  the  mere  will  of  the prin~e.~  How  far  this 
conception  is  reconcilable with  Bodin's  general  position  we 
find it difficult to say ; we  have drawn attention to a similar 
apparent incoherence in the theory of 
That Bodin t'hought that a monarchy of  the absolute kind 
was the best form of  government appears to us clear.  In  the 
last book  of  his "  De  Republics  he  compares the various 
forms of  government with each other, and concludes : Monarchy 
has  its inconveniences and dangers, but those which belong 
1 Id. id., I.  8  (p.  89) : "  Atque  in 
eo  quidem  principis  niajestas  elucet, 
cum populi  tribus  ot  ordines,  humili 
habitu ad principom rogationes ferunt, 
nec  ullam  imperundi  prohibendive, 
nec  suffragiorum  potestatem  habent ; 
sed princops arbitrio suo, ac voluntate, 
omnia  moderatur,  et quaecunque  de- 
crevit, ac jussit,  ea legum vim habent. 
Eorum  igitur,  qui  p~incipom  imperio 
populari  teneri,  ut  quidem  libris  por- 
vulgatis  tradunt,  minuenda  opinio 
cst ; id  enim  seditiosis hominibus  ad 
res  novandas  materiam  praebet,  ac 
rerum  publicarum  perturbationem 
uffert.  Neque cnim ulla ratio probabilis 
adduci potest,  cur  subditi principibus 
imperent,  aut  popnlaribus  comitiis 
ulla  potestas  t~ibui  debeat,  praetor 
quam in  ipsius  principis  ini'untia,  vel 
furore, vel captivitate, ut ei procurator, 
legatusve,  comitionim suffragiis  creari 
posset ;  alioquin  si  Iteges  legibus 
cornitiorum ac populi jassis teneantur, 
inanis est illorum potestas, inane regium 
nomen  futurum:  nec  tamen  sub tali 
principe  respublica  popularis  esse 
potest, sed  optimatum nut  paucorum 
cootus,  in  quo  legos  ac  edicta,  non 
ojus  qui  praeest,  sed  eorum,  qui 
aoqua  potestate  suffragium  habcnt, 
auctoritate, ao  nomine  imperantur." 
Id. id., I. 8 (p. 88). 
3  Id. id., I. 8 (p. 92). 
4  Id. id., 11. 1 (pp. 181, 182). 
5  Id. id.,  IV.  4  (cf.  this  volume, 
p. 381). 
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to an aristocracy  or democracy are much greater.  The best 
form of  government  is  that of  one man, whose  authority is 
not to be shared with the people or the "  Patres " ; all legis- 
lators,  philosophers,  historians,  and  theologians  hold  that 
this regal government is the best, not only for the convenience 
of  the prince, but for the safety and happiness of  the people. 
This supreme authority of  the prince must not be shared with 
the assemblies  of  the people  and nobles, or  the "  Maiestas 
imperii "  will inevitably give place to anarchy.  We must not 
give heed to the seditious clamour of  those who maintain that 
the prince must be subject to such assemblies of -the people, 
and that it is from them that the princes receive their authority 
to command  and  forbid.  Any  tyrenny  is  better  than  the 
domination  of  the people.  Tyrants will consider the danger 
of  their actions,  but  the violence  and  fury  of  the  peoples 
takes  no  rational  account  of  their  own  or  of  other's 
interests.l 
Bodin's  judgment  seem to us clear and emphatic, as well 
as the audacity with  which  he  appeals  to the authority  of 
legislators  and  philosophers-a  somewhat  strange  appeal. 
He  dogmatically  asserts  the  absolute  authority  of  the 
King  of  France, who mas  the source of  law, and free from 
the law ; in him it wa~s  that there resided that '' Maiestas 77 
Id.  id.,  VI.  4  (p.  710) : " Haec 
monarcl~iae incornmoda  ac  poricula 
gravissirna  quidem:  sod  ea  quae  ah 
aristocratia  et  democratia  pendent, 
multo  graviora  . . . (p.  712)  Quod 
igitur  superius  in  optimo  civitatis 
statu  imperium  unius  esse  oportere 
diximus,  nee  cum populo  patribusque 
communicandum ;  quod  item  legum 
latores,  bisiodri,  philosophi,  theologi, 
una voce regale civitatis genus omnium 
optimum  ac  beatissimum  judicant,  id 
non  ad  principis  commoda  partinet, 
sed ad populorum suorum foelicitatom, 
vitamquc tutius bcatiusque  degondam. 
At  summa  principis  potestas  optim- 
aturn populivc coetibus nec  subiugari, 
II~C  circuncidi nec  ulla  sui parte corn- 
municari, sine pernicio potost, alioquin 
majestatem irnperii  vel  in  pestiferi~~n 
anarchiam, vol in popularem perturba- 
tionem prolabi neccsse  ost.  Id autem 
attentius pondarandunl  nobis  est, ne 
seditiosis  popularium  ac  imperitorum 
voces exaudiamus, qui principes popu- 
lorum  coetibus, et comitiis  subiicien- 
dos, ab iisque imperandi ac prohibendi 
leges  accpiendas  esse  putant:  qua 
quidom  re  non  mod0  monnrchiarum 
pulcherrimarum  sed etiam subditonmm 
interitus  sequatur  necesse  est. . . . 
(p.  713)  Quaccunque tamen  tyrannis 
videtur  tolernbilior  populi  dominatu. 
Etenim tyranui  suo periculo  progrcdi 
cogitant ;  populi  vero  impetus  no 
furor,  nee  sui,  nec  alieni  rationem 
habet." 
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or  sovereignty  which, as  he  contended,  must  slways  exist 
somewhere in a political ~ociet~y. 
If we  attempt to sum up  the most important aspects  of 
Bodin's  political  theory, we  must  observe first  the singular 
significance of  his suggestion that the State rests upon force, 
and that it was not, at least in its original form, related  to 
justice, while it was to be directed by reason.  Unhappily he 
did not, as far as we  have seen, develop the conception, amd 
it is  therefore  difficult  to determine  how  far it was  really 
important in  his mind. 
It is in his theory of  the absolute and supreme authority, 
subject only to the natural and divine law, which resides in 
the State, that we find the most significant aspect of  his work, 
but for  our present  purpose  its importance lies  specially in 
his judgment  that this supreme and absolute power may be 
given by the commonwealth to one man ; and that the king, 
in  the  proper  sense of  the word, is  one who  possesses  this 
authority.  There can be, in Bodin's judgment, no such thing 
as a mixed  governmcnt, no combination  of  the monarchical 
and aristocratic and popular elements.  It is here that Bodin 
breaks away most completely from the medizval tradition and 
the great medizval political thinkers, and even substantially, 
if  not formalI1y,  from the principles ol such men as De Seyssel. 
It is true that Bodin, speaking not as a theorist but as an 
observer, evidently rccognised that it  was almost impossiblo 
to find  any  such  monarchy  in  Western  Europe,  with  thc 
exception of  France ;  whilo he maintained stoutly but without 
any  groat  amount  of  historical  evidence, that the King  of 
France  was  in this  sense  supreme  and absolute,  the source 
of  law, and not subject to law, and that it was in him that 
there  resided  that "  Maiestas,"  that  supreme  or  sovereign 
power,  without  which  there  can  be  no  "  Respublica." 
It  is in the work of  Bodin that we find the most highly devel- 
oped assertion of  the absolute authority of the prince.  There 
are, however, some other writers of  the last part of  the sixteenth 
century who, in  varying terms,  asse,rt a theory  of  the same 
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authority of the prince is founded upon the divine law-that 
is, they restate  that theory  of  the "Divine  Right "-whose 
earlier appearance in the sixteenth century we have considered 
in Part 111. of  this volume. 
One  of  the most  important  of  t'hese was  Thomas  BiIson, 
Bishop  Winchester,  who  in  1586 published  a  work  entitled 
'  The  true  differcncc  between  Christian  Subjection  and 
Unnatural  Rebelli~n.'  This  treatise  is  in  the  form  of  a 
dia,logue between  Philander,  a  Jesuit,  and  Theophilus,  the 
Christian. 
Bilson  was  indeed  in  a  position  of  some  difficulty.  The 
primary purpose of  his treatise was to prove the necessity of 
submission to  the royal authority in England, but he  finds 
himself  compelled to defend, or at least to excuse, the revolt 
of  the  Protestants in  various  continental countries against 
their Catholic  superiors. 
We  may begin  by observing that Bilson cites  St Paul and 
St Peter as teaching that kings  are appointed by  God,  and 
must  be  obeyed ;  and the familiar  Gregorian  examples  of 
David's  submissive conduct to Saul, and asserts dogmatically 
that God  expressly commanded  tlhe people to be  subject to 
their king and not resist him."  l  In another place he says : 
"  Princes  appoint  penalties  for  others,  not  for  themselves. 
They  bear  the  sword  over  others,  not  others  over  them. 
Subjects must be punished  by them and they by none,  but 
by  God whose place they supply.  . . .  No  man may break 
the  laws  of  princes  without  punishment,  but  the  princes 
themselves, who may not be charged with the transgressions 
(of their own  laws).  For it was wisely spoken, he is wicked 
that saith to a king,  thou art an  offender.  And  if  it be  a 
monster in nature and policy to suffer the children to chasten 
the father, and the servants to punish  their master,  what  a 
barbarous  and impious  a  thing is  this,  to give the subjects 
power of  life and death over the princes." 
Again, more explicitly still : "  The serva,nt is not so surely 
bound to his maister, as the subject is to the prince ; powex 
I  Bilson, 'Tho True Difference,' &c.,  Id. id. id.  (pp. 97, 98). 
part iii.  pp. 7,  8,  12, 37. 
of  life and deat,h tho maister  hath none,  the prince  hath ; 
refuge against the maister hal,h the servant to the common 
governor  of  them both, which  is the magistrate, the subject 
hath no  refuge  against  his  sovereign, but  only  to  God  by 
prayer  and patience,  and therefore  the  prince  may  denlise 
the servant, if  the maister be like to corrupt him ; but no 
rnan can discharge the subject, though the prince go about to 
oppresse him."  l 
It would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  dogmatic  and  un- 
qualified statement of  the unlimited  authority of the prince, 
or  words  which  so  ciirectly  and emphatically  repudiate  the 
tradition of  mediaeval civilisation. 
When,  however,  we  turn  to  Bilson's  treatment  of  the 
political  conditions in continental countries, we  seem to find 
ourselves  in  another  world.  The  Jesuit  brings  up  the 
conduct of  the Protestants on the continent, and cites Beza's 
dcfence  of  the  French  nobles  in  taking  up  arms.  Bilson 
defends them on  the ground that the king  had been in the 
hands  of  the Guises,  and while  he  would  not undertake to 
defend  a11  that Protestant writers had said about resistance 
to kings, he urged that the constitutional system of  different 
countries  varied.  He  goes  on : "  The  Romans,  we  know, 
could never abide the very name of  a king.  The Common- 
wealths  of  Venice,  Milan,  Florence,  and  Genoa  are of  the 
same mind.  Many States have governors for life or for years, 
as they best liked that first created their policies, and yet a 
sovereignty  still  remains  somewhere  in  the  people,  some- 
where in  the senate,  somewhere in  the prelates  and  nobles 
that elect it : a magistrate, who bath his jurisdiction  allotted 
and prefixed unto him, thus far and no further, and ma~y  be 
resisted  and  recalled  from  any  tyrannous  excesses  by  the 
general  and  publike  consent  of  the  whole  State  whom  he 
governeth. 
In Germany  the  emperor  himself  hath  his  bounds  ap- 
pointed unto him which he ma,y not passe by the laws ol the 
enipirc ;  and the princes,  dukes,  and cities  that are under 
hiin  have  power  to  governe  and  use  the  sword  as  God's 
1 Id. ld. id.,  p. 262. 432  TIiE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PART  IV.  CHAP.  111.1  THEORY  OF  THE ABSOLUTE  MONARCHY.  433 
ministers, in their charge.  And though, for the maintenance 
of  the empire,  they  be  subject  to  such  orders  as  shall be 
decreed in the convent  of  all their States, and, according to 
that direction sre to furnish the emperor with men and monies 
for his  necessary wars  and defence : yet, if  he  touch  their 
policies,  infringe  their  liberties,  or  violate  the  specialties 
which he by oathe and ordcr of  the empire is bound to keepe, 
they may lawfully resist him, and by force reduce him to the 
ancient  and received form of  government, or else repel him 
as a  tyrant, and set another in  his place by  the right  and 
freedom  of  their  country.  Therefore the Germans'  doings 
or writings can help you little in this question.  They speak 
according to the lawes and rights of  the empire, themselves 
being  a  verie  free  State, and  bearing  the sword as  lawfull 
magistrates  to defend  and protect  their  liberties,  and pro- 
hibit injuries against all oppressors, the emperor himself not 
excepted." l 
In another passage Bilson's  contention is set out again in 
illore general terms.  The Romanist: Philander, brings forward 
the revolts  in Scotland, France,  and the Low  Countries, as 
well as those in Germany.  The Protestant, Theophilus, con- 
tends that the reformers had been barbarously slaughtered, but 
adds :  LL I must confesse that except the laws of  those realms 
do permit  the people to stand on  their right, if  the princes 
should offer  them wrong, I  dare not  allow their  arms.  . . . 
Philander:  Think  you  their  lawes  permit  them  to  rebel 5, 
Theophilus : I  busie  not  myself  in  other  men's  common- 
wealths  as you  do,  neither  will I rashly pronounce a11  that 
resist to be rebels ; cascs may fall out in Christian kingdoms 
when  the people may  plead  their  right  against  the prince, 
and not be charged with rebellion.  Philander : As  when, for 
example ?  Theophilus : If a prince should go about to subject 
his kingdom to a foraine realme, or change the forme of  the 
commonwealth from inperie to tirannie ; or neglect the lawes 
established  by  common  consent  of  prince  and  people,  to 
execute his  owne pleasure ; in  these  and other  cases  which 
might  be  named,  if  the nobles  and commons  join  together 
' Id. id. id., pp. 266-270. 
to defend their  ancient  and ancestral liberty, regiment,  and 
lawes, they may not well be counted rebels.  Philsnder:  You 
denied that even  now,  when I did  urge  it.  Theophilus : I 
denied that bishops had authoritie to prescribe conditions to 
kings when they crowned them ; but I never denied that the 
people might preserve the foundation, freedom, and forme of 
thcir  commonwealth,  which  they  forprised when  they  first 
consented to have a king.  Philander : I remember you were 
resolute  that subjects might not resist  their princes for any 
respects, and now I see you slake.  Theophilus:  As I said, so 
I say now, the lawe of  God give.th no man leave to resist the 
prince ; but I never said that kingdoms and commonwealths 
might  not  proportion  their States as they  thought  best  by 
their  public  lawes,  which  afterwards the princes themselves 
may  not  violate.  By  superior powers  ordained  of  God  we 
understand not only princes, but all politiko States and regi- 
ments, somewhere the people, somewhere the nobles, having 
the same intorest  to the sword, that princes have  in  their 
kingdoms ; and in kingdoms when princes bear rule, by the 
sword we  do  not mean the prince's  private will  against his 
lawes, but his precept  derived from his lawes, and agreeing 
with his lawes : which though it be wicked, yet may it not 
be  resisted  by  any  subject  with  armed  violence.  Marry, 
when  princes  offer their  subjects not justice  but force, and 
despise all laws to practise their lusts : not any private man 
may take the sword to redresse the prince ; but if  the lawes 
of  the land appoint the nobles as next to the king to assist 
him  in  doing  right,  and  withhold  him  from  doing  wrong, 
then  they be licensed by  man's  law, and so  not prohibited 
by God's, to interpose themselves for the safeguard of  equitie 
and innocence, and by a11 lawfull and needful means to procure 
the prince to be reformed, but in no case deprived when the 
sceptre is inherited."  l 
In these  passages  Bilson  admits  that  the  laws  of  some 
countries might contaiiz provisions for restraining the prince's 
actions,  and  that  in  extreme  cases  the  community  might 
defend its ancient liberty and laws against him ; and he also 
1 Id. id. id., pp. 279, 280. 
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makes  it  clear  that, by  the "  superior  power  ordained  of 
God,"  he  did  not  mean  only  the prince,  but a11  "  politike 
States and regiments."  Like Calvin, he  did not allow that 
any private person  might  by force resist  tho prince,  but it 
was  different with the constitutional authorities  of  the com- 
munity.  He even admitted that the community might depose 
an elected prince, like  the emperor, though  he emphatically 
assertcd that this did not apply to the case of  an hereditary 
prince.  He suggested that such a constitutional limitation of 
the authority of  tho prince existed in the empire and possibly 
in other continental countries, but he did not suggest that they 
existed in  England ; and he at least  seems to suggest that 
the monarchy in England was absolute, and that its '; divine 
right "  could not be questioned. 
We  turn next to a  group of  Scottish writers  whose  work 
was  in  some  degree  related  to  the  deposition  of  Mary, 
Qlxcen  of  Scots, and to George Buchanan's  defence of  this. 
la a treatise  published in 1581 by a Scotsman, Cunerus, who 
was Bishop of  Louvain, the 4L divine right,"  and the principle 
of  non-resistance,  are  set  out  in  very  explicit  terms.  He 
cites  Samuel's  description  of  "  the  manner  of  tho  king " 
(1 Sam.  viii. 11,  &c.) as being  a  statement  of  his  rights- 
although he admits that it had been variously interpreted- 
for though the king, in doing such things as Samuel described, 
might be committing grave sins, the people must not resist. 
The king is the lord of  the land, and thc kingdom has been 
givcn  him  by  God,  and  even  his  wicked  actions  must  be 
cndured by his  subject8.l 
A moro  important work  was  published  the same year  by 
Adam  Blackwood, entitled '  Pro  Regibus  Apologia,'  which 
1 Cunerus,  ' De  Christiani  Principis  terrae  est,  st regnum  Regi  datum  a 
Officio '  (Ed.  Mons,  1581),  p.  63 :  Dco  ost,  ut  supra  diximus.  Non 
"  De quo quidem  jure  varie hoc  loco  quod  Rex  possit,  recta  conscientla, 
loquuntur interprctes.  Caoterum tamcn  bonis omnibus subditorum, et subditis 
nemo negat, quin hac rationo jus regis  ipsis  pro  libidine  frui :  sed  quoniam 
dici  posset,  quoniarn  si  Rex  hacc  omnia  regiae  potestrtti  aubdita  sunt, 
faciat, licet  aliquando  graviter peccot,  ut  etiamsi  preeter  modum  exigat, 
populus  tamcn  jure  pati  clebeat,  et  tolerarl tamen debeat." 
non  rcsistcrc :  quoniarn  rcs clominua 
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is a formal reply to George Buchanan's '  De Jure Regni apud 
Scotos.'  Blsckwood was a Scotsman, but had been educated 
in France, and was a counsellor or judge at P0ictiers.l 
Blackwood was an uncompromising defender of the theory 
of  the unlimited  authority of the king.  He admitted indeed 
that  neithcr  the  ancient  empire  of  Rome  nor  the conteni- 
porasy  empire  had  this  chara~ter,~  but he  maintained  that 
the position  of  the Kings  of  Scotlantl was wholly different : 
the lives and fortunes of  their  subjects were  in their power 
and they recognised no superior.  This was also, he say;,  the 
character of the monarchy in the kingdoms of  France, England, 
Spain, Portugal, and  others, in  that  the  people  could not 
be admitted to any share in the supreme power ; for this was 
the true nature of  monarchy, that its authority could neither 
be divided nor   ha red.^ 
This is  a thoroughgoing  statement, and the treatise  is  in 
the main an expansion of  it.  In the first place, Blackwood 
maintains that the monarchy in Scotland was founded upon 
force, the kingdom was created by Kenneth, and the people 
had therefore  no legal rights ; the king, he seems to mean, 
granted to certain  great  men  the "  dominium " of  certain 
provinces, but retained  in his  own  hands the  potestas  et 
imperium."  The  royal  authority, he  again contends,  was 
founded in many kingdoms not  on election but on the force 
Cf. D. N. B. 
'  Adam  Bl~~liwood,  ' Pro  Regibus 
Apologia,'  IV.. pp. 51 and 64. 
Id.  id.,  IV.  (p.  65) : "  Scotorurn 
Regum longe diversum jus est, quibus 
capita  fortunaeque  civium  sunt  oh- 
noxiae, cum ii nulla ronditione populo 
teneantur,  nec superiorem ullam  prae- 
ter  solius  numinir  potestatem  agnos- 
cant.  Eodemquo  jure  suis  rogibus 
adstricti  sunt  Galli,  Angli,  131spani, 
Lusitani, aliique permultl  quorum res 
rationesque omnes ita regibus addictae 
sunt, ut ne volontibus quidem populus 
in  ullam  supremac  potestatiii  et irn- 
perii  societatem  admitti  queat.  Ea 
siquidem  cst  monarchiao  natura,  ut 
sine hoc imperio consistere non  possit, 
quod  nec  dividatur  nec  communica- 
tione cum alio profanetur." 
"d.  id.,  VI.  (p.  65) :  "  Quod  si 
pracsentem  Scotici  regni  conditionem 
spectemus,  nec  ab ouo  quod  dicitur, 
eius initia repetamus, Picticae  ditionis 
accessione Kennethus rex non protulisse 
fines  imperii,  sed  regnum  inchoasse 
videbitur, ac virtutc bellica  peperisse, 
quod  ante  nullum  erat.  .  . .  Ut 
autem  intelligas nihil  in  huic  Scotico 
populo  fuisse  juria,  sed  fi.;co  cecisse 
omnla,  Rex  arbitratu  ea suo proreri. 
bus  quibusdam  erogavit,  ut  penes 
eos,  eorumque  posteris,  provinciarum 
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of  arins, or on some other system of law, and by this he means 
the law  of  hereditary  succession,  which  the people  cannot 
abr0gate.l 
Blackwood goes on to maintain that the authority of  kings 
was analogous to that of  the fat,her over his family, or of  the 
master  over  his  slaves :  they impose upon  them  whatever 
laws they please, they do not receive these from them, and they  . - 
rule  them  according t,o their  own  j~dgment.~  He  appeals 
to the history of  Scotland  and cites a passage from Hector 
Boece to show that the supreme power and authority of  law 
had lain  with  the king.3  He  admits  indeed  that in Rome 
the authority which had at first belonged  to the kings was 
transferred to the law, but maintains that this  was  not the 
case  elsewhere;  for,  he  says,  nowhere  was  such  a  bridle 
(fraenum) imposed upon kings, and their authority subjected 
to that of  the multitude, nowhere was  a law imposed upon 
kings  which  should  restrain  their  supreme  authority.  The 
is zt  living law in the world, and his power and jurisdic- 
tion cannot be controlled by any other law than his own will." 
A little further on he asks what can be more absurd than to say 
that the king declares tho law, while the people makes it.5 
1  Id.  id.  (p.  71) :  "  Non  jam 
animadvertis,  Buchanane,  quam  soli- 
dum sit hoc  disputationis tuae princi- 
pium,  quam firmo nitare fundamento, 
cum  tot regna  non  election8 sed  vel 
armis,  vel  alio  jure  quaesita  reperia- 
mus l  Quamquam  autem  ea  vi  et 
armis initio posita fuere, legibus tamen 
retenta  et jure  posteris  tradita  nomo 
non intelligit, jure, inquam, non  popu- 
larium  suffragiorum . . . sed  agna- 
tionis atque sanguinis ; quam populus 
nec abrogare, nec ex ea derogare quid- 
quam potost.  Est enim rogia  dignitas, 
legis  et  naturae  donum,  quod  extra 
populi  commercium  perpotua  regni 
consuetudo siabilivit." 
Id.  id.,  VII.  (p.  80) :  "Rex 
liominum coetui  prseest, non socus ac 
pater  familiae,  dominus  servis,  navi 
gubernator,  quibus  imponunt  quas 
volunt  Ieges,  non  accipiunt, ;  quibuq 
imperant non ipsorum judicio sed suo : 
quos regere, quos tueri, non ex ipsorum 
nutu  ac  voluntate,  sed  a  natura 
prescripts lege tenentur." 
a  Id, id.,  VIII.  (p.  84) : "  Nam  si 
rerum  nostrarum  annales  evolvamns, 
summam  juris  ac  leym  potestatem 
penes regos fuisse reperiemus." 
4  Id.  id.,  IX. (p. 96) : "  Nusquam 
enim  gentium  hoc  fraenurn  regibus 
inijectum  inveneris,  ut  multitudinis 
imperio  submisorint  fasces,  et  legem 
acceporint  supremae  ditionis  atque 
potestatis  nuae  moderatricem.  Prin- 
ceps  enim  animats  lox  est  in  terris, 
cujus potestas ai,que jurisdictio non alia 
loge  quam  ipsius  voluntate  in  angus- 
tum cogj potest." 
6  Id.  id.,  XIII.  (p.  119) :  "  At 
quid absurdius dici potest, quam juris 
dicendi  regem,  logum  ferendaru~n 
auctorem  esse  populum." 
Blackwood's  statements are curiously inconsistent with the 
political conceptions of  De  Seyssel.  His notion  of  an abso- 
lutely unrestrained monarchy goes indeed much further than 
even Bodin ; for in another place he maintains dogmatically 
that not only the persons but the property  of  all the people 
are in the power of the king.  It is only the use of  this which 
belongs to private pers0ns.l 
It  is no wonder that Blackwood, in another place,  should 
seem  to be  indignant  that Aristotle  should have  described 
the Persians  and other  Asiatic  monarchies  as  being  really 
barbaro~s.~ 
The treatise of  Blackwood is somewhat  crude,  and shows 
little acquaintance with contemporary conditions and theories, 
but it may be one source of  the opinions of  a work which was 
important  by  reason  of  its authorship, that is, '  The  True 
Law  of  Free Monarchies,' written  by James VI. of  Scotland 
and published first in 1598 before he became King of  England, 
and republished in London in 1603.3 
In this work James unites the secular theory of  the absolute 
king  and the theological theory  of  his absolute  authority as 
being by divine  right.  He  opens  the work  with  a  general 
statement of  the proper functions of  a monarchy.  The office 
of  a king is to maintain  justice  and judgment,  to establish 
good  laws  for  the people,  and to procure  peace  for  them. 
In  his coronation oath he swears, first, to maintain the religion 
presently professed "  in the country ; secondly, to maintain 
all the good laws made by his predecessors ; and thirdly, to 
maintain  the whole country and every  estate therein in  all 
their ancient privileges and libertie~.~ 
This has a very constitutional sound, and seems to restrain 
the authority of  the king.  James was describing, so far, the 
1 Id.  id.,  VI.  (p.  68)  :  "Neque  singulorum esse videntur." 
enim ita rerum  ignarus es, ut nescias  2 Id. id., VI. (p. 68). 
non  mod0  personas  omnium  regibus  Our citations are from  the  edition 
obnoxias  ac veluti  mancipio  nexuque  of  1603. 
teneri,  verum  etiam  res  omnes popu-  4  James I., 'The  True  Law of Free 
larium, atque fortunas  ita regum  esse  Monarchies,'  B.  3. 
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office or duty of the king, but when he turns to the duty of 
the  subjects  we  find  quite  another  mode  of  thought.  He 
cites  the speech of  Samuel (1 Sam.  viii.)  on  the  nature of 
kingship, and explains what this implied.  ''  First, he (Samuel) 
declares unto them, what points  of  justice  and equitie their 
king  will break in  his behaviour  unto them.  And next, he 
putteth them out of  hope that wearie as they will, they shall 
not have leave to shake off  that yoke, which  God, through 
their importunities, hath laid upon them.,' 
Again,  James  cites  the  example  of  David's  conduct  to 
Saul, as Gregory the Great had done, and concludes : '' Shortly, 
then, to take up in two or three sentences, grounded upon all 
these arguments out of  the lawe of  God, the dutie and allea- 
geance of  the people to their lawful1 king, that obedience, I 
say, ought to be to him, as to God's lieutenant in earth, obey- 
ing his commands in all things, except directly  against God, 
as the  commands  of  God's  minister,  acknowledging him  a 
Judge, set by God over them, having power to judge  them, 
but to be judged onely by God, whom to onely he must give 
count of  his judgement  . . . following and obeying his lawful 
commands, eschewing and flying his  furie in  his  unlawfull, 
without resistance, but by sobs and teares, to God.,' 
This is indeed the theory  of  the divine right  of  the king 
and of  passive  obedience in  a  most  extreme form.  James 
does not cite directly  any authority for this doctrine except 
the  Scriptures,  but  we  may  conjecture  that he  derived  it 
from writers like Tyndale. 
He goes  on to show that this absolute power  of  the king 
was  also founded upon the "  Fundamental and Civile Lawe, 
especially of  this country."  He admits that in the first ages 
it may  be  true  that various  commonwealths chose  a  ruler 
for  themselves,  but  this,  he  says,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
Scotland, for Scotland was  conquered by  King Fergus, who 
came from Ireland, and he and his successors imposed their 
laws upon the country, "  and, SO it follows, of  necessity, that 
the kings  were  the Authors  and Makers  of  the lawes,  and 
not the lawes of the kings."  He does not ignore the existence 
1 Id. ~d..  B.  Id. ~d.,  C. 
of  the Parliament, but in it "  the lawes are but craved by his 
subjects and onely made by him  at their rogation  and with 
their  advice.  For  albeit  the king make  daily  statutes and 
ordinances, injoyning such paincs thereto, as he thinks meet, 
without  any advice of  Parliament or Estates, yet it lyes in 
the power of no Parliament  to make  any kinde  of  lawes  or 
statute, without  his  sceptre be  put to  it, for giving it the 
force of  a Law." l 
So much for Scotland, but James also maintains that "  the 
same ground of  the king's right over all the lande, and subjects 
thereof, remaineth alike in all other free monarchies, as well 
as in this " ; and, with special reference to England, he con- 
tends  that  William  the  Conqueror  made  himself  King  of 
England by force, and made his own 1aws.l 
The king then is the source of  all law, and he is over all 
law ; he is '<  maister over every person that inhabiteth the 
same, having power over the life and death of  every one  of 
them.  For although  a just  prince  will not  take the life  of 
any one of  his subjects without a cleare law:  yet the same 
lawes, whereby he taketh this, are made by himself, or his pre- 
decessors.  And so the power flowes alwayes from him~elfe.~~  2 
The king should, indeed, govern according to his law, '' For 
albeit it be true that I have at length prooved, that the king 
is above law, as both the author and giver of strength thereto ; 
yet a good king will not onely delight to rule his subjectes by 
the law, but even will conforme himself, in  his  own  actions 
thereunto,  always keeping  that ground,  that the health  of 
the commonwealth be his chiefe law." 
The king may  mitigate or suspend a general law, but  a a 
good king  although he be  above the Law, will subject  and 
frame his actions thereto, for example's sake to his subjectes," 
but he  does this  "of  his  own  free will,  but not  as subject 
thereto." 
Having thus set out his conception of the absolute authority 
of the king  as  founded  upon  divine  law, and  the  principle 
that the king  is the source of  law  and above  law, he  con- 
siders  some arguments  against  this.  James  had  evidently 
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heard  of  the theory  of  a contract between king  and people, 
and he is at pains to show that this conception had no value, 
LL For,  say  they,  there  is  a  mutual1 paction,  and  contract 
bound  up,  and  sworne  betwixt  the king  and  the  people, 
whereupon it followeth, that if  the one part of  the Contract 
or the Indent bee  broken  upon  the king's  side, the people 
are no longer bound to keep their part of  it, but are thereby 
freed of  their oath.  For (say they) a  contract betwixt  two 
parties  of  all lawe frees the one  partie if  the other breake 
unto him. 
As  to  this  contract  alledged, made at the  coronation  of 
a King, although I deny any such contract to be made then, 
especially containing such a clause irritant, as they alledge : 
yet I confesse that a King at his coronation, or at the entry 
to his kingdome, willingly promiseth to his people, to discharge 
honourably and truly the office given him by God over them. 
But presuming  that thereafter  he  breake  his  promise  unto 
them, never  so  inexcusable, the question  is,  who  should be 
judge of  this breake, giving unto them this contract were made 
to them never so sicker, according to their alleageance."  l 
We  return to Prance and may  observe the contentions of 
Pierre de Belloy in a short treatise  entitled '  Apologie  Catho- 
lique,'  published  in  1585 and directed  against  the Catholic 
League and its refusal to admit that Henry of  Navarre could 
be recognised as the legitimate heir to the French crown.  He 
admitted that there were  laws  of  the emperor  (i.e.,  of  the 
Roman  law)  which  declared  a  heretic  to  be  incapable  of 
inheritance, but these, he maintained, applied only to private 
persons and not to kingdoms or empires, for these could not 
be  taken from  their  true lords  for heresy  or for  any  other 
cause, for they are held immediately from God Himself, and 
not from men ; subjects are bound  to obey  and serve their 
princes, and cannot question their j~stice.~ 
Id. id., IT.  main  de  ceux  qui  en  sont  les  vrais 
Pierre de Belloy, ' Apolog~e  Catho-  Seigneurs,  soit pour  heresie,  ou  autre 
Ilque,'  ed. 1585 (fol. 30) : "  Or, autre  raison  quelconque,  pource  qu'ils  sont 
chose est  des Empires et Royaumes,  tenus  imm6diatement  de  la  main  de 
qui ne  peuvent  estre  armcher  de  'a  Dieu Eternel, non des hommes. . . . De 
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And  again, the people have no right to control the actions 
of  the  king,  but  may  only  lift  their  eyes  to  heaven  and 
remember that it is by the  divine will  that the sceptre has 
passed into the hands  of  him who  bears the crown, whether 
he is good or bad.  This is specially the case where the king 
comes to the throne, as in France, by legitimate  succession, 
and where, by the law of  the monarchy, the people have not 
only placed all their power in the hands of  the king, but have 
tied themselves to the succession of  the Blood Roya1.l 
A more important work, which  also sets  out  the theory of 
the absolute monarchy, was  published in 1596 ; this was the 
'  De Republica ' of  Peter Gregory of  Toulouse. 
He  cites  the Aristotelian  classification  of  the  three  good 
forms of  government-good  because they are directed to the 
wellbeing  of  the whole  ~ownunity.~  He  refuses  to  admit 
that there are strictly any mixed governments : the supreme 
power must lie either with the king, or the "  Optimates,"  or 
the pe~ple.~  He indeed  admits  the three  forms, but  pays 
no  further  attention  to  the  aristocracy  and  the  popular 
government, and assumes that the people had transferred all 
their authority to the prin~e.~ 
It is,  however,  with  the nature of  the French  monarchy 
that he is really concerned.  The king holds supremo authority, 
he  does  indeed  protect  the  people  from  oppression  by  the 
nobles, he admits plebeians to the magistracy and the public 
sorte que les sujets n'ont  quo voir sur 
les Rois, et ne sont nez  que pour  les 
oboir et servir, quols quo lours Princes 
soient, eans s'informor plus avaut de la 
justice  d'iceux." 
Id. id. (fol.  31) : "  I1  dy done que 
ce n'est  pas  au peuple  de controolcr, 
qu'avec  humilit6,  et  obeyssanco,  les 
actions et qualit66 de son Roi, mais il 
doit seulement lever  les yeux  au ciel, 
et considerer  on soy-mesme que par la 
volont6 Divine lo  scoptre est tomb6 6s 
main  et pouvoir  de  celuy  qui  porte 
la  Couronne,  soit-il  bon  ou  mauvais ; 
singulierement quand  11  y  est appell6 
par legitime succession  telle  qu'est  en 
nostre  France,  en  laquelle  par  Loy 
Monarchique  lo  peuple  n'a  pas seule- 
ment remise  touto sa puissance  en la 
main  et  pouvoir  du  Roy,  ains  qui 
plus est, s'est  li6 les mains et n'y  pout 
pourveoir  tant  que  roster&  quelque 
masse  de sang royal, solon la Loy du 
Royaume, par laquello le Roi ne moi~rt 
jamais,  pour  qu'incontinent  le  mort 
saisit  le  vif  plus  proche  masle  du 
defunct  par agnation." 
Peter  Gregory  of  Toulouse,  '  Do 
Republica,' I. 19 ;  V. 1, 2. 
Id. id., V. 1-3. 
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offices, he  governs  the country  through  various  councils  or 
courts, he gives the cit,ies municipal law:: and officers ; but 
all this is under the royal authority and can be changed by 
him at his discretion.  All, however, is to be dono justly  and 
for the welfare of  the people, or the monarchy would degenerate 
into tyranny.l 
He maintains indeed that the famous passage in 1  Samuel 
viii.  describes the abuse of  the royal authority, not its legiti- 
mate use, unless indeed  such actions should be required for 
the public  good 2;  but the absolute power  of  the prince has 
been  given  him  by  God,  he  is  God's  vicar,  and  we  must 
recognise in him the majesty and image of  god.3 
Gregory  repudiated  emphatically  the  opinion,  which  he 
attributes to Aristotle,  that the man who  rules  over  an un- 
willing people is a  tyrant, for, as he maintains,  if  this were 
true, there neither  has  been,  nor  could  be,  a  State wldch 
deserves the name of  a monarchy ; for a State which depends 
upon the will of  the people cannot be called a monarchy, but 
a  democracy ; the supreme power in such a  State resides  in 
the people and not in the prince.  The king who violates the 
1  Id. id., V. 18 : "  In Galliae Monar- 
chi8 Status nuno  talis eat  qui omnos 
rerum  publicarum  salubres  leges  con- 
tineat.  Nam  penes  unum  regem 
omnium rerum summa, verum non ut 
tyrannus moderatur  rempublicam  aut 
regnum,  sed  habet  concilia  virorum 
olectorum,  et  ita  optimatum  habot 
diversos senatus, qui quotidiana negotia 
justitiaeque  merita,  populo  distri- 
buant,  citra  appellationem  nomine 
tamen  principis, suo tamen  privilegio 
et sibi  concessa potestate.  Habet  et 
democraticas  bonas  illas  leges  prin- 
ceps  in  regno,  ut  libertas  populi 
conservetur,  a  nu110  optimatwn  op- 
primetur,  legibus  regatur  diligentor, 
ad  aequum  st bonum  redactis : non 
excludit  princeps  plebeios  a  magis- 
tratibus,  ab  administratione  reipub- 
licae,  sed  eos idoneos admittit ; con- 
cedit  civitatibus  suis decuriones, con- 
sules,  legesque  municipalea ;  quae 
omnia habcnt  rerum  pnblicarum mix- 
tionem ;  at  sub monrtrchia tamen, quia 
in  potestate  principis  est, seu  regis, 
haec  omnia  mutare, si sibi  videatur. 
Attamen  presumitur,  non  nisi  juste, 
et ad salutem populi et ejus utilitatem. 
mutare aut tollore ; alioquin et ipsius 
monarchia degeneraret in tyrannidem." 
Cf. id. id., IX. 12. 
Id.  id.,  IX.  1,  5,  and  8 ; 111. 
2,  10. 
Id.  id.,  VI.  2,  9 :  "  Neque  in 
principibus  tam  inspicore  vel  con- 
siderare  debemus  quid  ipsi  per  so  et 
tanquam  homines sunt, sed  quantum 
illis concossum et permissum a Deo sit. 
Neque  in  principibus  tam  personam 
singularem reveremur, quantum majes- 
tatem Dei et imaginem potestatemque 
consideremus  et  roveremus  ex  parte 
illius cujus  delegati  sunt,  et vica~ias 
in terra partes gerunt." 
Cf.  id.  id., 111.  1,  10 : "  Postqnam 
laws  of  nature and the laws of  God is indeed  a tyrant, but 
not the king who disregards the "  p~lit~ical  " and civil la~~fi.1 
He develops the last principle in the next part of his treatise, 
and while he admits that the prince must obey the supreme 
law of God and of  nature, he maintains that he is not bound 
by his own laws or those of  his predecessors,  except for some 
fundamental laws, such as that of  the hereditary succession, 
which  the king  cannot  violak2  The  prince  has  power  to 
make, to interpret, and to abrogate all general laws, and the 
right to issue "  privilegia,"  and thus to <'  derogate "  from the 
law ; he even has  the right to use  a  non-obstante " clause 
in such  privilegia."  3 
On the other hand, like Bodin  and mmy of  the Civilians, 
he admits  that if  the law  of  the prince  had  passed  into a 
contract, he could not annul it, for the obligation of  a contract 
belongs to the natural law, to which, as a political and rational 
being, the prince is subject.  As in the Civilians, this conception 
is brought into relation with the feudal law." 
It is also true that Gregory urges upon the prince that it 
is well to take counsel ; and he gives a short account of  the 
Councils  in  Greece  and  in  the -Carolingian  times,  and  he 
finds the traces of  these in the meetings of  the three Estates, 
which are called together by the king that he may learn from 
enim  commissa  est  potostas  a  Deo 
principi in subditis absoluta." 
Id.  id.,  XXVI.  7,  8 :  " Omuis 
jurisdictio  in  statu  monarchiae, 
gladioque  potestas,  e solo  Deo,  ut 
princeps ejus vicario monarcha pendet." 
'  Id.  id.,  VI.  18,  16 :  "  Tamen 
admonendi  sumus,  non  bene  mea 
sentcntia  Aristotelom et  eius  asseclas 
sensisse  omnes  qui  invito  populo 
praesunt, esse tyrannes reprobos : nam 
si hoc  verum  esset, nullum  esset, aut 
fuisset rognum quod monarchiae nomen 
llabuerit:  quod  enim  pendet  ex 
arbitrio populi,  illud non  regnum  nut 
monarchia,  sod democratia dici debet, 
in  qua  suprema  potostas  non  penes 
principem  sit,  sed  penes  populum ; 
neque nogandum quidem, leges naturae 
et  divinas  non  servantem  st contra 
ess  agentem,  tyrannum  facto  esse: 
at  non  ita,  si  contra  leges  politicas 
agat et civiles." 
a  Id.id.,VII. 5, 8, 17,21). 
Id. id., IX. 39. 
"d.  id.,  VII.  20,  26:  "  Quando 
etiam lex et constitutio principis transit 
in  contracturn revocare non  potest in 
preeiudicium  eorum  quibus  ius  in 
eadem  quaesitum  eat. . . . 26.  Quia 
obligatio  est  de  iure  natumlis,  cui 
etiam  princeps  subicitur . . . et  licet 
princeps sit solutus legibus, non tamen 
dictamiue  rationis  naturalis  st  loge 
naturae,  quia  Ot  princeps  est  animal 
politicum et  rationis psrticeps.  . . . 36. 
Contractus servari debent  proculdubio 
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them the grievances of  the people,  and  sometimes that he 
might inform them of  the necessity of going to war, or of  other 
public  affairs, for  which  the assistance  of  the subjects  was 
required.  He  mentions  three  causes  for  which  especially 
they might be called : first, the appointment of  a regent, in 
the  case  of  a  minority,  or when  the king  was  insane, or  a 
prisoner, and he mentions as examples the captivity of  King 
John,  the  insanity  of  Charles  VI.,  and  the  minority  of 
Charles VIII.  Second, to deal with conspiracies, the reform 
of  the  Commonwealth, or  the  oppression of  the  people  by 
the  nobles.  Third,  when  it  was  necessary  to impose new 
"  tributes " and aids upon the people, to lay before them the 
urgent  affairs  of  the  kingdom  and  the  king,  which  justly 
required  the help  of  the subjects.l 
Gregory was, however, careful to add that the people must 
not imagine that this was done by the kings because the King 
of  France  was  dependent  on  these  assemblies, for  he  could 
impose  and  exact taxes  without their  consent.  It must be 
understood  that the King of  France was  not  dependent  on 
the assemblies, as in Poland and elsewhere, but the assemblies 
were  dependent  upon  the king, who summoned them  at his 
pleasure,  for  the  kingdom  was  an  hereditary  monarchy, 
otherwise  the  kingdom  would  not  be  a  monarchy  but  a 
democra~y.~ 
Finally,  he  also  discusses  the  question  of  the  deposition 
of  the prince.  He admits that the depositions of  the Emperor 
Henry  IV.  by  Pope  Gregory VII.,  and of  Frederick 11.  by 
Innocent IT., were  justifiable ; and that even the deposition 
of  the Emperor  Wenceslas  by  the  electors may  have  been 
lawful,  as  the  empire  was  elective ; but  he  denies  that 
hereditary  monarchs  could  be  depo~ed.~  The  monarch  is 
dependent  on  God  only ; it is to God  only that he will give 
account for the souls of  his subjects.  All his jurisdiction and 
1  Td.  id., XXIV. 1-3, 4 and 5.  princeps  tributa  imponere et exigere : 
2  Id.  id.,  XXIV.  63 :  "  Quae  sed ut paterne subditos moneat, causam 
proferuntur a rege non ut ideo populus  neoessariam  esse  ex  qua  coguntur 
arbitretur  ex  eius  nutu  monarchism  propter  utilitatem  publicam,  ab illis 
regiamque potestatem  pendere.  Nam  subsidia petere." 
ot sine consensu populi potest iure suo  Id. id., XXVI. 4, 11. 
the power  of  the sword in the monarchy is from God  only ; 
his subjects have no  authority to  deal with  him  judicia1ly.l 
In an earlier passage he had indeed asserted that while  the 
authority  of  the  prince  was  absolute,  his  function  was  to 
maintain  justice  and  to be  the  defender  and  father  of  his 
subjects,  and  that, if  he did not fulfil the function,  he was 
a tyrant  ; but a litt'le further on he condemns in the strongest 
language  those  who  dared  to  conspire  against  an  unjust 
prin~e.~ 
The  most  important defender in this  period, after  Bodjn, 
of  the absolute  authority of  the king  was  William  Barclay, 
a Scotsman indeed by birth and early education at Aberdeen 
University,  but  he  studied  law  at Bourges  and  became  a 
Professor of  Civil Law, first at Pont-A-Mousson and later at 
Angcrs.4  His  most  important work, '  De  Regno  et  Regali 
Potestate,'  was  published  in  1600, and  while  it is  in  large 
measure  a  reply  to George Buchanan, it surveys  the whole 
question of  the source and nature of  the royal authority. 
If  we  make  the attempt to set out Barclay's  opinions in 
some reasoned order, we  may begin by observing that he dis- 
cusses the conception set out by Buchaiian (and Hooker, as wo 
may remember) that man had first created kings to remedy the 
disorders incident  to life without a controlling authority, and 
then  made  laws for  the purpose of  restraining the arbitrary 
actions of  tho king.6  He maintains that laws  are made not 
to bind the king, but to take the placo of  his personal authority 
when he was ab~ent.~  He t$hinks  indeed that princes should 
1 Id. id., XXVI. 6, 24 : "  Monarcha 
solum a Deo pendit, et illi soli ips8 pro 
animabns  subditorum  redditurus  ost 
rationem." 
Id. ~d.,  XXVI.  7, 9 : "  Omnis iuris- 
dictio  in  statn  moriarclliae,  gladliquo 
potestas  a  solo  Deo, et princopr  elus 
vicario monarcha pendet : ideo subdl11 
qui  carent  poteetate,  iuridico  in 
eum animadvertere non  possunt." 
Id. id., IX. 12. 
3  Id.  id.,  X.  2,  8 :  "  Non  dico 
por:o  bone  agere  subd~tos, qui  ob 
iniustitiam  principis,  manus  audaces, 
temerarias inferant, et factiones archi- 
tectentur, aut coniurationes hac occas. 
sione vel alia etian graviori in legitimum 
suum  principom  moliantur :  nam 
hoc  detester, abominer,  et  maiestatis 
poena atrocioro dignum existimo." 
'  Cf.  Allen,  '  Polltical  Thought  in 
the  Sixteenth  Century,'  p.  386  ff. 
(Cf. D.  N.  B.) 
J.  Barrlay, '  De Regno,' I. (p. 24). 
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take advice, a,ud speaks of  the evil effects of neglecting this,] 
but he is  also clear  that, finally, it is  the king who  decides 
what is to be  law.2  He repudiates  indignantly Buchanan's 
assertion  that  the  Scottish  constitution  required  that  laws 
should be made with the consent of  the "  Proceres " and the 
approval of  the people13  and asserts  dogmatically that, both 
in Scotland and in Praace, the king made laws without the 
consent of such a body as the "  Senate.?'4  This is important, 
but more  important is  his  emphatic statement that no  one 
is a king who is bound by the laws.5 
Barclay's  main principles will become clearer if  we examine 
his  conception  of  the  source  and  character  of  the  royal 
authority. 
EIe  n~aintains  that the royal  authority is  Divine.  He is 
careful indeed to explain that this does not necessarily mean 
that the man  whom  God  destined for the government  was 
king  before the consent  of  the people  was  given.  Saul, he 
says, was  chosen by  God, but was  made king  ('  populi  suf- 
fragio,"  and it was  the  same with  Da~id.~  What  Barclay 
means  is  that when  the king has  been,  by the  Divine  per- 
mission,  lawfully  constituted  by  men,  God  gives  him  an 
authority which is superior  to that of  the whole  peo~)le,  for, 
when  it is  said  that  God  has  established  the  king,  it  is 
meant  that God  has confirmed his authority in such a sense 
that it cannot be violated or controlled by the people.' 
This, he  maintains,  is  true also  of  the king  who  succeeds 
by hereditary right,  unless  the lawful heir  is  by nature in- 
capable, or there is some grave doubt about the right order 
1  [<I.  id., I. (p. 41). 
Id. id., I. (pp. 44-  Li). 
Id. id., I. (p. 43). 
Id. id., 11. (p. 98). 
Id. id., 11.  61. 
Id. id., 11.  2 (p. 111). 
'  Id.  id., 111.  2  (p.  112) : " Quod 
igitur positum est, regnum  a Deo ease 
. . . id  eo  pertinet,  ut  intelligamus 
Deum  Regibus,  seu  instinctu,  sou 
prrmisso divino ab hominibus legitime 
constitutis,  cam  outhoritatir  praoro- 
gativum  impertiri, quae  onmis  populi 
potestatem  superot.  . . . (p.  113). 
Dicitur etiam constituore Regem Deus, 
quod potentiam dominationii;, instituto 
Regi delatam  ita confirmat, ut infringi 
a  populo  aut infirmari  amplius nulla 
ratione  possit.  Neque  onim  ut Reges 
creare,  ita et creatos abdicare, aut in 
ordinem  cogere,  populorum  arbitrio 
commissum  est,  idque  infra  pluribun 
demonstrabitur." 
of  the succession ; and he referrs  to the succession in Scotland 
in t,he time of Robert Bruce and the dispute about the succes- 
sion  in  France  between  Philip  of  Valois  and  Edward  III., 
which  was  determined  by  the  "Ordinum  et  Optimatum 
conventus." 
The authority of  the king is  thus derived from  God, and 
Barclay illustrates this by a reference to Samnuo17s description 
of the "  Jura Regis " (1 Samuel viii.).  Such royal conduct as 
Samuel describes, Barclay says, would be unjust, but cannot 
be judged by men.2  Kings  and princes who acknowledge no 
superior are reserved  to the judgment  of  God ; others must 
answer  to the king  for  their  actions,  but the king  only  to 
God.  Those, therefore, who claim a~thorit~y  to judge the king, 
who  is the vicar of  God, are guilty of  a great offence against 
 GO^.^ 
It is interesting to observe that Barclay finds himself  com- 
pelled  to repudiate  or  explain  away  St  Tliomas  Aquinas. 
Boucher had cited St Thomas (' De Reginline Principum,' I. 6) 
as saying that if the people had the right to appoint the king, 
it was  also within their right to depose him if  he became  a 
tyranL4  Barclay  endeavours to meet  this  by  suggesting  a 
doubt whether the '  De Regiinine Principum ' was a genuine 
work  of  St Thomas,  and then  argues  that, even  if  it were 
genuine, the principle only applied when the king was elective.5 
Barclay  thus maintains  that the  authority of  the king is 
in such a sense Divine that revolt against him is revolt against 
God. 
We turn frorti liis thcolo,rrical arguments for the contention 
Trl. id., 111. 2 (p. 120). 
Id. id., 111.  6 (p. 141). 
'  Id. id., 111.  6  (p.  142) : "  Nempe 
ut  intelligamus,  Regibus  tantum  et 
Rlonarchis sive Principibus, qui alienam 
dominationem non  agnoscunt,  id  osse 
tributum,  ut  Dei  solius  iudicio 
reserventur :  caeteri omnes humanurn 
subeant,, quia homines super se habent. 
Itaque  Magistratuum,  Magnatum  et 
Principum  populi  inferiorurn,  Rex 
sou  Princeps  summus;  Regis  vero, 
Dominus ipse opera interrogabit.  Hic 
soli  Dco,  illi  Deo  et liomini  poenas 
meritas, debitasque persolvero tenentur. 
Et  vero populus magnam Dci iniuriam 
facit,  qui  de  Rege  vicario  ipsius,  et 
summo secundum  eum intor  homines 
constituto,  iudictlndi  sibi  potestatem 
arroget." 
Cf.  this  vol., p. 401 ; and  vol.  v. 
pp. 95-97. 
Barclay,  '  De  Regno,'  VI.  20 
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that the prince had an absolute authority to the legal.  He 
maintains that this was the judgment  of  such eminent Jurists 
as the Speculator (i.e., Durandus the elder), Bartolus, Baldus, 
Paulus  de  Castro,  Ludovicus  Romanus,  Alexander,  Jason, 
Albericus, and others.  He sums  up  their  opinion  as  being 
that the Pope and the prince, when acting "  ex certa ~cientia,~' 
can do anything "  supra ius, contra ius, et extra ius," for the 
prince has "  plenitudo potestatis," and when he wills anything 
ex  certa scientia,"  no  one  can  question  his  authority.  It 
is sacrilegious to dispute  about  the authority of  the prince. 
The  prince  can  establish  laws by his  sole  authority, though 
it is "  humanum " that he should consult tho "  Proceres 7' ;  the 
prince  can  annul all "positive  77 laws, for he is  not  subject 
to thcm, but they to him, for God has subjected all laws to 
him.  The  com&ds  of  the prince have  the force of  laws, 
the prince is in truth ('  legibus SO~U~US.~~  1 
It  should  be  observed  that with  regard  to this last point 
Barclay  recognised  that  there  was  an interpretation  very 
different from his own ; that was the interpretation of  Cujas, 
who, as we have seen, had maintained that the words "  legibus 
solutus "  only applied to certain laws.  Barclay mentions the 
opinion, but only to repudiate it. 
Id. id., 111. 14 (p.  193) : "  Ac  ne 
festinantem  demoremur, dum singulos 
ot  ordine reconseamus, quae  sit Juris 
Doctorum  hae  in parte  sententia,  ex 
Speculatore,  Bartolo,  Baldo,  Paulo 
Castrensi,  Ludovico  Romano,  Alex- 
andro, Feline, Alberico, aliisque magni 
no mini^ intorprotibus facile discet. 
Papam scihcet et Principem ex certs 
scientia, supra ius, contra ius ot extra 
ius omnia posse.  Atque in Principem 
quidom  esse  plenitudinem  potestatis, 
et  postquam  aliqua,  vult  ex  certa 
scientia, neminom  posse  ei dicere, cur 
ita facis ;  et  solum Principom constituero 
legom universalem, populum vero legem 
part~cularem. Et quod  cum Princops 
sit causa  causarum, non  eat  de  eius 
potestate  inquirendum,  cum  prlmae 
causae nulla sit causa : quoniam  illud 
quod primum est, aliud ante so hnbere 
non  potest.  Et esse crimon  sacrilegii 
instar disputare de potestate Principis. 
Et  Principem  solum  posse  condere 
statuta,  licet  humanum  sit,  quod 
consilio Procerum utatur, denique Prin- 
cipem posse tollere leges positivas, quia 
illis  non  aubicitur,  sed  illse  dbi.  Et 
Deum  Principi  logos  nubiecisse,  et 
nullam  legem  eius  colsitudini  imponi 
posse.  Et licet  de  iure  aliquid  non 
valeat,  si  tamen  Princeps  de  facto 
mandat  servari,  proinde  est, ac  si de 
iure valeat quo ad subditos.  Et  solum 
Principom soli Deo habere  de peccato 
reddoro rationem,  et soli coelo debere 
innocentiae rationem.  Et temerarium 
esse  velle  maiostatem  regiam  ullis 
terminis  limitare.  Et Principem  re 
Vera  esse solutum legibus." 
Id.  id.,  TTI. 15.  Cf.  this  volume, 
pp.  315.318. 
The  nature  of  Barclay's  conception  of  the  absolute  alld 
Divine autllority of  the prince seems then to be clearly as well 
as  emphat(ica1ly expressed ;  but  we  must  observe  that he 
makes two  exceptions to his principle  of  non-resistance  and 
implicit  obedience.  If  the prince  behaves  with  intolerable 
cruelty and tyranny, not  to private  individuals  but  to  the 
whole  commonwealth  of  which  he  is the head, or  to some 
important  part  of  it,  the  people  has  the  right  to  resist, 
while  it must  not  withdraw  its  proper  reverence,  or  take 
vengeance  for  the  wrongs  d0ne.l  This  is  an  important 
concession ; but in another place  Barclay goes  still  further. 
l-Ie  repudiates  indeed  Boucher's contention that any private 
person  may  punish  the  tyrant  when  the  public  authority 
had  deprived  him  of  his  kingdom ;  but  he  admits  that 
the  community  may  slay  the  prince  who  endeavours  to 
destroy it, not indeed because thc community is superior to 
the prince,  but because, if  he endeavours to overthrow the 
commonwealth and kingdom, he  has  deprived  himself  of  all 
lordship, and has in law and in fact ceased  to be  king.2  In 
another place  he gives  as examples of  the conditions under 
which a country may takc arms against the king, the conduct 
of  Nero, and of John Baliol, who promised to acknowledge the 
overlordship of  Edward I. in S~otland.~ 
It  is  also  very  important  to observe  that  while  Barclay 
sets out the principles of  the absolute authority of  the prince 
1 Id.  id.,  111.  8  (p.  159) : "  Qua  id,  si  de  illo  Principi  intelligatur 
propter  si  Rex,  non  in  singulares  qui  hostili  animo,  id  est  animo  per- 
tantum  porsonas  aliquod  privatum  dendi  Rempublicam agat, vcrissimum 
odium  exccrcoat,  sed  corpus  etiam  quidem est ; sed non ea rationc  quam 
Reipublicae  cuius  ipse  caput  ost, id  tu proponis,  quia  SciliC~t  Rospublica, 
est,  totum  populum  vel  insignern  sivo  quod  tu  vis,  Populus  Principi 
aliquam  eius  partem,  immani  et  supcrior, sit, publicaqi~c  penes populum 
intoleranda  saevitia  sou  tyrannica  di-  potostas antl~or~tasquo  resideat : hanc 
rexit :  populo  quidem  hoc  casu  enim falsam et mendaccm esse, multis 
resistendi iniuriae illatse, non reoedendi  iam modis, mnltisquo in locis perspicue 
a  debita reverentia  propter  acceptam  ostendimus,  sod  ea  solum  ratione, 
iniuriam,  praoscntem  dcniquo  im-  quod  qui  perdendae  Reipublicae,  et 
pet-  propulsandi,  non  vim  praoteri-  Regni penitus evr~rlendi  animurn gerit ; 
tan1 ulc~scendi  ius habet."  is semet Dominittn ct Principizlu omni 
2  Id. id.,  VI.  22  (p.  503) : "  Quod  exuit, atquo ips0 iurc, sivc ipso fact", 
itaque scribo, ltcnlpnblicam  posse eum  R-x esse desinit." 
occidere, qui in ipsam  l~ost~litor  agat,  Id. id., 111.  16 (p. 211). 
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'  in  general  terms,  though  with  special  reference  to  France 
and Scotland, he was  aware that these  were not recognised 
in  all  countries,  and  he  seems  to  be  perplexed  about  the 
German Empire and Po1and.l 
That  Barclay's  judgment  with  regard  to  the  absolutt 
authority of  the prince continued to be held by him is evident 
from  another  treatise,  published  in  1609, a  year  after  his 
death.  This  was  the work  entitled  'De  Potestate  Papae,' 
which was concerned mainly  with the refutation of  the con- 
tention  of  those  Roman  Catholic  writers  who  maintained 
that  the  Pope  could,  for  sufficient  reasons,  depose  kings. 
We are not here concerned with this question, but it is worth 
while to observe that Barclay repeated his judgment that the 
king  was  subject  to  God  only,  to no  human  or  temporal 
punishment, and that, as the Jurists had said, he was ''  legibus 
sol~tus.~~  He admits indeed that the form of  government 
in  any  commonwealth was  a  matter  to  be  determined  by 
human law, and even the decision who was to be prince ; but 
when  this  had  once  been  settled,  obedience  to him,  in  all 
things not  contrary to the commands of  God, was  required 
by natural and Divine ~rdinance.~ 
Finally, there  were  two writers  in  England, by  profession 
Civilians and Professors of  Roman Law, whose work we might 
have discussed in  Part 111.  of  this  volume ; but  although 
they  were  Civilians,  their  work  was  primarily  related  to 
constitutional  conditions  in  England.  The  first  of  these, 
1 Id. id., IV. 13. 
2  Id.,  'Do  I'otestate  Papae,'  XII. 
(p.  94) :  "  Nam  inprimis  quid  ei 
magis  contrarium,  quam  quod  tota 
antiquitas  Christiana  somper  censuit, 
Reges  solo  Deo  minoros  esse,  solum 
Deum  iudicem  habere,  nullis  legibus 
hominum  subiici,  nullisque  poonis 
temporaliter plecti  vel coerceri posse, 
ac proinde quod iuris doctores dixerunt, 
'  Princeps  legibus solutus est."'  Cf. 
id. id., XXXT. (p. 249). 
Id. id., XXVII.  (p. 211) : "  Nam 
licet  de iuro  humano  sit, ut hac  aut 
illa  reipublicae  forma  utamur,  vol 
hunc aut alium  Principcm haboamun : 
tamen  ut eum quom semel acccpimus 
revereamus, oique in omnibus quae Doi 
mandatis  non  repugnant,  submisso 
pareamus,  non  humanae  solum,  secl 
naturalis et divinae ordinationis ; idquc 
neminem  arbitror  negaturum,  '  qui 
potestati  resistit,  Dei  ordinationi  rc- 
sistit.'  Inde fit, ut quod initio arbitrii 
et  vol~mtatis  erat, id, post  datam  de 
subiectione  fidem,  statim  in  obsoquii 
necessitate  convertatur." 
Albericus Gentilis, is justly  famous for  his work  on  the Law 
of  War, in which he, at least  in  some  measure, anticipated 
the great work  of  Grotius.  He had  been  Professor of  Civil 
Law in Perugia, but, adopting the Reformed opinions, he fled 
from Italy and finally found a  refuge in  England, and was 
made  Professor  of  Civil  Law  in  0xford.l  In  1605  he 
published  a  short  work,  '  R$cgales Disputationes  Tres,'  in 
which  he  discussed  the  source and nature of  the authority 
of  the king, with special reference to England. 
Supreme princes, Albericus says in the first  of  these  'Dis- 
putationes,'  have no superior, but are above all mon ; they 
are absolutely supreme, for they recognise no  authority over 
them except God, neither man nor law.  Tho prince is "  legibus 
sol~tus,'~  and '' quodcunque placet principi " is law.  This is 
not a barbarous rule, but that of  the Roman  Law, the most 
excellent of  all the system  of  law of  me,n.2  Again, a little 
later, the prince is God on earth, and his authority is greater 
than that which formerly belonged to the father over his son, 
or to the master over his slave  ; and  in  another  place he 
even  seems  to suggest that the authority of  the law of  the 
prince  is  simply  that of  his  will,  without  any reference  to 
Albericus admits indeed that this was not true of  all forms 
l For a careful account of  Albericus, 
cf. Professor T. E.  Holland's edition of 
his worlr, '  De Jure Belli,' 1878. 
Albericus  Gentilis,  '  Regales  Dis- 
putationes  Tres ' (ed. London,  1606). 
' Disputatio Prima ' (p. 8) : "  Supremi 
sunt  (principes)  quibus  nullus  est 
superior,  sed  ipse  supra  omnes. . . . 
Atque  in  his  haesilaro  non  oportet. 
Illio  haesitetur,  dum  quaeritur,  isti 
supremi quales sunt.  In qua quaestione 
bonam profecto operam, et bene longam 
navavit Bodinus. 
Ille  est  hinc  absolute  supremus, 
qui nihil supra se, nisi Dcum agnoscit : 
nec  cuiquam  reddere  rationem,  nisi 
Deo habet. . .  . Et hoc igitur supremi- 
tatis  est  ut  nihil  supra  se  umquam 
cernat  principatum,  neque  hominem, 
neque  legem.  Ergo  et absolute haec 
potestas ost, et absque limitibus.  'Prin- 
ceps  legibus  solutus est,'  erit  lex,  et 
eadem, quod lex est quodcumque placet 
principi.  Et  haec lex non barbara, sed 
Romana est : id eat praestantissima  in 
legibus hominum." 
Id. id.  id. (p. 11) : "Princeps est 
Dcus in terri~,  ciu~  potestas maior eat, 
quam  quae olim  fuit  patris  in filium, 
domini in sorvum." 
Id. id. id. (p. 24) : " '  Quod  prin- 
cipi  placuit ' inquit  lex.  Sufficit  pro 
ratione  voluntas  inquit  Angelus.  Et 
verba  illa  (inquit  Bodinus)  rescrip- 
torum, placitorum,  '  Ita nobis placet,' 
apponuntur ita, ut ostendat principis a 
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of  monarchy.  There  were  some  in  wl~ich  authority  rested 
upon  certain  agreemcnts,  and the subjects  had  reserved  to 
themselves their own Ia~t-s  and privileges ; he refers to Alciatus, 
and cites as examples of such conditions the imperial cities of 
Germany, some of  the papal states in Italy, the provinces of 
'' Lower  Germany " (meaning, no  doubt, the Netherlands), 
which had for  so many  years  been  defending their liberties, 
and the long  and successful rcsistance  of  the Swiss  to the 
Austria~~s." 
Albericus,  however,  contends  that  the English  monarchy 
had not this character, but that in England the king had an 
absolute authority  subject to no control by the public  law. 
He refers to the important distinction made by Baldus between 
the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary powers  of  the  prince, 
and he  identifies  the latter  with  that which  was  meant  in 
England by the Prerogative.  The first is bound by the laws ; 
the second is so absolute that the prince  could take away a 
man's  lawful right without any cause.2 
Id. id  ~d.  (p  14). "  General~tor 
voro  ad  potcsl~,tom hnnc  prlnclplr, 
quam absolutam contendlmus,  adden- 
dum ost, hoc  ~ta  a nob~s  propom,  hls 
qiu  s~mpllclter et  plonarle  subdltl 
sunt ;  non  auteln  qul  vemssent  In 
dedlt~onem  cert~s  fooderlbus,  ut  qnla 
reservassent slb~  suas leges et pnvllcg~a. 
Nam  1st1  quantum  ad  plon~tud~nem 
potostatls, non  d~cuntur  subdltl, quod 
post al~os  declarat Alc~atns. 
Et  de  111s  non  bubdltls  trad~t 
exemplum  m  clvltat~buq Germamae 
~mperlallbus,  st  m parte malolo pontl- 
firlao  Ital~cae  d~tlonls  Nos  notaro 
exemplum  m  prov~nclls Germanlao 
lnfer~orls  l~benter  solemus,  quao  lam 
annos plus~mos  pugnant  p~o  llb~rt~te 
contra  lllam  plen~tud~nem  potestat~s. 
Pro  qua  l~bertato adversus  eandom 
dommatlonem,  et  advolsus  oandom 
domum Austnamm pugnarunt Helvetll 
dlu ac fe11~1ter  " 
Cf  for  Alclatus,  p  290  of  th~s 
volume 
?  Id  ~d.  ~d  (p.  10) :  "  In  alns 
reg~bus est  princeps  nostor  quom 
loglbus  solutun~  audlrnui  Quad  out 
potestatls solutae,  vol  (ut  loqmmur) 
absolutae.  Atquo  absoluta  potostas 
est  plenltudo  potestatls  Est arbitrll 
plen~tudo, nu111  vel  necessitate,  vel 
Inrls  public1  reguIls  sub~eota  Quad 
ox  Baldo  acceptum  d~cunt  aln.  E5t 
poiestas  extraord~narla  ot 11bore.  Est 
illa quam In Angha iilgn~ficanius  nomlno 
(ut ego quldem exlstlmo) reglae Prel o- 
gatlvae. 
Atque  SIC  ~nierpretes lurls  com- 
mumtor  s~r~bunt,  csso  In  prlnc~pe 
potostatem  duphcem,  ordmarlani  ad- 
strlctam  lrglbu,,  et  alteram  extra- 
o~dlnar~am,  lcg~bus  abbolutanl  Atque 
absolntain  defimunt,  so~undnm  quam 
potest  llle  tolloro   us  al~enum,  etlam 
magnum, et~am  sme causa " 
Cf  id. ld. ld. (p 25). 
Cf. for the concephon of  an extra- 
ordmary as well a? an ordln~ry  author- 
~ty  m the prmce, tho oplnlon of  Baldun, 
p. 20 of th~s  volume. 
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It is true that in another place he seems to admit that he 
might concede that the prince  could not, cvcn in his "  pleni- 
tudo potestatis,"  take away his subjects' property without just 
cause ; but he  seems  to mean that this was not of much im- 
portance, for the absolute prince himself determines what is a 
just  cause.l 
He  was  indeed  aware  that  it had  been  argued  that  no 
people could be found so senseless as to confer such an absolute 
authority upon the prince ; but this contention was, he says, 
false, and he appeals to Aristotle, and also to Bodin, who had 
shown that  such  absolute kingdoms  existed even  to-day in 
Asia, Africa, and Europe, and he refers to that learned prince 
(meaning  presumably  James I.) who  had  maintained  that 
the Hebrew monarchy had been of  this kind.2 
Albericus  admits,  however, like  Bodin  and  the Civilians, 
that all princes were subject to the Divine Law, the Law of 
Nature, and the Law of  Nations, and, like Bodin and many 
Civilians, that he was bound by his  contract^.^ 
In  the third of  these '  Regales Disputationes,' 'i De Vi Civium 
in Regem sempcr iniusta,"  he does not add much of  import- 
ance ; he condemns all violence offered to the prince by his 
subjects ; but he again makes the important reservation that 
1 Id ~d ~d.  (p.  27) : "  Et~am  lllud 
dare possum alns et doctori mi Thob~o 
Non~o,  P~~nclpem  nec  de plen~tudme 
potestat~s  posse  prlvare subdltos dom- 
lnlo  rerum  suarum, slne lusta  causa, 
qulquld  do  alils  doctor~bus antoa 
posu~  Sed SIC  dwimus, de hac tamon 
causarum  institla  censere,  ~d  esso 
arb~trn  Prlnclpls  absolut~. In quo slt 
dlfforent~a cum  Prlncipe   alter^,  cul 
arb~tn~  non  est,  ~ud~care  de  causls, 
at  ex legibus lud~care  habet." 
Id.  ~d.  ~d (p.  18) :  "  Profertur 
tert~um  (argumentum), quod  non  re- 
per~atur  usquam populum adeo amens, 
qul  tantam  umquam  detulerit  prm- 
c~pi  potostatem.  Imo populus posuerlt 
al~quas  prlnc~pllus  leges, quem ultra 01s 
progredi non hceret.  Quad it~dem  est 
a~,l~rn~nium  falsum, ut contra osten- 
sum  do  Ar~stotele eat.  CUI  addo 
Bodlnum  pent~ss~mum,  qu~  hod~eque 
domtnatus  m  Asla,  Afrlca,  Europa 
ostendlt,  slcut  dommorum  In  sorvos. 
Doctus  Prlnceps  contend~t,  et  talem 
fu~sse regem  Ebraeorum,  do  quo 
andlt  sc~hcet ~lla, '  H~c  09t  ratlo 
~pm  regls,  qm  regnab~t  supra  vos. 
Flhos  vestros  acc~p~et,  &c ,' in prlmo 
Samuehs." 
8  Id.  ~d.  ld.  (p  17) .  "  Prmceps, 
lnquit  Baldus,  supra  Ins,  sclllret 
c~v~le,  mfra  ius,  scll~cet  naturale  et 
gentmm.  Non  supra dlvmum ]us, ut 
Idem hcnblt h~c,  et Bartolus et Angelus. 
Llgatu~  P~lnceps  ct lege contractus, 
ut hlc ldcm ot Jason " 
(p. 30)  "  Tcrt~us  casus In actu, qu~ 
fit rnter  prmclpcm  et pnvatum, ut In 
contractu, ut Prmceps solutus non  est 
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this does not apply to the cases when the prince was subject to 
a judge or a guardian, as was alleged to be the case in France 
and  the  Netherlands.'  It  is worth  noticing  that Albericus 
was  aware of  the arguments which had been  drawn from the 
feudal laws in favour of the right to resistance, but he repudi- 
ated this on  the ground that the nature of  feudal authoritv 
--. 
was wholly different from that of  a king : it was of  the nature 
of  a ~ontract.~ 
The authority of  the prince is greater than that even of  a 
father : and it belongs to the Divine law, the natural law  of 
nations, and was not established by men alone.3 
Albericus does  not add much to the general theory of  the 
absolute monarchy and its Divine authority, but he is of  some 
interest as asserting that whatever might be the case in other 
countries, the English monarchy possessed in its Prerogative 
an extraordinary  authority subject to no laws  or limitations 
except those of  the Divine and natural law, and of  contract. 
The other work of  this same time is that of  James Oowell, 
Professor  of  Civil  Law  in  Cambridge, '  The  Interpreter,' 
published in 1607. 
He  had  indeed  in  an  earlier  work, '  Institutiones  Juris 
Anglicani,'  published in 1605, set out  constitutional concep- 
tions similar to those of  St Germans and Sir Thomas Smith. 
He distinguished in  this  work  two  elements in the laws of 
Id.  id.,  III., "  De  Vi  Civium  in  ita  et subditus possit  obsistere simili 
Regem "  (p.  99) :  "  Vim  omnem  domino suo.  Hoc enim  argumentum 
civium  iniustum  semper in Principem  tanto  est  infirmius,  quanto ius  feudi 
esse  defendimus (this does not  apply  ligat  vasallum  minus.  Feudum  non 
to  a  prince  like  the Doge of  Venice,  dat  domino  imperium  in  vasaellum, 
who  should rather  be  called  a magis-  est enim quidam  contractus, quo quis 
trate).  Sed  neque  de  illo  Principe  alteri  obligatur,  non  autem irnperium 
loquimur,  qui iudicem aliquem habet,  conceditur . . . Alia  subditorum,  alia 
aut  custodem.  Quemadmodum  sub  vassalorum iura." 
custode  faciunt quidam  Regem  Calli-  Id. id. id. (p. 101) : "  Cui  respon- 
arum,  et  plurimi  Belgae  Principem  demus  ad  enunciatum,  quod  imo 
suum."  Principi  amplius  debemus  quam 
Id.  id.  id.  (p.  111) : "  Sexturn  patri.  . . . Est  iuris  divini  potcstas 
(argument in  defence  of  the  right  of  Principis:  non  a  solis  hominibus 
resistance) . . . quad sicut pote~t  feu-  constituta.  Est  iclris  naturalis  gen- 
datarius  vi  obsistere violento domino,  tiurn." 
imo etiam  proditori  obsistere  potest : 
England, the '  Consue,tudines  Veteres '  and the '  Statuts ' ; the 
first are approved  LL cominuni sponsione," and by the oath of 
the king ;  while  the second  were sanctioned by the common 
counsel of  the kingdom.  They do not arise from the will of 
the king  alone,  but  are  established  by  the consent  of  the 
whole kingdom called  together for the purpose by  the king ; 
but the king's approval is also necessary.1  The king is indeed 
superior to the laws in this respect, that he can grant "  privi- 
legia "  to  individuals,  or  municipal  bodies,  or  societies 
(collegiis), but only  so  far as they  do  not injure  any  third 
person2 
Two years later, however, in 1607, Cavel!  set out in '  The 
Interpreter ' political  principles which  certainly  seem  to be 
very  different.  This  work  is  in  form  a  dictionary  of  legal 
terms in alphabetical order ; and we  may conveniently begin 
by noticing the article on the king.  "  Thirdly,'1 he says, "  the 
king is above law by his absolute power (Bracton, lib. pri. 8) ; 
and though for the better and equal1 course of  making laws, 
he does admitte the 3 Estates, that is, IAO~~S  Spirituall, Ilords 
Temporall, and the Commons into counsell, yet this, in divers 
learned men's  opinions is not  of  constrainte, but of  his  own 
benignitie,  or by reason  of  his  promise made  upon  oath at 
the time of  his coronation.  For otherwise were he a subject, 
after  a  sort,  and  subordinate,  which  may  not  be  thought 
without breach of  duty and loyalty.  For then must we  deny 
him to be above the law, and so have no power of  dispensing 
with  any  positive  law,  or  of  granting  especial1 priviledges 
and charters unto any, which is his onely and clear right, as 
James  Cowell, 'Institutiones Juris  versi  regni  consensu  per  Regem  ad 
Anglicani ' (ed.  Cambridge,  1605), I.  hoc convocati stabiliuntur.  Sic tnmen 
2, 3 : "  Consuetudines nimirum veteres,  ut  Regis  approbatio  necessario  re- 
tam communi  populi sponsione quam  quiratur." 
Regis  sacramento  cornprobatas,  et  I. 2,s  : "  Jus civile Anglorum potest 
statuta,  quae  ad  dictorum  consuetu-  eorum  consensu mutari, quorum  con- 
dinem  vel  supplcmentum  vel  etiam  silio est promulgatum." 
emendationem, communi regni consilio  a  Id. id., I. 2,  6 : "In hoc  tamen 
sanciuntur."  Rex  Anglorum  legibus  est  superior, 
I.  2, 4  : "  Jus  scripturn  apud  nos,  quod  privilegia  pro  arbitrio  sno, 
saltem  pod  in  usu  est,  continent  dummodo tertio non iniuriosa, pcrsonis 
statuta.  Illa  autem  non  a sola prin-  singulis,  vel  etiam  municipiis  nut 
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Sir Thomas Smith well expresseth (lib. 2. cap. 3, '  De Repub. 
Anglorum '), and Bracton (lib. 2. cap. 16, 3), and Britten (cap. 
39). . . . And though, at  his coronation he take an oath not to 
alter the lawes of  the land : yet, the oath notwithstanding, he 
may alter or suspend any particular law that seenieth hurtful1 
to the public estate (Blackwood, 'Apologia Regum,' 11)" 
There are clearly two conceptions expressed in the passage. 
First, the King of  England does normally consult Parliament 
in  making  laws, but Cowell will not  say that this  is  neces- 
sary ; and second, that there is in the king an absolute power, 
which  is  above law ; but Cowell may not  here  mean  much 
more than the power of  dispensing with the law or of  granting 
'' privileges "  in special cases. 
We go on to the article on ''  Parliament."  "  In England we 
use it for the assembly of  the king and the three Estates of  the 
realm,  videlicet,  the  Lords  Spirituall, the  Lords  Temporall, 
and  Commons,  for  the  debating  of  matters  touching  the 
commonwealth, and especially the making and correcting of 
laws.  Which  assemblg or  court  is  of  all  other  the highest 
and of  greatest  authority, as you  may recall in  Sir Thomas 
Smith, '  De  Rep.  Ang.,'  2. 1, 2,  &c.  . . .  And  of  these two 
one must be true, that either the king is above the Parliament, 
that is the positive laws of the kingdom, or else that he is not 
an absolute king (Arist., lib. 3, Politic, cap. 11). And, though 
it be  a  merciful1  policie,  and  also  a  politique  mercie  (not 
alterable without great  perill) to make  laws by  the consent 
of  the whole Realme, because so no one part shall have cause 
to complaine of  a partialitie : yet simply to bind  the prince 
to or by those laws were repugnant to the nature of  an absolute 
mouarchy.  See  Bracton, lib.  5, Tract.  3, ca.  3 nu.  3.  . . . 
That learned Hotoman in his '  Franco Gallia ' doth vehemently 
oppugne this ground  . . . but he is clean overborne by the 
pois of  reason." 
This  does  not  add  much  to  the  contentions  of  the  last 
passage,  but there is perhaps  a  slightly  diffcrent emphasis ; 
for though  Cowell uses  tho highest terms of  the authority of 
Parliament, he maintains that an absolute king must be above 
Parliament and the positive laws of tlle kingdom. 
In the article on  Prerogative he declares very emphatically 
that the Icing of  England is an absolute king.  He explains 
that  by  the  Prerogative  he  understands  "  that  especial1 
power, pre-eminence or privilege that the king hath in any 
kind,  over  and  above  the ordinarie course  of  the  common 
law, in the right of  the crown.  . . . Now for these regalities 
which are of  the higher nature (all being within the compass 
of  his prerogative, and justly to be comprised under that title), 
there is not one that belonged to the most absolute prince in 
the world which will not also belong to our king, except the 
custom of  the nations so differ (as indeed they doe) that one 
thing be in the one accompted a regalite, that in another is none. 
Onely  by  the custom  of  the kingdom,  he  maketh  no  laws 
without the consent  of  the 3  estates, though he may  quash 
any laws concluded of  by them.  And  whether his power of 
making laws be restreined  (de necessitate) or of  a godly and 
commendable policy,  not  to be  altered  without great perill, 
I  leave  to  the  judgment  of  wiser  men.  But  I  hold  it 
incontrovertible  that  the  King  of  England  is  an  absolute 
king." 
It is clear that Cowell conceives of  the "Prerogative " as 
being some ultimate and reserved authority possessed by the 
King of  England over and above his ordinary powers, which 
was  comparable with the "  absolute " power of  other kings ; 
this suggests a comparison with Albericus Gentilis ; and, while 
he admits that by the custom of  the country he made no laws 
without  the consent  of  Parliament, he will not say whether 
this was necessary or merely good policy. 
In the article  on  Subsidies he  makes a  somewhat curious 
suggestion.  Re defines  a  LL Subsidie " as  " a  tax or  tribute 
assessed by Parliament  and granted by the Commons to be 
levied of  every subject " ; and adds :  LL Some hold the opinion, 
that the subsidie is granted by the subjects to the prince in 
recompense  or  consideration,  that  whereas  the  prince,  of 
his absolute  power, might  make  laws of  himself, he  doth of 
favour admit  the  consent  of  his  subjects  thereto,  that  all 
thinqs in their own confession may be done with the greatest 
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If we  now  endeavour  to sum up  the development  of  the 
theory  of  the  absolute  prince  in  the  sixteenth  century,  it 
seems to us  clear that there were two elements in this, one 
theological,  the other  legal ; but  neither  of  these  has  any 
real  relation  either  to  the  Renaissance  or  to  that  great 
religious  movement  which  we  call  the  Reformation  and 
Colmter-Reformation. 
If we  begin  with the conception that the authority of  the 
prince is  absolute  because  he  is  the representative  of  God, 
and because his  authority is therefore  equivalent to that of 
God, it is obvious that it rested upon little except the tradi- 
tion of  the unfortunate phrases of  Gregory the Great, and a 
superficial interpretation  of  some  passages  in  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments.  Writers  like  Tyndale and  Bilson  among 
those  who  followed  the  Reformed  movement,  md Barclay 
among those who adhered to Rome, had evidently no serious 
or critical foundation for the view ; while Luther once held 
it but later abandoned it ; and Calvin and Hooker among the 
Reformed, and the great  Jesuits like Suaree  and Bellarmine 
among the Romanists,  repudiated it.  It is  quite impossible 
to relate  this  in  the sixteenth  century  to  any  one  of  the 
theological movements of  the time in particular. 
The nature of  the legal conception of  the absolute king  is 
more complex.  We recognise here the effects of  the revived 
study of  the Roman Jurisprudence in the Corpus Juris Civilis. 
The  great  Jurists  were  indeed  perfectly  clear  that  all 
political authority in the Roman State was derived from the 
people ; but they wrote at a time when practically the legis- 
lative  power  belonged  to the emperor;  their  conception of 
law and its source was  for practical purposes represented  in 
the  words  of  Ulpian,  "  quod  principi  placuit,  legis  habet 
vigorem :  utpote cum lege regia, quae de imperio eiuis lata est, 
populus ei et in eum omm suum inlperium et potestatem con- 
ferat " (Dig. I. 4, 1). The normal medieval conception of  the 
nature and source of  positive law was much more complex ; it 
rested  upon  the principle  that  positive  law  was  primarily 
custom; and this was exprcssed in the words of  Gratian, founded 
indeed upon  St Isidore : "  Humanum  genus  duobus regitur, 
naturali videlicet iure et moribus"  (Gratian, 'Decretum,' D. 1). 
When the conception of  deliberate legislation gradually  took 
shape the law was  thought  of  as representing  the action of 
the whole community, of  the king doubtless, but also of  the 
great  and  wise  men,  and  as  requiring  the  consent  of  the 
whole  community.  The words of  the '  Edictum Pistense ' of 
864, "  quoniam lex consensu populi et constitutione regis fit " 
(M. G.  H. Leg., sect. ii. vol. ii. 273) are not, as some careless 
observers  have  sometimes  seemed  to  think,  mere  empty 
phrases,  however  incidental  in  their  original  context  they 
may have been ; rather they represent the normal conception 
of  men in the Middle Ages. 
The  revived  study  of  the  Roman  law  therefore  brought 
into the political thought of  the Middle Ages a new and revolu- 
tionary  conception;  and while  there  is  little  trace  of  this 
even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries outside of  the 
technical work  of  the Civilians, we  can hardly doubt that it 
did  gradually  exercise  considerable influence,  and  that  the 
development  of  the theory  of  the absolute  authority of  the 
king or prince in the sixteenth century may, at least in part, 
be traced to this. 
Again, it was from the revived study of  the Roman law that 
there  oanie  the conception that  the  emperor  was  "  legibus 
solutus," was not only the source of  law, but was above it, or, 
if we may put it so, outside of  it.  What the original meaning of 
the phrase may have been, we do not feel competent to discuss. 
It  is  difficult  to reconcile the view  that it meant  that the 
emperor could do or command whatever he pleased with  the 
terms of  the rescript of  Theodosius and Valentinian of  426 A.D. 
Lb Rescripts contra ius elicita ab omnibus iudicibus praecipimus 
refutari " (Cod. I. 19, 7).  What is  quite certain is that the 
conception that the prince could normally ignore and over-ride 
the law was contrary to the whole tradition of medieval society 
from  Hincmar  of  Rheims  in  the ninth  century  (cf.  vol.  i. 
pp.  230-235) to John of  Salisbury in the twelfth  (cf. vol.  iii. 
pp.  137-142), Bracton in the thirteenth  (cf. vol.  iii.  p.  35), 
Fortescue in the fifteenth (cf. this vol. p. 143), and Hooker in 
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political theorists correspond with the constitutional tradit'ions 
in Spain as well as in England.  It is true that the mcdiaval 
Civilians were  by  no  means  certain  or clear  in  their inter- 
pretation of  the words "  legibus solutus " ; such a statement 
as that which  Jason de Ma'yno attributes to Baldus, that the 
Pope and  the prince could do anything " supra ius et contra 
ius et extra ins,"  may have corresponded  with  Jason's  own 
opinion (cf. this vol., p.  83  and  p.  149), but  it  can  scarcely 
be  said  to  have  beell  asserted  by  the  Civilians  generally. 
As  we  have seen, in the sixteenth  century Alciatus and the 
most important French Civilians from Connon to Cujas frankly 
criticised  or  repudiated  the whole  conception  (cf. this  vol., 
part iii.  chap.  5).  And  even  Bud6 and Bodin  seem  clearly 
to confirm the judgment  that the ('  Parlement "  could protect 
private rights against the king. 
At  the same time,  the conception that the king  was  not 
only the source of law, but above it, was apparently present 
in the Roman law, and we see the reflection of  it even in such 
a prudent and judicions official of  the French Court as Michel 
L'H6pital.l 
Boclin  clearly held  the principle that the king  was  above 
the law,  when he maintains  that in spite of  the rescript  of 
Emperor Anastasius  (Cod. I. 22, 6) the magistrates must obey 
the command of the prince even when he knew it to be contrary 
to the law ;  and Barclay sums up the opinion of  the Civilians 
as he understood them as being that the Pope and the prince, 
who have "  plenitudo potestatis,"  could  do  anything  LL supra 
ius, contra ius et extra ius," for he was  legibus solut~zs.~'  3 
This  conception  was  even  more  revolutionary  than  tho 
first,  and more  completely  contrary to the whole  character 
of  the political civilisation of the Middle Ages, for, as we have 
so  often said, the foundation of  this was  tho principle  that 
the law was the supreme power in the commoi~wealth. We 
do not,  we  think, go  too far if  we  say that it is surely the 
foundation of any rational system of  society that the authority 
of  the law is greater than that of  any individual member of 
the community. 
Uf. p. 415 ff.  Cf.  p.  424.  Cf. p  448. 
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It is no doubt true and imporlant  that we  can seo  in the 
work, especially of  the Huguenot pamphleteers  and of  Bodin, 
Lhe  development of  a conception that there must be in every 
community an authority behind the positive law, and greater 
than that law ; and we may ask how far this was related to 
the  theory  of  an absolute  monarchy.  It  is  obvious  that, 
properly  speaking,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The 
''  Maiestas j7 might in theory belong either to tlic whole com- 
munity, or a few, or  to one ; there is  no  necessary relation 
between  the conception  of  an ultimate  supreme  power  and 
that of  an absolute nlonarch, nor indeed  clots Bodin pretend 
that there is ; but that there may have been in some men's 
minds a confused impression that there  was  such a relation, 
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CHAPTER  IV. 
REPRESENTATIVE  INSTITUTIONS  IN PRACTICE. 
WE  have  dealt  with  these  in  the fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries, and have seen their importance as illustrating the 
general  conceptions of  men  in Central  and Western  Europe 
about political  authority ; we  must  now inquire what place 
they occupied in the sixteenth century, in fact and in political 
theory.  In this  chapter we  shall consider briefly  what  we 
know  about  the  meetings  of  these  representative  bodies, 
especially in Castile and in France, and the part they played 
in public affairs, while in the next chapter we shall put together 
some  of  the  contemporary  theories  of  their  powers  and 
importance. 
When we  examine the proceedings of  the Cortes of  Castile 
we  find that they were  meeting  frequently, and that they 
were occupied not only with  questions  of  taxation, but with 
a  variety  of  important  public  affairs.  The  first  and  most 
important  of  these, however, was  legislation, and we  have a 
very important statement with regard to this in the prologue 
to the proceedings of the Cortes at Toledo in 1450.  In this 
year  Ferdinand  and Isabella,  in  calling  together  the repre- 
sentatives  of  the town,  said  that they  did  this  because the 
conditions  of  the time  required  the provision  of  new  laws, 
and they describe the process  of  legislation, as being carrietl 
out with  the consent of  their Council, but on the petition of 
the C0rtes.l  It  is deserving of notice, too, that Ferdinand and 
'  Cortes,'  vol.  iv.  Toledo,  1480.  necc~xario y  provcchoso  proveer  de 
Preface: "E nos conosciendo quo cstos  remcclio por  leyes nuevamente  fechas, 
oasos occurrian a1  presente in que esce  ansi  para esecutar  Ias  pasadas,  como 
Isabella declared that all royal  l'  mercedes e facultades "  con- 
trary to '' desta  ley"  were  to be  treated as null and void, 
and that it was  provided that royal Briefs using the phrases 
proprio  motu  e  certa  sciencia  or  containing  a  lL  non- 
obstante clause "  were to be treated in the same way.l 
We may compare the terms in which  the Cortes at Valla- 
dolid  in 1506 promised  obedience and fealty to the Queen 
Joanna, and her husband  Philip ; that is  according to  the 
laws and "  fueros  and the ancient  custom of  the country. 
In another clause they declared that the kings (i.e.,  the former 
kings) had laid it down that when it was necessary to make 
laws, the Cortes should be summoned, and that it was estab- 
lished that no laws should be made or revoked except in Cortes ; 
they petitioned  that from  henceforth  this procedure  should 
be foll~wcd.~ 
para  proveer  e  remediar  10s  nuevos  que de aqui  adelante fueron  fechas e 
casos, accordamos de enbiar mandar  a  dadas  contra  a1  tcnor  dosta  ley,  e 
les  cibdades  e  villas  de  nuestros  contra lo ennella contenido, seen en si 
Reynos que suelen enbiar procuradores  ningunas  e de ningund  valor,  aunque 
de Cortes en nombre do todos nuest,ros  contenen  en  si quales  quier  clausulas 
Reynos, que enbiasen 10s dichos procu-  derogatorias  e  no  obstancias." 
radores  de  Cortes  asi  para  jurar  a1  95 :  Clause  abolishing  offices 
principe nuestro fijo primogonito here-  created  since  1440,  on  the  death  of 
dero destos Reynos, como para entender  the  present  occupant,  and  even  if 
con  ellos e  platicar  e  proveer  en  las  they were renewed by Briefs "  proprio 
otras cosas que sean nescessarias de so  motu e certa sciencia"  and containing 
proveer  por  byes  para  la  buena  a "non-obstante"  clause, these were to 
gouernacion dest,os dichos Reynos,  be treated as "  ningunas e de ningund 
Los quales dichos procuradores  . . .  valer." 
nos  preguntaron  e  dieren  certas peti-  Id. id., Valladolid,  1506, Yroface : 
ciones, e nes  suplioaran  quo  sobrellas  "  Y  prometen  que les seran  buonos  o 
mandamos  proveor  o  remediar  como  I~nles  vasalles e suditos naturales, . . . 
viesemos  que  complia  a  servicio  do  segund  las  leyeu  e  fucros  e  antigua 
Dios o nuestro,  a bien de la republice,  costumbre  destos  Reynos  lo  dis- 
e pacific0 estado destos dichos nuestros  pone. . . ." 
reynos,  sobre  las  quales  dichas peti-  (p. 226)  6 :  "Y por  esto 10s  rreys 
ciones, y sobre las otras cosas que nos  estable~~oron  que,  quando  obiesen  de 
entendimos ser complideras, con  accu-  hazer leys, pare que fuesen probechosas 
erdo  de  las  perlados  e  caualleros  e  a sus rreynos,  e cada provinpia fuese 
doctores del nuestro Conseio, proueimes  hien  probeyda,  se  clamasen  Cortes  e 
e ordanamos, e statuimos 10s leyes que  procuradores  y  entendieson enellos, y 
se siguen."  par  esto  so  establepio ley  que  no  se 
1 Jd. id., Toledo, 1480, 84  (p. 164):  fipiesen  ni  rrebocasen  leys  syno  en 
"  E  qu~remos  e ordinamos  quo  todov  Cortes :  snplican  a  vuestras  altezas 
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Again at Valladolid in 1518 and in 1523 the Cortes petitioned 
Charles (the Emperor Charles V.) that the "  Cartas e Cedulas 
de  suspensgones " which  had  been  given  by  him  and  his 
predecessors  should  be  revoked,  and  Charles  assented.l  At 
the Cortes in Mhdrid in 1534, in response to a petition to the 
same effect, Charles said he did not intend to issue any such 
Briefs. 
In tho  proceedings  of  the  Coi.tes  at Valladolid  in  1523 
we  have a formal declaration by the king, that the answers 
given  by  him  to  their  petitions  and  "  capitulos"  were  to 
be enrolled and carriecl  out as laws and pragmatic sanctions 
made  and  promulgated  by  him  in  C~rtes.~  The  Cortes  at 
Madrid in  1534 petitioned  the king  that all  the '(  capitulos 
proveydos " in  past  and present  Cortes  should  be  recorded 
in  one  volume,  with  tho  laws  of  the "  Ordinamiento,"  as 
amended  and  corrected,  and  that  every  city  and  "  villa " 
should have a copy of  the book ; the king replied that he was 
providing for thk4 
Towards the end of  the century we  find  in the proceedings 
of  the Cortes of  Madrid of 1579-82 an important petition and 
reply  with  respect  to the laws of  tho kingdom.  The Cortes 
petitioned Philip 11.  that no law or pragmatic was henceforth 
to be made  or published until it had been  before  them  (sin 
darle  primero  parte  dolla).  The  king  replied  that  it was 
just  that  the  kingdom  ~hould  receive  satisfaction  on  this 
point. 
e faga asy, e quando leys se obieren de 
hazer,  manden  llamar  sus  rreynos  e 
procuradores  dellos,  por  que  para 
las  tales  ley8  seran  dollos  muy mas 
entera mente ynformadas, y  vuestros 
rreynos  juste  e derechamento  provoy- 
dos : e  porque fuera dcsta horden, se 
an  fecho  muchas  prematicas,  de  quo 
estor vuestros rreynos se  syenten  por 
agrabiados,  mande que aqucllos ssean 
rrebistos,  e  probean  e  rremedian  lor 
agrabio~  quolas tales prematiron ticnen. 
R.  (Royal reply) que  quando fuero 
ncsresa~iu,  %u  alteza lo mandarh proveer 
de manera que se d6 cuenta dello." 
'  Id.  id.,  Valladolid,  1518,  23 ; 
1523, 62. 
Id. id., Madrid, 1534, 42. 
Id. id., Valladolid, 1583 (p. 402). 
Id. id., Madrid,  1534 (1). 
Cortes  of  Castilc.  1663  to  1598 
(4.  Madrid,  1877,  &c.) ;  vol.  vi., 
Madrid,  1679-1582,  111.  (p.  8-10) : 
" Por  tanto :  suplicamos  humilde- 
mente a vuestra Majestad,  sea servldo 
de mandar  que de nqui  adelante,  es- 
tando el  Reyno junto,  no se haga Icy, 
ni pragmatica, sin darle primero  parte 
dell&, y  que  antea  no  se  publique; 
porque denlhs de ser esto lo mas con- 
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It appears to us that it is perfectly  clear that the Cortes 
throughout  maintained  that  the  only  normal  method  of 
legislation  was  by  the  king  in  the  Cortes, and  that  they 
vigorously  protested  against  any  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  crown  to  override  this legislation  by  any  royal  Brief, 
as they had done in earlier centuries. 
It is no  doubt  true that if  the control of  legislation was, 
at any rate during the first half  of  the century, among the 
most  important  of  the functions of  the Cortes, the control 
of  taxation was  of  equal significance, as it  had  been  in the 
fourteenth  and fifteenth  centuries.  There can be no  doubt 
that the constitutional rule in Spain was that the king could 
not, except for his ordinary revenues, impose taxation without 
the consent of  the Cortes, and that this principle was recognised 
throughout the century. 
In  1515 the Cortcs met at Burgos, and the crown laid before 
it a statement on the War of  the Holy League, and intimated 
that the King  of  France was  about to make  war  on  Spain, 
and asked for assistance.  The Cortes thanked the crown for 
its communication, and in view of  the situation granted tho 
same aid as it done at Burgos in 1512.l  In 1518 the Cortes 
in  Valladoliil petitioned  Charlcs  V.  to  abolish  a11  the new 
impositions which had been laid upon  the kingdom, against 
the law, and Charlcs replied that if  they would give him the 
details  he would  see  that the matter  should be  dealt  with 
according to justice.2  At  the  Cortes held  at Santiago  and 
Corunna in 1520, the Bishop of  Badajos reported the election 
of  Charles  to  the  empire,  rcpresentecl  the  great  expenses 
which  his  coronation  would  involve,  and  asked  the  Cortcs 
to  continue  the  '<  servicio,"  which  had  been  granted  at 
veniente J  servicio do vuestra Majestad, 
lo recibiri~  por el mayor favor  y merccd. 
que so puode sign~ficar. 
R.  (king's  reply) :  A  esto  vos 
respondemos : quo  tendremos  mucha 
quenta con mandar que en lo que per 
esta  vuostra petlc~on  nos suphcais, 80 
dB  al Beyno satisfazion, come es juSt0." 
1 '  Cortcs,'  vol.  iv.,  Burgos,  1515 
(pp. 247-249). 
2  '  Cortes,'  vol.  iv.,  Valladolid, 
1518  (82) :  "  Otro  sy,  suplicamos  E 
vuostra  Alteza  nos  haga  morced  cln 
mandar quitar todai las nuebas ynposy- 
ciones que Sean puostas encston Roynos 
contra las leyes e prematicas dollas. 
A  esto  ves  rrospandemos  qne  de- 
clareys  adonde  estan  puestas,  y  que 
lo  mandaremoa  probeer  conforme  n 
justicia." 
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Valladolid in 1518, for three years more.  This gave rise to a 
protracted  discussion  of  the  question  whether  the  king's 
request  for  a,  grant,  or  the  petitions  and other  business of 
the  procurators  shoul(1  be  considered  fist.  The  Cortes 
by a large majority  agreed that the general business  should 
be considered first, but the crown steadily refused to sanction 
this, as contrary to precedent.  The majority  still persi~ted, 
but  gradually  became  smaller,  and  when  at last  the  pro- 
curators of  Valladolid went  over to the minority,  the grant 
to the crown was made.l 
The conflict was, however, renewed  at Valladolid in 1523 
Charles V. again asked for the "  servicio,"  and promised that 
if  it was granted within twenty days, he  would reply to the 
petitions  if  the  Cities.  The  Cortes  had  demanded  that 
these  should be heard  first,  and that the " servicio " should 
be  considered  afterwards, and Charles again refused, saying 
that  this  was  contrary  to  the  tradit,ional usage,  while  the 
Cortes contended that they had received written instructions 
from their Cities, that they were not to grant the "  servicio " 
until their petitions had been  considered, and suggested trhat 
they should  be  sent to lay  the matter before them.2  The 
dispute about the precedence of  petitions and grievances was 
continued  at Toledo in  1525, and Charles promised that the 
petitions should be answered before the Cortes ~eparated.~ 
1 Id. id.,  'Santiago  y  la  Corfina,' 
1620  (pp. 300-321). 
2  Id. id., Valladolid, 1523 (p.  352)  : 
Declaration  of  the  king :  "  Que 
otorgado  el  servipio dentro de veynte 
diras,  que  10s  capitulos  que  fueren 
dados  y  suplicapiones  generales  y 
particularee  que  traeys  de  vuestras 
qibdades  e  villas,  10s  mandare  ver  e 
rresponder como mas convenga." 
(p.  355)  :  Statement  of  Cortes : 
"  Fueso el servipio pasado dela Corunna 
y quo no fueren oydos 10s procuradores 
tan  complidamente  como  quisieran. 
Este enfermidad  se  aria de curar  con 
medpina contraria, que primeramente 
fuesen  complidamnte  oydos  y  des- 
pachados sus negocics y remediados 10s 
agravios  que  pretenden,  y  despues 
desto  avia de ser pedido el  serviyio." 
(p. 357).  The king refused, and in- 
sisted  that this  was  contrary  to the 
traditional custom. 
(pp.  358,359). The Cortes deliberated 
and reported that the cities had given 
them  written  instructions  that  they 
were  not  to make  a grant  until  their 
petitions  had been examined, and they 
asked the king- 
(p. 361)  : "  Pjos mande hazer correos 
alas cibdades fuziendoles saber todo lo 
su~edicho,  y  aun  presindiendo  de  10s 
que  se componen con  la  voluntad  de 
vuestra alteza." 
a  Id. id., Toledo, 1526-6. 
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It should be observed that among the petitions  presented 
at Valladolid in 1523 was  one that the king  should not ask 
for such grants, for the country was poor, and the royal revenue 
had  increased  greatly  since  the time  of  the  Catholic kings 
(Ferdinand and Isabella), and the king replied that he would 
not ask for a 'L servicio," except for a just cause, and in Cortes, 
and according to the laws of  the kingd0rn.l  It  is clear t'hat 
Charles  recognised  that  the  power  of  imposing  such  taxa- 
tion  did  not  belong  to the crown,  except  in  and  with  the 
Cortes. 
When we  come to the later part of  the century it is clear 
that the authority to grant a subsidy (servicio) still belonged 
to  the Cortes ; the king (Philip 11.)  asked for it, and the Cortes 
granted it.=  We  find also  that the dispute about the pre- 
cedence  of  subsidies  and  petitions  was  again  renewed  in 
1563 and 156673  and that  the  king  again  promised  that he 
would answer the petitioners before the Cortes terminated.4 
But we also find a new and protracted dispute about certain 
other forms of  the royal revenue.  At  the Cortes of  Madrid 
in 1566 the king asked for a subsidy, and the Cortes granted 
it,  but  complained  of  certain  new  Lb rentas,  &c.,',  which 
had  been  imposed  by  the crown,  and  presented  a  formal 
petition in which they urged that the former kings had ordained 
by  laws  made  in the Cortes that no  new  " rentas,  pechos, 
derechos,  monedas 7'  nor  other  forms  of  tribute  should  be 
created  or  collected  without  a  meeting  of  the  kingdom  in 
Cortes,  and  the  authorisation  of  the  procurators,  as  was 
established  by  the law of  the Ordinance of  King  Alf~nso.~ 
1 Id.  id.,  Valladolid,  1523,  42 
(p. 378)  (Reply of  king) : "  Aesto ves 
respondcmos que no entendemos pedir 
servipio, saluo  con  justa  cause  y  en 
Cortes,  e  quardando  las  leyes  del 
rregno." 
Cf.  Cortes  of  Castile,  1563-1698. 
Cortes of  Madrid, 1563,  1566;  Cordova, 
1576; Madrid,  1573, 1579. 
a  Id., Madrid, 1563,  1566. 
Id., Madrid,  1563. 
Id.,  Madrid,  1566  (p. 414), Potition 
111. : "  Otrosi decimos;  que 10s Reyes 
de  gloriosa memoria, predecessores de 
vuestra  majestad,  ordinaran  y  man- 
daran  por  leyes  fechos  en  Cortes, no 
se creasen ni  cobrnsen nuevas rentas, 
pechos,  derechos,  monedas,  ni  otros 
tributos,  pnrticullos,  ni  gencralmente, 
sin junta del Reyno en Cortes, y sin otor- 
gamiento de 10s procuradores d61, como 
consta per la ley del Ordinamlento del 
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The  king  replied  apologetically,  urging  the  great  wars  in 
which he had been involved, and his  great need of  money; 
he said that he would rejoice if  he could relieve the count'ry 
of  these burdens, but did not give any pr0mise.I  The Cortes 
by  a  majority voted  that they  did  not  authorise any new 
rentas fl without the assent  of  the Corte~.~  The  question 
was  raised  again  in the Cortes  at Cordova  in  1570 and at 
Madrid in 1576, and the king argued in much the same terms.3 
It should be observed that the king, while contending that 
the conditions of  the time compelled him  to levy them, did 
not  deny  their  illegalit'y, and that he  made  no  attempt  to 
levy  the "  servicio " without  obtaining  the  consent  of  the 
Cortes. 
Legislation  and  taxation  were  not,  however,  the  only 
public  affairs  which  came  before  the Cortes.  In 1476 the 
Cortes complained of  the administration of  justice, and asked 
that for two years they should be allowed to appoint certain 
persons who should reside in the royal Court, and the crown 
assented.4 
In 1525 Chaalcs  V.  agreed that the Cortes should appoint 
two of  their number to reside at Court as long as was necessary 
to see that what had just  been authorised by the Cortes was 
carried  out.6  Among  other  public  matters  with  which  the 
Cortes dealt, one of  the most interesting was the union of  the 
kingdom of  Navarre.  At the Cortes of  Burgos in 1515 Ferdi- 
nand announced  his intention  of  carrying this  out, and the 
Cortes, in  the  name  of  the  kingdom  of  Castile  and  Leon, 
accepted  this.6  Other  matters  brought  before  the  Cortes 
included the alienation of the royal patrimony, 1476 and 1450 ; 
the nat~ralisat~ion  of  foreigners, 1476,1523 ; affairs concerning 
Id., Madrid,  1566 (p. 154).  diputar dos personas de entre vosotros 
Id., Madrid, 1566 (pp. 208, 209).  que  rresydan  en  nuestra  corte  por  el 
Id., Cordova,  1570,  Petition  111. ;  tiempo quo fuere nescessario, como me 
Madrid, 1576, Petition I.  lo suplicays ; y para en lo de adelante, 
'  Cortos,' vol. vi., Madrigal, 1476, 3.  mandamos  a  10s  del  nuestro  consojo 
"Id.  id., Toledo, 1525, 16 : "  A esto  quo lo vean  y platiquen  nobrollo,  y  lo 
vos  respondernos  quo  nos  plaze  que  provean  como  vieron  que  cumple  a1 
para  la  expedipion y  esecupion  de  lo  bien destos nostros rreynos." 
otergado  en  estas  Cortes,  podays  Id. id., Burgos, 1516 (p. 249 ff.). 
the relations  of  Church and State, 1512, 1525, including the 
interference of  the Inquisition in matters which did not concern 
religion, 1579 ; and the royal marriage, 1525. 
The  conception  of  the  nature  of  legislative  authority  in 
France does not appear to us to have been so clear in France in 
the sixteenth century as in Spain ; and it is not always easy to 
distinguish between administrative and legislative action.  In 
spite of  this, however, it seems to us that from the beginning 
to the end of  the century, the principle of  an absolute power 
in  the king  to override ancient  law, or  to create  new law, 
would have been recognised only by a few. 
--  We  find a commission appointed by Charles VIII. in 1497 
to collect  and publish  the customs  of  different  parts  of  the 
kingdom,  but  it  must  be  carefully  obgerved  that  Charles 
authorised this only on the condition that the collection and 
record had the approval of  the Three Estates of  each district, 
or at least the larger and wiser part; of  them.l  It  would appear 
that the work had not been completed, and in 1506 Louis XII. 
appointed another commission to carry it out, subject to the 
same conditions.2  This recognition of  the place of  customary 
bw, and of  the principle that it rested  primarily  upon  the 
recognition of  the country, is obviously of  great importance. 
The  authority  of  the Provincial  Esbates  in  constitutional 
matters and in legislation, so far as these concerned particular 
provinces,  is  sometimes very  emphatically  stated.  It  was 
on  the representations  and requests  of  the Three Estates of 
Provence that Louis XII. in 1498 united this province to the 
French crown, with the promise to maintain all its liberties, 
customs,  and  laws.3  On  the  occasion  of  the  marriage  of 
Louis XII. to Anne of  Brittany in 1499 it was provided in the 
Letters Patent, issued  on  the occasion  by the king, that no 
new laws or constitutions should be made, which might change 
the rights  and customs  of  Brittany, except  in  the manner 
which had been observed in the Duchy ;  that is, that if  occasion 
1 '  Ordonnances,' vol. 21 (p. 18).  Id., v01.  21 (p.  39). 
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should arise for some change, it was to be done by the Parle- 
ment and Assembly of  the Estates of  the pr0vince.l 
It was  with the advice of  the Three Estates of  Normandy 
that in 1499 Louis XII. transformed the "  Exchequer Court " 
of  Normandy into a "  Parlement."  We find in 1532 another 
example of  the importance of  the Provincial Estates in con- 
stitutional matters, in the provision for the perpetual  union 
of  Brittany  to  the  French  crown.  The  Estates  petitioned 
Francis I. that the Dauphin  should be  recognised  as  their 
duke, and that various things done contrary to their customs 
should be revoked and annulled, as having been done without 
the knowledge  and  consent of  the Estates ; and  they  also 
petitioned  that Brittany  should be  in  perpetuity  united  to 
the  kingdom  of  France.  The  king  accepted  their  request, 
and declared his eldest son to be the Duke of  Brittany, accord- 
ing to the custom that the eldest should succeed to the Duchy, 
notwithstanding anything that might have been  done before 
to the contxary, without  the knowledge and consent of  the 
Three  estate^.^ 
It is true, however, that in one important case we  find that 
Louis  XII.  overrode the Estates  of  Provence.  In 1501 he 
issued an Ordinance establishing a "  Parlement "  in Provence, 
and he did this after consultation with  some notable persons 
of  his Great Council, of  the  LL Parlement " and of  Provence ; 
but there is no direct reference to the Estates.4  An  Ordinance 
of  1502 seems to indicate that some representation had been 
1 Id., vol.  21,  1 (p. 149) : "  C'est  a 
savoir  que  en  tout  que  touche  de 
garder  et  de  conduire  le  pays  de 
Bretaigne  et  les  subjets  d'icelui,  en 
leurs droits, libertea, franchises, usaiges, 
coustumes  et tailles . . . en  mamiere 
que aucune nouvelle loi  ou constitution 
n'y soit faite, fors en la maniere accous- 
tum4  par  les Roys et Ducs predeces- 
seurs de nostredite cousine la Duchesse 
de Bretaigne.  . . . 
7.  Item,  et  en  tant  que  peut 
toucher  qui s'il advenoit que de honne 
raison il  y eust quelque cause de faire 
rnulncions,  particulierement  en  aug- 
mentant,  diminuant  on  interpretant 
lesdits droits, coustumes, constitutions 
ou  etablissements,  que  ce  soit  par  le 
parlement  et  assemblees  des  estats 
dudit pays, ainsi que de tout tems est 
accoustum6, et que autrement  no  soit 
fait, nous  voulons  et  entendons  que 
ainsi se fasse, appellez toutes voyes, les 
gens  des  trois  estats  dudit  pays  de 
Brehigne." 
Id., vol. 21 (p. 215). 
'  Recueil des Anciennes  Lois,'  vol. 
12..  No.  191 (p. 375). 
'  Ordonnances,' vol. 21  (p. 280). 
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made by the Three Estates of  Provence, presumably against 
the creation of  the "  Parlement,,' and the king had appointed 
a commission to inquire into the matter, and had in the mean- 
while  suspended  the  operation  of  the  Ordinance  of  1501. 
Louis XII., having heard the report  of  the comniission and 
the representations of  the Estates, now "  de nostre plein science, 
pleine puissance et authorit6 royal  et provenpalle " conkms 
the creation of  the Parlement.1 
In 1535 we  find an Ordinance of  Francis I. which appears 
to us as though it were intended to impose certain limitations 
upon the meetings and proceedings of  the Three Estates of 
Provence.  They are not to meet more than once in the year, 
and then  under  Letters Patent  from  the  king;  they were 
to be  presided over by  deputies of  the king, and  were  only 
to deal  with  matters  mentioned in the Letters Patent, but 
they might make representations to these deputies, who might 
deal  with  them  according  to  the  powers  which  they  had 
received, or  report  them  to the king.  The royal  governor 
is forbidden to call together  the Estates, except  on  matters 
of  great urgency or danger.  The king forbids the Estates to 
make Statutes or Ordinances, or any act of  administration  of 
justice, and declares these null and void if  they should do  so.a 
Id., vol. 21 (p. 298). 
'  Recueil,' vol.  12, 221,  32 (p. 422) 
(1535) :  "  Quant  au  fait  des  trois 
estats  de  nosdits  pays,  Contes  et 
terres adjacentes (Provence, etc.) . . . 
statuons  et  ordonnons,  qu'il  ne 
pourront eux assembler, si n'est par nos 
lettres  patentes,  une  fois  l'ann6e,  en 
tel  temps  et  lieu  qu'il  nous  plaira 
ordonner par nosdites lettres.  Esquels 
estats presideront  ceux  qui  par  nous 
seront  d6put6s,  et  non  autres,  et  y 
sera tout seulement traicte et conclud 
des  affaires  mentionnez  en  icelles. 
Bien  pourront  les  gens desdits estats 
ddduire  et remonstrer  les  affaires  ir 
nosditd deputez, pour y estre pourveu 
selon le  pouvoir  que  leur  sera  baill6, 
ou nous en faire le rapport. 
33. Defendons  audits  gouvernenr, 
grand seneschal et tous autres d'assem- 
bler  lesdits estats, si ce  n'est  ou  il  y 
auroit cause urgente  et necessaire, ou 
peril Bminent, auquel cas s'assembleront 
par  permission  dudit  gouverneur  qui 
est 8,  present,  ou  sera  pour  le  tempa 
edvenir, ou son lieutenant, l'un desquels 
assistera  et  sera  present  a  ladicte 
assemblbe,  en  laquelle  pourvoyront 
audit eminent  p6ri1,  et le  plutost  quo 
faire se pourra, nous advertiront  de ce 
qu'aura est6 fait. . . . 
34.  Inhibons  et  d6fendons  aux 
gens desdits estats, do  no faire  statuts 
et  ordonnances,  n'anrun  autre  acte 
d'adrninistration  de  justice.  Et  si 
aucuns en  ont fait  par cy devant,  ou 
faisoient  par  aprAs,  les  avons  declare 
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We shall return  to the position of  the Provincial  Estates, 
especially with regard to taxation, but in the meanwhile we 
may say that it is evident that they continued to have a very 
considerable  con~t~itutional  importance. 
When, however, we  endeavour to determine  what was the 
constitutional position and importance of  the States Gcneral 
in France in the first half  of  the sixteenth century, we  have 
found it difficult to form a precise opinion.  It is not correct 
to say that they were  wholly forgotten or ignored ; the as- 
sembly, which seems to have the character of a meeting of  the 
States General, held at Tours in 1506, dealt with the marriage 
of  Francis,  Count  of  Angoul&me  (afterwards Francis I.),  and 
the daughter of  Louis X1I.l  It was provided by the Treaty 
of  1514 between  Louis  XII. and Henry  VIII. of  England, 
that the Treaty should be ratified not only by the Parliament 
in  England, but by  the Three Estates to be called together 
for the purp'ose in France.2  Francis I. commanded his mother 
in  1525 to assemble  (( aucun nombre"  of  good  and notable 
persons of  all the provinces and cities of  France, that they 
might give their consent to the Edict which he made in Madrid 
transferring the kingdom to his son (to be resumed by himself 
when he should be set at libert~).~  In the Treaty of  Nadrid 
of  the same year between Francis and Charles V., it was pro- 
vided that the hostages given to Charles should remain with 
him until the Treaty had been approved  and ratified  by the 
States General, as well as "  registered "  by the Parlements of 
Paris and the pro~inces.~ 
It  is  true that the "  Ordonnances " by  which  Francis I. 
entrusted the government  ef  France in  1515, and again  in 
1523, to his mother, gave her what may be taken as meaning 
a  complete authority to make  L( Ordonnances," Statutes, and 
Edicts, with the advice of  the Council, but they also specifically 
include the power to call together the Estates of  the kingdom, 
or any part of  it, to report to them the affairs of  the kingdom, 
' '  Ordonnances,' vol. 21 (p. 335).  12, No. 130 (p. 243). 
'  Ordonnances,'  vol.  21  (p.  556).  a  'Recueil,'  vol.  12,  No.  132  (p. 
Clau~e  26.  261). 
"  Recueil  des Anciennes LOIS,'  vol. 
and to ask for aids and money, and other things, which might 
be needed.l 
As we have often said before, wa are not in this work writing 
a Constitutional History, nor are we  concerned to disentangle 
the highly complex conditions, political and religious, which 
brought about the civil wars of  France in the latter part of  the 
sixteenth century ; our task is only to endeavour to observe 
and understand  the nature and history of  the political ideas 
and theories of  Western Europe.  It is therefore not our part 
to explain  why it was  that with the death of  Henry 11.  in 
1559 the political conditions of  France seem to have changed 
so  suddenly;  it  is  enough for 11s  to observe that they did 
thus change. 
In the year after Henry's  death, his successor, Francis II., 
summoned the States General to meet at Orleans in December. 
Francis 11.  died on  5th December, but notwithstanding the 
Estates  were  opened  on  13th December,  with  a  speech by 
Michel  L'HBpital,  the  chancellor.  How  far the  speech  as 
reported  and printed  in  his  works  corresponds exactly with 
what he said on the occasion we cannot pretend to say ; but 
it contains  some  very  important  observations,  both  on  the 
history of  the Stfates General and on  their functions as con- 
ceived by a great royal official. 
It was  certain, he said, that the ancient kings were  wont 
to hold the Estates frequently, though they had been disused 
for some eighty yems.  The Estates were an assembly of  all 
the  subjects  or  their  deputies,  and the  purpose  of  holding 
them was that the king should communicate with his subjects 
on the most important matters and receive their opinions and 
counsels, that he should hear their complaints and grievances, 
and provide for these  as might  be reasonablo.  The Estates 
had  therefore  been  called  together  for  various  causes,  as 
circumstances required,  to ask for help in men  and money, 
or to sot in order "  la justice," or to provide for the government 
of  the country, or for other businesk2  (By the words  the 
'  '  Recueil,'  vol.  12, No.  30  (p. 42).  M.  L1H6pit&l,  '  (Euvres  Com- 
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government  of  the  country " he  seems  to mean,  specially, 
the determination of  the succession, for he refers to the Estates 
as having decided that the succession to Charles IV.  belonged 
to Philip of  Valois and not to Edward 111. of  England.)  The 
king, he said, is not bound to take counsel with  his people, 
but it is good and honourable he should do  s0.l  The former 
Estates had  been  most  useful to the kings, and Louis XII. 
had discontinued the meetings, not because he feared to give 
the people authority, but because he did not wish  to impose 
this burden upon them.=  The purpose for which the Estates 
had now been  summoned was  to find means to appease the 
seditions in the kingdom, caused by religi~n.~ 
This speech of  L'HBpital  appears to us to be of  very con- 
siderable importance in relation to the development of  political 
conceptions in the years which followed, and it is also specially 
important not only because he was a great officer of  the crown, 
but because; as we  have pointed  out in the last chapter, he 
held  very  strongly  that the authority of  the king  was  not, 
in the strict sense, subject to the law, and that resistance to 
him  was  never  lawfuI."t  is  therefore the more important 
that he should, like C~mmines,~  look upon the States General 
as a normal and reasonable form of  the representation of  the 
whole  community,  disused as he  says  (not  quite  correctly) 
for some eighty years, but traditional and useful.  And it is 
also  important  to  observe that he looks upon  the function 
messieurs  parce  que  nous  reprenons 
l'ancienne coustume de tenir lea estats, 
ja  delaisser  par  le  temps  do  quatre- 
vingts ans, ou environ, ou n'y a memoire 
d'homme  qui  y  puisse  atteindre :  je 
diray en peu de paroles,  que c'est  de 
tenir les estats, pour quelle causes l'on 
assemblent lee estats. . . . 
I1  est  certain  que  lee  anciens  roys 
avoient coustume de tenir souvent les 
estats, qui estoient I'assembl4e de tous 
leurs subjects, ou des dbputez par eulx. 
Et  n'est aultre chose tenir les estats que 
communiquer par le roy svec ses sub- 
jects,  de  ses  plus  granden  affaires, 
prendre leur adviz et conseil, ouyr aussi 
leurs  plaintes  et  dol6ances,  et  leur 
pourvoir ainsi que de raison. .  . . Lee 
estats estoient assemblez pour diverses 
causes, et selon les occurrences et les 
occasions qui se prBsentirent, ou  pour 
demander secours de genz et deniers, ou 
pour  donner  ordre 8.  la justice  et aux 
gens de guerre . . . ou pour  pourvoir 
au  gouvernement  du  royaume,  ou 
aultres causes." 
Id. id., p. 382. 
Id. id., p. 385. 
a  Id. id., p. 386. 
'  Cf. pp. 415, 416. 
'  Cf. p. 214. 
of  the Estates when they met, as being, not merely to supply 
money, but also to give their opinion  and counsel upon the 
highest and most important affairs of  the country. 
When we  turn from L'HBpital's  opinion  as to  the nature 
and functions of  the States General to the actual proceedings 
of  their meeting at Orleans, apart from the question of  taxation, 
to which we  shall return later, we find that the Three Estates 
presented  separately their  L'  cahiers " with  their  complaints 
and requests, and in January 1561 the king issued a general 
"  Ordonnance " "  sur les plaintes, doldances et remonstrances 
des  deputez des trois cstats."  l  The Estates were  also con- 
cerned with the question of  the Regency during the minority 
of  Charles  IX., and in  his  LL will and  testament " L'HBpital 
says that the question was brought before the Estates, and that 
they entrusted the "  tutela "  of  the young king to his mother, 
and appointed the Eing of Navarre to help and advise her.2 
We do not pretend to deal with the history of  the disastrous 
years that followed, the outbreak of the civil wars, the attempts 
at a settlement of  the religious difficulties, and the massacre 
of St Bartholomew in 1572.  The Edict of  pacification of  May 
1576 was followed in August by the meeting of  the Three Estates 
at Blois ; and it is at  least evident that they were clear about 
their own importance, and asserted their constitutional auth- 
ority.  This is illustrated  in the terms of  the address to the 
king by the nobles, the composition of  which is attributed to 
M.  de Beaufremont.  They thanked God  that the king  had 
been  pleased  to  call  together  the  General  Council  of  the 
kingdom, that is the Estates, to which his ancestors had always 
turned when it was necessary to set things  in order.3  More 
'  Recueil,' vol.  14, No.  8 (p. 64). 
M.  L'Hapital,  '  CEuvres,'  vol.  ii. 
p. 607 : "  Ea controversia, cum ad tres 
ordines delata esset . . . vel acquitate 
ducti,  quid  enim  aequius  quam  filii 
tutelam matri committi I  Vel  assiduo 
nostro  auditu, tutelam  regii  corporis 
et bonorum  matri  detulerunt,  regem 
Navarrae  adjutorem  et  consiliarium 
matri dederunt." 
' R~rueils  des  Pieces  concernants 
la Tenu des gtats  GBnBraux, 1660-1614,' 
vol. iii., No. 48 (p. 453), ed. Paris, 1789 : 
"  Nous  louons  Dieu,  Sire . . . de  ce 
qu'il vous a plu convoquer et assembler 
sous  le  nom  des  Etats,  le  Conseil 
GBnBral  de  votro  Royaume,  seul  et 
solitaire  remede,  auquel  ves  majeurs 
ont toujours recourus, comme it l'ancre 
sacre,  pour  remettre  toutes  choses 
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important, however, is that the Third Estate demanded, first, 
that the States General should meet  again  after  five  years, 
and  after  that  every  ten  years ; and  secondly,  that  the 
Ordinances  made  by  the  king  should  have  a  legislative 
character,  and  should  not  be  revoked  except  in  another 
meeting  of  the  Estates.l 
It was, however, twelve years before the Estates met again, 
in 1588, and again at l3lois ; and this time the Estates were 
largely  under  the  control  of  the  Catholic  League ; but  it 
would  appear  that  they  were  now  even  more  determined 
to  assert  their  constitutional position.  The  meeting  of  the 
Estates  was  opened by  a  speech  of  the king  (Henry III.), 
and in this he declared on his oath that he would bind himself 
to observe all that he had decreed as sacred laws, and would 
not  reserve to himself  any liberty  for  the future to depart 
from them for any cause or under any pretext.  It is true that 
Henry went'on to say that in doing this he might seem to be 
submitting to laws of  which  he was  himself  the source, and 
which  themselves  exempted  him  from  their  authority,  and 
that he  was  thus  imposing  upon  the royal  authority  more 
limits  than  his  predecessors,  but, he  says,  it was  a  token 
of  the generosity of  a good prince to submit to the laws and 
to bind himself to maintain them.2 
Id. id., vol. ix., No.  108  (p. 274): 
"  I1 vous plaira  que de dix ans en dix 
ans il sa fasse uno  pareille convocation 
et  assemblbe des  Btats . . . et  nean- 
moins  que  pour  cette  fois,  et afin  de 
tenir  plust6t  la  main  A  I'exBcution  do 
ce qui sera avise aux presents Qtats,  ils 
seront  indiqu6s  et  remis  a  cinq  ans 
prochains." 
Id. id. id. (p. 272) : "I1 vous plaise, 
suivant les promesses connues en votrc 
proposition,  que  ce  qui sera  par vous 
ordonn6, suivant  la remonstrance  des 
troiv Btats, ne pourra Btre r6voqu6, soit 
en  g6nBral  on  en  particdier,  sinon en 
pareille assembl6e et sur pareil avis des 
Otats, enjoignant  A  tous juges, mBme  A 
ceux de  vos oours souveraines, en  cas 
que  pour  faire on  juger  au  contraire 
de ce qui aura Bt6  avis6 auxdits Btats, 
leur  fussent  prQsont6es  lettres  ou 
mandements, voire en forme d'edits, ou 
par derogation sp6ciale on particuli&re, 
de  n'y  avoir  aucun  6gard  et  de  n'y 
point ob6ir." 
'  Rccueil des  PiBces,'  kc., vol. iv. 
(v.)  p. 55.  Cf. Picot, '  Histoire des fitats 
GBnBraux,' ed. 1872, vol. iii., pp. 100 ff : 
"  Je me veux lier, par sorment solennel 
. . . d'observer  toutes  les choses que 
j'y  aurai  arret6es  comne  loix  sacr6es, 
sans me reserver Q moi-m6me la license 
de  m'en  departir  a  l'avenir  pour 
quelque  cause,  pr6texte,  ou  occasion 
que ce soit, selon que l'aurai arrBt6 pour 
chaque point.  . . . 
Que s'il  semble qu'en  ce  faisant, je 
me  sournette trop volontairernent aux 
It  is no doubt true that Henry 111. was  at this time in the 
power of  the Catholic League, and it is probably to the engage- 
ments of  the ''  Edict of  Union " that these words primarily 
refer ; but they suggest the temper of  the Estates.  We may 
put beside these some statements made  by the Third Estate 
and the clergy, urging upon the nobles to join  with  them in 
persuading the king himself to swear, and to compel the Princes 
and the Three Estates to swear, to the Catholic Union.  This, 
they said, could only be made irrevocable if  it were sanctioned 
by the States General.  The Edicts of  the king had no other 
foundation than his will, and could be revoked by him at his 
pleasure, only Edicts approved and sanctioned by the States 
General were firm and inviolable.  The kings were not bound 
by the civil laws  (whatever  this may mean), but they were 
bound  by the Laws  of  God  and the Natural  Laws, and by 
those  to which they had sworn when  they were  consecrated 
and an0inted.l 
In the "  Cahier " of  the  Third  Estate  it was  demanded 
that the "  Parlements " should not publish and register any 
Edict until this had been communicated to tho "  Procureurs- 
Syndics " of  the Estates of  tho  province^.^ 
loix dont je  suis auteur, et qui d'elles- 
m8mes me  dispensent  do  lour empire, 
et que par ce moyen je  rende la dignit6 
royale  aucunoment  plus  bornBe  st 
limitbe quo mes predocesseurs, c'est  en 
quoi  la,  gencrositb  du  bon  prince  se 
connoit,  que do drcsser ses pensees st 
ses actes selon 10  bonne loi, et se bander 
du  tout  A  no  131  laisser  corro~npre." 
(He cites the story of  tho king who said 
that if  the power which he bequeathed 
to his successors was loss than it had 
been, it was more durable.) 
1 Id.  id.,  vol.  iv.,  p.  123 :  "La- 
quelle  ne  pouvoit  autromcnt  Btre, 
ni  mieux  Qtablie irr&vocable, qa'btant 
lue, approuvBe et arret6e en 11assemb16e 
gbn6rale des Qtats. D'autant meme quo 
tous  les  edits  des  rois  n'ont  d'autro 
fondement  que leur volont4 et plaisir, 
qu'iceux  sont  r4vocahles  par  eux- 
memes  d'un  consentement  conll-airs, 
ou quolque occurrence nouvcllo, ou con- 
sideration.  . . . 
"  Que  10s  rois  n'bi,oient  tonus  aux 
lois civilcs ; mais aussi qu'ils n'etoient 
exempts de suivro 10s  lois 6tablics  do 
Dieu, soi les naturelles . . .,  ni les autres 
sous conditions desq~~ellos,  la couronno 
lour dtoiont d6fBrOe, lcsquelles  its Qtoient 
nocessit6s  do  snivre,  entretenir  et 
maintenir comme jurees A  leur sacre et 
onction royale." 
'  RecuciI dos Ancionnes 'ois,'  kc., 
vol.  14 (p. 632) : "  Extrait des Cahiers 
du  Tier*  Etat pr6sent6s au Roi  aux 
gtats de Blois,"  1588:  'LSur  le point 
do  la  justice  . . . que  les  Cours  do 
l'arlement  ne  pussent  Q  l'advenir 
publier  et enregistrer  les Bdits,  avant 
qu'ils  0usSent  6t6  cOmmuniqu6s  aux 
procureurs-syndics  des  6tats  dans  lea 
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or even the notables, but published it with the advice of  the 
Princes of  the Blood, other princes and officers  of  the crown, 
and other great and notable persons of  his Council of  State ; 
but he was careful to say that he did this after he had examined 
the  Cahiers des plaintes "  of  his Catholic subjects, and after he 
had permitted his subjects of  the Reformed religion to assemble 
and  prepare  their  statements ; and  that  it was  only when 
these had been carefully considered that the Edict was issued.l 
We  must  turn  to  the  financial  authority  of  the  Estates 
Provincial  and General in  the sixteenth century.  We must 
bear in mind that the position of  the Provincial Estates was 
of  great importance, and that even though the States General 
only  met  occasionally, it must  not  be  assumed that it was 
admitted  that the  French  crown  had  the  right  to impose 
taxation at its own discretion.  We give a few examples of  the 
recognition of  the place of  the Provincial Estates in this matter. 
On the occasion of  the marriage of  Louis XII. to Anne the 
Duchess  of  Brittany  in  1499, it was  specially provided  in 
the  Lettcrs  Patent  confirming  the  liberties  of  the  Duchy, 
that when subsidies were to be levied, the Estates were to be 
called together in the accustomed  and we  find that 
in 1501 the Royal Commissioners, who  were  sent to hold  a 
'Recueil,' vol. 15,No. 124 (p. 171) : 
"  Pour  cesto  occasion  ayont recogneu 
cette affairo de trds grande importance 
et digue  de trds  bonne  consid6ration, 
aprds avoir repris les cahiers dos plaintes 
de  nos  subjects  catholiques,  nyant 
aussi  permis  h.  nosdits  subjects de  la 
religion prdtendue roform60, do s'assem- 
bler  par  dbputations pour  drosser  les 
lours st  mcttro ensemble toutes lesdites 
remontrances,  et  sur  ce  fait  confer6 
avec eux par diverses fois et reveu les 
arr6ts  pr6cedents ;  nous  avons  jug6 
necessairo  do  donnor  maintenant  sur 
le tout B  tous nosdits  subjects une loi 
g6n6rale, claire, notte  et  absolue, p%r 
laquelle  ils  soient  regles  sur  tous  les 
differends qui sont cy-devant  sur ce sur- 
rvenus entre eux, et y pourront encores 
survonir  cy-aprds. . . .  Pour  ces 
causes, ayant avec l'avis des princes de 
nostre sang, autres princes et offioiers 
de  la  couronne,  et autres grands  et 
notables personnages de nostre conseil  , 
d'estat  prds de nous,  bien  et diligom- 
ment  poisb  et  considQr6 tout  cestc 
affaire, avons par cost Qdict porpetuel 
st irrbvocable dit, declare et ordonn6, 
disons, dbclarcons et ordonnons etc." 
'  Ordonnances,'  vol.  21,  1499 
(p. 150)'(4) : "  Item que en  tant que 
touche  6s  impositions  de fouaiges  et 
autres subsides livrcz on  cuoillis audit 
pays de Brotaigno, los gens des estats 
dudit pays soyont convoquez et appellez 
on  la form accoustam6e." 
Cf.  'Ordonnanco  of  1498'  (vol.  21 
p.  76) on  the  question  of  raising  the 
price of  salt in Burgundy. 
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meeting of the Estates of  Brittany, were instructed to report 
to them the great expenses of  the war in Italy, and to ask 
them  to  grant  special taxation  to meet  these.l  In 1551 
Henry 11. forbade the "  Parlement 7'  of  Grenoble to interfere 
in the levy of  taxes which the Estates of  Dauphine imposed 
at their  annual  ~neeting.~  In 1571 it  would  appear  that 
Charles IX. asked the Estates of  Brittany to grant a subsidy 
of  300,000  limes,  but  they  would  only  give  120,000.3  In 
1578 the Estates of  Normandy  demanded  the reduction  of 
taxation to the level of  the time of  Louis XII., and granted 
the taille for one year only.4 
When we  turn to the national authority we  find that there 
are some important references, even in the first part of  the 
sixteenth century.  Louis XII. in 1508 speaks of  the  grants 
of  money in the form of  aids, tailles, and gabelles, as having 
been imposed by his  ancestors  after great  deliberations with 
the princes, prelates, nobles, burgesses, and other inhabitants 
of  the country, to resist the invasions of  its  enemies.6  It is 
true that the words do not refer directly to the States General, 
but they  seem  to imply  the  national  consent  to  taxation. 
Francis I., in  giving his  mother  charge  of  the  kingdom  in 
1515  and  1523  during  his  absence  at the  wars  in  Italy, 
specifically mentions that he has given her authority to call 
together the Estates of the kingdom, or of  particular provinces, 
to report  to them the condition  of  his  affairs,  and  to ask 
them  for  aids.6  In 1549 Henry  11.  issued  an  Ordinance 
raising  the wages  of  the '(  Gendarmerie,"  and  substituting 
this  for  the contributions  in kind  which  the inhabitants  of 
the places  where they  were  quartered  had  been  obliged  to 
make to them ; but he adds that he had first caused the matter 
to be laid before the people of  the various provinces, and had 
received their approvaL7  In 1555 Henry repeated the Ordi- 
nance,  and again  added that ha  had imposed the necessary 
taxation with the consent of  his  subject^.^ 
'  Recuoil,'  vol. 61, No. 48 (p. 432).  '  Ordonnances,' vol. 21 (p. 385). 
Id., vol. 13, No.  204.  ' '  Recueil,' vol. 12 (p. 42). 
a  Picot,  Histoire des  Btats  Gonor.  '  Recueil,'  vol.  13, No.  102. 
aux,' vol. iii. p. 3, note 1.  Id., VO~.  13, NO. 265, 
'  Id. id.,  vol. ii. p. 389. 
VOL.  VI.  2 n: We  have  already  dealt  with  the important  constitut,ional 
conceptions of  the history  and nature of  the States General 
which the Ghanccllor, Michel L'Bdpital, set out in the speech 
with which he opened the States General at Orleans in Deeem- 
ber  15GO.l  For  our present purpose it is important to con- 
sider the speecli he made to them on 31st Jallunry 1561. 
He first put before them the lamentable financial position 
of  the king, whose debts now amounted to 43 million livres. 
He proposed that t,he clergy should undertake to redeem the 
royal domain and the aids  and  LL gabelles " which  had been 
alienated,  and  he  proposed  to  the  Third  Estate  that  the 
" gabelle "  in salt, the  tailles,"  and the tax on  wine  sliould 
be  greatly  increased ; but  he  also  assured  them  the  king 
asked  this  only  for  a  period  of  six  years,  after  which  all 
the taxes should be restored to the level at which they stood 
in the time of  Louis XII.  It is important also to observe that 
L'H6pital  added, that as the members  of  the Estates said 
that  they  had  not  received  authority  to make  any  grant, 
they  should  return  to  their  provinces,  and  consult  them, 
and return in Bla~.~ 
When the States Gencral mat at Blois in 1576, several of  the 
deputies of  the Third Estate represented that the crown was 
1 Cf.  p.  473. 
&I.  L'HOp~ial,  ' (Euvres Complotos,' 
vol. ii. (p. 161).  Tho king had reduced 
his expenditure, but there was a heavy 
debt of  43 million livres, and he therefore 
begged  tho  estates  "Q  subvenir  8.  son 
princo et lui ayder Q son urgent neces- 
sit6 " (p. 1G4).  Tho king  beggod  the 
clergy  "  do  racheptor  son  domaine, 
sos aydes  et gabelles aliesnez, et s'il.3 
no lo pouvoit faire prhntement, qu'ils 
lo fist, dens six ann6es prochaines. . . . 
Tontos  fois  avait  Qt6 advid ung  ox- 
pod~ont,  qu'aux  lieux  et endrolts  ou 
lo roy prenait pon  droit do gabollos, on 
l6voroit  sur  chascung  muyd  do  sel 
quinze livres tournois  et aux lieux oh 
il n'y a gabelles, on prendrast ung quart 
au autres redevances. . . . 
(p.  165)  Et  au  regard  du  tiers- 
estat, quilz consentissent 8. l'augmenta- 
tion des tailles;  et ob l'on  no  percoit 
que  les droicts  de  huitiesme  ou  dou- 
ziome du vin, que lo  roy on  prendroit 
lo  quart  ou  autre  raisonnable  impost 
. . . et  quo  le  roy  ne  demandoist 
losdits  imposts, aydes  et  subventions, 
quo pour six ans au plus, et si plutost 
il  se  trouvoit  acquitt6  de  ses dobtos, 
il  romettroit  lo  tout  B  son  anoienne 
forme,  ot  en  to1  estat  qu'il  estoit  du 
regno de Louis XII. . . . 
(p. 166) Et parce  que lesdits estats 
avirent  rornonstrir,  qu'ils  n'avoient 
charges do coulx qui les avoiont oom- 
miz  d'aucune  chose  accordor,  dlct 
qu'ilz  se retirassent  en  leurs pays,  et 
nvsemblassent par gouvernemens, que 
dedans  le  premier  jour  do  Mai  112 
compamssent &  Melun." 
CHAP. 1v.I  REPRESENTATIVE  INSTITUTIONS IN PRACTICE.  483 
levying  money  by  various  new impositions,  contrary to the 
ancient constitution, and it was agreed to request the king to 
cause  inquiries  to  be  made  about  this  in  each  province.l 
The nobles joined in this request,2 and again, when  the Third 
Estate was asked to grant an aid of  two million "  livres,"  it 
replied  that  they  had  received  no  power  from  their  con- 
stituencies to make such a grant.3 
At  the Estates  of  Blois  in 1588, one  of  the Burgundian 
deputies  complained  that they  had  been  compelled  to pay 
extraordinary  impositions "  eontre  la  libertd  et lo  privilege 
du pays,"  and the Third Estate joined  in tho  demand that 
the taille sllould be reduced to the level of 1576.5 
As  we  have  already  pointed  out, no  States  General  met 
during the reign  of  Henry IV., but it must  be  noticed  that 
it was with the advice and consent of  the Assembly of  Notables 
which  he  called  together  in  1596 that the new  tax of  tho 
"  pancarte " was  imposed  in  1597 ;  and  it  was  provided 
that while one-half of  the proceeds of  the tax was to be under 
the dircct  control of  the king, tho other half  was  to be  ad- 
ministered  by  a  commission  appointed  by  the  notabIes. 
This arrangement did not, however, continue long.  After  a, 
few  months  the  commission  transferred  their  part  to the 
king, and in 1602 Henry IV. abolished the tax, on the ground 
that it had  been  found pnculi&r,rly onerous, and substituted 
other forms of  taxation for it.= 
It  would  thus  appear  that in  the  sixteenth  century,  as 
before, apart from the ordinary revenues of  the crown, which 
now included the taille at a more or less definite amount, it 
was generally held that it was proper, if  not absolutely neces 
sary, that the crown should  obtain the consent  of  the com- 
'Recueil des Pi6oes ooncernement la  Pouple." 
Tenu des *tats  Gbneraux, 1560-1614,'  Id. id., p. 236. 
vol. iii. p. 233 : "  Que pendant I'assom-  Id. id., p. 260. 
b16s de ces presents &ats,  on fait lover  '  Id. id.,  vol.  iv.,  '  ProcAs-Verbal,' 
par les provinces plusieurs deniers sur  p. 231. 
ledit  Tiers-Etat,  tant  par  formes  Id. id.  id.,  ' Pieces Justifioativcx,' 
d'emprunts, nouvelles impositions, que  p. 131. 
autres  nouvellett6s,  et  Brect~ons do  'Recueil,'  vol.  15,  No.  110  and 
nouveaux  gtats  et  Officiers,  contre  NO.  162. 
1'Estat  ancion,  et  2%  la  foul19  du 
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munity, either formally or informally, through the Provincial 
%states, the States  General, or  some  less  formal  assembly, 
before  it  could  impose  taxation.  It  is  no  doubt  probably 
true that in the sixteenth century, as in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, the crown from time to time raised money 
without  any constitutional formality, but it seems clear that 
this was irregulm.  CHAPTER  V. 
THE  THEORY  OF  REPRESENTATIVE  INSTITUTlONS  IN 
THE  POLITICAL  LITERATURE  OF  THE  SIXTEENTH 
CENTURY. 
WE have so far considered the importance of  the representa- 
tive  institutions  as  we  find  them  illustrated  in  the  actual 
proceedings  of  the  Cortes  and  the  Estates,  Provincial  and 
General, of  Spain and France, but we  must now take account 
of  the discussion of  the subject in the political treatises and 
pamphlets of the sixteenth century.  We have said enough to 
show that these representative institutions  continued in the 
sixteenth century to have some real importance in the struc- 
ture of  political society. 
This, however, is not a sufficient account of  the significance 
of  the  conception  of  the  organised  representation  of  the 
community.  We think that it is clear that the importance of 
this  was  almost  universally  recognised  in  theory,  and  was 
accepted even by those who insisted most strongly upon the 
authority of  the monarchy. 
We may begin by reminding ourselves of  the terms in which 
Cornmines, in the last years of  the fifteenth  century  (or the 
first  years  of  the  sixteenth  century), refers  to  tho  States 
General.  Commines7 own opinion was  that the royal  power 
was greatly increased when the king acted with the advice or 
counsel of  his subjects, that is of  tho Estates ; he speaks with 
disdainful contempt of  those who  opposed their meetings as 
tending to diminish the royal authority ; and he is equally 
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impose taxation  on  his  subjects without  their  c0nsent.l  It 
is  quite clear that to Commines the meet,ings of  the Estates 
were  a  normal,  useful,  and even,  for  financial  purposes,  a 
necessary part of  any intelligent system of  government ; and 
this is the more important because he was a great servant and 
officer of  the French crown. 
It is,  again, true that while  de Seyssel's  principle  of  the 
limitation  of  the  authority  of  the French  monarchy  rested 
primarily  upon  a  legal  foundation,  and that he  was  little 
interested  in  representative  institutions,  he  was  clear  in 
maintaining that when  there were great matters to consider, 
such as war or legislation, the king should call together, not 
his Ordinary Council, but a great council of  princes, prelates, 
nobles, jurists, and (though he  seems to admit it grudgingly) 
some citizens of  the great towns.2  De Seyssel had been, like 
Commines, for many years in the service of  the French crown. 
Again, as we have seen in the last chapter, Michel L7H6pital 
as Chancellor of  France, at the opening of  the States General of 
Blois in 1559, spoke of  the ancient Kings of  France as having 
held  meetings  of  the Estates frequently, and  aid  that they 
bad  consulted  them on  matters of  grave importance for the 
country.  He  says  indeed that the king  was  not  bound  to 
take counsel with his people, but it was good and useful that 
Ile should do   SO.^  It is clear that in L7H6pital's opinion the 
States  General,  as  representing  the  French  people,  were  a 
normal and valuable part of  the political organisation  of  the  , 
country. 
It is also very important to observe that even Bodin, with 
all his  insistence  upon  the "Maiestas " (sovereignty) of  the 
King of  France, maintains the great importance of  the meet- 
ings of  thc representative  assemblies, and indeed  states this 
as a general principle which applied not only to France, but 
to the  other  important  countries  of  Western  Europe.  He 
urges the great advantages of  such assemblies for dealing with 
ljhe evils which might arise in the commonwealth, for making 
laws,  or  for  raising  money.  He  praises  the  Spanish  and 
Cf. pp. 214 and 201.  Cf. p. 473. 
Cf. p. 233. 
English  rule  that  their  LL Curiae " or  LL Parlamenta " met 
every  three  years,  and  while  he  admits  that the King  of 
France  did  not  call  together  the '' Comitia " (the  States 
General) so frequently, he points out that six of  the French 
provinces had their particular assemblies.  He mentioils with 
approval  Commines7 vigorous  criticism  of  those  who  had 
opposed the meeting of  the States General, on the accession of 
Charles VIII.  (Tours, 1484) ; and finally he  describes  with 
admiration the system of  representative assemblies, local and 
general,  which  were  highly  developed  in  Switzerland  and 
Bodin,  '  De  Republica,'  IIT.  7 
(p.  346) :  " "  Regia  tamen  potestas 
optimis legibus ac institutis moderata, 
nihil  corporibus  et  collegiis  firmius 
aut stabilius  habere  potest.  Nam  si 
opibus, si pecuniis, exercitu, regi  opus 
est, id  o~nnium  optime  a  collegiis et 
corporibus  fieri  solet.  Quinetiam  illi 
ipsi  qoi  conventus,  quae  I-Iispani 
curiae, Angli parlamcnta vocant abolori 
cupiunt, urgentibus  periculis ad  con- 
ventus,  velut  ad  sacram  anchoram 
confugiunt,  ut  seipsos  Rempublicam 
ab  hostibus  tueantur.  Ubi  enim 
melius de curandis Reipublicae morbis, 
de sanandis populis, de iubendis legibus, 
de  statu  conformando,  quam  apud 
principem  in  Senatu,  coram  populo 
agi  potest 7  . . . Quamobrem  sapi- 
enter ab Anglis et Hispanis institutum 
est, si quidem illud toneremus, populi 
convcntus tertio quoque  anno  haberi, 
et  ut  princeps  libentius  id  faceroh, 
nullum inlperari tributum poterat, nisi 
populi  conventus  habercntur :  id 
quod etiamnum factum memini, quum 
ab Andium Duce Francisco in Angliam 
iussus legationis causa traijeci.  Nostri 
rcges  non  ita snepe  ut Angli  comitia 
cogunt,  sed  cum  sexdecim provinciae 
in hoc imperio numerentur, sox habent 
sua quaednm singularia comitia, quae 
ut omnino tollerentur modis omnibus 
tentatum est ab iis  qui sua scolora et 
peculatus  pervulgari  metuunt.  Ut 
etiam  Carolo  VIII  Roge  Imperi~un 
ineunte,  cum  universae  provinciae 
conventus  haberi  opertere  una  voce 
conclamarentur,  non  defuerunt  qui 
maiestatis  crimen  ingererent  iis,  qui 
in senatu cum populo idem  sentirent ; 
quibus  acerrime  restitit  Philippus 
Comminius  rerum  gerendarum  usu 
clarissimus  senator.  Sed  quam  sint 
necessaria totius populi concilia, ex co 
perspicitur,  quod  quibus  populis  sua 
concilia  cogere  licet,  cum  iis  optime 
agitur :  coeteri  populi  tributis  ac 
servitute  urgentur,  nam  singulorum 
voces minus exaudiuntur : totius vere 
provinciae  clarissima vox  est, rogatio 
eff~cax,  quam ne princeps quidem ipso, 
si  velit,  repudiare  possit.  Quanquam 
innumorabiles  sunt  conciliorum  utili- 
tates.  Nam  si conscribondi exercitus, 
imperanda  tributa,  cogenda  pecumin 
sit, tum ad hostes repcllandos, tum ad 
latrocinia  perditorum  hominum  coer- 
cenda,  turn  ad  portus,  arces,  mocnia 
sartatecta aint, vias et coetera id genus 
sarcicnda,  quae nulla  rationo  possunt 
a singulis, omnium optime ab universis 
conficiuntur ; ut onim omittam coctera. 
. . . Sod  qnao  do  conciliis  provinci- 
arum  discimus  quam  sint  Rebus- 
publicis  ufilin,  quam  provinciis  salu- 
taria,  quam  civitatibus sing~~lis  necos- 
saria,  omnium  optime  Holvetii  ac 
Cermani  sentiunt,  ooque  melius,  quo 
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Bodin  returns  to the subject in  a  later  book  of  the 'Do 
Republica,'  and  deals  specially with  the  principle  that no 
taxation could be imposed without the consent of  the Estates. 
He says that in an assembly held by Philip of  Valois in 1338 
it was  declared  that no  taxation  could be imposed without 
the consent of  thc Estates ; and that though Louis  XI. im- 
posed  a tax (without thcir consent) in  the last  years  of  his 
reign, this was abolished by the States General of  Tours on the 
ac&ssion  of  Charles VIII.  He adds  that  Commines  main- 
tained that princes could only impose taxes with the consent 
of  their subjects, as was still the rule in Spain, Britain, and 
Germany .l 
We  have already refcrred  to the very interesting and im- 
portant statements of  Jamee Almain and John Major, in the 
early years of  the century, that the community is superior to 
the Icing, and can depose him ; and John Major says that in 
difficult  matters  the  Three  Estates  of  the kingdom  are to 
direct  him.2  In another  place  we  have  out  that 
Calvin, with all his emphatic condemnation of  the disobedience 
of  private persons  to the divine authority  of  the ruler,  was 
also  clear  that if  the king  should  abuse  his  authority  and 
misgovern  his  subjects,  the  ma,gistrates  of  the  people,  or 
De  Helvetiis  notum  eat,  et  libris 
accurate  praescriptum :  de  Germanis 
obscurins,  habent  tamen  non  mod0 
singulae civitates sua collegia, corpora, 
iura universitatis : verum etiam decem 
Imperii provinciae, circulos ipsi  appel- 
lant, sua singul'is annis comitia cogunt, 
quorum  rogationes  ac  decreta  ad 
universos  totius  Imperii  convcntus 
referuntur :  quibus  Impcrium  illud 
stare videmus, et quibus sublatis ruore 
necesse est." 
'  Bodin,  '  De  Republica,'  VI.  2 
(p.  656) : "  Itaque  Philippo  Valesio 
conventus  Gallicos  habonte  anno 
MCCCXXXVIII,  populi  rogation8  docre- 
tum est, ne ullum tributi aut vectigalis 
genus  nisi  consentientibus  ordinibus 
imperaretur.  Ao  tamotsi  Ludovicum 
XI.  regem  gravissima  difficillimaque 
btlla eo impulissent, ut praeter vectigal 
praediorum  publicorum  ac  dominii 
fere octingenties H.  S. Tributi nomine 
extremo  imperii  suo  anno  exigeret : 
nihilominus tamen Carolo VIII. regnum 
ineunte, coactis apud Turones comitiis, 
annua  illa,  quae  ordinaria  evaserunt, 
tributa  sublata  sunt:  sed  eandem 
oblationem  quam  Carolo  VII.  dono 
dederant,  in  oerarium  ac  septuagios 
H. S. donationis  nomine  inferri, quam 
summam  semel  tantum  ab  universis 
ordinibus exigi placuit : ne impostcrum 
imperaretur.  Et  quidem  Philippus 
Comminius,  qui  tunc  publici  consilii 
particeps  erat, negavit principibus tri- 
buta  imperare  licere :  sod  ea  tantum 
capero  posse  qua8  consentientibus 
subditis  dono  darentur :  eoque  iuro 
Hispanos, Britannos, Germanos etiam. 
num uti videmus." 
Cf. pp. 245 and 248. 
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perhaps  the Three  Estates,  should  restrain  him1  We have 
also, in  an earlier  chapter, dealt  with  the conception of  the 
nature and source of law in St Germans (1539), and especially 
his treatment of  English law as being primarily founded upon 
custom;  and we  are here  only  concerned  to  observe  that 
whan  t'his  was  not  adequate,  the  laws  which  he  calls 
statutes could be  made  by the king,  the lords spiritual and 
temporal,  and  the  community  of  the  whole  kingdom  in 
Parliament. 
We  have  also  referred  to  that  important  work  of  Sir 
Thomas  Smith,  'De  Republica  Anglorum,'  which  sharply 
contrasts  the prince  who  governs  with  the consent  of  the 
people and according to the laws of  the commonwealth, with 
the tyrant who  makes  and breaks  the law at liis plea~ure.~ 
We must now consider his treatment of  the nature and power 
of  Parliament.  He defines a respublica or commonwealtE~  as 
being a  multitude of  free men  united  into one, and holding 
together  by mutual wills  and contracts,  for their protect-ion 
in  peace  and  war.4  The  fundamental  character  of  the 
government  of  the commonwealth  of  England he  describes 
in sweeping and emphatic words.  It belongs to three kinds 
of  men ; the king or queen by whose  will  and authority all 
things are ruled, tho greater  and lesser nobles, and the yeo- 
manry, and each of  these classes has its part in judgments, 
in election  of  officers,  in imposing taxation,  and in making 
laws.5  The  meaning  of  this far-reaching  statement  is  ex- 
plained when, in a  later  chapter, he goes on to describe the 
Parliament  and its powers.  It is in the Parliament  that the 
whole absolute power resides, for there are present  the king, 
the nobles,  the  commons,  and  the  olergy  are  represented 
by  the bishops.  It  is  they who  take  counsel for  the well- 
being  of  the kingdom  and commonwealth,  and when,  after 
long  deliberation,  a  Rill  is  read  three  times,  discussed  in 
both  Houses,  approved,  and  confirmed  by  the  assent  of 
the  king,  no  question  can  be  raised  as  to  what  has  been 
Cf. p. 266. 
Wf. pp. 234 236. 
a  Cf. p.  326. 
Sir  Thos.  Smith, '  De  Republica 
Anglorum,' I. 10 (ed. 1683). 
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decided, for it has the force of  1aw.l  There was  indeed little 
or nothing that was new in this, but it is interesting to compare 
the statement of  the "  absolute " authority which resides in 
Parliament with the conception of  Bodin. 
Sir  Thomas  Smith  goes  on  to enumerate  the  powers  of 
Parliament, and in a later chapter, those of  the king.  Parlia- 
ment among other things makes laws, declares the rights and 
properties of  private persons, establishes the forms of  religion, 
determines the succession to the kingdom, imposes taxati~n.~ 
The king, on the other hand, has the right  of  making war 
and peace, of  appointing the Council, he has absolute power, 
not restricted by any laws, in time of  war ;  he has control over 
the currency,  the right  of  moderating  the  severity  of  law, 
when  mercy  and  equity  require  it; he  appoints  the  chief 
officers  of  the  kingdom,  and no  jurisdiction  great  or  little 
belongs to anyone except the king.3 
We  have  set  out  these  statements  of  political  writers, 
mostly of  the earlier part of  the century, because, as it seems 
to us, it is only when we  have made clear to ourselves what 
was  the normal judgment  of  the time that we  can properly 
understand  and  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  often 
highly controversial literature of  the later part of  the century. 
We have already cited  George Buchanan7s emphatic state- 
ment  that the legislative  authority  belonged  to the  whole 
people  of  a  commonwealth,  but  that  as  in  Scotland  this 
Id.  id.,  11.  1 : "  The  most  high 
and  absolute  of  the  realm  of 
England consisteth  in the Parliament. 
For as in warre where the king himself 
in person, the nobilitie, the rest of  the 
gentilitie,  and  the  yeomanrie  are,  is 
the force and power of  England : so in 
peace and consultation when the Prince 
is  to  give  . . . the  last  and  highest 
commandement,  the  Baronio  for  the 
nobilitie  and  higher,  the  knights  ea- 
quiers, gentlemen and commons for tho 
lower  part  of  the commonwealth, the 
bishoppes for  the clergie, bee  present 
to avertise,  consult  and  shew  what  is 
good  and necessarie for  the common- 
wealth,  and  to consult together;  and 
upon mature deliberation everie bill or 
lawe  being  thrise reade  and  disputed 
uppon  in  either house, the  other  two 
partes  first  each apart, and  after  the 
Prince himself  in presence of  both the 
partios doeth consent unto and alloweth. 
That is the Prince's and whole realmes' 
deede : whereupon justlie no man can 
complaine, but must accomodate him- 
selfe to finde it good and obey it." 
Id. id., 11.  1. 
Id. id., 11.  4. 
power  should  be  entrusted  to persons  chosen  from all  the 
orders  (Estates) who  should  deliberate  with  the  king,  and 
that only after this should the final judgment be given by the 
peop1e.l 
In the Huguenot pamphlets the demand for the recognition 
of  a  regular  representative  authority  was  founded  in  the 
first place upon historical contentions, which may have been 
in  some  respects  overstated  and  even  fantastic,  but  that 
does not mean they had no value.  Hotman in the '  Franco 
Gallia  (1573) maintained  that the supreme  government  in 
the Merovingian period belonged to the assembly of  the repre- 
sentatives of  the whole people, which met every year, and was 
composed  of  the king,  the nobles,  and the  deputies  of  the 
provinces, and he held that this continued in the Carolingian 
period,  and under  the house  of  Ca~et.~  He was  on firmer 
ground  when  he  came  to  the  later  Middle  Ages,  and  put 
together a number of  examples of  tho importance and actions 
of  the St,ates General in France,  from  the time  of  the first 
great meeting,  to deal  with  the conflict  between Philip the 
Fair and Boniface VIII. in 1302, down to the States General 
of  Tours in 1484.3  He cites that important passage in Com- 
mines'  '  Memoires,'  to which  we  have  already referred,  and 
concludes  that  it mas  only  the  flatterers  of  the  king  who 
resisted the freedom of  the Estat~.~ 
Much  of  this may  seem  a  little fanciful,  but it is not  so 
fant,astic as the notion  that in  the Middle Ages  the govern- 
ment  of  the  Empire  or  the  French  kingdom  had  been 
that of  an absolute  monarch.  We  are, however,  not  here 
concerned with the accuracy of  Hotman's  appeal to history, 
but with the importance of  its appearance at this time.  For 
it  recurs  in  the  other  important  political  tracts  of  the 
time. 
The  '  Remonstrance  demanded  the  restoration  of  the 
ancient laws and the assembling of  the Estates, as had been 
the custom  till thc French kings  desired  to rule  absolutely 
I  Cf. p.  333.  Id. id., XVI1.-XIX. 
Hotman, '  Franco  Gallia,'  X., pp.  Id. id..  XIX. (p. 708). 
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(souverainement) and un~ontrolled.~  The writer cites various 
examples  of  such  meetings  in Merovingian and Carolingian 
times,  and  contends  that it  was  by  these  means  that  the 
proper relations between the king, the nobles, and the people 
had  been  maintained,  and  should  now  be  restored.=  He 
urges the excellent results of the meeting of  the States General 
at Tours in 1484, and the good  work  begun  by the Estates 
which  met  at Orleans  in  1560,  which  had  been  unhappily 
frustrated  by  evil   machination^.^  What  is  better,  he  ex- 
claims, than that the Ordinance of  God should be graved on 
the heart of  the king, and that the king should govern with 
the goodwill and consent  of  his  peoplc ; and what  is  more 
detestable than that he should lord it over them by constraint ; 
how can the State be now maintained but by  the ancient and 
sacred rule of calling togctller the Estates, by mcails of  which 
some remedy  might  be  found for the corruption  of  religion 
anrl j~stice.~ 
The '  Droit dcs Magistrats ' points out the excellent results 
of  the recognition of the authority of  Parliament in EngIand,S 
and asserts  that  the  French  peoplo  had  from  the first  so 
ordered the monarchy that the kings did not reign by heredi- 
tary succession alone, but were elected by t,he Estates of  the 
1 '  Remonstrance  aus  Seigneurs,'  Id., p. 77. 
p. 76 : "  Procure5 que 18s lois anciennes  Id., p.  78. 
obtiennent et recouvrent leurs vigueurs  Id.,  p.  78 : "  Qu'y  a  il  plus  re- 
en ce Royaume, et quo par la convoca-  commandablc, quo quand l'ordonnance 
tion legitime des Estats (ou comme en  do Dieu qui est authcur ot consorvateur 
un Royaume libre, les langues doivent  de  tout  bon  ordre,  est  cngrauee  au 
aussi estro libres), on  pourvoye  8.  une  cceurs des Roy, et lo Roy regne auec la 
ruine  prochaine  dont  la  Franco  est  benevolence  et consentement  de  son 
menassee.  Qui est un moyen legitilne  peuple.  Comme aussi il n'y  a rien do 
des  la  premiere  institution  de  ceste  plus  detestable  que  quand  le  prince 
Monarchie, pratiqub et continub iusqucs  veut  dominer  par  contrainte,  et per- 
a ce  que nos Roys ayent voulu regner  vertit la fin pour laquelle il est ordonne 
souverainement sans estre contrerollez,  do Dieu.  Et  comment est il anjourdhuy 
lequel il est expedient et necessaire de  possible de maintenir  cest  estat . . . 
revoquer en usage.  En ces assemblces,  si ce n'est  par ceste ancienne et sainte 
qui au commencement se nommoyont  observance, d'asscmbler les Estats, par 
parlemens, le  Roy communiquait avec  lesquels on  pourra  remedicr  8,  la cor- 
ses  sujets,  prenoit  leurs  advis,  oyoit  ruption  qui  a  tant  gaign6e  sur  la 
leurs plaintes  et y pourvoyait.  Et de  Religion  et la justice." 
ceste police dependent  la  grandcur  de  '  Droit des Magistrats,' p. 760. 
la France." 
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kingdom,  who  had  also  exercised the  right  of  dep0sition.l 
The  ancient  and authentic  histories  showed  that  the same 
Estates had possessed the authority to appoint  and remove 
the  principal  officers  of  the  crown,  or  at least  to  observe 
what the kings did in this matter, and to control taxation and 
the other more important affairs of  the kingdom in war and 
peace.  The writer recognised indeed that this was no longer 
the case in France, but he maintains that this was contrary 
to the methods of  the "  Anciens " and "  directement repug- 
nant  aux  loix  posees  avec  le  fondement  de  la  Monarchic 
Fran~aiso,"  and he  appeals to all good jurists  to say whether 
any prescription was valid against these." 
The  '  Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos ' sets  out the  some con- 
ception  in  emphatic  terms.  In encient  times  the assembly 
of  the Three  Estates met  every year,  in  later periods from 
time to time, to determine matters concerning the common- 
wealth, and the authority of  this assembly was such that its 
decisions were held as sacred.  It was in its power to deter- 
mine  such  matters as war  and peace,  as the imposition  of 
taxation,  and when  the corruption  or tyranny  of  the king 
required,  it  could  even  change  the succession.  Hereditary 
succession had been accepted  to avoid the inconveniences of 
election, but when it  caused greater  evils and the kingdom 
became a tyranny, the lawful assembly of the people retained 
authority to depose the tyrant and to appoint a good king in 
his place.= 
Id., p. 766. 
Id., p. 767. 
8  ' Vindiciac Contra Tyrannos,'  Q. 3, 
p.  98 :  "At praeter  haec,  quotannis 
olim, post vero eliquando,  quotiescun- 
que saltem necessitas postulabat, habe- 
batur  trium  ordinum  conventus,  quo 
regiones urbesque omnes alicuius nomi- 
nis  suos legatos mittebant, et quidem 
Plebei,  Nobiles,  Ecclesiastici  in  una- 
quaque  sigillatim,  ubi  de  his  quae 
ad  Rempublicam  pertinebant  publicc 
statuebatur.  Eius  vero  conventus, 
ma  fuit  perpetua  authoritas,  ut  non 
modo,  quao  ibi  statuta  forcnt  sacra 
sanctaque haberentur, seu pax facienda, 
seu  bellum  gerendum,  sive  Regni 
Procuratio  cuiquam  deferenda,  sive 
veetigal  imperandum  esset :  verum 
etiam  regis  luxus,  desidiae,  tyranni- 
disve causa in coenobia detruderentur, 
eoque  authore, universae  adeo stirpes 
regni successione privarentur, non secus 
ac primum, Populo auctore, ad regnum 
vocatae fucrant.  Nempe quas consen- 
sus  extulerat,  dissensus  exturbabat. 
. . . Ex quo sane liquet, successionem 
tolleratam  quidem ad vitandum smbi- 
tum, secessionem, interregnum, et alia 
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Mariana's  conception is clear, but it is further developed in 
a  very  important  passage  dealing  directly  with  the Cortes. 
In order to restrain the king within due bounds, our ancestors, 
he  says,  had  provided  that nothing  of  greater  importance 
should be  done  without  the' will  of  the chief  men  and the 
people,  and  to  this  end  it was  the  custom  to call  to  the 
assembly  of  the  kingdom  men  chosen  from  all  the  orders 
(Estates), the Bishops, the "  Proceres "  and the Procurators of 
the cities.  This still continued in Aragon and other provinces 
of  Spain, but in Castile (in nostra gente) it had for some time 
come  about that the L'Pr~~ere~  " and the Bishops had been 
excluded from the assembly, and he  suggests that this  had 
been done in order that public affairs should be controlled by 
the capricious will of  the king and the desires of  a few.  The 
people  complained  that  the  Procurators  of  the  cities  who 
alone continued to attend were frequently corrupted by bribes 
and promises, especially  as they were  appointied by lot and 
not by deliberate choice.1 
These observations  of  Mariana  on  the composition of  the 
Cortes of  Castile are very important and interesting, and in 
the remainder  of  the  chapter  he  develops  his  view  of  the 
importance of  the aristocratic element in the Spanish  consti- 
Nec  mirum  cum  robore  corporis sine 
consilio, sine prudentia  ad servitirtem 
nati aunt quidam :  Principum imperium, 
quamvis graue, volentes nolentes ferunt. 
Nos  hoc loco non  de barbaris, sed  de 
principatu  qui  in  nostra  gente  viget 
et vigere aequtun est, deque optima et 
saluberrima  imperandi  forma  dis- 
putamus." 
Id. id., I. 8 (p. 76)  : "  Roc maiores 
nostri,  providentes  viri  prudentes 
periculum, ut Reges continerent  intra 
modestiae et mediocritatis  fines, ne so 
nimia potestate  efferent, undo publica 
parnicias  existeret,  multa  sapientor 
Ranxer~mt atque  praoclare.  In  his 
quam  prudenter,  quod  nihil  maioris 
rei  sine voluntate procerum  et populi 
sanctum  esse  voluerunt ; eoque  con- 
silio, delectos ex omnibus ordinibus ad 
conventus regni, Pontifices tots  ditione, 
proceres,  et  procuratores  civitatum 
euocare moria erst.  Quod hoc tempore 
in Aragonia Jiisqueprouinciis retentum, 
vellem  nostri  Principes  reponerent. 
Cur  enim rnaiori ex parte antiquatum 
in nostra gente eat, exclusis proceribus 
et Episcopis, nisi ut sublato communi 
consensu, quo salus publica continetur, 
Regis  ad  arbitrium,  at ad  pancorwn 
libidinem res publicae  et privatao ver- 
tantur.  Homines  priuatos,  quales 
procuratores  urbium  sunt,  qui  soli 
hac tompestate supersunt, donis speque 
corrumpere conquoritur populuspassim : 
praesertim  non  iudicio  delectos,  sed 
sortis temeritate designates, quae nova 
corruptele eet, argumenturn reipublicae 
perturbatae, quod prudentiores dolent, 
mutire nemo audet." 
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tution.  We  are, however, not writing a history  of  constitu- 
tions,  and  cannot  therefore  deal  with  this  question  as  it 
deserves. 
We turn to Hooker, and it is highly important to observe 
how emphatically so careful and restrained a political thinker 
sets out the importance of  the authority of  the community as 
represented in Parliarncnt.  In the first book of  the '  Ecclesi- 
astical Polity ' he was  dealing with the general principles of 
law, and the source of the positive law in the authority of  the 
community ; he was not concerned, except incidentally, with 
the question of  the representation of  the community.  Such 
reference, however, as he  made,  was  clear and unequivocal. 
"  Laws,"  he  says,  lL they  are  not  therefore  which  public 
approbation  hath not  made  so.  But approbation not  only 
they give who personally declare their assent by voice, sign, 
or act, but also  when  others  do  it in their names by  right 
originally  at least  derived  from  them.  As  in  parliaments, 
councils, and the like assemblies, although we  be not person- 
ally  ourselves  present,  notwithstanding  our  assent  is  by 
reason of  others, agents there in our behalf."  It is Parlia- 
ment which expresses that public approbation without which 
there is no law. 
It is, however, in the eighth book that Hooker's treatment 
of  representative authority is fully  developed.  Re doe8  this 
in his  careful discussion  of  the relation  of  the ecclesiastical 
authority to that of  thc State, and it is in this connection that 
he sets out with great precision his conception of  the nature 
of  Parliament, and of  its relation  to the king and the whole 
community.  "  The  Parliament  of  England,  together  with 
the  convocation  annexed  thereunto,  is  that  whereupon  the 
very essence of  all government within this realm doth depend ; 
it is  even the body  of  the whole realm;  it consisteth of  the 
king  and of  all that within  the land are subject  unto him ; 
for they are all there present,  either in person or by such as 
they  voluntarily  have  derived  their  very  per,wnal  right 
1 Hooker, ' Ecclesiastical PoliLy,'  I. 10, 8. 
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unto.'7 l  Such  is  Hooker's  conception  of  the  nature  of 
Parliament, and lest there should be any confusion as to the 
source of  its authority, he adds at the end  of  this section : 
" Which laws being made amongst us, are not by  any of  us 
to be so taken or interpreted as if  they did receive their force 
from  power  which  the  prince  doth  communicate  unto  the 
Parliament, or to any other court under him, but from power 
which the whole body of  the realm being naturally possessed 
with, hath by free  and  deliberate  assent  derived unto him 
that  ruleth  over  them,  so  far  forth  as  hath  been  already 
declared.', l 
The  authority  of  the laws  is  derived,  not from  the king, 
but from the whole community, as indeed is the authority of 
the  king  himself,  as  we  have  seen  in  an  earlier  ~hapter.~ 
The authority  of  the king  in  regard to the making  of  laws 
had  been  described  a  little  earlier  in  the  same  section  as 
mainly negative.  "  The supremacy of  power which our kings 
have in the case of  making laws, it resteth principally in the 
strength of  a negative  voice ; which not to give them, were 
to deny  them that without  which  they were  but kings  by 
mere title, and not in exercise of  dominion." 
It is clear that Hooker, Like  St Germans and Sir Thomas 
Smith, had no  doubt  that in  England  the  suprcme  power, 
that is the legislative, resided  not  in  the king  alone, or in 
any smaller  body  of  persons,  but in  that assembly  which 
contained all, and represented all the community, the king, the 
peers, and the whole body of  the people. 
Finally, we  turn once  again to Althusius, who is specially 
important to us  as expressing the continuity  of  that repre- 
sentative theory in Germany which we  have seen in Leopold 
of  Babenberg and in Nicolas of  Cusa.3 
Althusius describes the nature and functions of  the councils 
of  the commonwealth, no  doubt primarily  with the constitu- 
tional system  of  the German Empire in his  mind,  but also 
as the embodiment of  a general principle of  political society. 
Id. id., VIII. 6, 11. 
Cf. p. 370. 
a  Cf. pp. 39 and 215. 
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They are composed of the  members 77 of  the political society, 
and consider and determine upon all the difficult and weighty 
matters which  concern  the whole  imperium,"  such as the 
fundamental laws, the "  iura Maiestatis," the taxes, and other 
matters  which  require  the  deliberation  and  consent  of  the 
whole  ('  polity."  A11  the  LC members " have  the  right  of 
deliberation,  but the decision is  made  by  the votes  of  the 
maj0rity.l 
This  is  clear  and important,  but  of  equal  importance  is 
Althusius'  statement  of  the  principles  (rationes)  on  which 
this representative system rests.  First, that which concerns all 
should be done by all ; second, it is better that these matters 
should be considered by many, for many know more and are 
less easily mistaken than a few ; third, there are some affairs 
which  cannot  be  dealt  with  except  by  the  people  in  such 
councils ; fourth, those who have great power are restrained 
and  corrected  by  the  fear  of  such  councils,  in  which  the 
demands of  all are freely heard.  Finally, it is in this manner 
that the liberty  of  the people  is  preserved,  and the public 
officers are compelled to give account of  their administration, 
and to acknowledge that the people or universal society, by 
which they have been created, is their lord.2 
'  Althusius,  '  Politics,'  XVII.  56 : 
"  Concilia  illa  occumenica  generalia 
regni,  seu  corporis  consociati,  sunt 
membrorum  illius  convocatorum  con- 
ventus,  in  quo de  Republica  eiusque 
utilitate at commodis . . . deliberatur, 
et  consilorumcommunicationc pro salute 
communi aliquid  concluditur  st decer- 
nitur. 
In  his  itaque  conciliis  et  comitiis 
generaliter  totius  consociationis  uni- 
versalis, regni seu Reipublicae negotia 
illius ardua, difficilia et gravia tractnn- 
tur, examinantur  et concluduntur, uti 
sunt negotia et causae totum Imperium 
politiamve,  vel  membra  illius  concer- 
nentes,  de  legibus  fundamentalibus 
politiae, de iuribus  Maiestatis, de con- 
tributionibus et collectis indicandis . . . 
et de  aliiu, quae  communern  delibers 
tionem  et  consensum  totius  politiae 
postulant. 
57.  Concilia  igitur  et comitia  haec, 
politiae  vel  regni  sunt  epitome,  ad 
quam  omnia  publica  regni  negotia 
referuntur, et a membris regni discrussa 
et examinata dociduntur. 
58.  Ius deliberandi,  consultandi,  et 
examinandi  singula,  regni  et  Rei- 
publicne  membra  habent.  Ius  deci- 
dendi  vero est penes auffragia et sen- 
tentias plurimorum membrorum." 
Cf. id. id., XVII. 43, 44. 
Id.  id.,  XVII.  60 :  "  Rationes 
horum  Comitiorurn  sunt.  Primo, 
quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus peragi 
aequum  est.  . . . Deinde,  melius 
causa  a  pluribus  examinari . . .  cum 
plures  plura  sciunt,  et  minus  falli 
possunt.  Tertio,  quia  quaedam  sunt 500  THE  LATER  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY.  [PBRT  IV. 
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These are drastic and emphatic statements of  the principle 
that the supreme authority in a political society is not only 
derived from, but remains with the whole community or people, 
and the assembly which represents it.  There is indeed nothing 
here to surprise us, for, as we  have already seen, the supreme 
authority or "  Maiestas " always remains  and must remain, 
in the judgment  of  Althusius, with  the whole  community ;  l 
but it makes it  plain  that in  his  mind  this  was  no merely 
abstract  judgment,  but that this  supreme  authority  had  a 
concrete embodiment in the representative assembly. 
The reference to the representative assembly as protecting 
the liberty of  the people is interesting, and he returns to this 
in a later chapter.  It is, he says, a part of  liberty that those 
at whose risk,  and by whose blood  and treasure, things  are 
done,  should  administer  them  by  their  own  counsel  and 
authority. 
It  is  also  clear  that in  the judgment  of  Althusius  these 
representative  councils  of  the community  were  to be  found 
in all the countries of  Central and Western Europe, not only 
in the Empire but  in  France, in  England  (he refers to Sir 
Thomas Smith), in the Netherlands, Poland, Castile, Aragon, 
Portugal,  Denmark, Norway,  Sweden,  and  Scotland ;  and 
it should be observed  that he  describes the constitutions of 
the various territories  in  the  German  Empire as having the 
same character.4 
Althuaius was indeed no enemy of  monarchy, but he main- 
tained,  in  direct  opposition  no  doubt  especiaIIy  to  Bodin, 
negotia,  quae  non  possunt  nlsl  a 
populo  in  talibus  com~tlls tractari. 
Quarto,  qul  sunt  In  magna  potentla, 
horum comlt~orum  metu, m quo 11bere 
omnium postulata audluntur, In  officlo 
contlnerl  et corrigl possunt.  Den~que 
hoo  mod0  libortas  quaedam  populo 
superest, atque admlnlstratores  public^, 
rat~ones  suae admin~strat~oms  reddere, 
et populum, seu universalom consocla- 
tlonem,  domlnum  sum, a  quo  sunt 
conatltut~  agnoscere coguntur." 
Cf. pp. 360, 378. 
Id  ~d.,  XXXIII.  30 :  "  Doindo 
l~bertatls  pars  est,  quorum  penculo, 
facultatlbus,  auxlho, bonis  atque san- 
gulne res gentur, illa eorum quoque con- 
slllo et auctontate admimstretur. . .  . 
Unde llbertatls lmago In hoe comlt~orum 
habendorum  lure  retmetur,  et poten- 
tlorum,  adulatorum,  ~n~ustorum  et 
avarorum  conatlbus  remedlum  pon- 
~tur  " 
Id ld ,  XXXIII. 
Id. Id..  YIII. 
that in a good polity the various elements must be combined ; 
the democratic in the assemblies of  the people, the aristocratic 
in the senate and councillors, the monarchical in the executive 
action of  the supreme magistrate, the king1  Or, as he  put 
it in another place, every form of  commonwealth was "  tem- 
pered "  and mixed, and he refused to recognise that there could 
be  any  simple  and  unmixed  form  of  political  association, 
the infirmity of  human nature would prevent its continuance, 
nor could it be adjusted to a good and social life.2 
We  think that it is  clear that in theory as well as in fact 
the political representation  of  the community was important 
in the sixteenth as well as in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
turies, and it is obvious that it was thought of  as existing in 
almost all European countries, and not only in Spain or England 
or the Empire. 
1 Id  ~d.,  XXVII.  44 : "  Unds  In 
bona polltla temperanlentum quoddam 
conspicitur.  Nam  In  populi  com~tns, 
Democratlae imago apparet ;  m senatu 
et conslllanls Arlstocratiae,  m  exeou- 
t~one  summl Maglstratus, Reglae potes- 
tatls et Monarch~ae  species." 
a  Id. ~d.,  XXXIX.  16 : "  Quod cum 
~ta  s~t  recte  diclmus  temperatam  et 
mixtam  esse  quamvis  Re~publicae 
speclem,  uti  hommis  complexlo  ex 
quatuor  quo8  dur~ humorlbus  esse 
trmperata. .  .  . 
Id.  id,  XXXIX.  23.  "Constat 
enlm  ex  praccedent~bus  et tots doc- 
trma  pohtlca,  me  nullam  speclem 
Maglstratus ab llla mixtione immunem 
statuere. 
Slmphcem  et  purum  atatum  In 
pol~tlca  hac consoclat~one  non agnosco. 
neque ob naturae humanae imbecllllta- 
tem esse potest diuturnum, aut bonum, 
et socloll vitae accomodatum." PART V. 
CONCLUSION. 
WE have endeavoured, in the six volumes of  this History, to 
give  some  account  of  the most  important  elements  in  the 
development  of  the political  principles  of  Western  Europe 
during sixteen centuries, a large and, as some may think, a\n 
over-ambitious enterprise.  We  can  only say that we  found 
ourselves compelled to make the attempt.  When we  began 
this work some forty years ago our intention was much more 
restricted ; we  proposed little more than a careful study of 
the political theory of  the thirteenth century, and we  there- 
fore began with a detailed consideration of  the political theory 
of  St Thomas  Aquinas.1  We  soon, however,  found  that in 
order to understand the real significance of  that great political 
thinker, we  were compelled to go back to the Roman Jurists 
of  tho  Corpus  Juris Ci~ilis,~'  to  the  New  Testament,  the 
Christian  Fathers,  and the  literature  of  the earlier  Middle 
Ages, and even to make some study of  the post-Aristotelian 
political  theory.  Some  friendly  critics  observed,  naturally 
enough,  that  the treatises  of  an  eclectic  literary  man  like 
Cicero,  and a  somewhat rhetorical  literary  philosopher like 
Seneca, were inadequate representatives of  this, and we  were, 
and are, very conscious of  this.  We can only hope that some 
scholar more competent  than ourselves will some time take 
in hand t,he task of  reconstructing from the fragments of the 
1  Cf.  "  The  Political  Theory  of  St  in  tho  '  Scottish  Review,'  January 
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post-Aristotelian philosophers an adequate and critical account 
of their political theory.  We  are still convinced that, while 
the debt  which  we  owe  to the great  political  thinkers  like 
Plato and Aristotle  is  unmeasurable, it is  also  true that it 
was  during  the centuries  between  Alexander  the Great  and 
the Christian era that some of  the most  distinctive and im- 
portant principles of  the mediaval  and modern  world  took 
shape.  It  was  during this  period that the Hellenistic world 
learned  to  conceive  of  mankind  es  being  homogeneous  and 
rational,  or,  to  put  it into  the terms  of  Cicero  and  other 
Roman writers, all men  are alike, for  they are rational  and 
capable of  virtue.  And it -was during the same period that 
the older conception of  the solidarity of  the group  began  to 
be transformed  by the recognition  of  the inalienable liberty 
of  the human spirit. 
We are also very conscious of  the fact that, in the attempt 
to deal with the vast  and complex political literature of  six- 
teen centuries, we have had to treat of  many matters for the 
study  of  which  we  had  little  technical  qualification.  And 
especially is  this  true  of  the political  jurisprudence  of  the 
Roman and Canonical and Feudal lawyers, and we  recognise 
with gratitude thc forbearance and friendly treatment of  our 
work by the Jurists.  We  cannot indeed regret that we  ven- 
tured  to  do  this,  for  we  feel  that without  this  it is  really 
impossible to deal  adequately  with  the political  ideas  of  a 
period like the mediaeval, which was  dominated  by  the con- 
ception of  the supremacy of  law. 
We  have  at last  completed  the  task  which  we  had  set 
before  ourselves, and must now  again make  the attempt to 
set  out what  seem  to us the most important elements in the 
political ideas and theories of  the Middle Ages ;  but now, with 
special reference  to  this volume, we  must  consider  how  far 
during  the  centuries  from  the  fourteenth  to the  sixteenth 
the  principles  of  the  political  civilisation  of  the  thirteenth 
century were modified, and how far these were continuous.1 
An attempt to  sum up  tilo principal  century will  be found in  Part Ill. of 
elements in the political theory of the  Volulne V. 
Middle Agos to the end of  tho thirteenth 
The formal aspect of  Mediaval Political Theory is to be found 
in  that conception which  is  implied in  the post-Aristotelian 
philosophy, in  the Christian  Fathers, and in  the Digest  and 
Institutes of  Justinian, that the political and social order of 
society is conventional rather than natural, and represents the 
consequences of  the fall of  man from his primitive innocence. 
It is true that St Thomas Aquinas, under the influence of  the 
Aristotelian  "  Politics,"  endeavoured  to  correct  this,  but  it 
is  also  true  that  the  post-Aristotelian  tradition  was  too 
firmly rooted to be shaken even by St Thomas' great authority, 
and that the contrast between the conventional and natural 
conditions continued to furnish the formal terms of  political 
thought  to the end  of  the sixteenth  century.  We  can  see 
this in so  great a political thinker as Hooker, though he was 
evidently a disciple of  St Thomas Aquinas.  Indeed, we  can 
recognise  the  continuance of  this  tradition  in  Locke  in  the 
seventeenth century and in the earlier essays of  I3ousseau in 
the eighteenth.  It was  not till Rousseau in  his  later work, 
and especially in the '  Contrat Social,' restated the Aristotelian 
conception that man  is  only  man  in  the coercive society of 
the State, and urged that apart from this he would be nothing 
but  a  "  stupid  and limited  animal,"  that  the  Aristotelian 
principle  once  again  became  the foundation  of  all  rational 
political  thinking.l 
This formal medizval conception then is interesting, but it 
is doubtful how far it had any great importawe.  It is very 
different with that greet principle which dominated the political 
thought  of  the Middle Ages,  that the first and most funda- 
mental  quality  of  political  society  was  the maintenance  of 
justice.  St Augustine, in the '  Do Civitate Dei,' handed down 
to the Middle Ages, not only Cicero's definition of  the nature 
of  the commonwealth, but also  his emphatic  assertion  that 
where there is no justice  there is no  commonwealth.2  Here 
indeed we are dealing not with a conception which was peculiar 
to  the  post -Aristotelian  philosophers,  but  rather  with  one 
which they carried on from Aristotle and Plato ; but it is not 
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the less imyorta,nt to make clear to ourselves that this was the 
normal principle of  the Middle Ages. 
It  was  set out  by  the Roman  Jurists  of  the Digest  and 
In~titutes,~  by the Christian  father^,^ in the political treatises 
of the ninth ~entury,~  by the political theorists of the Middle 
Ages,4  and by the mediasval  Civilians and Can~nists.~  It is 
true that in one place St Augustine had suggested that the 
conception  of  justice  might  be  omitted  from  the definition 
of  the cornmon~ealth,~  but it is clear that this exercised no 
influence in the Middle Agw. 
This  conception  of  justice  as  the  rationale  of  political 
society may indeed seem to some persons, not well acquainted 
with political problems, as too obvious to require statement ; 
or, on the other hand, it may appear to some, and especially 
to those  who  are unfamiliar  with  history,  as too  indefinite 
to be of  much profit.  It must indeed be admitted that there 
never  has  been,  perhaps  there  cannot  be,  any  adequate 
definition of  justice,  but to those who are better acquainted 
with  the history of  political  civilisation it will be clear that 
it is exactly the pursuit of justice which distinguishes a rational 
and moral society from a stupid anarchy. 
It would in any case be a very great mistake if  we  were 
not to recognise that the conception of  justice  found in  the 
Middle  Ages  a  great and effective form in the law, and its 
authority  in  the  commonwealth.  The  numerous  political 
treatises  of  the ninth  century  are largely  composed  of  ex- 
hortations  to the king  to  maintain  justice,  and,  if  we  ask 
what  they  meant  by  justice,  it is  clear  that  they  meant 
primarily  the law-the  law aa distinguished from the merely 
arbitrary and capricious will of  the ruler.'  It  is this which 
was meant when the "  Assizes of  the Court of  Burgesses," in 
the kingdom  of  Jerusalem,  declared  that ('  La  Dame  ne  le 
Sire n'en  est seignor se non dou dreit  . . .  mais  bien sachids 
Cf. vol. i.  p. 66 ff.  2 and 7. 
Cf. vol. i. p. 1G1  ff.  Cf. vol.  ii.  part i. chaps.  1  and  3; 
Cf. vol. i.  p. 220 ff.  part ii.  chap. 7. 
'  cf.  vol.  ili.  part  i.  chap.  2; part  8  Cf. vol.  i.  pp. 166-168 
li. chsps. 3 and 6 ;  vol. v. part i. chaps.  7  Cf. vol. i.  chaps.  18, 19. 
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qu7il n'est  mie  seignor  de  faire  tort,"  or  when  John  of 
Salisbury  said that the difference between the king  and  the 
tyrant  was,  that the king  obeys  the law  while  the tyrant 
flouts it,2 or when  Bracton  in  memorable words  lays  down 
the principle  that, while  thc king  is  under  no  man,  he  is 
under god and the law, and that thero is no king when mere 
will rules and not the law.3  Nicolas  of  Cusa in the fifteenth 
century  reinforced  this  judgment  with  the  authority  of 
Aristotle,  whom  he  cites  as saying that when  the laws are 
not  supreme  there is  no  polity.4  This is what  was  meant 
when  so  wise  and prudent a political  thinker  as St Thomas 
Aquinas  did  not  hesitate  to say  that, while  sedition  is  a 
mortal sin, revolt against a tyrant is not to be called sedition ; 
for his rule is not just.6  We  think  that we  are justified in 
maintaining  that  the  first  principle  of  mediaeval  political 
society was the supremacy, not of  the prince but of  the law, 
for the law was the embodiment of  justice. 
If, however, we  are to understand  the medizeval political 
principles, we must now consider the nature of  law, not merely 
in its relation to justice, but also with regard to its source. 
To  the people  of  the  Middle  Ages  the  positive  law  was 
primarily and fundamentally the custom of  the community- 
that is, the expression of  the habit of  life of  the community ;  it 
was not properly something deliberately or consciously made. 
The earlier medizeval codes, as everyone knows, are not acts 
of  legislation, but records of  custom, revised, no doubt, and 
modified from time to time by the ruler and his wise  men, 
but not, properly speaking, made by them.  The feudal laws 
in  tho same way  were records of  custom.  The picturesque 
account of  the origin of  the laws of  the kingdom of Jerusalem, 
given  by Jean  d9Ibclin and  Philip  of  No~ara,~  is no  doubt 
literally unhistorical, but it represents admirably the mediaeval 
temper.  Bracton  asserts  that  English  law  was  custom ; 
and while he seems to think that other countries used written 
1  Cf. vol. ili.  pp.  32, 33.  Cf. vol. vi. p. 136. 
2  Cf. vol. lii. pp.  137, 138.  Cf. vol. v. p. 92. 
Wf. vol. IU.  pp.  38,  67.  Cf. vol. iii. pp  43, 44. 505  CONOLUSION.  [PART  V. 
laws, his great contemporary, Beaumanoir, asserts in equally 
broad terms that "  all pleas are determined by custom,"  and 
that the King of  France is bound to maintain them.l 
When, therefore, we find that the first systematic Canonist, 
Gratian, begins his '  Decretum ' with the great generalisation 
that mankind is governed by two great systems of  law, Natural 
Law and Custom, and in another place sets out the principle 
that, even when the law is made by some person or persons, it 
must be confirmed by the custom of  those who live under $2 
we  recognise  that he is  not  expressing  a  merely  individual 
opinion, but is putting into formal phrases the general judg- 
ment  of  the Middle  Ages.  Law was  not to them primarily 
the expression  of  thc will  of  the ruler,  but  of  the habit of 
life of the community.  It is important to observe that even 
in  the sixteenth century an English  Jurist like St Germans 
looks upon  custom as the normal source of  English law, and 
that Statutes of  Parliament are only added when the customs 
were not suffi~ient.~  The truth is that to think of  the mediawal 
king  as  making  laws  by  his  own  personal  authority  is  an 
absurdity. 
It is, however, true that at least from the ninth century we 
can see that the conception of  definite and deliberate legislation 
begins to appear, and, while there was little development  of 
this in  the tenth  and eleventh  centuries,  we  can  trace  its 
gradual  progress,  and can  see that while  the conception  of 
law as custom continued to be of  great importance, the con- 
ception  of  law  as being  the expression  of  the rational and 
moral will  of  the supreme  powcr  in the community bccame 
more  and more important.  We say the rational and moral 
will, for there is no trace of  any conception that the merely 
arbitrary or capricious will had any real place in law.  This is 
the real moaning of  the principle that the supreme authority 
in the community is always limited by the Divine and Natural 
laws. 
Law came,  that is,  to be thought of  as the expression of 
Cf. vol. iii. p. 42.  '  Cf. vol. vi. pp. 23-1-36. 
a  Cf. vol. ii. pp. 98 and  155. 
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the will  of  the legislator.  Who,  then,  was  the legislator ? 
The  answer  is  that it was  the whole  community, and this 
was  the  necessary  collscquence  of  the  fact  that  law  was 
custom before it was command.  From the ninth  century at 
least there can be no  doubt about the normal conception of 
the Middle Ages.  There are some words of  EIincmar of Rheims, 
the  most  important  ecclcsiastical  statesman  of  the  ninth 
century,  which  express  this  very  clearly.  Kings,  he  says, 
have laws by which they must rule ; they have the capitu- 
laries  of  their  ancestors,  which  were  promulgated  with  the 
consent of  their faithful men ; and this corresponds with  the 
normal forms of  legislation as we  find them in the Carolingian 
0apitularies.l 
This  is  again  the conception  of  the source of  law as we 
find it in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Glanvill says 
that those  are properly  laws  which  are made  by  the king 
with  the consent  of  the chief  men  (proceres).  The Norman 
Summa de Legibus " says that laws are made by the prince 
and maintained  by  the people.  Bracton lays  it down  that 
that has the force of  law which has bcen  determined  by the 
counsel and consent  of  the great  men,  the approval of  the 
whole  commonwealth  and the authority  of  the king ; and 
again,  when  the laws  have  been  approved  by  the  custom 
of  those concerned and by the oath of  the king they cannot 
be changed  or  annullcd without  the common  consent  of  all 
those  by  whose  counsel  and  consent  they  had  been  pro- 
mulgated.2  The meaning of  this is illustrated by the formulas 
of  legislation  as we  find tlicm  in the Empire, in France, in 
Castilc, and in England in the thirteenth ~entury.~ 
In this volume we  have seen that these  conceptions con- 
tinued  to bo  normally  accepted in  the fourteenth, fifteenth, 
and  sixteenth  centuries.  Law  was  still  primarily  custom, 
but when it was madc it was thought of as deriving its authority 
from the community.  This is continually illustrated in  the 
roceedings of the Cortes of Castile, and is expressed in theory, 
not only by an English Jurist like Fortescue, but by  one of 
1 Cf. vol. i. pp. 233-39.  3  Cf. vol. v. pp. 51-63. 
"f.  ~01.  iii. pp. 46-48, and p. 69. the greatest thinkers of  the fifteenth century, Nicolas of  Cusa. 
He thinks that the wiser  men  should  be  elected  to prepare 
the laws, but their wisdom gives them no authority to impose 
these by coercion on other men ; this coercive power can only 
be given by the agreement and consent  of  the c0mmunity.l 
Marsilius of Padua, no doubt, expresses this principle in sharper 
and more  precise  terms  than  we  generally  find in northern 
writers,  as  was  indecd  natural  in  one  who  was  thinliing 
primarily  in  the terms  of  the Italian  City  Republics,  but 
his  principles  were  not  substantially  different  from  theirs. 
It would be difficult to find a better expression of  the general 
principles of  these centuries than in the words of  Sir Thomas 
Smith, a man of  great public experience and a minister of  the 
Crown under Elizabeth : "  When one person beareth the rule, 
they defines that to be the estate of  a king, who by succession 
or election commeth with  the good will of  the people to the 
government, and doth administer the common wealth  by the 
lawea of  the same, and by cquitie.  . . . A tyrant they name 
him who  by force commeth to the monarchy against the will 
of  the peoplc, breakcth  lawes already made at his pleasurc, 
maketh  others  without  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
people." 
It is no  doubt true that in the later part of  the sixteenth 
century these principles were often discussed in controversial 
terms  by  men  like  Gcorge  Buchanan  in  Scotland  and the 
writers  of  the  I-Iuguenot  parnphlcts,  but  in  Hooker  and 
Althusius  and  Mariana  we  find  the  same  confidence  and 
clearness  expressed  in  large  and profound  terms.  Hooker 
makes  the same distinction  as Nicolas  of  Cusa between  the 
wise men who should '' devise "  laws and the authority of  the 
community  which  alone can  give  them their "  constraining 
force " ; and of  England he says, "  Which laws, being made 
amongst us, are not by any of us so taken or interpreted, as 
if  they  did  receive  their  force  from  the power  which  the 
Prince  doth  communicate  unto  the Parliament,  or  to  any 
other  Court  under  him,  but  from  power  which  the  whole 
body  of  the Rcalm, being naturally possessed  with, hath by 
l  Cf. vol. VI. p.  170.  Cf. vol. vl. pp. 326-27. 
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free and deliberate assent derived unto him that ruleth over 
them, so far forth as hath been declared." 
There is really no doubt that the normal political judgment, 
whether  practical  or  theoretical,  of  the  Middle  Ages  and 
down to the end of  the sixteenth century, was that the Positive 
Law was  the expression of  the will or consent  of  the whole 
community, including  the king, and that the conception  of 
writers  like Bodin  and Barclay that the king  was  the legis- 
lator, represented an intrusive and alien principlc.  Indeed it 
should be carefully  observed that Bodin  and Barclay them- 
selves recognised, and quite frankly, that while they thought 
that the King of  France possessed an absolute power in legis- 
lation,  it was  diiEcult to find any other country of  Central 
and Western Europe of  which this could be said.= 
We have so far dealt with the source of  Law, but in order 
to appreciate  correctly  the  meaning  of  the  mediaeval  con- 
ception  of  the supremacy  of  Law,  we  must  take account  of 
the normal principle  of  the Middle Ages, that the Law was 
supreme  over  every  member  of  tho  community,  including 
tho king. 
We  have  dealt  with  this in relation  to Feudalism in the 
third volume of  this work, and in more general terms in the 
fifth volume.3  Professor Ganshof of  Ghent has indeed brought 
forward strong reasons to show that the prefeudal king was, at 
laast in civil matters, subject to the judgmont  of  the court, 
like other men ;  Qnd  this  confirms  our  judgmont  that we 
arc dealing with a general principle of  medizeval civilisation. 
That this continued  to be the normal  political  judgment 
of  Central  and Western  Europe from  the beginning  of  the 
fourteenth  century  till  the  end  of  tho  sixteenth  is  clear. 
We must not recapitulatc what we have said in this volume, 
but we may draw attention to sorne of  the clearest  examples 
of  this. 
1 Cf. vol. vi. p. 355-57.  sue la Comp$tence des Cours FQodales 
2  Cf. vo1.  vi. pp. 426-26, pp. 440-50.  en  France " (in '  Melanges  d'histoire 
8  Cf. vol.  ili. part i. chap. 4 ; part 11.  offerts B  Henrl P~renne  ').  Cf. vol.  v. 
chap. 5;  vol. v. part  i. chap. 7.  p. 111. 
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Nothing  perhaps  is  more  significant  than  the  continual 
and  emphatic  protests  of  the  Cortes  of  Castile  and  Leon 
against the attempts of  the kings to override the laws by the 
issue  of  special briefs containing "  non-obstante " clauses, or 
referring to their ('  certain knowledge or absolute authority " ; 
nothing could be  more significant except the answers of  the 
Kings Juan I. and Juan II., and the replies made by Queen 
Juana with regard to "  Pragmatics " issued without the con- 
sent of  Cortos, and by the Emperor Charles V.,  about "  cartas 
de suspencion de pleytos."  l 
Perhaps, however, even more significant of  the principle of 
these centuries is the treatment of  the relation  of  the Ring 
of  France to the law and the Courts of  Law by De Seyssel 
in the '  Grant Monarchie de France.'  Do Seyssel had been for 
many  years  in  the service of  the French  Crown,  and it ie 
therefore the more  noteworthy  that he  should  have looked 
upon  it as the best  of  all monarchies because it was neither 
completely absolute nor too much restrained : it was restrained 
by the Law and the L'  Parlemens."  We have pointed out tha,t 
Machiavelli in his '  Discourses ' on  Livy expressed  the same 
j~dgment.~  And  most remarkable is it that Budd, who  set, 
out the doctrine of  the absolute monarchy in France in the 
most  extravagant terms,  should  have at the same time felt 
compelled  to  draw  attention  to the fact  that  the French 
Eings submitted to the judgment of  the Parliament of  Paris ; 
and that Bodin should have contended that the judges should 
be  permanent  and irremovable,  except  by  process  of  law, 
because  the kingdom  should  be  governed  by laws  and not 
by the mere will of  the prin~e.~ 
Tho  principle  of  the  Middle  Ages  is  indeed  admirably 
summed  up by  Hooker,  after citing  the words  of  Bracton, 
"  Rex non debet esse sub hornine, sed sub Deo et lege."  ' I 
cannot  choose but  commend highly  their  wisdom  by  whom 
the  foundations  of  this  commonwealth  have  been  laid ; 
wherein,  though  no  manner  person  or  cause  be  un-subject 
'  Cf.  vol.  vi.  pp.  4,  133-36,  232,  Cf.  vol. vi. p. 296. 
238.  Cf. vol. vi. pp. 381-83. 
Cf. vol. vi. pzrl  iii. chap. 1. 
to tne king's  power, yet so is the power  of  the king over all 
and in all limited, that unto all its proceedings the law itself 
is a  rule.  The  axioms of  our  royal government  are these : 
Lex  facit  Regem.'  The  king's  grant  of  any  favour  made 
contrary to the law is void, '  Rex nihil potest, nisi quod jure 
potest ' " (' Eccl. Pol.'  VIII. 2, 13). 
It is  time, however, that we  should consider the political 
significance of  the revived  sfrzdy of  the Ronlall  Law in  the 
Middle  Ages.  We  are not  indeed  dealing  with  the general 
influence of  this on mediaoval civilisation ; we  are concerned 
with it only so far as it affected its political coilceptiolls and 
principles.  We  have  endeavoured  in  the second  and fifth 
volumes of  this work to set out some of  the more important 
conceptions of  the nature and source of  Law as we  find them 
in the great Bologna  Civilians of  the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, and we  think  that it is important  to notice  that 
these great Jurists were  as clear and emphatic as the feudal 
lawyers and the political theorists in asserting that positive 
law was the formal expression of  justice.  Justice is the will 
to establish Aequitas, and laws flow from justice as a stream 
from its s0urce.l  They did  not  conceive of  it as arbitrary, 
or as expressing the capricious will of  the lawgiver.  In this 
respect  the  Civilians represented  the normal  conception  of 
the Middle Ages. 
It  is  also  most  important  to observe  that the  Civilians, 
following  the tradition  of  the Jurists  of  the Digest,  looked 
upon the community or people as the sole ultimate source of 
the positive  law of  the State.  The people might  grant this 
authority to the prince,  might  constitute him  as legislator, 
but it was only in virtue of  their grant that this or any other 
authority  belonged  to him.  It is  sometimes forgotten  that 
when Ulpian said, Li  Quod principi placuit, logis habet vigorem," 
he added, "  ut pote cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata 
est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem 
conferat."  That  which  has  pleased  the  prince  has  the 
force  of  law,  but  only  because  the people  have  given  him 
1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chaps.  1 and 2.  e '  Digest,' I. 4, 1. 
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this authority.  What, if  any, importance this principle may 
have  had in the  ancient  empire,  we  are not  competent  to 
discuss,  but it  must  be  remembered  that this  is  the  only 
theory of  the immediate source of  the authority of  the emperor 
which  is  known  to the  lawyers  of  the  Digest,  and it was 
recognised  in the Code, not only  by  Theodosius and Valen- 
tinian, but also by Justinian himse1f.l 
The Civilians down to the end of  the sixteenth century not 
only recpgnised this, but, as we have seen. in a treatise ascribed 
by Professor Fitting to Irnerius, in one of  the Glosses ascribed 
by Professor Besta to Irnerius, and in Bulgarusl Commentary 
on the Digest, it is drawn out into the general principle that 
it is the a Universitas " or '' Popul~s,~~  or the magistrate "  qui 
obtinet  vicem  universitatis,"  which  is  the  source  of  all 
law.2 It seems to us important that this recognition by the 
Civilians,  that all political  authority  was  derivcd  from  the 
community, coincided with the normal judgment of  the Middle 
Ages and confirmed it. 
It is, however, very different when we consider some other 
important  elements in the tradition  of  the Roman  Law as 
interpreted by the mediaval Civilians.  The Roman Law, as 
they knew it, was the law of  the Empire, not of  the Republic, 
and while  the jurisprudence  of  the "  Corpus Juris Civilis " 
represented in fact a long development of  juridical experience 
and of  legal wisdom, in principle the emperor was the legis- 
lator.  (We confess  that we  should  have been  glad  to find 
some detailed historical criticism of  the rescript of  Theodosius 
and Valentinian  (' Cod.' I. 14, 8) which deals with the process 
of  legislation ; but it is also clear that Justinian looked upon 
tho emperor as the sole legislator and the sole final interpreter 
of  the laws (' Cod.' I. 14, 12).) 
The  Roman  emperor  was  then  to the  Bologna  Civilians 
normally  the legislator.  We have indeed  pointed  out that 
there was a real and profound divergence among the Civilians 
of  the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on the quostion whether 
the  Roman  people  had  transferred  their  authority  to  the 
l'Code,'I  14,J,I.17,1r7. (Cf.  2Cf~01.i~p.67. 
vol. I. p. GY.) 
emperor in such a sense that they retained nothing and could 
reclaim nothing.  This  seems to have been  the judgment  of 
some of  the best-known Civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, of  Imerius, Placentinus,  and Roger;  but, on the 
other hand, Azo,  Hugolinus,  and Odofridus maintained  that 
the Roman  people  had indeed  given  their  authority to the 
emperor, but they oould reclaim it.  Hugolinus indeed describes 
the alnperor as a  "procurator  at hoc,"  and they and John . 
Bassianus were agreed that the custom of  the Roman pcople 
still retained  its  legislative  auth0rity.l  In the  fourteenth 
century  the  Civilians  were  aware  of  the  controversy,  and 
inclined  to  the  view  that the custom of  the Roman  people 
still  retained  its  authority ;  this  seems  doubtful  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  but  one  Civilian,  Christophorus  Porcius, 
stoutly maintained  an  opinion  similar  to that of  Azo  and 
H~golinus.~ 
This is indeed interestinq and important, but at the same 
time, even  to those Civ~lians  who  thought that the  custom 
of  the Roman people  retained its authority in  making  and 
unmaking law, and that it might reclaim its general legislative 
authority, the emperor was normally the legislator. 
This  coi~eeption  was  wholly  alien  to the principles  of  the 
Middle Ages, from Hincmar of  Rheims in the ninth century 
to Hooker in the sixteenth. 
More important still was the question of  the subordination 
of  the prince to the Law.  What the real doctrine of  the Roman 
Jurists had been we do not pretend to determine, but Ulpian 
had in one place said that the prince was ''  legibus  solutus " 
(' Dig.'  I. 3, 31), while Bracton said that the king was undcr 
God and the Law.3  The mediaeval Civilians were, it seems to 
us, often gravely perplexed as to the real meaning of  Ulpian's 
words,  for it was  difficult to reconcile these with the words of 
Theodosius  and Valentinian,  "  Digna  vox,  &c.,"  and  they 
were  apparently  contradicted by  tlle  rescripts  of  the  same 
1 Cf. vol. 11.  pp. 60-66.  Brscton,  'Do LP~I~us,'  I.  F,  6. 
2  Cf  vol. VI.  part I.  chap. 2 , part 11.  (Cf. vol. 111.  p.  b7.) 
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emperor  (' Cod.' I. 19: 7) and of  Anastasius  (' Cod.' I. 22, 6), 
which  conlmanded  the  magistrate  to  ignore  any  ilnperial 
rescript or Pragmatic Sanction which was contrary to the Law 
and the public service.  In the fourteenth century, however, 
while  Bartolus  uses  such  phrases  as  that it is "  aequum et 
dignum " that  the prince  should  obey  the  Law,  this  is  of 
his  own  free  will  and not "  de  necessitate,"  Baldus  speaks 
of  a  supreme  and absolute authority in  the prince  which  is 
not under the law, as contrasted with his ordinary authority, 
which is  subject  to it ; and as Jason  de Mayno, writing  in 
the later fifteenth century,  reports,  Baldus  had  in  another 
place  said  that the Pope  and the prince  can  do  anything, 
''  supra ius et contra ius et extra ius."  l 
It is true that some of  the French Civilians of  the sixteenth 
century,  under  the influence probably  of  Alciatus  of  Milan 
and Bourges, and especially the great Cujas, felt that this was 
a dangerous doctrine, and set out in various terms what seemed 
to thcm the necessary correction of  this interpretation of  the 
words  that  the  prince  was  "legibns  solutus."  We  have 
dealt with this in  detail, and here we  need  only recall that 
Cujas maintained that these words could only refer to those 
laws upon which Ulpian wa,s in this passage  (' Dig.' I. 3, 31) 
commenting,  and that the prince  was  not  free  from  many 
others, especially if  they had sworn to observe them.  What 
the French Civilians thus contended was also maintained by 
Zasius of  Freiburg "nd  by Alth~sius.~ 
On  the other hand, we  can see that this doctrine that the 
king was  above  the  law was  held by some in the sixteenth 
century.  It was stated or implied in the words of  the Presi- 
dent  of  the  Parliament  of  Paris  in  1527.  and  of  Michel 
L1H6pital ;  4 it was  asserted in somewhat ludicrous terms by 
Bud6  in  his  'Annotations  on  thc  Pandects.'  6  This power 
seems at times to be attributed by Bodin to the King of  France, 
in  whom the Maiestas resides, while at other times he seems 
to express a different view.6  It is asserted dogmatically by 
1 Cf. vol. vl. pp. ID, 20,  149.  Cf  vol. vi. pp. 416, 417. 
Cf. vol. vi. part 111.  chap  5.  Cf. vol. vi. pp.  293-96. 
Cf. v01.  vi. p.  359.  6  Cf. vol. vi. p.  427. 
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Peter  Gregory  of  Toulouse,l  and  Barclay  appeals  rather 
recklessly to the most eminent Civilians of  the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries  as holding that the Pope and the prince, 
when acting '' ex certa scientia," caD do anything, "  supra ius 
et contra ius et extra ius."  2 
We  do  not  indeed  suggest  that  the  development  of  the 
conception  that  the  prince  was  above  the  law  was  due 
entirely  to the influence  of  the  Roman  jurisprudence,  but 
we  think  that it is  clear that it  was  related  to it, and we 
think  that such phrases as those which we  have just  quoted 
illustrate the growth of  this influence, for these men were no 
longer merely commenting upon and endeavouring to interpret 
the "  Corpus Juris Civilis  as the mediaeval Civilians had done, 
but they were applying principles drawn from this to the actual 
constitutional and legal conditions of  the Western kingdoms. 
The truth is that this was  an innovation, and a somewhat 
barbarous innovation, for the supremacy of  the law over all 
persons  is  perhaps  almost  the  most  essential  characteristic 
of  a  rational  social  order,  and  mediaeval  political  theory 
had always maintained it.  We have thus felt compelled to 
recognise that the influence of  Roman  Law, great and useful 
as it was  in  other aspects of  life, was in  some respects mis- 
chievous  and retrograde.  The feudal system had its  grave 
defects : it tended always towards the anarchy of  the noble 
class, that anarchy which  Machiavelli  spoke of  in  a passage 
to which  we  have  referred, in which  he  said  that the very 
existence of  a noble class ('' gentiluomini," meaning by these 
a feudal territorial nobility) made a ''  vivere politico " almost 
irnpos~ible.~ 
It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  absolute  monarchies  of 
the  seve~teenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  represented  the 
necessity  of  controlling  this  aristocratic  anarchy,  but  that 
can  hardly  justify  before history  the attempt  to  control  it 
by the anarchical autocracy of  an absolute king. 
There was indeed another element in the political conceptions 
1 Cf. vol. vi. p. 443.  Wf. vol. vl. p.  260,  note 3. 
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of  the sixteenth century whose influence was parallel to that 
of  the Roman  Law,  as we  have  just  been  dealing with  it; 
that is, the conception of  the king as being the vicar of  God 
in such a sense that he was above a11  human authority, that 
resistance  even  to  his  unjust  and illegal  actions  and  com- 
mands  was  resistance  to God  Himself.  This  conception,  as 
has been well pointed out by Professor A. Kern in his admir- 
able work, '  Gottesgnaden  und  Widerstandsrecht  im  Mittel- 
alter,'  had  grown  out  of  various  elements  in  the  earlier 
Middle  Ages,  but  in  the political  literature  with  which  we 
have been concerned, it was derived almost wholly from some 
of  the Christian Fathers, and especially from St Gregory the 
Great, who  drew it from certain parts of  the Old  Testament 
and the conception of  the "  Lord's Anointed." 
The authority of  Gregory the Great was naturally so strong 
that in the ninth century we  find even Hincmar of  Rheims 
sometimes citing his words, and a Church Court threatening 
those  guilty  of  rebellion  with  exc~mmunication.~  In  the 
stormy times  of  the great conflict  between  Hildebrand  and 
Henry IV. we  find not only Henry IV. but some of  the clergy 
maintaining  that  the  king  could  be  judged  by  God  only, 
and  Wenrich  of  Trier  and the  author  of  the  treatise  ' De 
Unitate Ecclesiae Conservanda '  (Walther  of  Naumburg) appeal- 
ing  to  the  authority  of  Gregory  the  Great,  and  Gregory 
of  Catino maintaining that it was  God only who  could take 
away the authority of  the king.2 
Practically, however, the conception of  Gregory the Great 
was  overpowered  by  the  principle  that  political  authority 
was,founded upon justice and law, and the distinction between 
the king and the tyrant.  If  Manegold and John of  Salisbury 
maintain  this in the sharpest terms,3 it must be remembered 
that it was  St Thomas  Aquinas  himself,  as we  have  seen, 
who declared that while sedition was a mortal sin, resistance 
to  the  unjust  rule  of  a  tyrant  was  not  ~edition.~  These 
are the principles of  the political literature of  the fourteenth 
'  Cf. v01. i. pp. 217-18.  a  Cf. vol. iii. part  i~.  chap:.  5 and 6. 
"f.  vol. iii. part ii. chap. 4.  '  Cf. vol. v. p. 92. 
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a,nd fifteenth centuries.  Only very rarely, as in Wycliffe, in the 
proceedings of  the Cortes of  Olmedo in 1445, and in a treatise 
of  Bneas Sylvius (afterwards Pope Pius 11.) do we  find t'his 
appeal to the authority of  God as forbidding all resistance to 
the king, for he was the vicar of  G0d.l 
It was  not till the sixteenth century that this  conception 
had  any real importance in  political  thought, and we  have 
treated  it in  some detail in this volume, first in Luther and 
Tyndale in  the earlier  part  of  the  cent~ry,~  and  again  in 
some later writers, especially Bilson, James I., Peter Gregory 
of  Toulouse,  and  Barclay.3  Luther,  however,  after  1530 
abandoned this  view, and admitted that it was the law and 
not the king which was  supreme,4 and the other writers who 
maintained  this  conception  of  the  ''  Divine  Right " were 
unimportant, and their authority cannot be mea,sured against 
that of  Calvin and Hooker among the Protestants, or of  the 
great Jesuits among the Catholics.  How a manifestly fantast,ic 
conception such as this should have come to  have some import- 
ance in the seventeenth century, it is not for us to say; perhaps 
the  dreadful experienoe of  the French  Civil  Wars,  and the 
incompetent  absurdities of  the Fronde  in  France,  and  the 
dependence  of  the  Anglican  Church  upon  the  Crown  may 
serve to explain  it in  part. 
We  are  clear  that,  as  in  the  conception  of  the  prince 
and  his  absolute  authority,  which  was  derived  by  some 
Civilians  from  the  Roman  Law,  we  have  here  a  merely 
intrusive  conception, which  was  wholly alien to the rational 
and intelligible  political  tradition of  the Middle  Ages,  that; 
the law was supreme and not the prince. 
We  turn back to a  saner world than that of  the absolute 
prince of  some interpreters of  the Roman Law, and of  those 
who upheld  the "  Divine Right,"  and, curiously enough, we 
find  it  in  the terms  of  a  conception  which  has  sometimes 
1 Cf.  vol.  vi.  p.  54,  and  part  ii.  a  Cf.  vol.  vi.  part  iv.  chnp.  3  fpp. 
chap. 4.  430-60). 
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been  thought  merely  antiquarian  and even  irrational,  that 
is,  in the principle  of  the contractual  relation  between  the 
ruler and the ruled. 
Whatever we  may think of  it, this was, next to the prin- 
ciple of  the supremacy of  law, perhaps  the most important 
of  all the political conceptions of  the Middle Ages.  We need 
hardly again point out that we  do not mean that unhistorical 
and unscientific conception of  a contract by  which men  had 
formed  themselves into  political  societies.  It  may  be  said 
that this was implied in the Stoic theory of  the conventional 
nature of  political  institutions,  but it had no  real  place  in 
mediaoval  thought,  though  there  may  be  occasional  traces 
of  it.  It was  not till the seventeenth  and eighteenth  cen- 
turies  that it became  the fashionable,  if  only  hypothetical, 
st,arting-point of  political  theory. 
The  principle  of  the  contract  between  the ruler  and the 
ruled  was, on the other hand, the general assumption  of  all 
mediaoval  political  theory,  and it was  upon  this  that there 
were built up the principles of  the nature and limitations of 
the authority of  the prince. 
This conception indeed, so  far from being merely abstract, 
was  founded  upon  certain  conditions  of  political  authority 
which  found  a  definite  expression  in  the  coronation  cerc- 
monies of  Western Europe at least from the eighth century- 
that is, in the  rnutual oaths  of  the  prince  and the people. 
It is indeed a little strange that some writers should not have 
observed that in the ninth century these principles of  mutual 
obligation were not only a part of  the "  recognition " of  the 
prince, but that continual appeal was made to them as deter- 
mining  the  nature  of  the  relations  of  prince  and  people.1 
For in these mutual oaths the prince swore to maintain not 
only abstract justice,  but the  concrete  law, and the  people 
swore  to  obey  the prince.  This  was  indeed  an  intelligible 
and practical conception of  the relations of  ruler and ruled ; 
indeed it was only another form of  the principle that the law 
was  supreme.  The contractual conception then goes bacali  to 
the earlier Middle  Ages,  hilt; it continued  to find expression 
Cf. vol. i.  chap. 20. 
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throughout them in the importance attached to the coronation 
oaths. 
There can, however, be no doubt that this was  immensely 
strengthened by the development of  the feudal system.  For, 
as we  have endeavoured to make plain  in the third volume 
of  this work-while  there are elements in the feudal relation, 
especially  as  set  out  in the poetical  literature,  of  a  purely 
personal  nature,  implying  an  almost  complete  and  uncon- 
ditional loyalty  of  the vassal to his lord-when  we  examine 
the  juridical  literature  of  feudalism,  it  is  the  contractual 
conception of the mutual obligations of  lord and vassal which 
we  find to be dominant.  Even that well-known passage in 
the letters of Fulbert of  Chartres which sets out the obliga- 
tions  of  the  vassal  in  comprehensive  terms,  concludes  by 
saying that the lord must also fulfil the same obligations to 
his  vassal.  And  the  structure  of  feudal  society  provided 
the methods  by  which  this  should be  enforced, for in  case 
of  a dispute between the lord and vassal, the determination 
belonged to the Court which was composed  of  all the vassals 
and not to the 1ord.l 
The  conception  of  the  contractual  relation  between  the 
prince and the community may be expressed in sharper terms 
by Manegold than by others, but in substance he represents 
the  normal  mode  of  mediaoval  political  thought,  that  the 
prince  is  bound  to  the  community  by  his  obligation  to 
obey  the  law,  and  that  the  tyrant-that  is,  as  John  of 
Salisbury  especially  puts  it,  the  prince  who  ignores  or 
defies  the  law-has  forfeited all  claim  to  a~thority.~ 
When therefore Marsilius of  Padua laid special stress upon 
the principle that it was the community which was the source 
of  all positive law, that it was from the community that the 
ruler  (pars principans)  received  his  authority,  and that the 
community which had given  this  authority could  also with- 
draw  it, if  he  violated  the law, he was  implicitly  asserting 
the doctrine  of  the contract.3 
There  is  therefore  not'hing to  surprise  us  when  we  find 
Cf. vr~l.  iii. part i.  chaps. 1,  2, 3.  4.  and 0. 
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that in the later sixteenth century t'he principle of  a contract 
between  the prince  and  the community,  as  expressing  the 
condition on which authority was granted to him, should be 
reaffirmed not  only  by  controversialists,  but  by  the  most 
careful and restrained political thinkers. 
It is particularly interesting to find that in the '  Apologie ' 
of  William of  Orange the conception of  the contract is stated 
under  the terms  of  the conditions on which  Philip 11.  held 
his power in the Netherlands ;  the oath whioh he took before 
they swore obedience to him, and the right of  his vassals to 
enforce these conditions upon him, under the terms of  feudal 
law.  George  Buchanan  asserts  roundly  against  Maitland, 
who urged that subjects are bound by their oath of  obedience 
to the king, that kings are bound by their promise to administer 
the law,  and that  there  is  therefore  a "  mutual  contract " 
between the king and the citbens.  The '  Droit des Magistrate ' 
maintains that the people had only surrendered their liberty 
to  the king  on  certain  conditions,  and that, if  these  were 
violated, they had the right to withdraw the authority which 
they  had  granted.  The  'Vindiciae  Contra  Tyrannos ' sets 
out  the  principle  of  a "  fcedus " between  king  and people. 
It  was  the  people  who  created  the king  on  the  condition 
that he should rule justly and according to the law, and the 
people  and  those  who  are  responsible  for  their  protection 
have  the  right  to  enforce  this ;  and  it  maintains  that  a 
'(  pactum " of  this  kind  was  part  of  the  constitution,  not 
only  of  the empire  and other  elective monarchies, but also 
of  the great  hereditary  monarchies like  France,  Spain,  and 
England, and was embodied in the coronation oaths.  Hooker, 
with  characteristic  breadth  of  judgment,  observes  that the 
nature  of  this  "compact  ))  is  to  be  determined  not  by  a 
search  for  "  the  articles  only  of  compact  at  the  first 
beginning,  which  for  the most  part  are  either  clean  worn 
out of knowledge, or else known unto very few, but whatso- 
ever  hath  been  after  in  free  and  voluntary  manner  con- 
descended unto, whether by express consent, whereof  positive 
laws  are  witnesses,  or  else  by  silent  allowance  famously 
notified through custom reaching beyond the memory of  man." 
It is the whole body  of  the public  laws of  the community 
which constitutes the terms of  the contract.  Althusius, like 
the  author  of  the '  Vindiciae,'  maintains  that  the contract 
between the  Chief  Magistrate  and the commuriity was  a 
part of  the constitutional system in almost all modern king- 
doms, whether elective or hereditary, and he relates it to the 
form of  the mutual oaths of  kings and subjects ; and, in still 
more general terms, he declares that no kingdom, no common- 
wealth was ever created without a mutual contract between the 
prince  and his  future  subjects,  which  was  to be  religiously 
kept by  both,  and that if  this  were  violated  the authority 
founded upon  it would  fall to the ground.l 
Finally, we must also recognise that in the political structure 
of  the Middle Ages there was always implicit, and sometimes 
expressed,  the principle that  the best  form  of  government 
was that in which all the members of  the political community 
had  their  share.  St Thomas Aquinas said that in his judg- 
ment, in a good form of  government it was in  the first place 
important  that  all  should  have  some  share  in  authority ; 
this  tends  to  the  peace  of  the  community,  for  all  men 
will  love  and  maintain  such  an  order;  and  he  found 
this  in  a  monarchy  in  which  one  should  rule  "  secundurn 
virtutem,"  and  under  him  others,  also  ruling  "  secundum 
virtutern,"  and yet  the  authority  would  belong  to  all,  for 
they may be elected from all, and are elected by all.  Such 
a  constitution,  he  continues,  combines  the  character  of  a 
monarchy,  an  aristocracy,  and  a  democracy.  St Thomas 
claimed to derive this from Aristotle, and he found an example 
of  it in the constitution established by Moses for the people of 
Israel. 
St Thomas then clearly thought that the mixed constitution, 
in which the authority of  the whole community-king,  nobles, 
and  people-was  represented,  would  be  the  best  form  of 
government.  How far he was conscious that this corresponded 
1 Cf.  vol.  vi.  part  iv.  chap.  2,  Theologica,'  1.  2,  105,  1.  (Cf. "01.  v, 
sect. 4.  p. 94.) 
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with the development of  the representative system which was 
taking place in his time we  cannot say, but he thought of  the 
mixed  government  as superior to all the simple forms, and 
he found the essence of  this in the elective and representative 
method. 
We have often said that it was the supremacy of  justice and 
law which was the fundamental principle of  Mediaoval Political 
Theory, but we  must now put beside this the principle that, 
subject to the final authority of  justice  and the divine and 
natural laws,  it was  the  community  which  was  supreme- 
the community which included the king, the nobles, and the 
people.  This was the principle out of  which the representative 
system grew. 
It is a rather curious incompetence of judgment  which sees 
in the words of  Edward I.'s  summons of  the bishops  to the 
Parliament of  1295, "  quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus appro- 
betur,"  nothing  but  the  rhetorical  use  of  an  incidental 
phrase in the 'i Corpus Juris Civilis."  What it meant to those 
who  drafted the summons is  quite immaterial ; the fact is 
that it expressed the development  of  the political  self-con- 
sciousness of  the community.  Implicit indced it had always 
been  in the authority which lay behind  the custom and law 
of  the community, but in  the later  centuries  of  the Middle 
Ages  it  found  for  itself  a  new  form  in  the  representative 
system. 
The  Huguenot  pamphlets  of  the  sixteenth  century  may 
express this conception of  the supremacy of  the community 
in  extravagant  terms,  but  they  were  saying  nothing  more 
than Mariana said in Spain and than Hooker said in England : 
"  In kingdoms, therefore, of  this quality the highest governor 
hath indeed universal  dominion, but  with  dependence upon 
that whole entire body, over the several parts of  which he hath 
dominion ; so that it standeth for an axiom in this case.  The 
king is '  maior singulis, universis minor.' "  1 
It was  the supreme power of  the community which, in the 
judgment  of  the  most  important  political  writers  of  tho 
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sixteenth century, found its embodiment in  the Dict  of  the 
Empire,  in  the  Cortes  of  Spain, in  the  States  General  of 
France, and in the Parliament of  England. 
It is in the Parliament,  says Sir Thomas Smith, that the 
whole absolute power resides, for there are present  the king, 
the nobles, the commons, and the clergy are represented  by 
the bishops.  The Huguenot writers demanded the restoration 
of  tho Estates to that place which they had held till some of 
the French kings had desired to rule  absolutely  and uncon- 
trolled, and Boucher, representing  the Catholic League, said 
that the 'l  Maiestas ,' was embodied in the Estates.  Msriana 
in  Spain contemptuously  repudiated  the contention  that the 
authority of  the king was equal to that of  the Cortes.  Hooker 
says, "  The  Parliament  of  England,  together  with  the con- 
vocation annexed thereunto, is that whereupon the very essence 
of  all government within this realm doth depend ; it is even 
the body of  the whole realm ; it consisteth of  the king and of 
a11  that within this realm  are subject  to him ; for they are 
all there present, either in person or by such as they volun- 
tarily  have  derived  their  very  personal  right  unto."  And 
Althusius  expresses the  principle  of  the  authority  of  these 
representative  assemblies  when  he  says  that  it  is  by  such 
Councils  that the  liberty  of  the  people  is  preserved,  and 
that  the  "public  administrators "  are  taught  that  the 
people-that  is,  the  universal  community-is  their  1ord.l 
The  representative  system  was  then  the form  of  the prin- 
ciple  of  the  supremacy  of  the  community,  of  the  whole 
community,  including  the  king,  the  nobles,  and  the 
commons. 
We  are  not  here  dealing  with  the  developments  of  the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the conditions or 
circumstances  which  brought  about  the  conflicts  between 
the monarclly and the community, whether  in  England or in 
the  continental  countries  TiVc  are  in  this  work  concerned 
with the development of  thc principles of  political civilisation 
in  the Middle Ages, and we  think that it is true to say that 
Of.  vol.  vl. pa~t  iv. chap. 2, sect. 2.  1 Cf. vol. VI.  p.  368, and part iv. chap. 6. in  these  we  can  see  not  only  principles  of  profound  and 
permanent value, but also that the moral and political genius 
of  the Western nations was making its way through immense 
difficulties,  and  through  wha8t often  seems  an  intolerable 
confusion, to rational and intelligible ends, to some kind  of 
reconciliation of  the principles of  liberty and authority. 
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Definition of  politicalsociety,Cicero, 
358. 
Object  of  political  society,  the 
common good.  358. 
Final end  oYf  political  society, the 
service of  God,  358. 
Political  society  formed  by  con- 
twct of  members,  358. 
Government  nothing  else  than 
execution of  law,  359. 
Supremacy  of  law  is  supremacy 
of  God,  supromacy  of  man  is 
that of  a beast,, 359. 
Magistrates bound by laws  01  the 
kingdom  and  the  " Maiestas," 
359. 
Magistrate  is  not "  legibns gener- 
alibus solutus,"  refers to Cujas, 
359. 
Law  may  give  him  right  of  dis- 
pensation in some cases, 359. 
Naturo of  "  Maiestas:;  it does not 
belong to prince or  optimatos," 
but to  the whole commonwealth, 
260, 261, 500. 
Ai~t~hority  to rule granted only by 
community, and  must  be  exor. 
cified according to law, 371,  372. 
No  commonwealth  ever  formed 
without contract between prince 
and subjects, 394. 
Contracts  existed  in  almost  a11 
modern  Icingdotus  elcctivo  or 
hereditary, 395. 
Ruler  who  violates  fundamental 
laws is a  tyrant and should be 
resisted and deposed, 406. 
Ephors  entrusted  by  people  with 
authority to restrain tho licence 
of  the  supreme  magistrates. 
Equivalents  of  these  in  all 
countries  of  Western  Europe, 
411, 412. 
Nature and functions of  councils of 
commonwealth ;  they  decide 
on  "  iura  maiostatis."  legisla- 
tion, taxation, &c., 498, 499. 
l'rinciplcs  (Rationes)  on  which 
represontative system rests, 490. 
Representative  councils  to  be 
found in all countries of  Central 
and Western  Europe, 500. 
Representativc  assemblies  em- 
body and defend  the liberty of 
the people,  500. 
Anclreae, Joannes- 
Custom  cannot  change  "lex 
communis,"  hut  may  derogate 
from  it  in  particular  place,  if 
permitted by Pope or prince, 25. 
Anrelo  de  Perusia. :  nrince  cannot 
tGke  away privato property without 
cause, 86. 
Archdeacon  (Gulielmus Baisio)- 
Some  said that people  could  not 
make  law,  others,  that  they 
could  resume authority granted 
to emperor, 24. 
All  laws  must  be  confirmed  by 
custom,  but,  if  subjects  are 
unreasonable,  legislator  can 
compel them, 24. 
' Archon  et  Politie '  (' La  Politique, 
Dialogue ')- 
Tyranny  when  legitimate  prince 
violaten tho laws,  336,  337. 
Laws made with  consent  of  com- 
monwealth,  and  the  prince  is 
subject to them, 337. 
Reminiscence  of  principle  of 
mutual  obligation  of  lord  and 
vassal in feudal law,  338. 
Appeal of  Reformed to  rotection 
of  formal laws and odP,cts, 338, 
376. 
Rulers  have  sworn  obedience  to 
the  laws,  and  have  promised 
the "  Souvoraineti.,"  that is the 
Estates, to keep them inviolably, 
338,  376. 
Prince i~ the Imago  and  Vicar  of 
God, if  good, 366. 
People  hnve  the right  to appoint 
and depoce mogi~trateq,  11eredi- 
tary or elective,  366,  367. 
AIagistrates  who  represent  the 
"  Souverainet6 " are inferior  to  I 
"  Souverain," as private persons, 
but  superior  to him  in  their 
public capacity, 375. 
Contract  between  prince  and 
people,  388. 
Baldus- 
Custom overrides law locally, cites 
Boniface  VITI. and Gratian,  19. 
nnce  should  obey  law,  but not 
'' de necessitate,"  20, 82. 
Prince has a supreme and absolute 
authority as well as an ordinary 
one-referred  to  by  Albericus 
Gsnlilus, 20, 82, 452. 
Prince  and  llis  successors  bound 
by  contracts,  and  by  "  Con- 
suetudines."  Customary law has 
authority over the prince (Super 
Feudis), 20,  21. 
Good  king  better  than good  law, 
Q9 
U". 
Cited by Jason de Mayno as saying 
;Fat  Pope  and  prince  has 
plenitudo potestatis "  and can 
do  anything,  "  supra  ius  et 
contra ius et extra ius,"  83,  149. 
Citod by Jason de Mayno as  saying 
it  must  always  be  presumed 
that prince desires what is just, 
and that his actions should  be 
regulated  "a  iustitia  poli  et 
fori,"  150. 
Princo  cannot  take away  private 
property  without  cause,  for  it 
belongs  to  '  ins  gentium "  or 
"  ius naturale,"  85. 
Dealing with feudal law, maintains 
that  emperor  cannot  deprive 
a  vassal  of  his  fief  witho~rt 
proved offence, 85. 
Dealing with feudal law, good and 
natural laws bind the prince, 85. 
Pr$ce  right  to  impose 
collek!'  but  only  if  it  is 
useful  to the state;  subject  is 
not bound by natural obligations 
to pay, if  the tax is levied merely 
by his "  effrenata voluntas,"  86. 
Subjects may expel king who acts 
tyrannically, but cannot deprivo 
him of  his "  dignitas,"  87. 
Barclay, William- 
Denies  that lams  were  made  to 
restrain kings, 445. 
Repudiates  Buchanan's  assortion 
that in  Scotland  laws  required 
consent  of  "  Proceres "  and 
people,  446. 
In Scotland and France king made 
laws without Senate.  446. 
No  one is king  who i$ bound  by 
the laws,  446. 
Royal  authority is Divine.  King 
is constituted by men, but God 
gives him an  inviolable authority, 
446. 
This  is  also  true  of  hereditary 
kings ;  unless  there  is  grave 
doubt about order of  succession, 
in  such casec, as in Scotland in 
thirteenth century,  and France 
in the fourteenth, the'guccession 
is determined  by the  Ordinum 
et Optimaturn Conventus," 447. 
Royal  conduct  such  as that de- 
scribed in 1 Sam. viii. is unjust, 
but cannot  be  judged  by men, 
447. 
Co~tends  that St Thomas Aquinas 
De ,Reg. Prin.,'  I.  6  was  not 
genume,  or  only  applied  to 
elective kings, 447. 
Revolt  against  king  is  revolt 
against  God, 447. 
Appeals  to the great Civilians for 
sup  ort of  his view  that king's 
autfority was absoluto, 448. 
"  Plenitudo  potestnt's,"  possessed 
by  Pope  and  Prince,  they can 
do anything "  ex certa scientia, 
supra  ius,"  448.  ~ ius, kontra  ius  et extra 
Prince  can make law,  by his sole 
authority, though it is "  huma- 
num " that  hy,  should  consult 
the "  Proceres,  448. 
Commands of  pi-jnce  have force of 
Law.  He is  legibus solutus." 
Re~udiates  Cuias' interwretation 
of  ihis, 448.  . 
Two  exceptions  to  doctrine.  of 
non - resistance ;  when  prince 
behaves with intolerable cruelty 
not  to particular  persons,  but 
to  the  whole  commonwealth. 
When  prince  endeavours  to 
destroy the commonweslth.  Ex- 
ample  of  first, Nero,  of  second, 
John Baliol, 449. 
Is aware  that  his  principle  of 
absolute  authority  of  prince 
was not the view of  all countries. 
449, 450. 
King  subject to God  only,  he  is 
"  legibus solutus,"  450. 
Barnes,  R. :  duty  of  complete  sub- 
mission to kine, however uniust. 291.  -.  "  - 
Bartolus- 
Aware  of  divergence  between 
Civilians  on  the  authority  of 
custom, 17. 
Roman people have lost the power 
of  electing  and  deposing  em- 
peror;  first  belongs  to German 
princes, fiecond to Pope,  18. 
Custom  "  praeter  legem "  over- 
rides law,  18. 
Prince  is "  Iegibus  solutus,"  but 
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it is ''  aequum et dignun] " that 
he should obey them, 19. 
Prince  is  bound  by  any contract 
made  with  a  city,  contracts 
belong to "  ius gentium,"  19. 
Municipal  laws  of  Italian  clties, 
made with  of  prince, 
cannot override "  ius commune," 
26. 
Methods  of  legislation  in  these 
cities, 27. 
"  De Regimine Civitatis,"  76-80. 
Definition  of  good  and  bad 
governments from Aristotlr, 76. 
Distinction  between  king  who 
governs according  to laws, and 
the  kine  who  makes  laws  as 
he will~,~76,  77. 
Description of  kings in 1. Sam. viii. 
is that of  tvrant, 77. 
King has righ"t  to  impose taxes for 
royal expenses,  77. 
Different  kinds  of  government 
adapted to states according  to 
their  size ;  small  state  best 
governed  by  whole  people, 
largor (lilre Florence and Venice) 
by a few, largest by a kinp,  78. 
Tyranny  the  worst  of  nll  forms 
of  ebvernment.  Itaiv  full  of 
tjra'nt~,  79. 
'  De Tvranno,'  4, 80, 81. 
~efiniiions  of tyrant,fromAri~tot,le, 
St Ieidore,  and St Gregory the 
Great, 80. 
Two kinds of tyrants, "ex defectu 
tituli," and "  ex part,e  exercitus," 
81. 
'  De Gnclfis et Gebellinis,'  tyrant 
may  rightfully  be  rleposrd : 
rites  St Thomas  Aquinas  that 
it is not sedition  to overthrow 
the tyrant, 81, 87. 
Repudiates  the  contention  of 
Jo.  Butrigariuq,  that  prince 
could  take  a  man's  property 
without cause,  8t. 
'  Comm.  on  Digest  cites William 
of  Cuneo and Cynus  as saying 
that Roman people could revoke 
tho  authority  given  to  the  -  - 
emperor,  87. 
Cited  by  Jason  de  Mayno  as 
saving  that  when,, prince  acts 
AU  nerta srientia  ho removes 
allye,ial obstacles, 149. 
Beaufremont,  M.  de- 
Address of  nobles to king nt States 
Generol  of  Orleans,  1576,  his 
ancestors l~nd  always called  tho 
Estates when  it  was  necessary 
to set things in order, 475. 
"  Belrenntniss,  Unterricht  und  Ver- 
manunr der Christlichen  Kirchen zu 
The  inferior  public  tautliorities 
may  rightly  defend  their  sub- 
jects  against the attacks of  the 
hieher authoritv on their religion, 
28%  287. 
- 
Subjects and  superiors  bound  to 
each other by oaths, 286. 
An evil authority is an ordinance 
of  the Devil, not of  God, 286. 
This  declaration  cited  by  John 
Knox in 1561, 398. 
Bellrtrmine, Cardinal- 
Political  authority  normally  not 
derived immediately from God, 
but  "  mediante  hominum  con- 
sensu,"  372. 
The Divine  Law commands obed-  -  -- 
ience  to the  king  while  he  is 
king,  but  does  not  forbid  his 
deposition for just  causes. 404. 
Belloy, Pierre de- 
Protests  against  doctrine  that 
Henry of Navarre, a~ a heretic, 
could not be King of  France, 440. 
The  people  cannot  control  the 
act,ions  of  the  king,  for  it is 
by  the  Divine  Will  that  he 
holds the crown,  whether he  is 
good or bad,  441. 
Bertachinus- 
Custom  and  statute  have  equal 
authority, custom  creates "  Jus 
Commune,"  ~;1.d  has equal 711th- 
ority  .  with  ---  Privilegium  of 
prmce,  I~I. 
Emperor ""  solutus  legibuu,"  but 
not  solutus  moribus  et 
ratione,"  he is bound to main- 
tain the '' consuetudines,"  151. 
Prince cannot revoke his contract, 
165. 
Bilson, Thomas- 
Cites  St  Paul  and  St  Peter  as 
teaching that  kings arosppointrd 
by God, and David's submissive 
conduct to Saul, 430. 
People  must  not resist  the king, 
430, 431. 
Servant can  appeal  to magistrate 
against his master,  but subject 
has  no  refuge  against  the 
sovereign but God, 431. 
Admits that Protestants on Con- 
tinent contended that their Con- 
stitutions allowed rcsistance, 431. 
He  seems  to  allow  resistance  in 
such  cases,  but  in  no  case 
deposition  of  horcclitary  prince, 
432, 434. 
Blackwood, Adam- 
Absolute  authority  of  kings  of 
Scotland,  France,  England, Spain, 
Portugal,  and  many  other 
countries, 435. 
People  in  theso  countries  cannot 
be admitted to any share in the 
supreme  authority,  even  if 
kings wished to do so, 435. 
The nature  of  monarchy  is  such 
that  it  cannot  be  divided  or 
shared, 435. 
Monarchy  in  Scotland  founded 
by  Kenneth  on  force,  and the 
people  thcrefore  have  no  legal 
rights, 435. 
Authority of  the king analogous to 
those of  father over his family, 
masters over their slaves, 436. 
Law  has  no  authority  over  the 
king, 436. 
Not  only persons but property  of 
all people are in the hands of  the 
king, 437. 
Bodin, Jean- 
Definition of  "  Respublica,"  418. 
Controlled  by  reason  and power, 
418. 
Supreme authority has "  Maiestas," 
and is "  potestas legibus soluta," 
418. 
Supreme  authority  is  subject  to 
"  lex  divina,,"  "  ]ex  naturae," 
and ''  1ex omnium gentium com- 
munis,"  419. 
Political  authority rests on force. 
Aristotle and others were  wrong 
when  they thought that in the 
beginning  kings  received  auth- 
ority  on  the  ground  of  their 
justice,  420. 
Natural  liberty  is  that of  a  man 
who,  under  God,  rejects  all 
authority  but  that  of  himself 
and right reason,  420. 
The citizen  is one  who  is  under 
the  supreme  authority  of 
another, he has lost his natural 
liberty, 421. 
Contradicts the opinion of  Aristotle 
that a man is not a citizen who 
does not share in "  imperium," 
421. 
The people  can transfer its aut,h- 
ority, without limit, to one man, 
421. 
Prince  who  has  complete  power 
has "  Mairstas,"  421. 
Prince  who  is bound  by  laws,  or 
holds authority only for a time, 
and  has  to  render  account  to 
t,hr peoplo, has not "  Maiestas," 
421. 
Prince  should  not  syar to tho 
laws,  this destroys  Maiestas," 
421, 422. 
Supreme  authority  is  limited  by 
contract& 422. 
Prince not limited by custom, 422. 
"  Prcp~ietas  "  and  '' I'OSSC~P~O  " 
belong  to  individual.  Prince 
has  only  "  Iniperium "  over 
thcm, 423. 
Thore is no such thing as a "  mixed 
constitution."  Supreme  power 
is indivisible,  424. 
The  magistrate  (inferior)  must 
carry out the commands of  the 
Prince  (Maiestas), even  aeainst 
the law;,  424, 425.  - 
Rescript of  Anastasius (Cod. I. 22, 
6) only  applies when  a  rescript 
does  not  contain  a  derogating 
clause,  425. 
Repudiates interpretation of  1  Sam. 
viii.  as a  description  of  "  iura 
maiestatis,"  425. 
Chief characteristic of  "  Diaicstas " 
is to make laws without <,onsent 
of  superiors, equals, or inferiors, 
425. 
~dmzs  that  it  was  difficult  to 
find a  true, that is an absolute 
monarchy,  425, 426. 
Laws were made in Spain, England, 
and  Empire by  the Estates  or 
Diet, 426. 
The Empire an aristocracy,  426. 
In France  alone  did  Bodin  find 
a  sovereign  and  absolute  mon- 
archy, 426. 
King  of  France  did not swear  to 
keep to laws,  426. 
There the prince's  commands have 
the force of  law,  426. 
He lays stress on permanent tenure 
-i.e.,  independenca  of  judges, 
they are irremovable except by 
process of  law,  383, 427. 
A  precarious  tenure  by  judges 
savours of  tyranny, 383,  427. 
Kingdom should, as far as possihle, 
be governed by  law, not by the 
mere will of  tho prince, 383, 427. 
Great  importance  in  France  and 
Europe of  the Eqtatoe, 486, 487. 
No  taxation  without,  conscnt  of 
the Estates, 488. 
Absolute  monarchy  the  best 
government,  427, 428. 
Supreme  authority  of  the  prince 
must not he sharcd with anyone, 
or "  Maiestas imperii " will give 
place to anarchy, 428. 
Any  tyranny  is  better  than 
domination  by the people,  428. 
Boucher, J.- 
" Maiostas "  remains  with  the 
people  and  is  embodiecl  in  tho 
Estates,  368. 
IL  is from the people, not from God 
only, that the king  receives  lus 
authority,  368. 
The  same  principle  embodied  in 
consliti~tional  systems  of  o:her 
Europoau  countries,  roIers  es- 532  INDEX. 
pecially to Empire, Aragon, and 
England,  369. 
Cites  deposition  of  Merovingian 
and Carolingian kings in France, 
of  Richard II., and recently of 
King of  Denmark, 369. 
Absence of constitutional forms in 
Brance due to recent tyrannical 
innovations of  Louis XI.,  369. 
Contractual relation between prince 
and De0Dle.  Relation to feudal 
law, 591: 
Bmolon:  cited  by  Hooker,  356,  357, 
378. 
Britten- 
Laws made by king  with barons, 
court, and other members of  his 
council,  7. 
King can only repeal laws with the 
consent of  tho same, 33. 
In cases  where  king  is  a  party, 
court is judge,  not king,  33. 
Buchanan, George- 
King is subject to  the law, 332, 333, 
491. 
The people  acting through Parlin- 
ment is the legidator,  332,  333, 
491. 
The manv are wiser than the one.  - 
334. 
Interpretation  of  laws  must  not 
he left to king, 334. 
Icings  of  Scotland hereditary, but 
are created by tho law and will 
of  the people,  just  as much  as 
elective kings, 366. 
Thore is a  contract between  king 
and  people;  it is  void  if  king 
breaks it, 387. 
Defends  resistance  to,  and  de- 
position of, prince who abuscs his 
power,  399. 
Authority of  law greater than that 
of  king, and authority of  people 
greater than that of  law; they 
can therefore call him to account 
in  greater  matters  as  well  as 
small, 400. 
Bud& G.- 
"  Princeps  legibus  solutus,"  294- 
99R  -.. ". 
Appeals  to  Aristotle  on  natural 
monarchy  of  king, who  is  in- 
comparably  supenor  to  his 
subjects, 294. 
Absurd to impose laws upon such 
a man, 294, 295. 
Roman  emperors,  at  least  in 
Ulpian's timc,and kingsof Franco 
have this quality, they are  human 
Joves, 294, 295. 
No  reason why laws  should stanrl 
between  prince and people,  296. 
Appeals to Romans xiii.  1, 296. 
Compares  "Curia  in  qua  summa 
jurisdictionis  Gallicae . . .  sita 
est " with Roman Senate,  296.  1  "Maiestas ''  of  Roman  people 
transferred to emperor by "  Len 
Regia,"  296. 
This  "  Curia "  (i.e.,  Parlomont.) 
declares prince's  "  Acta '!  to be 
"  rats irritave,"  296, 297. 
Princes,  though  "  legibus  soluti," 
submitted  themselves  to  the 
judgment  of  this Court, 296. 
Butrigarius, Jacobus- 
People had transferred their auth- 
ority to prince,  and  could  not 
make "general " laws, 23, 146. 
People  could  revoke  thcir  grant, 
and could  then make any law, 
i  23, 146.  '  Emperor  can  take away a  man's 
property  "ex  causa,"  but  not 
"  sine  causa,"  but  that is  not 
because  he  has  not  authority. 
I  but  because  he  had  said  that 
he would not do it,, 84. 
B~t~rigarius,  Jo. :  cited  by  Dartolus 
as  saying that prince could take away 
a man's property without cause, 86. 
Butrio, Antonius de- 
Roman people  cannot revoke  tho 
authority  of  the  emperor,  for 
he receives that from tho Pope, 
147, note 2. 
Roman  people  cannot  make  a 
"  universal  law,"  that  bolongs 
to the emperor,  147, note 2. 
Calvin, John- 
Defends  reformers  against  charge 
of  subversive doctrine.,  263. 
Holy Scripture describes function 
and  authority of  magistrate  as 
coming from God, 264. 
Cites  David  as  example  of  ~ub- 
mission even to  unjust rulers. 264. 
Rule  of  unquestion:ng  submi$sion 
only  applies to private persons. 
265.  266. 
If  thiy were  aggrieved, they must 
turn to the magistrates, 265, 266. 
Such  as  Ephors,  Tribunes,  in 
modern times perhaps the Three 
Estates, 266. 
Theso  are  the  guardians  of  the 
people,  and  are  guilty  of 
treachery if  they do not, defend 
t,hem  against  the  violence  of 
kings,  266. 
Prefers  a  mixed  government,  of 
aristocracy and "  Politia " ; this 
was  what  God  gave  to Tsmel, 
267. 
Without laws, ihcre a.ro no magis- 
trates ; without  magistrates, no 
laws, 267. 
Repudiates  the  notion  that  the 
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olitical  laws  of  Moses  are  !.  lndlng  .  on the states, 267. 
Subject  to  moral  law,  which  is 
eternal  law  of  justice ;  every 
state can make its  own laws, 268. 
Moral  law  of  God  is the "  testi- 
mony"  of  the  natural  law, 
which is written in men's hearts 
by God, 268. 
Priaciple  of  restraint  of  kings 
by  proper  authority  illustrated 
in his letters, 269, 270. 
Cornmines, Pllilippe de- 
Taxadon without  consent  of  sub- 
jects is mere tyranny, 202. 
Neithcr  king of  Franco nor  other 
kings had the right  to do this, 
202. 
Charles  V.  never  claimed  such  a 
right,  202. 
His high  opinion  of  the value  of 
the States General, 214, 485. 
His  contempt  for  those  who 
opposed their meetings, 214,215. 
Connon,  Francis- 
Primitive  world  ruled  by  kings, 
chosen  for  their  virtue,  and 
without fixed system of  law, 301. 
When  kings beman  to abuse their 
powor,  men ?mposed  restraints 
of law upon them, 301,  302. 
Cites  Aristotle  as saying that to 
obey  the law  is  to  obey  God, 
to obey a man is to obey a wild 
beast, 302. 
Cites  Demoathones  and  Papinian 
as saying that law is an agree- 
ment  of  the  whole  "  Civitas," 
302. 
In France it  is the king's authority 
which  binds  men  by  law,  but 
his  authority  is  drawn  from 
consent of  the people,  302. 
Prince  does  not  need  to  take 
counsel when  he lepislates,  303. 
Contemptuously rejects tho notion 
that law is superior  to custom, 
303. 
Unjust law i~,  not law at all,  303. 
If  hereditary king becomes tyrant, 
he should he depoyd, 303. 
The  prince  is  not  legibus  sol- 
utus,"  303. 
Contract- 
Cynus  discusses  question  whether 
emperor  was  bound  by  his 
contracts  made  with  city  or 
province,  15, 16. 
Prince  is  bound  by  contracts 
made with  city, Baldus,  19. 
Contracts belong to "  ius gentium," 
Bartolus, 19. 
Contracts  binding  on  prince  and 
his sucressor, Baldus,  20. 
Contractual  relations  of  ruler 
and  subject  in  Dauphin6  and 
Brianpon, 67-69. 
C0ntra~t~al  conception  with  re- 
gard to regents in Castile, 69 70. 
Contracts  binding  on  pince:  in 
Civilians  of  fifteenth  centmv.  -.,  7 
162-166. 
prince  bound  hy  contract  with 
people, Wessolius,  180. 
Prince  bound  by  contracts,  Al- 
ciatus, 300. 
Political  society  formed  by  con- 
tract  among members,  Hooker 
and Althusius,  364,  358. 
Contract between ruler and people, 
William  of  Orange,  '  Apologie,' 
383-385. 
The  conditions  of  Philip  11.'~ 
authoritv  with  Netherlands, 
~FoloGe,'  384. 
The mutual oaths between  Philip 
11. and the aeo~le  of  the Nether- 
lands, '  ~~&lo$e;  384. 
These  conditions  to  be  enforced 
by vassals, '  Apolpgie,' 384, 385. 
Contract  implied  In  Declaration 
to Diet  of  Empire,  1578,  8te. 
Aldegonde,  386. 
Assorted  in Articles of  Agreement 
with Duke  of  Anjou  in  1581, 
386. 
A~serted  dogmatically  by  George 
Buchanan,  387. 
Contract  void  if  violated  by  one 
party, Buchanan, 387. 
King  only  accepted  on  certain 
conditions ;  if  these  were violated, 
people  had  power  to withdraw 
his  power;  reference  to feudal 
law.  '  Droit  des  Maeistrats.' 
387;  388. 
Reciprocal  paqts  and  conditions 
between  prlnce  and  people, 
'  Archon et Politic,'  388. 
"Foedus"  between  kine  and 
people.  Condition  thax  king 
should  govern  justly ; if  king 
violates  his  power,  people  are 
free from all  obligation  to him, 
'  Vindiciae,'  388. 
A contract of  the kind part of  the 
constitution of  almost all states, 
'  Vindiciae,'  389. 
Embodied  in  coronation  oaths, 
'  Vindiciae,'  389, 390. 
Mutual contract hetwoen king and 
people;  if  king  violates  them, 
he  ceases  to be  kine,  Boucher.  -. 
391. 
Contract between king and people, 
Hooker,  392-394. 
Terms of  this to be found not only 
in  the beeinnine.  but in  whole 
body  of'  the -laws,  Hooker. 
392, 393. INDEX. 
No  kingdom  or  commonw~altk 
ever created without  R  contracl 
between  prince  and  people 
Althusius,  394,  305. 
Theemperor bound by his contract. 
refers to an oath of  Maximiliar 
that he would  not  obstruct  the 
proceedings  of  the "  Kammer. 
Gericht,"  Zasius,  323. 
Prince  is  bound  by  his contracts 
as  much  as  pr~vate persons, 
Bodin, 422. 
When  law  of  princo  has  passed 
into contract he i~ bound  by it, 
this  belongs  to  natural  law, 
Peter Gregory,  443. 
Prince  bound  by  his  contracts, 
Albericus Gentilis,  453. 
Cortes of  Castile and Leon- 
Kings  cannot  annul  the  law 
without  the consent  of  Cortes, 
Burgos  and  Bribiesca,  1379, 
1387, 4. 
Royal  briefs  contrary to custom 
or law to be disregarded,  5,  91. 
No  "  carta  blanca " to  be  used 
by king, 65. 
No  person to be injured  or  killed 
by king, till he has b;en  judged 
according to "  fuero  and law, 
65, 91. 
Contractwl  conception  in  posi- 
tion  of  regents  or  Tutores-in 
minority of  king, 69. 
Cortes  meet  freql~ently in  four- 
teenth  century, a  normal  part 
of government, especially during 
minority of  king, 90. 
Protests  agamst  illegal  taxation, 
91  .OR  -- --. 
Dcrnand that some of  its membcrs 
should sit in king's council,  95. 
Juan  11.  repudiates  in 1431 the 
conetitutional  provisions  of 
Bribiefica,  but  Cortes  reaffirms 
them, 1440, 1442, 1461, 133-135. 
No  taxation  without  consent  of 
Cortcs, 203-205. 
Cortes  at  Olmedo,  l??6,  affirmn 
the  "  Divine  Right  of  kings, 
186-188. 
Protosts against  royal interference 
in elections of  members, 207-209. 
Their  place  in  all  important 
affairs of  kingdom, 209, 210. 
Summoned  by  Ferdmand  and 
I~abella  to provide for legislation, 
1486, 231, 462. 
No law could  be made or revoked 
except in  Cortes, 1506, 232, 463. 
Replies  of  crown  to petition  of 
Cortes,  to  be  registered  and 
observed as law, 232,  233, 464. 
All "  Cartas do suspenzyon " to he 
revoked, 1518, 1523,233, 464. 
Frequent  meetings  throughout 
sixteenth century, 462. 
Taxation, 465-468. 
Two members  of  Cortes to reside 
at  Court till tho provisions made 
by Cortes were carried out, 1525, 
468. 
See also under Mariana. 
Courts and king- 
"  Curia " superior  to king,  Fleta, 
30,  31. 
When  king  is  a  party,  the 
court  is  judge,  not  the  king, 
Britten, 33. 
King cannot  be judge  in  his own 
cause,  '  Mirror  of  Justices,' 
34,  35. 
King  can  only  proceed  against 
anyone by process of  law, 64-G6. 
King of  France subject to " Parle- 
niens "  in matters of  dixtributive 
justice,  Do Seyssel, 221, 225. 
Machiaevelli  confirms  this  state- 
ment, 225. 
IGng  of  France  submittei  to be 
judged  by "  Parlemens,  Bud6, 
296. 
Private  person  could  apppal  to 
courts of  law  in  caseu  between 
himself  and  the  king,  Georgo 
Burhanan,  380. 
Courtn  of  "  Parlement " formerly 
in  France,  above  the  king, 
"  Remonstrance,"  380. 
"  Parlement "  of  Paris  set  as 
judge  for  certain  purposes  be. 
tween  king  and pr~vate  person, 
'  Vindiciae,'  381. 
Judges  must  be  irremovable. 
Custom  of  removable  judges 
savours of  tyranny, Bodin,  382. 
Cowell, James- 
'  Institutiones  Juris  Anglicmi,' 
1605, 454. 
Customs  approved  "  communi 
sponsione,"  455. 
Statutes  sanctioned  by  king  and 
Parliament, 455. 
King  can grant "  privilegia,"  but 
only  so  far  as  they  do  not 
injure any third party, 455. 
'  The Interpreter,' 1607, 455. 
Icing  above  law  by  his  absolute 
power.  456. 
He  takes counsel  with  the Three 
Estates,  but  this  is  not  "  of 
constrainte,"  but  of  his  own 
benignitie,  or  by  rewon  of 
his oath at coronation, 455. 
In  spite  of  coronation  oath  he 
may  altcr  or  suspend  any law 
that  morn-  hurtful to  "public 
estate,"  456. 
Parliament the highest  authority. 
Cites Sir Thomas Smith, 456. 
But king is above Parliament,  or 
he is not an absolute king, 456. 
Prerogative  is  the  special 
of  the king  above the or&::,"; 
course of  tl~e  common law,  457. 
custom  kmg  makes  no  law 
B%hout  consent  of  the  Three 
Estates,  457. 
Whether  this  is  of  necessity  or 
policy Cowell leaves to judgment 
of  wiser men, but king is absol- 
ute,  457." 
Subsidies  assessed  by  Parlia- 
ment  and  granted  bv  the 
commons,"  457. 
Some  hold  that  the  subsidie  is 
granted by subjects in considera- 
tion that whereas prince  might 
make  laws  of  his  absolute 
power,  he doth of  favour admit 
the consent of  his subjects,  457. 
Cujas- 
Men who are not ruled b'y  law and 
custom  are  not  a  People," 
and do  not  f orm a "  Res~ublica." 
311. 
There  may be  men  who live like 
the beasts without  government 
of ri~llt  reason  which is the law 
of  nature. but this mav be stirred 
up$the'm,311;'  " 
"  made by  consensus"  or 
'I'zonsuetudo  " or  bv  I' necessi- 
tas,"  312. 
"  Lex " is made by "  consensus " 
of  all in community, 3!?. 
"  Jus "  which is made by  necessi- 
tau" ismade by senate or prince. 
(Cit8sDig.i. 2, 2.9,and ll),  313. 
Custom,  approved  by  reason, 
consent  of  all,  and  judgment 
of  court,  abrogates  law  which 
has ceased  to be  of  use  to the 
commonwealth,  314. 
No  law  is  binding  which  is not 
approved by custom, 314. 
The  people  had  transferred  its 
authority to  the prince, or rather 
had ehared it'pith him, 316. 
Discussion  of  legibus  solutus," 
315-318. 
T?  words apply properly only to 
leges  caducariae,"  such  as 
"  Lox Julia et Papia "  on which 
Ulpianiscommentmg, 316, note2. 
This was  not true with regard  to 
many other laws, even if  prince 
had  not  sworn  obedience  to 
them. much less if  he had done 
this, 316. 
"  Hodie,"  the prmcos swear to the 
laws,  and  &re  not  ''  legibus 
uoluti,"  316, note 2. 
Prince  has  power  to  make  and 
unmake the lawn,  but  is bound 
by  them  so  long  as they  are 
laws, 316.318. 
Prlnre  has  "imperium "  not 
"  dominium "  over  private 
property, 318. 
Cuneo, Gulielmus de- 
Cited by Zabarella, as saying that 
power of  makmg custom neither 
had  been  nor  could  be  trans- 
ferred to prince.  Zabarella does 
not agree, 154. 
Cited by Zabarella  as saying that 
Roman people could revoke the 
authoritv given  to prince,  165,  "  - 
note 3.  . 
Cunerus, Bishop of  Louvain :  1 Sam. 
viii.  is  a  statement  of  the  "  ius 
regis " ; if  king  acts  thus,  he  sins 
gravely, but people must not resist, 
134. 
Cusa, Cardinal of- 
Laws  should  be  made  by  those 
who are to be  bound  by  thom. 
"  Quod omnes tangit, ab omni- 
bus approbar1 debet,"  136. 
Power  of  legislation  derivod  by 
emperor  from  Roman  people. 
and  could  be  taken  away  by 
them, 137. 
All  government  founded  upon 
ele2ion or agreement of  subjects, 
169-171. 
This arises from Divine ~nd  natural 
law,  170. 
The wise men should rule and make 
laws, but they have no coercive 
authority except from the agroe- 
ment of  their suhjects,  170. 
Prefers  monarchy, but an elcctive 
one, 171. 
Diet of  Empire, representative  of 
the whole Empire, 216, 216. 
Custom- 
Discussion  of  authority of  cu~tom 
by Bartolus and Baldus,  17-19. 
Princemust maintain its  authority, 
Baldus (Super Feudip), 21. 
Custom makes and unmakes  law, 
J. Faber, 22. 
Law must be confirmed by custom : 
but if subjects are unreasonable 
leginlator  can  coerce  them, 
Archdeacon,  24. 
Local custom cannot  create "  lex 
communis," but can create muni- 
cipal  law, if  permitted by  Pope 
or prince, Jo. Andreae, 26. 
Custom and law  in Civilians and 
Canonists  of  fifteenth  century, 
160-153. 
See under Connon, Duaren,  Vigelius, 
Doneau, and Cujas for sixteenth 
century Civilians. 
Prince  is  superior  to  cuptom, 
Bodin,  423. INDEX. 
Cynuu (Cino da Pistois)-- 
Princc derives his power from the 
people,  but "  imperium " from 
God, 13. 
Is aware  of  the conflict  between 
older  Civilians,  about  the  con- 
tinuance of  the legislative auth- 
ority of  tho people,  14. 
Emperor  bound "  honestate,"  not 
"  necessitate,"  to  observe  the 
laws, 15. 
Cites  Guido  de  Suea  on  binding 
nature  of  the  contracts  of  the 
emperor with any city or baron. 
16. 
Prince cannot take away a man's 
property  without  cause  "  de 
iuro,"  only  "de  facto,"  16,  86. 
Some  Civilians  say  that  Roman 
people  could  revoke  the  auth- 
orit,y given  to the emperor,  14 
(note l), 87. 
Decius, Philip : prince is bound by his 
contract,  E56. 
Diet  of  Empire : itn  legislative auth- 
ority, 7, 215, 216, 498. 
"  Divine Right "- 
Theory of  it in Wycliffe,  54. 
Theory  of  it in  fifteenth  century, 
185-191. 
Theory  of  it  in  early  sixteenth 
century, 271-292. 
See  under  Luther,  Melanchthon, 
Tyndale,  Barnes,  Bud6  Bilson, 
Cunerus,  Belloy,  Peter  Gregory, 
Barclay. Albericus Gentilia. 
Doncau, H.- 
Law established by Roman people, 
for  prlnce  only  has  legislative 
power,  because  people  havo 
conferred it on him,  308. 
Seems  to  mean  that  laws  still 
required consent of  citizens, 308. 
Custom  superior  to law,  if  later, 
309. 
All  men  are under  the law,  even 
prince,  though  he  is  "  legibus 
et solemnitatibus iuris solutus," 
309. 
Rescripts  of  prince,  which  are 
contrary  to  laws  and  puhlic 
interest, are  to be  ignored  by 
the judgee, though they contain 
"  non-obstante " clause,  unless 
they injure no one,  310. 
'  Droit des Magistrats '- 
It  is  only  detestable  flatterers 
who  tell  the  prince  that  he  is 
not bound by the laws, 305,  306. 
Huguenots  appealed  to  public 
edicts as  giving  them  the  pro- 
tection of  the laws, 306. 
Distinction between the "  Souver- 
ain " and  the  "  Souverainet6," 
Custom makes and unmakes  law,  King said to be "  legibus solutus,"  former  swears  fidelity  to  the 
latter, !?3,  374. 
Prince is  Souverain,"  but is not 
above the laws,  374. 
There are officers of  the "  Souver- 
ainet6,"  whose function it is to 
restrain  the "  Souverain,"  374, 
375, 409. 
The contract between king and the 
people,  387. 
Excellent  results  of  authority  of 
Parliament in England, 492. 
States  General  of  France  had 
formerly  elected  and  deposed 
kings, 492. 
They had formerly controlled the 
appointment  of  the  ministers 
of  the crown, taxation, and tho 
important affairs of  the kingdom, 
493. 
This  was  no  longer  the  cane  in 
France,  but  this  was  contrary 
to the ancient laws, 493. 
Duaron, Franpois- 
Prince has power of  making laws, 
but he contends that it  is possible 
to believe  that the people  also 
retained or shared it, 304. 
Custom  overrides  law,  for  lawa 
must be approved by the custom 
of  those conrerned,  305. 
Prince  is  "  legibus  solutus,"  but 
his rencripta contrary to law and 
public interest are void, 305. 
Durendus, William (Junior)- 
Temporal  and  spiritual  rulers 
should obey the laws, 24. 
Princes  should  not  make  laws 
without consent of  "  Probi," nor 
Popes without cardinals, 24, 25. 
"  Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus 
approbetnr,"  25. 
Edward  11.  and  111. :  terms  of  the 
coronation oath, 4. 
Egidius Colonna : suggested that king 
should rule according to his own will 
and laws that he had made,  10. 
Emperor : see under Prince. 
Engelbert of  Admont- 
King even if  he  had obtained  the 
kingdom justly, if  he misgovern 
the kingdom, is justly  deposed, 
40, note 1. 
Authority  of  universal  empiro, 
does not imply  continual  inter- 
ference with laws and conditions 
pf  particular  states  (vole, 
Da Bartolo all' Althusio, )  123. 
Faber, J.- 
Prince  derives his authority from 
God, but through the people, 22. 
People  can  depose  prince  io~ 
proper cause, 22,  07. 
22. 
Prince  not  bound  to  consult 
"  Proceres " when  making  law, 
23. 
F'rince  can  take  away  private 
property for a just  cause, 86. 
Ferrault, Jean- 
King  of  France  has  the  same 
leeislative  nower  as  Roman 
but  should  imitate  Jesus  who 
submitted to tho law,  141,  163. 
Origin  of  political society, in sin, 
158. 
Authority  of  the  prince  derived 
from  community,  and  limited 
by  obligation  to  community, 
159. 
Tvrant  has  lost  all  right  to  - 
emperor, 297. 
Identifies  Lox  Regia  with  Lex 
Salica,-by  it all authority was 




Prefers  mixed  government,  con- 
taining  elements  of  monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy, 1  GI. 
All  eood povernments are accord- 
~@i  of  France  can  impose 
novum vectigal,"  297. 
Fleta- 
King made by law, and is under it, 
7,  30. 
Law made by king with consent of 
counts, 8. 
Tho king has two superiors, the  law 
and his Curia, 31. 
Process of  law  against  the king's 
officers,  32. 
Fortescue, Sir John- 
"  Dominium  regale,"  "  dominium 
politicum,"  "  dominium  politi- 
cum et regale,"  142,  172. 
Law made in England by king with 
the Three Estates, 142, 217. 
Judges  bound to decide according 
to law, even if  king commands 
the opposite, 142. 
Contrasts  Roman  law  with  its 
principle  "  Quod  Principi 
lacuit,"  and  the  "  Regimen 
$ega!e  "  in France, with English 
oonatitution, 143, 173. 
All  just  authority  derived  from 
natural law, 172. 
Some  English  kings  had  tried  lo 
shalce off  the "  iugum politicum," 
174. 
Contrasts  condition  of  people  in 
England  with  that  in  Franco, 
174, 175. 
French  political  conditions  now, 
the results  f  war with England,  4 
175, 217. 
Neither St Lo  nor his ancestors 
imposed  taxe  without  the con- 
sent  of  the Three   estate^,  175, 
217. 
Ganshof, F.  L. : pro-feudal Lord under 
the jurisdiction of the court, 36. 
Gerson, Jean- 
Law has no force unless approved 
"  moribus utentium,"  140. 
King  of  France  submit,:  to judg- 
ment of  "  Parlemcnt,  140, 163. 
King cannot slay any man except 
by  process of  law, 140,  163. 
ini to law, 162. 
Community  has  authority to de- 
pose a prince if  he is incorrigible, 
163. 
Gwssaille, Charles de, 298. 
Gregory, Peter- 
There is no such thing a!  a mixed 
government, 441. 
King of  France is absolute, 442. 
1 Sam. viii. describes abuse of  Royal 
authority,  443. 
But  king  is  God's  vicar,  and his 
power is absolute, 442. 
Repudiates  opinion  which  he 
attributes to Aristotle  that  tho 
prince who rules over an unwilling 
people is a tyrant, 442. 
Prince  must  obey laws  of  nature 
and God, 442. 
He  is  x~pt  botnd  by  "  political " 
and  civil  laws,  except  for 
soy;  fundament$  laws like that 
of  success~on. 443. 
Prince  is  bound  by  laws  which 
have passed  into c~nt~ract,  this 
belongs to natural law, 443. 
Jt  is well for prince to take counsel, 
and he refers to Estates, 443. 
But he is not dependent  on them, 
he  can  impose  taxes  without 
their consent. 444. 
Admits  that  deposition  of  some 
emperors  by  Popes  wan  justi- 
fiable, and  even  that  of  Wen- 
ceelas  may  have  been  so,  for 
empire was elective, 444. 
But hereditary monarch could not 
be deposed, 444, 445. 
Hooker, Richard- 
His conception of  law derived from 
Aquinas, 351, 352. 
Political  society required  by  eco- 
nomic  needs,  by  mutual  in- 
clination,  and  demands  a com- 
mon order,  352. 
Law  necessary  to restrain  men's 
wickedness, 352,  353. 
Troubles  of  tho  present  time not 
comparable  with  those  of  time INDEX.  INDEX. 
by  citing the '  Bekenntniss ' of  tp  Magdeburg clergy (see under 
Bekenntniss "),  398, 399. 
Law- 
Conception  of  the  supremacy  01 
law in the Middle Ages,  3,  129, 
133, 237,  326-363, 506. 
Law  as  the  embodiment  of 
justire, 3, 505, 506. 
Royal  briefs  contrary  to  law, 
null  and  void  in  Castile,  4,  5, 
133-135, 462-464. 
Laws made in Castile  with advice 
of  Cortes, 5, 6. 
Method  of  legislation  in Wance in 
fourteenth century, 6,  7. 
Mothod of  legislation in Empire in 
fourteenth century, 7. 
Method of  legislation  as clescribecl 
by  Britten,  Fleta,  and  'Mirror 
of  Justices,'  7,  8. 
No  "  Politia " where  law  is  not 
supreme, Marsilius,  9. 
"  Populus," "  universitas civium," 
or  its  "  valencior  pars "  is 
Rourco of  law, Marsilius,  9. 
Moaning  of  "  vdencior  pars," 
Marsilius, 9. 
Proceedings  against  persons  or 
property only by process of  law 
in France, Castile,  and England 
in fourteenth century, 63-66. 
Violation  of  law  by  Richard  II., 
alleged  as  justifying  his  de- 
position, 72. 
Laws  should  be  made  by  those 
who are bound  by them "  quod 
omnes tangit,"  Cusa,  136. 
Legislative  power  given  to  em- 
Eeror by Roman people and can 
be  taken  away by them,  Cusa, 
137. 
~mportant ordinance  of  1439 
made  in  France  after  repre- 
sentations from States General, 
138. 
Laws must be approved "  moribus 
utentium,"  Gerson,  140. 
King of  France oannot slay a man 
except by process of  law, Gerson 
and D'Ailly,  140, 141. 
King of  France submitted to judg- 
ment  of  "  Parlement,"  Gerson, 
140. 
Law in England made by king and 
Estates, Fortescue,  142. 
Judges in England must carry out 
the law, even againrt the king's 
command, Fortcscue,  142.  - 
"  Dominium  politicurn  et regale," 
when,  as in England,  tho  king 
can  only  make laws  with  con- 
sent of  Estates, Fortescue, 142. 
Source  and  authority  of  law  in 
Civilians  and  Canonists  of  tho 
fifteenth century,  144-159. 
Difference  between  "  Citxa  Mon. 
lani "  and  "  Ultra  Xloni ani 'I 
on  question  whether  ~om& 
people could still make a genoral 
law, Porcius,  345-148. 
Pr,nce  has  authority  to  make 
laws,  and  without  confiulting 
the  "  Periti "  or  " Proceros," 
Jason de Mayno  and Paulus de 
Castro,  148. 
Princc not bound by law, Jason do 
Mayno  cites  Baldus  as saying 
that  Pope  and  prince  can  do 
anything  L'  supra ius,  et contra 
ius, et extra ius,"  149. 
Custom and law, in  fifteenth cen- 
tury  Civilians  and  Canonists, 
150-152. 
Contract8 of  prince as law, 153-156. 
King undcr law and :'  Parlemens " 
in France,  De Seyssel,  219.225, 
251. 
General theory of  law in  sixteenth 
century, St Germanr,  Soto, and 
Calvin,  227-230. 
Law as custom,  St Gormans,  234. 
2Rfi 
Custom  and  law  in  France  in 
sixteenth century, 237-239. 
No changes in laws and customs in 
Brittany without consent of  the 
Eetates of  Brittany,  237. 
King  of  France  above  the  law, 
speech  of  President  of  Parlia- 
ment of  Paris, 1527, 239. 
Louis  XII.  forbids "  Parlement, " 
to  pay  any  attention  to  dis- 
pensations  he  might  give  from 
Ordinance of  Justice of  1499, 239. 
Supremacy  of  law  related  to 
liberty, Machiavelli,  239. 
Law  and  prince,  see  under  Soto, 
Starkey, and Calvin. 
Law  and  prince  in  Civilians  of 
sixteenth century, 293-326. 
Source  and  authority  of  law  in 
later sixteenth century, 325-363. 
"  Maiestas " is supreme authority 
above Positive Law, but nubject, 
to  Laws  of  God,  nature  and 
nations, Bodin,  418,  419. 
Law  and  right  of  resistance  to 
prince, Luther and Melanchthon, 
280-287. 
See  also under  Prince  and  States 
General. 
Librrtv- 
M%S~  be  protected  in  the  con- 
stitution  of  the  state,  Machia- 
velli, 250. 
The people are better protectors of 
liberty than nobles, Machiavelli, 
250. 
Liberty  related  to  supremacy  of 
law, Machiavelli,  251. 
Liberty protected by Great Parlia- 
ment, Starkey, 261. 
Authority  to make law resides in 
community,  for  men  are  by 
nature born free, Suarez, 344. 
Liberty protected by representative 
assemblies. Althusius, 499, 500. 
Limited  Monarchy- 
De Seyssel, 219-225, 326. 
French  monarchy  neither  com- 
pletely  absolute, nor  too much 
restrained. 220. 
French  monarchy  restrained '!y 
religion,  "  la  justice " and  la 
police,"  219-225. 
King of  France subject to "  Parle- 
mens"  in  respect  of  "  Dis- 
trihutive justice,"  221. 
And  virtually  in  criminal 
matters, 221. 
Judges  are removable  only "  par 
forfait,ure,"  222. 
If  kings  attempted  to  derogate 
from  laws,  they would  not  be 
obey:d,  223. 
The  . ~reheminences  "  of  each 
Estate, 223. 
The Great Council, its  composition, 
223,  486. 
Excellence  of  French constitution, 
for  king  is  under  law  and 
" Parlement,"  225,  251. 
Lopold of  Bebenburg- 
People without lringcanelect one,39. 
Eloitors of  empe<or  act as repre- 
sentatives of  princes and people 
of  Germany, 39. 
They  act  not as individuals,  but 
as a "  collegium,"  39. 
Some  great  jurists  maintain  that 
Roman  people  csn  still  make 
laws, for people are greater than 
prince, 40. 
Peonlc  can  for just  cause  depose 
t6e emperor, 40. 
By  Roman  people  he  means  the 
whole community, including the 
princes  and  nobles  as well  as 
the other#. 40. 
Luther- 
Asserts  the  theory  of  "  Divine 
Right,"  and  derives  this from 
St  Paul  and  St  Peter,  nnd 
like  Grenorv  the  Great  from 
1 Sam.. 272." 
Coercive  nuthority  required  by 
sin, 273-275. 
Elector of  Saxony must not resist 
omperor, 275. 
League  of  reformed  princes  to 
defend  themselves  against  tho 
emperor  is  contrary  to  God's 
will,  276. 
Condemns  resistance  of  peasants 
to  their  "  Obrigkeit,"  religion,  276.  even to defend 
His extreme and violent language 
against the peasants, 277. 
A fuller discussion  of  necessity  of 
political obedience in '  Ob Kriegs- 
leute  aurh  im  Seligen  Stande 
sein kiinnen,'  278,  279. 
Aware  of  constitutional tradition 
of  the king's  oath,  but  sets it 
aside, 279. 
Change  in  1530.  Christian  men 
must  not  res~st  the  emperor, 
but  Empire  and  electors  may 
depose him, 280, 281. 
Doclaration  of  Torgau,  1530, by 
Luther  and  other  German  re- 
formers.  The jurists had shown 
them that the law recognieed the 
right of  resistance, and they must 
accept the law, 281, 282. 
Formal statement to same effect by 
Luther, Melanchthon, and others 
in  1536, 282, note 1. 
Letter  to  Spengler,  and  '  War- 
nung an mine  liebe Deutschen ' 
to same effect in 1531, 283. 
Machiavelli, Nicolas- 
Exoellenco of  French kingdom, where 
kin  is  under  law,  and  judged 
by f'arlement,  225, 251. 
Aristotle's  definition  of  good  and 
bad governments, 249. 
Good  forms  of  government  have 
tendency  to turn  into  corrypt 
forms,  and  therefore  mse 
founders  of  states endeavoured 
to create mixed forms, 249, 250. 
Protection  of  liberty  among  the 
most necessary functions of  the 
stato, 250. 
Better therefore that power should 
be  in the hands  of  the  people 
rather than the nobles,  ?!O. 
Existence  of  a  class  of  gentil- 
uomini "  (nobles)  incompatible 
with  a  "vivere  politico,"  260, 
note 3. 
Liberty  related  to supremacy  of 
law. 251.  252. 
~ibert~  oannot  be  preserved  or 
restored if  the people are corrupt, 
252. 
The  people are wiser, more prudent., 
lehs variable than a arince. 253.  .  .. 
254. 
Some  ground  for  the  saying, 
"  Vox Populi, vox Dei,"  253. 
Magdeburg,  *laration  of  Clergy of: 
Feo  under  Bekenntniss." 
Maicstus- 
Transferred  6  prince  by  "  Lox 
Regia,"  Bud& 296. INDEX. 
Magistrates  bound  by  the  civil 
laws of the kingdom and of  the 
"  hlaiestas,"  Althu~ius,,~  359. 
Nature  of  Maiestas,  potestas 
imperandi  universalis,"  which 
does not recognise  an equal  or 
superior, Althusius,  360. 
Does not belong to king or "  Opti- 
mates,"  but  to  the  whole 
commonwealth,  Althusius,  361, 
362,  500. 
Kings receive in'vestiture of  sceptre 
and  crown  from  thope  who 
represent  the  " fifaiostan "  of 
the people, "  Vindiciae,"  367. 
There  must  be  in  every  political 
country  some  supreme  power 
which  makes  laws  and  magis- 
trates and is subject to no laws, 
except those of  God and nature. 
This  Bodin  calls  "  Maiestas," 
372,  373,  418,  421,  422,  425. 
Maiestas belongs to whole people, 
cannot  be  transferred  to  one 
man, Althusius, 378,  379. 
Bodin  repudiates  1 Sam.  viii.  as 
an  interprotation  of  "iura 
maiestatis,"  425. 
Supreme authority of  prince must 
not  be  shared  with  nobles  or 
people,  or  "  Mainstas  imperii " 
will  give  place  to  anarchy, 
Bodin,  428. 
Majority- 
Meaning  of "  valencior  pars " in 
Marsilius,  11. 
Series of  monographs on thesubject 
by E. RuEni Avondo, 11,  note 1. 
Mariana- 
Men  driven into society  by their 
weakness and crimes,  348. 
Earliest government  that of  kings 
without laws,  348. 
Laws made because  men douhted 
justice and  impartiality of  prince, 
348. 
Law  is  reason  drawn  from  the 
mind of  God, and free from all 
changeableness, 348. 
Monarchy the best form of  govern- 
ment  when  controlled  by laws, 
the worst  when  free from that 
control, 349. 
Authority  of  king  is  drawn from 
the people,  349. 
Prince under law, or else a tvrant. 
The commnnity is greater than the 
king,  376. 
Only  in barbarous countries  have 
men  given  authority  to prince 
without limitation, 376,  377,  495. 
Community has the right to resist 
and  depose  prince  who  abuses 
his power,  402,  403. 
Discussion of  tyrannicide,  402-404. 
Authority  of  the  community  or 
the Estates greater than that of 
king, 494. 
Laments the fact that prelates and 
nobles  are  now  omitted  from 
Cortes : suggests that this had 
been done to increase the power 
of  the king,  496. 
Marsilius of  Padua- 
Expresses  in  drastic  terms  the 
normal  political  conceptions  of 
the Middl:,Ages,  9. 
NO "  politia  when the law is not 
supreme, Aristotle, 9. 
"  Populus "  is  "  universitas 
civium "  or its "  valencior pars " 
and is the legislator, 9. 
Meaning  of  "  vnlencior  pars " de- 
fined  "  considerata  quantitate 
personarum  et  qualitate  in 
communitate  illa  super  quam 
lox fertur,"  10, 11. 
Conception  of  origin and forms of 
the State  taken fromAristotle, 41. 
Meaning of  " Pars Principans,"  41. 
"  Pars l'rinci  ans" derives its  auth- 
ority  soleg  from  the  election 
zf  the  legislator,  that  is  tho 
civium  universitas,"  not from 
any porsonal qualities, 41. 
The correction  and  deposition  of 
the  " Principans "  belong  to 
the legislator, 41. 
Functions  of  "  Pars  Principans " 
are executive,  42. 
Question of  one supreme authority 
in the world  is not relevant to 
this treatise, 43. 
Method  of  correction  of  the 
"  Principans,"  judgment  should 
be  in  accordance  with  law,  if 
possible,  but  if  the  offence  is 
not provided  for  by  law,  thcn 
caw:'  should  be  determined  by 
the  sententia " of  the  logis- 
lator, 43. 
Masselin. Jenn-  -,  -  - .. .  . 
349.  Canon of  Rouen and representative  Refers  to "  justitia " of  of the Bailliage of  Rouen at the  3.50, 494.  States Gencral  of  Tours,  1484,  Hereditary  succession  to  176  - .  u. 
termindd  by  law,  any  change  His "  Diarium "  of  States General, 
must  be  made with  consent  of  175-179,  213,  214. 
Cortes, 369,  494.  Medizeval Political Theory- 
Commonwealth-may depose kings,  Its formal  character,  Nature  and 
369, 402, 403.  Convention, 605. 
The supremacy of  justice,  and law 
as the einbodiment  of  it,  505- 
507. 
The source of  Positive  Law.  The 
custom of  the community,  507, 
508. 
Laws  as  the  expression  of  the 
deliberate will of  the community, 
608-511. 
Laws  supreme  over  the  whole 
comm~ulity,  including  the king 
or prince, 511-513. 
Influence  of  the revived  study of 
the Roman law:'513-517. 
The theory of  the  Divine Right," 
617-519. 
The theory of  the contract between 
the prince and the people,  519- 
623.- 
The mixed constitution,  523-624. 
The  supremacy  of  the  com- 
munity, 624. 
The  embodiment  of  this  in  the 
ropresentative  system, 524-626. 
Melanchthon,  Philip- 
Agreement  at first  with  Futher's 
oarlv  o~inion  of  the  Divine 
~i~ct,"'284. 
Joined  Luther  in  Declaration  of 
1536 that resistance  to emperor 
was  in  certain  cases  lawful, 
284. 
Letter of  1539, 284. 
Declaration with  Bugenhagen  and 
ot,hers in  1646 that !,t  was Iaw- 
ful for the "  Stlnde  to defend 
themselves, if  emperor attacked 
them on account of  their religion, 
INDEX. 
285. 
Letter  of  1646, on  Rom.  xi!!.  1. 
Only  a  just  Po~er  is  an  Or- 
dinance of  God,  285. 
Reference  in  the  same  letter  to 
mutual  obligations  of  lord  and 
vassal  in feudal law,  285. 
Resistance to  unjust violence of  t,hd 
superior is  lawful, for the Gospel 
does  not  annul  the  politsicel 
order  which  is in  accordance 
with the laws, 1659, 286. 
'  Mirror of  Justices '- 
King subject to law, 8, 34. 
"  Parlementz " should  meet  twice 
every year, 35. 
Laws to be  made bv king and his 
counts,  not  by  kinR  and  his 
clerks.  35. 
Icing  is  not  judge  in  cases  of 
wrong  done  by the king to his 
subjects,  these  must  be  de- 
termined  in "  Parlementz " by 
his count8 (comites), 34. 35. 
BIixed  Governmmt- 
Best government will bo composed 
of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and 
timocracv,  Gerson  and D'Aillv, 
161-164. 
Turrecremata takes from Aquinas 
the  conception  that  the  best 
is  composed  of 
these three elements, 168. 
Wise  founders  of  states  had 
endeavoured  to  establish  con- 
stitution  which  had  something 
of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and 
democracy, Machiavelli, 249,250. 
The  mixed  most  state  wise  to be  men  best,  approve  Starkey,  a 
262. 
Ca!vin  prefers an aristocracy, or a 
government  aristocracy and  com~osed  a  ~o!itia,"  of 267.  an 
Men  have  judged  a  mixed  state 
including  king,  nobles,  and 
commons to be the best, Ponet, 
329. 
There is no such thing as a mixed 
constitut,ion,  it  is  simply  a 
"  popularis status,"  Bodin, 424. 
There are no mixed  governments, 
Peter Gregory,  441. 
All  novernments  are  mixed,  Al- 
thGsius,  601. 
' Modus Tenendi Parliamentum '- 
Aids  cannot  be  imposed  without 
Parliament, 36.  - 
All  important businesu  should  be 
brought before Parliament, 37. 
Parliament  must not adjourn  till 
all petitions have been heard, 37. 
Molina, L.- 
Community  entrusts authority to 
ruler, greater or less,  accorciing 
to it8  judgment;  if  the  ruler 
exceeds this, ho acts  tyrannicnlly, 
341,  343. 
Funct~on  of  king is to make laws, 
but  question  must  be  con- 
/  sidered  whether  the  paoplo 
nave  him  Dower  to make  law9 
&only  with'  their  consent,  or 
without it, 341, 342. 
Molina  thinks  that  it  is  almost 
incredible  that  the  cpmmon- 
wealth  should  have  given  all 
its authority to the ruler, 342. 
Monarchy is the best government, 
that is within the limits as~igned 
to it, 342. 
Royal power  derived immediately 
from the commonwealth "medi- 
ately" from God, 343. 
Occam, William of- 
"  Dialogus."  Authority  of  cmperor 
from God, but through men, 44. 
Distinction  between  k~ug who 
rules uccording  to his own will, 
and king  who rulcs  under  laws 
made by men,  45. INDEX. 
Doubts  whether  monarchy  of  the 
first kind existed in his time, 45. 
Emperor  or  king,  "  solutus  legi- 
bus,"  but  is  under  "natural 
equity,"  45. 
Are  men  bound  to  obey  :e 
emperor  "in  omnibus lioitis 
Not in cases where it is contrary 
to the "  utilitax " of  the people, 
46. 
In what  sense is emperor lord of 
nll property lcP7. 
Has  emperor  plenitudo  potes- 
tatis "  in temporal t,hing~  1 4R. 
He  can  only  make  laws  for  the 
pnblic good, not for  his  private 
convenience, 48. 
"  Octo  Quaestiones."  King  is 
superior  in  kingdom  in  some 
cases,  but  in  others  inferior, 
for he may be deposed and held 
prisoner, 48. 
Authority of  emperor derived from 
the  Roman  people,  thcy  did 
not  givo  him  an  author it,^  to 
rule despotically and they retain 
the  ,rig:$  to  diswose  of  the 
empire  casualiter,"  49. 
Comparison  of  Occam  and  Mar- 
silius, 50. 
Panormitanus (Nicolas de Tudeschis)- 
Custom  superior  to  "  Positive 
Law."  Diflerent opinions as to 
whether it required the consent 
of  Pope,  152. 
Political  authority a  consequence 
of  sin, 164. 
Parliament of  England- 
Its  authority  in  all  important 
matters, 1322,  4,  108. 
Should meet twice a year, '  Mirror 
of  Justices,'  35. 
Not merely to furnish aids, but tq 
legislate,  '  Mirror  of  Justicee, 
36. 
No  taxation  without  consent  of 
Parliament,  '  Modus  Tenendi 
Parliamentum,'  36. 
All  important  mttters  should  go 
to Parliament,  Modus  Tenendi 
Parliamentum,' 37. 
Must not adjourn till  all petitions 
are  heard,  ' Modus  Tenendi 
Parliamentum,' 37. 
Proceedings  in  Parliament  for 
deposition of  Richard 11.. 71-75. 
Control of  ministers by Parliament, 
1341, revoked in  1343, 109. 
Prosecution  of  ministers  and 
officials, 1376, 109. 
NO legislation or taxation without 
Parliament,  Fortescue,  217. 
Law of  England not made by the 
will  of king,  but by  300 elected 
man, that is by the consent ofthe 
whole lringdorn, Fortescue,  217. 
Those laws  of  England  which  do 
not  proceed  from  custom  are 
made  by  the  king,  lords.  and 
whole " communitas "  in Parlia- 
ment, St Germans, 236. 
The  "  Great  Parliament " not  to 
meet continually, but from time 
to time, Starlcoy, 261. 
It  is to appoint a Council which will 
sit  continually  in  London  to 
represent  the authority of  Par- 
liament, to control the king and 
his Council, Starkey, 261, 262. 
Community may give  its consent 
to  legislation  by  its  repre- 
sentatives,  an  in  Parliaments, 
Hooker, 355. 
In Parhament  the whole  absolute 
power  resides,  for  there  are 
present  the  king,  the  nobles, 
the  commons,  and  the  clergy 
represented  by  the  bishops. 
T. Smith, 489, 490. 
"  The  Parliament  of  England, 
together  with  the  convocation 
annexed  thereunto,  is  that 
whereupon the  very  essence  of 
all government within thin realm 
doth depend," Hooker, 497. 
Parlemens of  France- 
King  of  France  submits  to  be 
judged  by  them,  Gerson  and 
D'Ailly,  140, 141, 163. 
King  of  France judged  by  them, 
130 Seyssel, 221. 
King of  France judged  by  them. 
Machiavelli, 225. 
Princes submitted to the judgment 
of  Parlement, Bud6, 296. 
"  Courts de Parlement "  offoe  above 
the  kings  of  France,  Remon- 
strancc,"  380. 
"  The  Senatus  Lutetiarum "  is 
set in  a  certain  sense as judge 
between  the  Png  and  any 
private person,  Vindiciae,' 381. 
That  is  why  the  judges  are  ir- 
romovable, '  Vindiciae,'  381. 
That  judges  should  hold  by 
terminable appointment savours 
of  tyranny, Bodin, 381,  382. 
Paulus do Castro- 
Roman  people  could,  before  the 
coming of  Christ, have  deposed 
the  emperor,  but  this  now 
belongs to Pope, 147. 
Roman  people cannot  now  make 
law or general custom, 147. 
Prince can make law without con- 
sulting  the "  Periti " or "  Pro- 
ceres,"  148. 
Prince  and  Pope  bound  by  their 
contracts, 154. 
People- 
"  Universitas  civium "  1s  legis- 
lator, Marsilius, 9. 
It is  competent  to  make  law, 
Marsilius,  11. 
Has ,transferred  its  autho:i,ty  to 
prmce,  cannot  make  lex," 
but its custom has authority of 
law, Faber, 22. 
Has made and can depose princes, 
Faher,  22. 
Could  resume authority they  had 
granted  to  prince  and  make 
law, J. Butrigarius,  23. 
Some said  that  pcoplc could  take 
away  the  autho~ity  granted  t.o 
emperor, "  Archdeacon," 24. 
People  who  are  without  a  king 
can  clect  one.  The  electors 
of  emperor,  do this  "  vice  om- 
nium,"  prlnces  and  people, 
Lupold, 39. 
Some great Juri~ts  say that Roman 
people could still make laws, for 
people  were  greater  than  the 
emperor  and  could  for  just 
reason depose him, Lupold, 40. 
The "Principans "  derives his vth- 
ority  solely  from  the "  unlver- 
sitas  civium,"  which  can  also 
correct or depose him, Marsilius, 
41-44. 
Power  of  emperor  (Charlemagne) 
given him by the Roman people, 
Occam, 49. 
They  did  not  give him  powor  to 
rule  despotically,  and  retained 
their ri  ht to dispose of  Empire 
"  casuatter,"  Occam, 49. 
Can  revoke  authority of  emperor 
and make laws, Porcius and Jac. 
Butrigarius,  145, 146. 
Cannot  do  this,  Saliceto  and 
Paulus de Castro, 146, 147. 
Authority  of  king  granted  by 
consent  of  community,  and 
limited  by  obligations to them, 
Gerson,  159. 160. 
Rule  of  State  belong;  to  the 
"  congregatio  civium  or  their 
"  valentior  pars,"  Zabarella, 
165. 
Refers  to  " Lex  Regia "  and 
tablet  in  Lateran,  Zabarella, 
165. 
Electors  of  Empire  represented 
the "  universitas "  of  the Roman 
people, Zabarella,  166,  167. 
All  political  authority  rests  on 
election  by  the  subjects,  Cusa, 
169, 170. 
In  the  beginning '' kings  were 
created  by  the  suffragium " 
of  the people, Pot,  176. 
In  minority  of  kmg responsibility 
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for  the  kingdom  returns  to 
people, Pot, fi7. 
The  States,, General  are  "Pro- 
curatows  for all, Pot, 178. 
Prince bound by tho contract with 
the people, Wesselius,  180. 
Protection of  liberty safer in hands 
of  " Populari " than  of  nobles, 
Macl~iavelli.  250. 
Liberty impossible when the people 
are corrupt, Machiavelli, 252. 
The  people  normally  much  wiser 
than  the  prince,  Machiavclli, 
253, 254. 
The  people  are the  source of  the 
authority of  t,he prince, 364-372. 
The  sovereignty  of  the  people, 
372-379. 
The contract between the ruler and 
the peoplc,  383-395. 
The deposition of  the prince by the 
~eople,  395-407. 
Ponet, &ishop- 
Cites Aristotle's description of  three 
good governments, but prefers a 
"  mixte state,"  329. 
Denounces  absolute  government, 
329, 330. 
Governmont  ordained  by  God  to 
maintain  iustire. 330. 
Distinction "  between  States 
governed  by  laws  made  by 
prince,  and  those  where  the 
community makes the laws, 330. 
Constitutional  forms  to  prevent 
oppression by the head :  Ephors, 
Tribunes,  Diets,  Parliamentes, 
331. 
I6 is  lawful  to  depose  a  wicked 
ruler  and  to kill  a  tyrant.  but 
only  normally,  with  public 
authority, 331,  332. 
In  England  the  High  Constahle 
has  authority  to summon  the 
king  before  Parliament  to 
answer and receive justice.  331. 
Porcius, Christophorus- 
Controversy  whether  Roman 
people could still make law, 145. 
Bartolus and "  Citra Rlontani "  said 
not. "  Ultra Montani " said thcv 
could, 145. 
Porcius agrees with the latter,  145. 
lioman poopln  "  concessit," "  non 
transtulit "  its  authority  to 
emweror.  and  can  revoko this. 
145.  ' 
Roman  people  could  revoke  the 
clection of  the emperor, 145. 
Pot, Philippe, Sieur de la Roche- 
Question  of  regency  in  France 
should  be  determinod  by  the 
Estates and people,  176,  177. 
Kings in the beginning created  by 
the people,  176. 
2 M 54G  INDEX.  INDEX. 
If  king neglects his duty or abuses 
his  authority  he  should  bo 
deposed by the people,  not  the 
PODO.  39. 
Stntes  Cenernl  were  the  elected 
Procurntors  of  all  Estates  of 
the realm,  178. 
The large general powers of  States 
Genrral,  not  only  in  taxation, 
178. 
Stntos  Gcncrnl  deci~l~d  betwe~n 
I'liilip of  Vnlois and Edward 111. 
of  England, 178. 
Statos General  appointed regency 
when  Icing  John wax  prisoner, 
and in  ministry  of  Charles VI., 
178. 
I'rrrogative- 
I11 England-an  extraordinary and 
absolute  autl~ority,  not  xuhject 
to law, Albericus Gentili~,  452. 
Refers to Baldus as having  madc 
this  distinction  bctrveen  tho 
ordinary andextraordinary auth- 
ority  of  the  prince,  Albericus, 
452. 
Prerogative  is  an  ultimate  and 
reserved  power  possessed  by 
King  of  England  over  and 
abovo  his  ordinary  powors, 
yhich was  comparable  with the 
absohrte "  power  of  other 
kings, Cowell, 457. 
Prince, King and Empcbror- 
Prince  and  people;  see  under 
People. 
Princc and law : see under Law. 
Prince  and "  Divine  Right." :  ser 
under "  Divine Right." 
Prince  and  taxation:  see  under 
Taxation. 
Source and nature of  his aut,hority 
-paaszm. 
Provincial Estates in France- 
Met  frequently  in  fourteenth 
century, 6. 
Their relation  to taxation in four- 
teenth century, 98-101. 
Their  relation  to taxation  in  fif- 
teenth  century,  193-195,  197- 
199. 
Their  relation  to  lcgitilation  in 
fiftconth century, 469-471. 
Sometimes  limited  by  crown  in 
sixteenth ccntury, 471. 
Relation  to taxation  in  sixteenth 
century,  480,  481. 
" Quod  omnes  tangit,  ab  omnibus 
dehet  cornmuniter approbari "- 
Durandun, 24, 25. 
Nicolas of  Cusa.  136. 
Gerson,  161. 
"  Remonstrance au.r  Seigneurs "- 
Addressed  to  those  who  sought 
the proservation of  the kingdorn 
of  France  and  an  honourable 
liberty under the king, 335. 
L, 
soto, D.- 
Nature  of  Etornal  Law.  Natural 
Law. "  Jus Gentium."  and Civil 
Icing of  France was under the law, 
335. 
The Courts of  "  Parlement " were 
formerly  over  tho  kings,  but 
now basely servile,  335. 
Demanded  the  rcstordtion  of 
ancient lnw~  and tho assembling 
of  the Estates, 491, 492. 
Exan~plos  of  the meetings  of  the 
Estates from Morovin~~an  times 
till Estatos of  13lois, 1560, 492. 
Richard  11. :  proceedings  of  his  de- 
position, 71-75. 
Richard of  Armagh : the meaning  of 
"  dominium,"  60, 61. 
Ruffini  Avondo :  treatises  on  the 
theory  of  majorities  in  the  Middle 
Ages, 11, note 1. 
Saliceto, Bartholomew de- 
Cites  Jac.  Butrigarius  as holding: 
that Roman people could revoke 
tho  authority  of  the  emperor 
and make laws,  146. 
Saliceto  denies  this,  election  of 
emperor  belongs  to  German 
priliuos, deposition to Pope,  146. 
Roman  peoplo  could  not  make 
"  goneral  law,"  even  during 
vacancy  of  omperor ;  this  be- 
longs to Pope,  146, 147. 
Soyssel, Claude de : see under Limited 
Monarchy. 
Siete  l'articlas  :  first  formally  reco 
nisod  as Iuw, at Cortes of  Alcala 
Hennres, in  1348, 6. 
Smith, Sir Thomas- 
Contrasts  king  and  tyrant,  the 
latter  governs  without  consent 
of  people,  and  makr:s  and un- 
makes  laws  at  his  ploaqui-e, 
without  regard  to  common 
good,  326,  327,  365. 
Some  say  that  this  tyrannical 
gwer  was  possessed  by  the 
mg  of  France  since  the time 
of  Louis  XI.,  and  by  some 
Italian princes, 387. 
The whole  absolute power  of  the 
commonwealth  of  England  re- 
sides in Parliament, 489. 
Respective  powers  of  Parliament 
and king, 490. 
'  Somnium Viriclarii '- 
Klng of Franc~  ha~  right to  impose 
tasntion,  but  is  guilty  ol  sin 
if he doos this without causo, 37. 
Ordinary  and  extraordinary  rev- 
enues of  the crown, 37. 
Ordinary  revenues  originally 
granted to  prince for the defence 
of the country, justice, &c., 38. 
They  may be  refused  and  prince 
deposed  if  he  diverts  them  to 
other purposes, 38. 
~aw;  229. 
Princes  normally  do  not  derive 
their  authority  directly  from 
God,  but from the people,  255, 
365. 
Authority  of  king  is  great,  he is 
not  lnorely  "di~pensator offi- 
oiorum." but is the  "Rosuublica." 
255. 
King  has  power  of  making laws, 
"  Quod  Princini  ~lacuit." etc., 
26g, 256. 
Icing cannot bo  deposed except for 
tyranny, 256. 
Diucussion  of  tyrannicide  and 
Council of  Constance, 256. 
Princo  is "  legibus ?01ut11s."  he is 
subject  to  "  VIS  directiva " 
of  the laws, not to "  vis coerciva," 
257. 
"  Souverainot6 " and "  Souverain "- 
There mu~t  be in every community 
some  supremo  power  which 
makes all  laws  and magistroles 
and is ~uhject  to no law, except 
that  of  God  and  naturc,  and 
"  Jus Gentium."  Thisis "Maiec- 
tas,"  Rodin, 372, 418, ??9. 
Distinction  bctwcen  tho  Souver- 
ainet6 " and  the "  Souverain " 
in Huguenot treatiscs, 373. 
The  "  Souvcrainet6 "  rosides  in 
tho  communitv,  or  its  mprcr- 
sentativo  auth"ority,  while  the 
kine in  "  Souverain."  Hunuenot  ,  - 
treLises, 373. 
"  Concile  dos  Estat,s " retains  in 
it6 hands the sovereign authority 
of  the kingdom, IIotman, 373. 
There  are magistrnt,es  inferior  to 
tho "  Souverain "  and appointed 
by him, but who "  ne dependent 
pioproment  du souverain,  mais 
do  la  '  souverainet6,"'  'Droit 
des Magistrats,,', 373. 
The "  Souvorain  himself,  before 
he  is  put  in  pos3ossion  of  his 
sorrreign ndminiqtration, swenrs 
fidclity to the "  Souvorainct6," 
' D~oit  des Mngistrat~,'  !/3. 
Jcinzdom nnd  cmpires are  fiofn," 
nnd  owe  homage  and  services 
to the "  SouverninotB,"  '  Droit 
des Magistrats,' 373, 374. 
Tho  "Souvorain "  is not above the 
laws, bnt subject to  them, '  Droit 
des Magistrats,'  374. 
There  are  inferior  powers,  "  de- 
puties "  of  the people who create 
and  can  depose  prince.  They 
as "  souverains magistrats "  are 
above  the  prince,  while  as 
rivate  persons  they are below 
Kim, '  Archon et Politic,' 375. 
There  are  few  kingdoms  where 
rulers  are  not  bound  by  laws 
to  which  they  have  sworn 
at  their  accession,  and  thoy 
have  promised  the '' "  Souver- 
ainet4,"  that is  the  Esta?," 
to keep  them  inviolably,  Ar- 
chon et Politie,'  376. 
The authority of  the community 
is greater than that of  any one 
person ;  the  prince  should  be 
persuaded of  this, Marian::  376. 
King  is  under  the  law,  with 
dependence  upon  that  whole 
entire bodv,  over  which  he  has 
dominion,"  "  major  singulis, 
universis minor,"  Hooker, 378. 
Community  cannot  transfer 
"  Maiestas "  to  any other person, 
Althusius,  373 379. 
See also under  Maiestas." 
Ste. :ldegonde,  Philip Manlix de- 
Privileges de Brabant,"  an  im- 
plicit  contract with prince,  386, 
386. 
Contractual agreement of  Nether- 
lands with  the Duke  of  Anjou. 
1581, 386. 
St Germans, Christophor- 
Theory  of  Eternal  Law,  Net~wel 
Law, and Human Law, 228,229. 
The  six  foundations  of  English 
law,  234. 
Custom  the  source  of  three  of 
them,  the "  general customs of 
the  country,"  the  "  Maxima " 
the  courts,  and  certain 
the other forms of  law are not 
sufiicient, 236. 
Starlrey, Thomas- 
"  Dialogue  and Thomas  botweon  Lupset,"  Cardinal  259-263.  Pole 
The primitivo conditions of  hmnnn 
lifo.  259. 
Aristotclinn  rlnssification  of  gov- 
ernnlentp, 259, 260. 
England governed  for those many 
years  hy  princes  who  judged 
"  all  things  pertaining  to  the 
state of  our roalnl to hang only 
upon their will,"  260. 
Tlii; cannot be a good government, 
260. 
Prefcrs an elective monarchy,  but 
admits that an hereditary mon- INDEX.  INDEX.  549 
archy  was  better  in  England, 
261. 
If  prince is hereditary there must 
be  a  "  Great  Parliament " to 
repress  seditions  and  defend 
the liberty of  the people, 261. 
This is to appoint  a  Counril, not 
the ordinary Council of  tho king 
-its  composition, 261,  262. 
Its function  to maintain  "Laws 
and good  Policy,"  even against 
the  king,  to  make  war  and 
peace,  &c., 262. 
Authority  of  evil  government  is 
not derived from God, 262 
A mixed government the bout, 262. 
States General, France- 
Met  frequently  in  fourteenth 
century, 6, 96-108. 
Manifold  powers  and  functions, 
96-108. 
The  Templars,  renunciation  of 
obedience  to  Bonedict  XIII., 
war and peace,  96-98. 
Taxation  in  fourteenth  century, 
98-104. 
Abolition  of  illegal taxation,  1381, 
101. 
 he -constitutional  crisis,  1355- 
1358, 105-108. 
Taxation  in  fifteenth  century, 
192-201. 
Comminos  condemns  all  taxation 
without  consent  of  subiects.  .  . 
201-203. 
Their various functions in fifteenth 
century, 210-214. 
States  General  of  Tours,  1484, 
213, 214. 
Cornmines, hie high opinion of  their 
value, 214, 215. 
Fortoscue  says  that  neither  St 
Louis nor his ancestors imposed 
taxes without  consent  of  Thrcc 
Estates, 217. 
Supremo authority in Merovingian 
and Carolingian  times beloneed 
to  assemblies  of  the  people, 
which  he  relates  to  States 
General of  later times, Hotman, 
366. 
These  assemblies  elected  and 
deposed  kings,  and  States 
General  had  the  same  nowers. 
Hotman, 366. 
"  Maiestas "  remains  with  the 
people,  and  is  embodicd  in 
Estates, Boucher, 368,  369. 
Rctained  in  its  own  hands  tho 
"  souvernine  authorit6,"  Hot- 
man, 373. 
Identip "  I s souveraint6 " with 
the  Estats compos6s du  corps 
de tout, Ie  peuple,"  'Archon  et 
Politie,'  376. 
They  were  not  wholly  forgotten 
or  ignored  in  early  part  of 
sixteenth  century,  examples, 
472. 
Their  rcvival  after  the  death  of 
Henry II., 473. 
Speech by l'f18pital  at opening of 
Estateo of  O~leans,  1560, 473. 
Estates of  Bloi-,  1876.  Address of 
nobles, 475. 
Demand  of  Three  Estates  that 
they  should  moet  again  after 
five  vears:  after  that.  everv 
ton years,  175, 476. 
Dernand  by  Third  Estate  that 
Ordinances made by tho king on 
the "remonstrance "  of  the Three 
Estates should  not  be  revoked, 
except in a similar assembly 476. 
Estates  of  Rlois,  1588.  King 
swears that hc would  bind him- 
self  to observe the laws he had 
made, 476. 
Clergy  and  Third  Estate declare 
laws  made  by  the  king  with 
the Estates to bc inviolable, 477. 
Third  Estato  demanded  that  no 
edict  should  be  published,  and 
registered  by  "  Parlements " 
till  it had  been  communicated 
to the "  Procureurs-Syndics des 
Btats dans les provinces,"  477. 
Third  Estate demanded that the 
decisions  of  the Estatcs should 
be  published,  without  going  to 
the king's  council, 478. 
King  declared  th2t  he  did  not 
intend to make  fundamental " 
laws, except with  the advice of 
the Estates, 478. 
Henry IV.  in  1589 announced  his 
intention  to  call  togothcr  the 
States General within six months. 
Summons issued  for rnceting  in 
1590, but, it never met, 478, 479. 
Catholic  League  called  together 
the Estates in  1593, 479. 
Henry called together an asscmbly 
of  notables in 1596, 479. 
Those  called  wore  instructed  to 
consult the pooplo  of  their city 
or province,  479. 
Henry  essured  the  meeting  that 
he had called  them to hear and 
follow their advice, 479. 
The  Estates were  not  called  to- 
gethcr  by  Henry before  issuing 
the  "Edict  of  Nantes,"  1598, 
but  he  de~lared~~that  he  had 
examined  the  Cahiers "  of 
the   catholic^:^  and  had  per- 
mitted  the  Reformed "  to 
meet  and  prepare  their  stute- 
ments, 479, 480. 
Examples  of  taxation  by  Pro- 
vincial  Estates, States General, 
and assembly of  notable persons, 
1499 to 1597, 480-484. 
Suarez- 
Repudiates  conception  that 
political  authority  normally 
came  immodiate!~  fmm  God; 
this  only  happens  rarely,  344, 
RA5 
Comrncnity may transfer its jurin- 
diction  to  one  man,  but  the 
nature  and form  of  this  auth- 
oritv  is  determined  bv  human 
Will:  345. 
Legislativo power  belongs to king, 
but  this  depends  upon  the 
conditions undir which his power 
was  given  him  by  the  com- 
munity, 345,  346. 
Prince  ought  to  obey  his  own 
laws,  but  repudiates  the  con- 
ception that the plirase "  legibus 
solutus " applies only to "  leges 
caducarii,"  347. 
KPg ought to obey the laws, but 
IS  exempt  from  "  vis  legum 
ooactiva,"  347. 
Kingdom  can  justly  mr.ke  war 
upon a tyrant, 347, 348. 
Taxation- 
No  taxation without  Parliament, 
"  Modus  Tenendi  Parliamen- 
tum,"  36. 
Kine  can  impose  taxation  for 
pgblic  purfoses,  not  private, 
'  Somnium Viridarii,'  37. 
If  he  uses  them  for private  pur- 
poses,  he  may  be  deposed, 
'  Sornnium Viridarii.'  38. 
King  has  the  right- to  imposc 
taxation  for  royal  expenses, 
Bartolus, 77. 
Prince  has ,:he  right  to  impose 
"  collecta,  but  only  if  it  is 
uscful  to  the  comm,?nwealth ; 
but  tlier:,  is  no  obligatio 
naturalis  to pay  them,  if  it 
is  made  according  to  th; 
prince's  "  effrenata  voluntas, 
Baldu~,  85, 86. 
See  under  Cort,es  of  Castile, 
States  General  of  France,  and 
Provinc~al  Estates of  France. 
It is tyranny  to impose  taxation 
without  consent  of  subjeots, 
Co~nmines,  201. 
Ki;g  of  France  can  impose 
novum  vectigal,"  Ferrault, 
297. 
See un*  L'HBpital, Bodin, Thos. 
Smith,  Droit  des  Magistrats,' 
Parliament, '  Vindiciae.' 
Tudeschis,  Nicolas  de :  see  Panor- 
mitanus. 
Turrecremata- 
Laws  derive  their  authority from 
legislator,  but  are  void  unless 
oonfirmed by custom,  153. 
Custom has force of  law, if  allowed 
by legislator,  153. 
Prefers mixed government,  167. 
Better to be governed by law than 
by the will of  one man,  168. 
The  tyrant  is  one  who  governs 
for his own profit, 168. 
 subject,^  are not  bound  to obey 
the unjust commands of  prince, 
168, 169. 
Tyndale, W.- 
Concerned to show that Reformers 
were  not subverters of  political 
order, 287. 
Subjects who  resist  the king  ere 
resisting God, 288. 
Rulers  whether  good  or  evil  ere 
ordained by God, 288. 
King in secular matters is outside 
of  the law, 288. 
Dismisses  contemptuously  argu- 
ment  that  king  had  sworn  to 
maintain  the  laws,  privileges, 
&c., of  his subjects, 289. 
King  is  the  Lord's  anointed, 
cannot  be  deposcd  without  a 
special commandment from God; 
cites  the  story  of  David  and 
Saul, 289. 
Attributes misfortunes of  England 
in fifteenth century to  deposition 
of  Richard  II.,  whom  God  had 
set over them, 290. 
Restatement of  Gregory the Great, 
but under immediate influence of 
Luther, 291. 
Unitxklitical, of  Europe-  -. 
Dante, 111-123. 
En~elbert  of  Admont.  123. 
~aqtolus,  123. 
Pierre Dubois,  124-126. 
Vacarius : people  could  revoke  auth- 
ority given to prince, and could then 
make law, 23. 
Victoria, Francis- 
A  Dominican  and  Professor  at 
Salamanca,  328. 
King is bound by the law, 328. 
"  Potestas " of  king is from God, 
his  Authoritas "  from  the 
commonwealt,h,  365. 
Vigelius, Nicolas- 
Laws  abrogated  by  subsequent 
custom, 306. 
"  Princeps  legibus  solutus,"  he 
does not like this ; it is contrary 
to "  Digna Vox "  (Cod. i. xiv. 4). 
I  Reecripts of  prince contrary to law INDEX.  INDEX. 
are to be  rejected  by Courts of 
Law, unless they injure no one, 
207 
V" .  . 
'  Vindiciae contra Tyrannos' - 
Laws  made  by  wise  men  and 
magistrates  to  restrain  kings 
338,  339. 
The many are wiser than the one, 
R!lQ 
King  receives  the  law  from  the 
pcople,  339. 
Only  among  barbarians  is  king 
absolute,  339. 
Legislation  in  Empire,  England, 
S,pain, Hungary-by  represonta- 
tlve bodies-it  was formerly the 
same in France, 340, 494. 
Kings  the  Vicars  of  God,  God 
"  institutes " them,  but  people 
"  constitnte " them,  367. 
Even hereditary monarchs are only 
held  to  be  kings  when  they 
have  been  invested  by  those 
who  represent  the "  Maiestas " 
of  the people,  367. 
The  two  "  foedera,"  God,  king, 
and  people,  and  king  and 
people,  388, 389. 
God is the avenger of  the first, the 
people of  the second,  388, 389. 
Such a contract between king and 
people  exists  ln  almost  all 
countries,  Empire, France, Eng. 
land, Spain, Brabant, &c., 390. 
It is  related  to mutual  oaths  at 
coronation,  390. 
There are officers  of  the kingdom 
whose function it is to maintain 
this contract, 410. 
The  Three  Estates  (of  Fmnm)  -  \ 
met every year formerly, 493. 
Their authority in war and peace, 
and  taxation,  they could  even 
change  the  succrssion  and  de- 
pose the king if  he was a tyrant, 
493. 
Taxes  could  formerly  only  bo 
imposcd  by  the  authority  of 
t,he  Three  Estates  in  France. 
Cites law of  Philip of  Valois, 494. 
Wenceslas,  Emperor :  deposition  by 
the electors, 182, 183. 
Wesselins of  Groningen- 
Contract between people and ruler, 
180. 
contract  b~tween prince  and 
people in Netherlands,  383.385. 
Conceived  of  them  in  terms  of 
feudal lam, 384. 
If  Philip violated these obligations, 
tho Netherlands no longer obliged 
to  render  him  obedience,  385, 
395, 396. 
Nobles  have  the  right,  of  the 
Ephors  in  Sparta  to  control 
evil kings,  385. 
Wycliffe, John- 
"  Civile  dominium "  created  by 
"  Ritus Gentium,"  and roercive 
authority  mas  accepted  by  the 
custom  and  consent  of  the 
people  as approved  by  reason, 
61. 
Civil  law  and  political  authority 
instituted by men on account of 
sin,  but  derive  their  authority 
from God, 51, 63. 
Discusses the best form of  govern. 
ment,  in  view  of  man's  sinful 
nature ; monarchy is  probably 
the best, 52,  53. 
Christian  man  should  obey  the 
tyrant, "  quoad  bona  fortunae 
minus valencin,"  52. 
Meaning  of  "  dominium,"  52,  63, 
54, 56-61. 
Authority  of  the  ruler  founded 
on  the  election  of  the  com- 
munity,  in  England  and  in 
other kin  doms,  53. 
King is theqicar of  God, whether 
just  or  unjust, cites Rom.  xiii. 
and 1 Pet. ii.,  54. 
Resistance even to perverso ruler is 
a great sin, unless his commands 
are against God, 54. 
King  who  violatos the  laws  sins 
against God, 55. 
But  his  obed~ence to  law  is 
voluntary, 66. 
Zubarella (The Cardinal)- 
Discusses  authority  of  cuntom, 
commenting  on  Decretal  of 
Gregory IX. (Decretals i. 4, ll),  .  -> 
101. 
Political  authority  is  normally 
derived  from  the  community, 
cites Aristotle, but probably this 
is  a  reminiscence  of  Marsilius, 
1  KK 
only  to  righteous  rulers,  iL  is 
lawful to resist others,  181, 182. 
William of  Orange- 
Statement of  the principles  of  the 
King  not  to  be  obeycd  in  evil 
things,  and  may  lawfully  "  in 
regno turbari,"  181. 
niscusscs meaning  of  St Paul  in 
Romans  xiii.  1.  This  refcrr  -.~  ~  -  - -  .* -  -  -  -  --  - 
brazen tablet in Lateran dealing 
with  the  owers  given  by  the 
Senatc anl  the Roman people, 
165, 166. 
"". 
Discussion of  the question whether 
Roman people, when they trans- 
ferred  their  authority  to  the 
prince, still retained it, 165. 
Mentions  that  he  hnrl  ronn  n 
This  made  it  clear  that  Roman 
people  had  retained  the powor 
of  making lawn,  1G6. 
However this might be,  all power 
came to be in the hands of  t.he 
prince,  166. 
Agrces with  Liipold  of  Behenburg 
that tha ele~,tors  in electing the 
emperor acted ss  a "  ~olleg~um  " 
representing  the  "  universitas 
populi Romani,"  166. 
Government  a  Divine  institution 
even  among  infidels,  cites  In- 
nocent  IV.,  166. 
The  electors  can  for  just  causo 
depose  the  emperor,  at  least 
when  he  has  not  yet  been 
crowned by Popo,  167. 
This is Zabarella's  own judgment, 
but he submits  it totho judgment 
of  more  competent  persons, 
167. 
Zasiue 
Emperor has "  Potestas immensa," 
he  is  "  lcgibus  solutus,"  and 
can mako law ''  801118,''  319. 
Prince is bound by his ''  contracts " 
even  with  privuto  persons- 
relates this to feudal law,  319. 
Prinre's  actions must confor111 to 
reason  and  equity,  cites  the 
stories of  Trajan and Agesilans, 
and  the rescript  of  Anastasius 
that  no  heed  was  to  be  paid 
by  administrators  to  rescripts 
contrary  to  general  law  and 
public utility,  320. 
Discusses the meaning of  ''  legibus 
solutus."  This does  not  mean 
that the prince  could  annul  a 
man's legal rights by law, decree, 
or  statute.  Reference  to case 
"  in Conbistorio Principis,"  320. 
This is probably the care discussod 
in Zasius' '  Consilia,' ii.  10, 321. 
Two  principles  laid down in this. 
Emperor  cannot  override  the 
judgment  of  the Court, arid  he 
is hound by his contract, 321. 
Tl~ere  had  been  much  disuussion 
of  such  phrases  as  "ex  pleni- 
tudine  potestatis "  and  "  ex 
certa sciontia,"  321. 
Zasius is  quite clear  that by  the 
use of  such phrases the emperor 
could not annul "  Res Judicata," 
or  a  man's  lawful  rights,  321, 
322. 
Such phrases had become a matter 
of  convention,  and  they  had 
no great force,  322. 
In  this case the emperor was bound 
by  his own  constitution in the 
Diet  of  Worms,  1495.  This 
had  received  the  force  of  a 
contract, for  the  emperor  had 
sworn to observe it, 323. 
The authority of  the emperor does 
not extend to injustice,  though 
he  is  "loge  mere  positiva 
solutus,"  323,  324. 
The  "  ius"  claimed  by  a  '?an 
which  belongs  to  lus 
natural0  vei  gentiudR"  cannot 
be takrn away by the emperor, 
except  perhaps  for  obvious 
public utility, 323, 324. 
The Court, therefore, should order 
its  original  jud  ment  to  be 
carried out, 323,  824. 
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